

COLLECTED  
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS  
RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK  
OF THE  
EUROPEAN WAR.

---



LONDON :

PRINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE  
BY HARRISON AND SONS, 45 E., ST. MARTIN'S LANE, W.C.,  
PRINTERS IN ORDINARY TO HIS MAJESTY.

To be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from  
WYMAN AND SONS, LTD., 20, BREAMS BUILDINGS, FETTER LANE, E.C., and  
51, ST. MARY STREET, CARDIFF;  
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE, SCOTISH BRANCH, 23, FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH; or  
E. PINSONBY, LTD., 116, GRACIOS STREET, DUBLIN;  
or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies,  
the United States of America and other Foreign Countries of  
T. FISHER UNWIN, London, W.C.

1915.

*Price One Shilling.*

Walter Clinton Jackson Library  
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO  
Special Collections & Rare Books

## WORLD WAR I PAMPHLET COLLECTION

Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2010 with funding from  
Lyrasis Members and Sloan Foundation





COLLECTED  
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS  
RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK  
OF THE  
EUROPEAN WAR.

---



LONDON:  
PRINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE  
BY HARRISON AND SONS, 45-47, ST. MARTIN'S LANE, W.C.,  
PRINTERS IN ORDINARY TO HIS MAJESTY.

To be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from  
WYMAN AND SONS, LTD., 29, BREAMS BUILDINGS, FETTER LANE, E.C., and  
54, ST. MARY STREET, CARDIFF; or  
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE (SCOTTISH BRANCH), 23, FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH; or  
E. PONSONBY, LTD., 116, GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN;  
or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies,  
the United States of America and other Foreign Countries of  
T. FISHER UNWIN, LONDON, W.O.

1915.

*Price One Shilling.*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

---

	Page
Preface ... ..	i
I. List of Principal Persons Mentioned ... ..	xvii
II. British Diplomatic Correspondence ... ..	1
III. French Yellow Book ... ..	121
IV. Russian Orange Book ... ..	265
V. Belgian Grey Book ... ..	299
Appendix regarding Anglo-Belgian relations ... ..	349
VI. Serbian Blue Book ... ..	369
Appendix containing Signor Giolitti's Speech of 5th December, 1914 ... ..	399
VII. German White Book ... ..	403
Appendix containing Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's Speech of 4th August, 1914 ... ..	436
VIII. Austro-Hungarian Red Book ... ..	441
IX. Documents published subsequently ... ..	535
Index ... ..	545

## PREFACE.

## I.

The object of this volume is to bring together the official correspondence published by the various European Governments relating to the outbreak of the present war. The correspondence thus collected is not new, though official translations of the Serbian and Austrian Books now appear for the first time. Such a compilation of documents for the most part already widely known may appear to need some justification.

The work has been undertaken, not in order to excite new attention, but rather for the benefit of students of history and politics. In these days historical evidence is apt to become rapidly overlaid by a mass of commentary and criticism through which the student has to dig back to the original sources. This volume is mainly designed to facilitate such work.

With this end in view, the intention has been to republish only those original documents which the various Governments have laid before the world as authentic records of events. Commentaries, even when proceeding from the Governments themselves, are therefore excluded. For instance, the preface to the cheap edition of the British White Paper is not reprinted in this volume. To this rule, however, certain exceptions have been made. For obvious reasons it has not seemed fair to exclude from a volume published in England the commentaries contained in the German White Book and the Austrian Red Book. Further, the special interest attaching to the question of Belgian neutrality has been held to justify the publication, in an appendix to the Belgian Grey Book, of certain commentaries, emanating from Belgian and British official sources, on the charges brought in Germany against the good faith of the Belgian and British Governments. It is, however, hoped that these commentaries will not distract attention from the original documents published in the same appendix. The same considerations have led to the inclusion, as an appendix to the German White Book, of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's speech in the Reichstag on August 4, as containing the German case for the violation of Belgian neutrality. Finally, the attention excited by Signor Giolitti's speech in the Italian Parliament has seemed to justify its inclusion as an appendix to the Serbian Book.

Documents which were not included in the collections originally published by the various Governments but have been published subsequently officially in the Press are given at the end of the volume (Part X).

As historical sources these documents are of the first importance. Taken separately, they are interesting; but taken together and compared, they constitute a body of evidence of quite exceptional value. The object of the succeeding pages is to furnish a tentative guide to their comparison and to their valuation as a whole. There will be no attempt at a narrative, for the events are now too well known. Even a full discussion of all important points is impossible within the limits of a short preface. All that can be done is to give examples of how such documents may be handled. In a work of this kind, at this time, it is impossible to attain the impartiality of the historian, but what follows is a sincere attempt to approximate to that attitude.

## II.

For purposes of comparison, the documents may be divided into three periods:—

1. The state of European politics previous to the events of last summer.

This, the prefatory period, is only illustrated by a few documents, namely, the first chapter of the French Yellow Book (pp. 121-143), Signor Giolitti's speech (p. 401), the Austrian Statement as to the past activities of the Pan-Serb movement (p. 461 *et seq.*), the exchange of notes between Sir E. Grey and M. Cambon in November, 1912 (pp. 80-1 and 260-1), and the original documents in the appendix to the Belgian Grey Book (p. 350 *et seq.*). These documents do not, of course, pretend to give any general history of the causes which produced the crisis of 1914; they merely throw light on certain definite points immediately connected with that crisis itself. It is clearly impossible to deal with this period in the present Preface, as no full official correspondence relating to it has yet been published, and it would be improper to make statements with regard to it without the production of the evidence on which such statements would be based. There is, indeed, already a mass of evidence for this period before the public on which conclusions may well be founded, but the time has not arrived for its discussion in a Government publication like the present volume.

2. The period between the murder of the Archduke and the presentation of the Austrian Note to Serbia.

For this period we have Chapter II of the French Yellow Book (pp. 144-153), the first six numbers of the Austrian Red Book (pp. 448-452), Nos. 1, 2 and 161 (pp. 1 and 114) of the British White Paper, and Nos. 1 to 31 of the Serbian Book (pp. 370-387). This period is dealt with in the next section.

3. The period between the presentation of the Austrian Note and the outbreak of war. The bulk of all the correspondence, except in the case of the Serbian Book, is concerned with this period. The books vary, however, a good deal in the point up to which they carry the story of events. The Serbian Book ends with the declaration of war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia on July 28. The German, Austrian and Russian Books practically end with the declaration of

war between Germany and Russia on August 1, though the Russian Book adds the formal declaration of war with Austria-Hungary on August 6, and the Austrian Book adds twelve documents illustrating the formal steps as the result of which Austria-Hungary found herself at war with the other allied countries. The British and French Books carry the story down to the declaration of war between England and Germany at midnight on August 4, and the French Book adds the Declaration signed at London on September 4, binding England, France and Russia not to negotiate or conclude peace separately. The Belgian Book carries the story down to August 5 when Belgium finally found herself at war with Germany and was assured of the armed support of the other signatories of the Treaty of 1839, but it then proceeds to reproduce a series of documents illustrating subsequent events down to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Belgium on August 28. Of these 26 papers, the two last record the formal rupture between Belgium and Austria-Hungary. Six deal with miscellaneous subjects: the neutrality of Holland, the navigation of the Scheldt, the taking over of German interests in Belgium by the United States, and the departure of the Belgian Minister from Luxemburg. Seven relate to the extension of the war to the possessions of the belligerents in Africa. The remaining eleven papers illustrate the renewed offer made by Germany to Belgium on August 9 and its rejection on August 12.

As a whole, therefore, the correspondence in this volume is a minute record of the events of 10 days from July 23 to August 1. The subject is the Serbian Question. On August 1 the scene shifts; the light is switched from Serbia to Belgium and the French frontier. For the next four days, August 2 to 5, we have a record, equally minute, of the attitude of England, France and Belgium on the brink of war and of the communications received by them from the German Government. But we have practically nothing from the other side. There is the speech of the German Chancellor in the Reichstag (pp. 436-9); there is the Note handed in at Paris by Baron von Schoen on August 2 (French Book, No. 133, p. 234) and the telegram to Prince Lichnowsky of August 4 (British Book, No. 157, p. 108); there is the conversation with Herr von Below-Saleske at the Belgian Foreign Office, at 1.30 a.m. on August 3 (Belgian Book, No. 21, p. 311); there are finally the five telegrams semi-officially published in the German Press and reprinted in the collection at the end of this volume (pp. 538-541). That is all. "Very early" in the morning of August 2 the German troops appear on the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich in Luxemburg (p. 104); later on the same day they are reported to be across the French frontier at Ciry and near Longwy (p. 234); on August 3 their advance guard is at Gemmerich in Belgium (p. 316). Behind this screen of troops Berlin is almost silent. At London, Paris and Brussels decisions are still being formed. Deliberations continue; telegrams are exchanged. But at Berlin the direction of events has already passed from the Foreign Office to the General Staff, which does not talk and which publishes no records.

There is one other gap in the correspondence which must be noted. We know practically nothing of anything which passed between Vienna

and Berlin during this whole period. In the German Book there is only one communication between the two capitals (No. 16, p. 430); in the Austrian Book there are only eight (Nos. 33, p. 506; 35, 38, p. 515; 42, 43, p. 520; 46, p. 522; 48, p. 524, and 57, p. 529). The earliest of these is dated July 27 (No. 33). There is, indeed, as we shall see, no doubt as to the general relations between the two Governments, but from the historian's point of view this is not enough. We are dealing with a diplomatic episode; 10 days of feverish activity when new proposals and new developments followed each other hour by hour. The only real interest of such a crisis is to estimate how a general attitude responds to each new factor in the situation and thereby to gain an impression of the spirit behind the attitude. Here the German correspondence fails us. This very failure may not be without value as a guide to the historian. It has been perhaps the secret alike of Germany's predominance and of the strain under which Europe has lived for a decade, that Germany has always shown the world her power, but has never taken it into her confidence.

### III.

#### THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE MURDER OF THE ARCHDUKE AND THE PRESENTATION OF THE AUSTRIAN NOTE TO SERBIA, JUNE 28-JULY 23.

First, as to the attitude of the German Government. This may be dismissed in a few words. The German Book states, "We permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations" (p. 406). All the Books agree that the German Government professed to have no previous knowledge of the terms of the ultimatum. How much they did know can only be inferred from such documents as French Book, Nos. 9 and 21 (pp. 145 and 153), British Book, No. 1 (p. 1), Serbian Book, No. 26 (p. 383). On the question, what part Herr von Tschirsky played personally in the counsels of the Austro-Hungarian Government during this period, we know only the common belief of the representatives of the Powers at Vienna as revealed in British Book, Nos. 32 (p. 28), 95 (p. 74) and 161, 2nd para. (p. 114); Serbian Book, No. 52, 4th, 12th and 20th paras. (pp. 394, 396 and 398); Russian Book, No. 41 (p. 281); and French Book, No. 18 (p. 151).

Second, the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government. This is the vital point. After all that has been said and written lately on the subject it is not necessary to discuss the Pan-Serb movement. There may be a question as to the trustworthiness of the police reports on Serbian propaganda contained in No. 19 of the Austrian Book (p. 461 *et seq.*). But the broad fact is not in doubt. Serbia had nationalist ambitions incompatible with the recently established sovereignty of Austria-Hungary over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those ambitions are practically admitted in British Book, No. 30 (p. 27), they are presupposed in the advice given to Serbia as recorded in that document and in French Book, No. 26 (p. 157), they were evident in the attitude of the Serbian Press. The only question for Austria-Hungary was whether by her

dramatic annexation of the two Provinces in 1908, she had finally closed against herself the door of peaceful settlement. Whether Serbia or Austria had tried to keep that door open in the five years since 1909 is not a question which can be dealt with here—we can only refer to the different accounts of those years given in Austrian Book, No. 8 (p. 453) and Serbian Book, Nos. 5 (p. 371) and 30, para. 10 (p. 386). Be that as it may, Austria decided in July that the door was closed. Probably, as indicated in Signor Giolitti's speech, she had taken the same decision long before. Now, at all events, she made up her mind that war was inevitable and immediate war desirable. (Austrian Book, No. 6, p. 450.)

It was on this issue that Austria made war. The question of Serbian guilt in the murder of the Archduke could not have given rise to the Austrian ultimatum. Whatever may be the value of the evidence on this particular question contained in Austrian Book, No. 19 (p. 461 *et seq.*), few people would be found to say that this evidence involved the Serbian Government itself in a way that a jury could consider for a moment, and no one will say that it could have justified an ultimatum with a forty-eight hours' time limit. Whatever may be the value of the statement in Austrian Book, No. 9, paras. 2 and 3 (p. 455), as to the failure of the Serbian Government to investigate the murder, on the one hand, and on the other hand the assurances given by the Serbian Government of readiness to conduct such investigations (Serbian Book, Nos. 5 (p. 371) and 30, para. 5 (p. 385); Russian Book, No. 6 (p. 268); British Book, No. 30 (p. 27); French Book, No. 15 (p. 148)), it is obvious that, in regard to the murder itself, the Serbian Government had at any rate committed no flagrant breach of the duty of a neighbouring State to assist in the apprehension of criminals. It is the general account of Serbian propaganda in Austrian Book, No. 19 (p. 461 *et seq.*) which constitutes Austria's real case against Serbia. The distinction is well stated in Nos. 17 (p. 378) and 25 (p. 382) of the Serbian Book. It was a question of a fundamental antagonism of aims and ideals and a long-nursed sense of wrong.

Such cases are very difficult, but they are not new. It was not the first time that Austria-Hungary had deliberately placed herself across the path of a nationalist movement. In comparing the feverish atmosphere of the Austrian and Serbian Books a calm view of the issues may perhaps best be attained by reference to a correspondence which has now passed into history. From 1817 to 1848, Metternich was writing of the policy of the Piedmontese Government in its relation to Italian nationalism and Austrian rule in Lombardy and Venetia, in the same strain as Count Berchtold writes of Serbia. The same epithets are applied to the leaders of Italian nationalism; they are "poisoners," "highway robbers," "pickpockets." Take a few sentences at random. "The scheming policy of the Turin Cabinet." "There is no doubt that the Turin Cabinet cherishes ambitious projects which can only be carried out at the expense of Austria." "The causes (of complaint against Austrian administration in Italy), even had they been a hundred times more serious than they are, would not have justified the least of the plots hatched by the Piedmontese conspirator. In reality, in the struggle in which we are engaged, it

is not a question of our administrative faults, but of the attacks which faction directs against the existence of Austrian power." "The King seeks to mask under the veil of assistance rendered to the 'independence of the Italian nation' the blow which he strikes at respect for the sacredness of treaties and the manner in which he thus attacks at its base the maintenance of general peace and of all international relations." "The word 'nationality' and the words 'Respect due to nationalities' as applied to the Italian Peninsula are words devoid of practical sense." History has given its judgment on this correspondence; it is not for us to give one on the present controversy. The Serbian question is only a rehearsal of an old drama; it is enough that we recognise the plot.

The intention of Austria under these circumstances is undisputed. It is stated in the preface (pp. 443-7) and in No. 6 of the Austrian Book (p. 450) precisely as it was stated by M. Jules Cambon on July 24 (French Book, No. 30, pp. 161-2) and by Sir M. de Bunsen on July 27 (British Book, No. 41, p. 38). War was to be made inevitable; all means of retreat were to be cut off.

There is one further point to notice. The British Book, the French Book, and the Serbian Book agree in the picture they draw of the mystery surrounding the Foreign Office at Vienna during this period. On the whole the German and Austrian Books bear out this impression. It seems that the deliberate intention was to take both Serbia and Europe by surprise.

#### IV.

##### EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE AUSTRIAN NOTE.

We have no space to deal with the complex negotiations which fill the bulk of the Books. We can only consider three points as illustrations of the way the Books may be compared.

1. The character of the negotiations with Russia immediately following on the rupture with Serbia.

2. The view of the negotiations implied by the title of the German Book: "How Russia betrayed Germany's confidence."

3. The question of Belgian neutrality.

It will be observed that we omit any direct treatment of the position of Great Britain and France in relation to the outbreak of the war. The case for these two Powers has been often stated and is now before the world. A re-statement could carry no added conviction. On the other hand, of the above three points the first two have received no adequate treatment from the historical point of view, partly because the Austrian Book has only recently been published; while the third point touches so nearly the heart of the present struggle that a brief statement on it may not be out of place.

#### V.

##### THE CHARACTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE RUPTURE WITH SERBIA.

Austria knew, at the time when she presented her Note to Serbia, that she was risking a conflict with Russia. The fact is stated in so many words in Austrian Book, No. 26 (p. 501). Indeed, it was one of



the commonplaces of European diplomacy and witness is borne to it throughout all the Books without exception. There is no sign in the Austrian correspondence that Austria was under any illusion as to the danger of Russian intervention. But to judge from Count Pourtalès' airy words to the Serbian Minister at Petrograd on July 24 (Serbian Book, No. 36, p. 389) and Herr von Tschirsky's equally confident remarks to Sir M. de Bunsen at Vienna on July 26 (British Book, No. 32, p. 28), Germany was counting on Russian weakness or timidity to avert this danger. No such illusion, however, even if it was originally genuine, could have survived the events which immediately followed.

The point on which all the Books show striking unanimity is the absolute openness of Russia's attitude from the beginning. The steady consistency of that attitude gives the Russian Book its unity and its force. M. Sazonof's conversations on July 24 with the German Ambassador (German Book, No. 4, p. 427; Austrian Book, No. 16, p. 459; French Book, No. 38, pp. 167-8), and with the Austrian Ambassador (Austrian Book, No. 14, pp. 457-8; Russian Book, No. 25, p. 275); his instructions to M. Kudacheff on the same day (British Book, No. 13, p. 19) and the official announcement in the Russian Press on July 25 (Russian Book, No. 10, p. 269) were calculated to remove any possible doubt in the mind of the German and Austrian Governments.

The way in which Austria met this open attitude is curious. If there is one point on which the German and Austrian Books lay extraordinary emphasis it is the assurances given by Austria that she contemplated no attack on the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Serbia. But the nature of her communications to Russia on the subject is worth examining. On July 24 Count Berchtold says Austria wants nothing but the maintenance of the *status quo* (Austrian Book, No. 18, p. 461); on July 25 he mentions an indemnity (No. 20, p. 499); on the same day he declares that neither the territorial integrity nor the sovereignty of Serbia will be touched, *but* "we will proceed to extreme measures for the enforcement of our demands" (No. 26, p. 502); on July 27 the assurance that no territorial demands will be made on Serbia is made conditional on the "localisation" of the war (No. 32, p. 506). Clearly, this method of defining policy was not calculated to allay the apprehension frankly declared by M. Sazonof on July 24 (Austrian Book, No. 14, p. 458): "You will always be wanting to intervene again, and what a life you will lead Europe!" The general impression produced by Austria's assurances in this matter, whether that impression was just or unjust, may be seen from the doubt expressed in British Book, No. 79 (p. 61), whether she would consent to convert those assurances into "a binding engagement to Europe."

There is another point which indicates the distrust awakened, not unnaturally, in the mind of Russian statesmen by Austria's steps after her rupture with Serbia. Points 5 and 6 of the Austrian demands on Serbia relate to the participation of Austrian officials in one form or another in the measures to be taken by the Serbian Government against the anti-Austrian propaganda on Serbian territory, and against those implicated in the actual plot for the murder of the Archduke. In

the annotations on the Serbian reply published both in the German and Austrian Books, the following commentary is made on the Serbian reply to these demands: "If the Serbian Government misunderstand us on this point they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between *enquête judiciaire* and simple *recherches* must be familiar to them" (p. 513). Now, the Serbian Government were not the only people who misunderstood these demands, for they raised the immediate apprehensions of M. Sazonof, Sir E. Grey and M. Bienvenu-Martin (Austrian Book, No. 14, p. 458; British Book, No. 5, p. 13; French Book, No. 25, p. 156; and Austrian Book, No. 11, p. 456). Such general misapprehensions are always possible, but the strange thing is that Count Berchtold, as early as July 25, found it necessary to offer a special explanation on this very point to the Russian Government (Austrian Book, No. 27, p. 503). This explanation was given to the Russian Government "in strict confidence." In other words, Russia is informed in confidence of a point on which the Serbian Government certainly had a right to a full explanation. Austria might perhaps reasonably have considered it incompatible with her dignity to make the explanation to Serbia direct, but it could have easily been made indirectly through Russia. As a matter of fact it was made too late to influence the Serbian reply and under the seal of secrecy; and, moreover, both the explanation itself and the annotation on the Serbian reply are hard to reconcile with the statement about "supervision" made by Herr von Jagow on July 29 (French Book, No. 92, p. 204). The whole circumstance appears to require explanation, especially as it is duplicated by a similar "confidence" in the case of Great Britain, which may also be noticed.

On July 24 Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mensdorff in London that the Note to Serbia was not an ultimatum but a "*démarche* with a time limit" (Austrian Book, No. 17, p. 460), and that this fact should be communicated to Sir E. Grey. Sir E. Grey received this information (British Book No. 14, p. 20) and telegraphed it to Paris and Petrograd. It was conveyed to M. Sazonof on the morning of July 25 (British Book, No. 17, p. 21). He replied that this did not tally with the information which came to him from Germany. We know from German Book, No. 1 (p. 424), French Book, No. 28 (p. 159) and British Book, No. 9 (p. 16) what kind of language the German Ambassadors at the capitals of the Entente Powers were holding on July 24. The reassuring communication thus made to Great Britain can therefore only be explained, in the light of the other communications sent to Sir E. Grey from Vienna on July 23 (Austrian Book, No. 9, p. 454) and on July 28 (No. 39, p. 516), as an attempt to keep Great Britain quiet. Any reassurance designed really to preserve peace should clearly have been made at Petrograd. But while Count Berchtold was doing his best to reassure Sir E. Grey by urgent telegrams on July 23 and 24, he contented himself with writing a despatch (for such it appears to be) to Petrograd on July 25, containing arguments for the education of M. Sazonof (Austrian Book, No. 26, pp. 501-3). Again it must be said that these proceedings were not calculated to promote a frank exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd.

The real inference from this correspondence seems to be—and it lies very near the heart of the calamities from which Europe is now

suffering—that Austria proceeded throughout on the principle that it is better not to enter into discussions with the person with whom you have a difference of opinion. Hence the mystery reigning at Vienna for the first three weeks of July, and hence also the confidences as to Austria's moderate intentions carefully imparted on July 24 and 25 to the Powers not the most directly concerned with those intentions.

We have here laboured perhaps a rather minor point, and have not considered the course of those "conversations" between Vienna and Petrograd and Sir E. Grey's proposal for mediation by the four disinterested Powers, which formed the main features of the three days between July 25 and 28. But these main features have already been exhaustively discussed and commented on in public during the last few months, and the minor points dealt with above are raised because they seem comparatively new and because for that reason they throw additional light on the grounds for M. Sazonof's remark on July 28, recorded in French Book, No. 82, p. 199: "Certainly Austria is unwilling to converse." This distrust may usefully be compared with the impression made on M. Bienvenu-Martin by Herr von Schoen's communications at Paris on July 24 to 26 (French Book, No. 61, p. 183), and with the character of M. Jules Cambon's conversations with Herr von Jagow on July 24 and 27 (French Book, Nos. 30 and 74, pp. 161-2 and 191-2). Silence and a show of power were the weapons on which Germany and Austria relied.

## . VI.

THE VIEW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IMPLIED BY THE TITLE OF THE GERMAN BOOK: "HOW RUSSIA BETRAYED GERMANY'S CONFIDENCE."

The ground of the charge thus made by Germany against Russia is a little difficult to fix. As we have seen, Russia's attitude was entirely open throughout the negotiations, and the German Chancellor's telegrams to the German Ambassadors at London, Paris and Petrograd of July 26 (German Book, Nos. 10, 10A, and 10B, p. 428) show that, on the day following the rupture between Austria and Serbia, that attitude was already clearly understood in Germany. In fact, there is not a sign in the whole correspondence that any statesman in the whole of Europe ever doubted that Russia would regard an actual armed attack on Serbia under the circumstances as an attack upon herself. We are forced to the conclusion that if Count Pourtales at Petrograd continued to under-estimate the danger of war until his conversation with M. Sazonof at 2 a.m. on the night of July 29 to 30 (British Book, No. 97, p. 75; Russian Book, No. 60, p. 288; French Book, No. 103, p. 212), at which he "completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable," his under-estimate must have been based on a doubt, not as to Russia's policy, but as to her courage; and this is borne out by the attitude both of the German Ambassador at Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin (British Book, Nos. 32 and 71, pp. 28 and 57). Russia was not "in a position to make war."

But, so far as can be understood, the gravamen of the German charge against Russia is that the German military attaché at Petrograd

characterised the assurances of the Russian General Staff on July 29, as "an attempt to mislead us" (p. 410), and that the Czar's telegram to the German Emperor, of July 31 (p. 411), was despatched at the moment when the general mobilisation of the Russian Army was being ordered. That is to say, the German case is that :—

1. In the period between July 28 and July 31, during which the Russian Government assured the German Government that mobilisation was only proceeding to meet Austrian preparations in Galicia, the Russian Army was in reality being at least partially mobilised in Warsaw, Vilna and other districts against Germany. Russia was therefore taking advantage of Germany's attitude as stated to Sir E. Goschen by Herr von Jagow on July 27 (British Book, No. 43, p. 39) that "if Russia only mobilised in the south, Germany would not mobilise."

2. The Russian mobilisation occurred at a moment when Germany was making a special effort at peaceful mediation, and at a moment when the Czar was actually encouraging those efforts by pacific assurances.

We will take these two points separately.

1. Russian mobilisation measures between July 28 and July 31.

The German Book rests almost its whole case on the priority of mobilisation measures. The way in which that case was carefully built up during the negotiations is shown by British Book No. 71 (p. 56), where the German Chancellor declares on July 28 that the Russian mobilisation in the south endangered the efforts of the German Government to encourage direct communications between Vienna and Petrograd. Compare this with British Book Nos. 70 (p. 55), 74 (p. 58), 93 (1) and (3) (pp. 70 and 72); Russian Book No. 47 (p. 283); Austrian Book Nos. 40 (p. 517), 42 (p. 520), and 48 (p. 524); German Book No. 16 (p. 430). It will be seen that at the moment the Chancellor was speaking, Austria had already refused both direct discussions with Petrograd and Sir E. Grey's mediation proposals, *before* she heard of the Russian mobilisation, and on the sole ground that she had herself declared war on Serbia. It was *after* she heard of the Russian preparations that she resumed conversations on July 29–30. It will be observed that on July 28 Russia believed that the general Austrian mobilisation had been ordered. As a matter of fact, in sifting any case based on mobilisation reports there are several points to be remembered.

Mobilisation measures as preliminaries to war are a German tradition. If anyone will refer to the account of the negotiations between Prussia and Austria from March 31 to May 8, 1866, before the Prusso-Austrian war, given in Sybel's "Foundation of the German Empire," Book 16, Chapter 1, he will see the example in this line set by Bismarck. But a case based on priority of mobilisation measures is never a strong one for several reasons.

First, it is difficult enough to tell "who began it" when the negotiations are spread over months, but it is practically impossible to do so when, as here, it is a question of hours. Take the German telegram of July 26 to Petrograd (p. 408), given in the body of the German narrative, and the conversation between M. Sazonof and Count Pourtalès on July 29, recorded in No. 58 (p. 287) of the Russian Book.

The actual mobilisation measures are taken in the midst of a cloud of accusations and threats, and it is impossible to separate cause from effect, in the hurried hours which we have to study.

Secondly, in any attempt to state the facts, the minor accusations and innuendoes must be discarded as of slight importance, except as a guide to the psychology of the moment. Such minor points are German Book, Nos. 6 and 9 (pp. 427-8) ; Serbian Book, No. 52 (p. 395) ; French Book, No. 89 (p. 202) ; Austrian Book, No. 47, penultimate para., last sentence (p. 523), and a dozen other similar reports. The same may be said of rumours of violations of frontier (Austrian Book, No. 40, p. 518 ; German narrative, p. 413 ; British Book, No. 144, p. 103 ; French Book, No. 106, p. 214 ; British Book, No. 105, p. 80). They have their value, but to put them forward, as does the German and Austrian correspondence, as the actual ground for the commencement of hostilities is to assume the impossible position that the fate of nations is subject to the reported action of a roving patrol. Frankly, a marked insistence on such reports, as in the German Book, shows a poor appreciation of the value of the evidence.

Thirdly, mobilisation "orders" are not mobilisation. The mobilisation systems of different countries are radically different ; the precise nature of those systems, the lines of the railways and a hundred other points must be taken into consideration in judging mobilisation measures, and any statement which ignores these factors is a mere bid for uninformed public opinion. We cannot enter into a consideration of all these factors here, but a few indications may be given. No. 3 (p. 134) of the French Book, contains an allusion to the well-known fact of the secrecy of the first stages of German mobilisation, and M. Jules Cambon believed that this first stage was set on foot as early as July 21 (French Book No. 15, p. 149 ; see also No. 59, p. 182). It is unnecessary to estimate the accuracy of the various reports of German preparations in the French Book, interesting as they are. The hard fact that though Germany only proclaimed "Kriegsgefahrzustand" on July 31 and mobilisation on August 1, to take effect on August 2, the German troops were across the Luxemburg frontier at dawn on August 2, will probably be judged to be historical evidence of far more value than any isolated reports received during the crisis. As to Russian mobilisation, British Book, Nos. 43 (p. 39), and 121 (p. 92) show that it was fully realised in Germany that the Russian system was so complicated as to make it difficult to distinguish the localities really affected by mobilisation. Germany accuses Russia of mobilising against Germany, not Austria, because she is reported to be mobilising at Vilna and Warsaw, but both those towns are nearer to the Galician frontier than Prague is to the Serbian frontier, and Austria was reported to be mobilising at Prague four days before she declared to Russia that she was only mobilising against Serbia (Russian Book, No. 24, p. 274 ; French Book, No. 90, p. 203 ; Austrian Book No., 50, p. 526 ; German Book, No. 23, p. 432). The bare facts are of very slight value as evidence without a knowledge of the points already mentioned.

If the charges as to the priority of Russian mobilisation are examined in the light of these considerations, it will be admitted that the evidence for those charges is remarkably slight, and that, given the

admitted extreme slowness of Russian, and the extreme rapidity of German, mobilisation, a fact which is frequently alluded to in the correspondence, there is no indication in favour of, and an overwhelming presumption against, the theory that the Russian measures were further advanced than the German when war was declared on August 1st.

2. The charge that the Czar's telegram of July 31 (p. 411) was misleading, and that the mobilisation orders issued about the time of its despatch destroyed the effect of sincere efforts then being made by Germany to mediate between Russia and Austria.

In the first place, a glance at the Czar's telegram is sufficient to show that this charge is, to put it frankly, of the flimsiest character. His Majesty gave his "solemn word" that, while it was "technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations," the Russian troops would "undertake no provocative action" "as long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue." There was no promise not to mobilise; there was nothing but a statement which is almost word for word the same as that contained in the German Emperor's telegram to King George twenty-four hours later (page 540, No. 6)—the statement that, under certain circumstances, mobilisation would not be converted into hostilities.

As a matter of fact, a somewhat unscrupulous use, in effect though perhaps not in intention, has been made of the Czar's telegrams to substantiate the theory of "betrayal." Take for instance the German Chancellor's statement on July 31 (British Book, No. 108, p. 84), that "the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request." The telegram referred to must be that of July 29 (German Book, No. 21, p. 431), since this is the only one which mentions "old friendship"; but this telegram, though it asks the Emperor to restrain Austria, also says in so many words that popular opinion in Russia would soon force measures which would lead to war.

As to Germany's efforts at mediation, it does seem to be true that on July 29 the Austrian Government showed some signs of moving, in the direction of a peaceful solution. On that day occurred the conversation between Count Szapary and M. Sazonof (Austrian Book, No. 47, p. 523), which, on Count Berchtold's instructions of next day (Austrian Book, Nos. 49 and 50, p. 525) seemed likely to develop into a renewal of the direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd. On that day, too, Herr von Jagow went so far as to admit that these conversations furnished "a basis for possible negotiation" (French Book, No. 92, p. 204), and on July 30 he forwarded to Vienna, but apparently without comment, Sir E. Grey's last proposal which admitted the possibility of an Austrian occupation of Belgrade before the mediation of the Powers could be brought into effect (British Book Nos. 88 and 98, pp. 66 and 75; Austrian Book, No. 51, p. 526), and which Austria seems to have regarded at the time, and Germany subsequently professed to have regarded, as a promising basis of discussion (German narrative (pp. 410-1) and Austrian Book, No. 51). By July 31 these negotiations had resulted in distinct formulations of

the Russian and Austrian attitudes which were indeed far enough apart, but which still offered some hope of reconciliation. (Russian Book, No. 67, p. 290 ; British Book, No. 120, p. 91 ; Austrian Book, No. 51, p. 526.) On July 31 the exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd was proceeding (Russian Book, No. 66, p. 290), and, though there is a remarkable absence in the Austrian Book of any indication that there was at this moment any revived hope of peace, it does seem from the British and French Books that the atmosphere at Vienna was clearing on July 30-31 (British Book, Nos. 94, 95, 96, 118, pp. 73-4, 89 ; French Book, Nos. 104 and 115, pp. 212 and 222).

All this makes a fair showing, so far as the attitude of Austria and Russia is concerned. But what part had Berlin in these more friendly steps ? We hear of many German assurances of moderating counsels sent from Berlin to Vienna ; there are no documents either in the German or the Austrian Book showing what these counsels were, though the German Chancellor's account of one message to Vienna is given in British Book, No. 75 (p. 58), but they are mentioned in British Book, No. 95 (p. 74) as having come to the ears of M. Dumaine at Vienna, and it is only fair to point out that the renewal of conversations on July 29 between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary was due to a hint given to the latter by the German Ambassador. The point here is, however, not whether these counsels were actually given, for documentary evidence of which we have still to wait, but whether the attitude of Germany at this moment was calculated to reassure the Russian Government. And here we have the curious fact that there is in the whole correspondence not a single sign of any communication from Berlin to Petrograd during these days even hinting at the possibility of a compromise or of any form of international action to settle the dispute. Look at German Book, No. 14 (p. 429) ; British Book, No. 93 (2) (p. 71) ; Russian Book, Nos. 58, 60, 63 (pp. 287-289). These were the communications which reached M. Sazonof. Their tenour was "mobilisation," "proposals unacceptable," and so on. And breaking through the diplomatic correspondence come the German Emperor's telegrams. At 6.30 p.m. on July 29, His Majesty is, after all that has passed, still "of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war" (No. 22, p. 432) ; six and a half hours later, at 1 a.m., on July 30, he is threatening to abandon all attempts at mediation if Russia mobilises *against Austria*, No. 23. In this correspondence we have many assurances of mediation ; but are we allowed to see the substance ?

In fairness, no one will wish to press against German statesmen points arising out of the events of these last days. We have only gone into these points because Germany herself has tried to make use of them against her antagonists. The truth about these days is, as usual, very simple. Under the strain of a sudden crisis, Europe was bound to break at its weakest link, and that weakest link was Germany. She, alone of all the nations of Europe, could not negotiate on the brink of war. The nature of her institutions, the character of her people, the very perfection of her military organisation alike forbade it. The calculations of her General Staff were too fine drawn ; a state of uncertainty was intolerable to her nerves. The military machine was too vast and elaborate ; once set in motion, it must occupy the whole

stage of Government. Every other country could mobilise and yet continue to negotiate with a hope of success. But the German mobilisation was peculiar, not only in its effect but in its nature. Open mobilisation was the last stage. It was not a military preparation; it was in itself an offensive movement. On that order the German armies did not merely concentrate; they marched. If history passes judgment on Germany it will not be because she did this or that in the final crisis, but because she had for years consciously set herself to create a military machine which incapacitated her from assuming any other attitude but one of menace to her neighbours, and because, knowing the consequences of even a slight pressure on the levers of that machine, she acquiesced in or perhaps deliberately encouraged the steps which made that pressure inevitable.

In all this, Russia's attitude deserves a fuller recognition than has yet been accorded to it. She made no parade of pacific intentions; she played on no weaknesses; she counted on no doubtful factors; she took refuge neither in silence nor in catchwords. She stated openly the circumstances under which war would become inevitable. But she gave every chance to international action; she shunned no discussion; she was ready to accept any compromise provided only that the Austrian troops paused on the Serbian frontier. She steered her policy throughout by the light of the guiding fact that the Austro-Serbian conflict could not be localised even by her own abstention, for that conflict was not a simple attack on Serbia but a recommitment of the whole Balkan question. Her action during the whole crisis is entitled to the respect which is due to honesty and openness in international relations.

## VII.

### THE QUESTION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

There is no need to go into the details of a question which has now been so exhaustively discussed and on which opinion is already so fully formed. But the charges made by Germany against the action of Belgium and Great Britain in the years preceding the war appear to necessitate a brief statement bringing these charges into relation with the correspondence during the crisis.

Two charges have been made, which to a certain extent neutralise each other:—

1. That Great Britain had long intended to violate Belgian neutrality by force.

2. That there was an arrangement between the British and Belgian Governments providing for the violation of Belgian neutrality by consent.

As to the first charge, it may be dismissed in a few words. It is proved to be baseless, not by the statements issued by the British Government after the publication of the "incriminating" documents (Belgian Book, Appendix Nos. 2 and 6, pp. 351 and 354 *et seq.*), but by Sir E. Grey's despatch to Sir F. Villiers of 1913 (No. 1, p. 350) and by the simple fact that it was not till more than 60 hours after the presentation of the German ultimatum that Great Britain,



on August 5, definitely and finally promised "joint action with a view to resisting Germany" (Belgian Book, No. 48, p. 324).

Great Britain had the duty to defend Belgium by arms against a violation of her territory. On the one hand she had solemnly assured Belgium that such defence would never take the form of anticipatory violation. On the other hand, it had for years been a commonplace—not in closed diplomatic circles but among students of politics and in the columns of the Press—that German military preparations indicated an intention to attack France through eastern Belgium. In these circumstances it was the elementary duty of the British Army to obtain such information and make such preparations as would enable Great Britain, if called upon to do so, not merely to go to war in defence of Belgium, but to save her; and if any British officer approached any Belgian officer with this object, he was but fulfilling the functions for which a national army exists and without the fulfilment of which international obligations would become nothing but pious hopes.

As to the second charge, alleging an arrangement between the British and Belgian Governments, the formal denials of such an arrangement issued by the two Governments are really unnecessary, for the charge is sufficiently rebutted by Baron Greindl's despatch, published by the Germans themselves (No. 2, pp. 351-2). Nothing that has been published contains a shadow of evidence of anything resembling such an arrangement. But if further evidence of the truth is required, it is contained in the Belgian Book. In this preface we can leave Great Britain's case to the judgment of the student; but the action of Belgium, as revealed in the Grey Book, has never yet had full justice done to it, in spite of the general sympathy which it has excited.

Nos. 2 and 16 of that Book (pp. 300 and 308) show the careful measures taken by the Belgian Government in advance to secure the maintenance of their neutrality by diplomatic means. But on July 31 the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs assured Sir F. Villiers that it did not "seem possible that our neutrality could be threatened" (No. 38, p. 319), and in any case stated, in order that there might be no possibility of precipitate action by any of her guarantors, that she was able to defend herself (British Book, No. 128, p. 95). It was not till August 1, after the Belgian Government had received the assurances of the French Government (No. 15, p. 307), and had heard that the German Government would not commit themselves to any assurance (No. 14, p. 307), that the Belgian Representatives at the capitals of the guaranteeing Powers were instructed to present to the Governments the declaration of Belgium's intention to maintain and defend her neutrality. The next day, on August 2, when the news of the invasion of Luxembourg had arrived and Berlin was still silent, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs was careful to assure the German Minister at Brussels of his confidence in Germany's good intentions. At that conversation the German Minister alluded in reassuring terms to "his personal opinion as to the feelings of security which (Belgium) had the right to entertain towards (her) eastern neighbours" (No. 19, p. 309). A few hours later, at 7 p.m., he presented the German ultimatum (Nos. 20 and 23, pp. 309-12). At 7 a.m. the next morning, August 3, the Belgian Government returned

their reply (No. 22, p. 311) and telegraphed to their Representatives abroad that "Belgium is firmly resolved to repel any attack." But still Belgium waited. The enemy's troops were gathering on her frontier; at any time her armies might be attacked; but she still refused to be driven into one false step. That morning, some time before midday, the French Minister was informed that "the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers" (Belgian Book, No. 24, p. 313; French Book, No. 142, p. 238).<sup>\*</sup> Then King Albert sent an appeal to King George, but still only for diplomatic intervention (Belgian Book, No. 25 p. 313). Later on that day, or during the night, the German troops crossed the Belgian frontier (No. 30, p. 316; French Book, No. 151, p. 242). At 6 a.m. next morning, August 4, the Belgian Government received the final German notification (No. 37, p. 314). The Cabinet was assembled and after deliberation decided to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers, but that appeal was not made until the evening (Nos. 38, last para., 40 and 43, pp. 319-322).

We see in this narrative how scrupulously careful the Belgian Government were to avoid the slightest sign of suspicion, the slightest inclination to one of the guaranteeing Powers rather than the other, the slightest confession of mistrust—in short, the smallest movement in any direction, by word or deed, which could furnish the shadow of a pretext for such charges as those which have since actually been made. By this attitude Belgium was serving not only herself, but Europe; she was not only safeguarding her own honour, but she was preventing her peculiar international position from being made the occasion of suspicions or the excuse for hostilities. In face of this record, it may be possible to respect the straightforward avowal of the German Chancellor's speech (p. 438), however indefensible the policy he sought to justify; but it is difficult to treat with patience the insinuations made by Herr von Jagow, as early as July 31, regarding Belgium's hostile acts (British Book, No. 122, p. 93)—insinuations which are effectively exposed in Belgian Book, No. 79, pp. 344-5).

This, however, may be said. Charges against Great Britain are fair methods of warfare. They may call for denial, but not for protest. But charges against Belgium, made at such a moment and in such circumstances, can be justified by no standards of policy or morality. They fail before every test known to historical criticism, and the circumstances in which they are made are themselves a refutation. For the sufferings of Belgium to-day are largely due to her steady and honourable determination to appeal for no assistance which by any stretch of malicious construction could be interpreted as an infringement of the law of her existence.<sup>†</sup>

---

<sup>\*</sup> According to British Book, No. 151 (p. 106), the French military attaché actually made a definite offer on this day to the Belgian War Office of five army corps for the defence of Belgium, but the Belgian and French documents seem to show that this offer was unofficially made and was not alluded to by the French Minister or referred to in the general reply of the Belgian Government.

<sup>†</sup> The documents published in Germany (Belgian Book, App. No. 4, pp. 354-361) have been most unscrupulously used in the German press. To take one instance: the word "conversation" in para. 8 of the first document has in more than one reproduction been printed as "convention."

## I.

LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE  
CORRESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL  
POSITIONS.

## 1. GREAT BRITAIN.

<i>Lord High Chancellor</i> ... ..	Viscount Haldane.
<i>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i> ...	Sir Edward Grey.
<i>Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.</i>	Sir A. Nicolson.
<i>French Ambassador</i> ... ..	M. Paul Cambon. M. de Fleuriau (Chargé d'Affaires).
<i>Russian Ambassador</i> ... ..	Count Benckendorff. M. de Etter (Counsellor of Embassy).
<i>German Ambassador</i> ... ..	Prince Lichnowsky.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i> ... ..	Count Mensdorff.
<i>Belgian Minister</i> ... ..	Count de Lalaing.
<i>Serbian Minister</i> ... ..	M. Boshkovitch.

## 2. FRANCE.

<i>President of the Republic</i> ... ..	M. Poincaré.
<i>President of the Council</i> ... ..	M. René Viviani.
<i>Ministers for Foreign Affairs</i> ... ..	1. M. Jonnart. 2. M. Stéphen Pichon. 3. M. René Viviani. 4. M. Bienvenu-Martin (Acting). 5. M. Doumergue. 6. M. Delcassé.
<i>Political Director</i> ... ..	M. Berthelot.
<i>British Ambassador</i> ... ..	Sir Francis Bertie.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i> ... ..	M. Isvolsky. M. Sevastopoulo (Chargé d'Affaires).
<i>German Ambassador</i> ... ..	Baron von Schoen.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i> ... ..	Count Szécsen.
<i>Belgian Minister</i> ... ..	Baron Guillaume.
<i>Serbian Minister</i> ... ..	M. Vesnitch.

## 3. RUSSIA.

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> ... ..	M. Sazonof.
<i>Minister for War</i> ... ..	M. Suchomlinof.
<i>British Ambassador</i> ... ..	Sir George Buchanan.
<i>French Ambassador</i> ... ..	M. Paléologue.
<i>German Ambassador</i> ... ..	Count Pourtalès.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i> ... ..	Count Szápáry. Count Czernin (Chargé d'Affaires).
<i>Serbian Minister</i> ... ..	Dr. M. Spalaikovitch.

## 4. GERMANY.

<i>Imperial Chancellor</i>	...	...	Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.
<i>Secretary of State</i>	...	...	Herr von Jagow.
<i>Under-Secretary of State</i>	...	...	Herr von Zimmermann.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	...	Sir Edward Goschen. Sir Horace Rumbold (Counsellor of Embassy).
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	...	M. Jules Cambon. M. de Manneville (Chargé d'Affaires).
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	...	M. Swerbeiev. M. Broniewsky (Chargé d'Affaires).
<i>American Ambassador</i>	...	...	Mr. Gerard.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	...	...	Count Szogyeny.
<i>Belgian Minister</i>	...	...	Baron Beyens.
<i>Serbian Chargé d'Affaires</i>	...	...	Dr. M. Yovanovitch.
<i>French Minister at Munich</i>	...	...	M. Allizé.
<i>French Consul-General at Frankfort</i>	...	...	M. Ronssin.

## 5. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

<i>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Count Berchtold.
<i>Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs.</i>		Baron Macchio. Count Forgach.
<i>President of the Ministry of Hungary</i>	...	Count Tisza.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Maurice de Bunsen.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	M. Dumaine.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	M. Schebeko. Prince Koudacheff (Chargé d'Affaires).
<i>American Ambassador</i>	...	Mr. Penfield.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Herr von Tschirsky.
<i>Italian Ambassador</i>	...	Duke d'Avarna.
<i>Belgian Minister</i>	...	Count Errembault de Dudzeele.
<i>Serbian Minister</i>	...	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch.
<i>French Consul-General at Buda-Pest</i>	...	M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin.
<i>Russian Consul-General at Fiume</i>	...	M. Salviati.
<i>Acting Russian Consul at Prague</i>	...	M. Kazansky.

## 6. TURKEY.

<i>British Chargé d'Affaires</i>	...	Mr. Beaumont.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	M. Bompard.
<i>Serbian Chargé d'Affaires</i>	...	M. M. Georgevitch.
<i>Austrian Consul-General</i>	...	Herr Jehlitschka.

## 7. BELGIUM.

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	M. Davignon. Baron van der Elst (Secretary- General).
<i>Colonial Minister</i>	...	H. Renkin.
<i>British Minister</i>	...	Sir Francis Villiers.
<i>French Minister</i>	...	M. Klobukowski.
<i>American Minister</i>	...	Mr. Brand Whitlock.
<i>German Minister</i>	...	Herr von Below Saleske.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Minister</i>	...	Count Clary.
<i>Dutch Minister</i>	...	M. de Weede.

**8. SERBIA.**

<i>Prime Minister</i> ... ..	M. Pashitch.
<i>Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.</i>	Dr. Laza Patchou.
<i>British Minister</i> ... ..	Mr. des Graz.
	Mr. Crackanthorpe (First Secretary).
<i>French Minister</i> ... ..	M. Boppe.
<i>Russian Chargé d'Affaires</i> ... ..	M. Strandtman.
<i>German Secretary of Legation</i> ... ..	Herr von Storck.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Minister</i> ... ..	Baron Giesl von Gieslingen.
<i>Belgian Minister</i> ... ..	M. de Welle.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Consular Agent at Nish</i>	Herr Hoflehner.

**9. ITALY.**

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> ... ..	Marquis di San Giuliano.
<i>British Ambassador</i> ... ..	Sir Rennell Rodd.
<i>French Ambassador</i> ... ..	M. Barrère.
<i>German Ambassador</i> ... ..	Herr von Flotow.
<i>Serbian Minister</i> ... ..	M. Ljub Michailovitch.

**10. SPAIN.**

<i>Belgian Minister</i> ... ..	Baron Grenier.
--------------------------------	----------------

**11. DENMARK.**

<i>French Minister</i> ... ..	M. Bapst.
-------------------------------	-----------

**12. HOLLAND.**

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> ... ..	M. Loudon.
<i>French Minister</i> ... ..	M. Pellet.
<i>Belgian Minister</i> ... ..	Baron Fallon.

**13. LUXEMBURG.**

<i>Minister of State and President of the Government.</i>	Dr. Eyschen.
<i>French Minister</i> ... ..	M. Mollard.
<i>German Minister</i> ... ..	Herr von Buch.

**14. NORWAY.**

<i>French Minister</i> ... ..	M. Chevalley.
-------------------------------	---------------

**15. SWEDEN.**

<i>French Minister</i> ... ..	M. Thiébaud.
-------------------------------	--------------

**16. SWITZERLAND.**

<i>French Consul-General at Basle</i> ... ..	M. Farges.
--	------------



## II.

### THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE.





# THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE.

---

## No. 1.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 20, 1914.*

I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia.

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold,\* in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

\* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

---

## No. 2.

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 22, 1914.*

LAST night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should

be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted towards Servia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance.

### No. 3.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.*

COUNT MENSENDORFF\* told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with a time-limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. I admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards; that, if the demands were made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favourable recently.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

#### No. 4.

*Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24, 1914.)*

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est vu obligé d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie :

“Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait, d'ordre  
(M 3649)

THE Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade :—

“On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on

de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal la déclaration suivante :—

“La Serbie reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine et qu'elle se conformera par conséquent à telle décision que les Puissances prendront par rapport à l'article 25 du Traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage dès à présent à abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observée à l'égard de l'annexion depuis l'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d'un bon voisinage.”

“Or, l'histoire des dernières années, et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 juin, ont démontré l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du royaume par des actes de terroisme, par une série d'attentats et de meurtres.

“Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement : il a toléré l'activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage effréné de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements

the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government :—

“Servia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Servia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.”

“The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

“Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages,

subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

"Cette tolérance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes.

"Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis leur ont été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la "Narodna Odbrana," et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chefs du service-frontière serbe.

"Les résultats mentionnés de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimité expectative qu'il avait observée pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements concentrés à Belgrade et propagés de là sur les territoires de la Monarchie; ces résultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

"C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement

and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

"It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

"The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

"To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Govern-

serbe l'énonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigée contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

"Afin de donner un caractère solennel à cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier à la première page du 'Journal officiel' en date du 13/26 juillet l'énonciation suivante :—

"'Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

"'Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars, 1909.

"'Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer.'

ment a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

"In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their 'Official Journal' of the 13/26 July the following declaration :—

"'The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—*i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"'The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

"'The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.'

" Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le 'Bulletin officiel' de l'armée.

" Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre :

" 1° à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale ;

" 2° à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite 'Narodna Odbrana,' à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise ; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme ;

" 3° à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie ;

" 4° à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal ;

" 5° à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre

" This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army.

" The Royal Servian Government further undertake :

" 1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity ;

" 2. To dissolve immediately the society styled 'Narodna Odbrana,' to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form ;

" 3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ;

" 4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government ;

" 5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed

l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie ;

"6° à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe ;

"des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives ;

"7° à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du Commandant Voija Tankosić et du nommé Milan Ciganović, employé de l'État serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo ;

"8° à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorités serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière ;

"à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Schabatz et de Ložnica coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière ;

"9° à donner au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, qui, malgré leur position officielle, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise ; enfin

"10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

"Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, à 6 heures du soir.

against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy ;

"6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory ; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto ;

"7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employé, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Sarajevo ;

"8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Ložnica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier ;

"9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government ; and, finally,

"10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.



“Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette note.”

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette note à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici :

Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement Royal serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain même de cette déclaration la Serbie s'est engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle.

Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinées à créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des généraux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'État et des juges, bref les sommités du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigés plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité

“A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.”

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations :—

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la dernière crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque-là occupées en Macédoine sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

En présence de ces agissements, auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposée depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars, 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimité du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal espérait que le royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie, lorsque, après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gou-

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Serbia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal

vernement Impérial et Royal rendit possible, par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune, l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'État voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du royaume, qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes conséquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour où l'héritier présomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

En présence de cet état de choses le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe à arrêter le mouvement incendiaire menaçant la sûreté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées, qui ne sauraient admettre que le régicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix européenne fût continuellement troublée par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal tient à la disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier elucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressée aux représentants

Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a *dossier* elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the

Impériaux et Royaux auprès des autres Puissances signataires.

Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

*Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914.*

Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

#### ANNEXE.

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavril Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicité y relative—crime commis par eux le 28 juin dernier—a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes :

1°. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son séjour à Sarajevo, de l'Archiduc François-Ferdinand fut formé à Belgrade par Gavril Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, le nommé Milan Čiganović et Trifko Grabež, avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosić.

2°. Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets Browning avec munition, moyennant lesquels les mal-fauteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livrés à Belgrade à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež par le nommé Milan Čiganović et le commandant Voija Tankosić.

3°. Les bombes sont des grenades à la main provenant du dépôt d'armes de l'armée serbe à Kragujevac.

4°. Pour assurer la réussite de l'attentat, Čiganović enseigna à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež la manière de se servir des grenades et donna, dans un forêt près du champ de tir à Topšchider, des leçons de tir avec pistolets Browning à Princip et Grabež.

5°. Pour rendre possible à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež de passer la frontière de Bosnie-

#### ANNEX.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavril Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions :—

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavril Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, one Milan Čiganović, and Trifko Grabež, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosić.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež by the man Milan Čiganović and Commander Voija Tankosić at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms dépôt of the Servian army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Čiganović taught Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabež in a forest near the shooting ground at Topšchider.

5. To enable Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

Herzégovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un système de transport secret fut organisé par Čiganović.

D'après cette organisation l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzégovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut opérée par les capitaines-frontières de Chabać (Rade Popović) et de Ložnica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbić de Ložnica avec le concours de divers particuliers.

smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Čiganović.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabać (Rade Popović) and Ložnica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbić, of Ložnica, with the assistance of various individuals.

### No. 5.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

NOTE addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.\*

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff\* replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia's part.

I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation.

## No. 6.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof\* to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof\* said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view ; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Serbia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Serbia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Serbia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out ; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France ; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

#### No. 7.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

BEFORE departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Serbia could not leave Russia indifferent.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 P.M. to-morrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake ; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any Power.

## No. 8.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to  
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 24, 1914.*

AUSTRIAN demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.

## No. 9.

*Note communicated by German Ambassador, July 24, 1914.*

THE publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army.

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity; to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-



Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.

## No. 10.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

AFTER telling M. Cambon\* to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff† upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Servia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg.

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Russia then mobilised, it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

\* French Ambassador in London.

† Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Serbia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 11.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Serbia. I understand the German Government is making the same communication to the Powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburg, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Serbia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State.

Prince Lichnowsky\* said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Serbia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands *in toto*. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Serbia; a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria.

\* German Ambassador in London.

## No. 12.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

SERVIA ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows.

Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government.

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.

## No. 13.

*Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.*

(Translation.)

M. SAZONOF télégraphie au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Vienne en date du 11 (24) juillet, 1914 :

“La communication du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aux Puissances le lendemain de la présentation de l'ultimatum à Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un délai tout à fait insuffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour l'aplanissement des complications surgies.

“Pour prévenir les conséquences incalculables et également néfastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'action du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, il nous paraît indispensable qu'avant tout le délai

M. SAZONOF telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914 :

“The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

“In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential

donné à la Serbie pour répondre soit prolongé. L'Autriche-Hongrie, se déclarant disposée à informer les Puissances des données de l'enquête sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner également le temps de s'en rendre compte.

"En ce cas, si les Puissances se convainquaient du bien-fondé de certaines des exigences autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement serbe des conseils en conséquence.

"Un refus de prolonger le terme de l'ultimatum priverait de toute portée la démarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois auprès des Puissances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases même des relations internationales.

"Le Prince Koudachef est chargé de communiquer ce qui précède au Cabinet de Vienne."

M. Sazonof espère que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique adhérera au point de vue exposé, et il exprime l'espoir que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien munir l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne d'instructions conformes.

that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna."

M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna.

#### No. 14.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a *démarche* with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris (St. Petersburg), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

## No. 15.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

I LEARN from the Acting Political Director that the French Government have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government contained in your telegram of to-day.\* They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Serbia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday.†

\* See No. 14.

† See No. 12.

## No. 16.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as Belgrade. He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Serbia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.

## No. 17.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—*(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,\* and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade.†

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Serbia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Serbia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time

\* See No. 14.

† See No. 12.

appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Serbia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

If Serbia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Serbia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.

I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.

### No. 18.

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)*  
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of the 24th July\* acted on.

Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold† is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended.

\* See No. 11.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburg. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.

#### No. 19.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 25, 1914.*

I SAW the Secretary-General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia become menacing.

In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway.

#### No. 20.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

LANGUAGE of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 P.M. to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes.

## No. 21.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to  
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

THE Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply:—

The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the "Official Gazette." The ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana.

The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.

## No. 22.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to  
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views.

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government.

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.

## No. 23.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to  
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

THE Austrian Minister left at 6.30.

The Government have left for Nish, where the Skuptchina\* will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives.

\* The Servian Parliament.



## No. 24.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

YOU spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday,\* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential.

\* See No. 6.

## No. 25.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed.

Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia,\* and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky† said, however, that

\* Should be "Italy."

† German Ambassador in London.

if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. He expressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion.

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were travelling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it.

---

No. 26.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

“The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning.”

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague.

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps.

---

## No. 27.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

I HAVE communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of to-day.\* I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it.

\* See No. 21.

## No. 28.

[Nil.]

## No. 29.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

## No. 30.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Servian Minister called on the 23rd instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson\* on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Serajevo—an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy—disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects—Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian

\* British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual.

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch\* his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

\* Servian Minister in London.

### No. 31.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

SERVIAN reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent.

### No. 32.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

ACCORDING to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Serbia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out, that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Serbia. One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Serbia. Serbia was about to receive a lesson which she required; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Serbia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation and retirement of Government from Belgrade.

## No. 33.

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 26, 1914.*

EMPEROR returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.

## No. 34.

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 26, 1914.*

UNDER-SECRETARY of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.\*

Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this.

\* See No. 21.

## No. 35.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war.

## No. 36.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.*

WOULD Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

---

## No. 37.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.*

BERLIN telegram of 25th July.\*

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four Powers if necessary.

\* See No. 18.

---

## No. 38.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 27.)*

Sir,

*Rome, July 23, 1914.*

I GATHER that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusionments which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

---

## No. 39.

*Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.—(Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.)*

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement Royal serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal du \*10 de ce mois et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout malentendu qui menace de gâter les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

Le Gouvernement Royal conscient que les protestations qui ont apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'État, protestations qui furent coupées court par les déclarations du Gouvernement serbe, faites le \*18 mars, 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelées vis-à-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que, depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont succédé que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de choses politique et juridique créé en Bosnie et Herzégovine, le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'a fait aucune représentation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois donné des preuves de sa politique pacifique et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balkanique, et c'est grâce à la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne que cette paix a

THE Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant,\* and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina† and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th\* March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot

\* Old style.

† The Servian Parliament.

été préservée. Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable pour les manifestations d'un caractère privé, telles que les articles des journaux et le travail paisible des sociétés, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappent, en règle générale, au contrôle officiel, d'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi, de cette façon, à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a été péniblement surpris par les affirmations, d'après lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à Sarajevo; il s'attendait à ce qu'il soit invité à collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime, et il était prêt, pour prouver son entière correction, à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites, se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, est disposé à remettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans égard à sa situation et à son rang, pour la complicité duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies, et spécialement, il s'engage à faire publier à la première page du "Journal officiel" en date du 13 (26) juillet, l'énonciation suivante:

be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Sarajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Sarajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:—

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne toute propa-

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda



gande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels. Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers en fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement Royal et Impérial, à la propagande susmentionnée, et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal serbe était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars, 1909,\* qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que se soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers et fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que, dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer."

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée Royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publié dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre :

1. D'introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina† une disposition dans la loi de la presse, par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine

\* New style.

(M 3649)

which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909,\* which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake :—

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupchtina† a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-

† The Servian Parliament.

et au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, à faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui actuellement aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution est impossible.

2. Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la société "Narodna Odbrana" et autres sociétés similaires aient commis, jusqu'à ce jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal et dissoudra la société "Narodna Odbrana" et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage à éliminer sans délais de l'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomentier la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande.

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même à éloigner du service militaire ceux pour qui l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie

Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian

austro-hongroise, et il attend que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, mais il déclare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, éventuellement, auraient été mêlés au complot du 15\* juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents ou autorités austro-hongrois qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle; cependant dans des cas concrets des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction en question pourraient être données aux agents austro-hongrois.

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder, dès le soir même de la remise de la note, à l'arrestation du Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. Quant à Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui

Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th\* June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who

jusqu'au 15\* juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être arrêté.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus tôt possible, les présomptions de culpabilité ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de leur culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête à Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquête ultérieure.

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznitz qui ont manqué à leurs devoirs et laissé passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, ont eu après l'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie, dès que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces propos, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont, en effet, été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la

up to the 15th\* June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Sarajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitz line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by

présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt comme toujours d'accepter une entente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question à la décision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) mars, 1909.

*Belgrade, le 12 (25) juillet, 1914.*

the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

*Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.*

#### No. 40.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant\* (last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris† arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken.

\* See No. 26.

† See No. 36.

## No. 41.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received July 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.

## No. 42.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received July 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

YOUR proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,\* is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so.

\* Nos. 36 and 37.

## No. 43.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received July 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 26th July.\*

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he

\* See No. 36.

was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof \* to exchange views with Count Berchtold.† He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

#### No. 44.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government.

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of His Majesty's Government in my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the

24th instant.\* I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if they supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

\* See No. 6.

#### No. 45.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

SINCE my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of to-day,\* I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

\* See No. 44.

#### No. 46.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had



exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

### No. 47.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

SEE my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.\*

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments.

\* See No. 46.

### No. 48.

*Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

COUNT MENSENDORFF\* told me by instruction to-day that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure per-

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

manently the most vital Austrian interests. Serbia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Serbia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Serbia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the south-eastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Serbia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if necessary.

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Serbia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Serbia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing—the co-operation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 49.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson\* to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London.

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano† would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

\* British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

† Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 50.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 31.)

Sir,

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 50.

*Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

(Translation.)

POUR mettre fin aux menées subversives partant de Belgrade et dirigées contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a fait parvenir à la date du 23 juillet, 1914, au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie une note dans laquelle se trouvait formulée une série de demandes pour l'acceptation desquelles un délai de quarante-huit heures a été accordé au Gouvernement Royal. Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas répondu à cette note d'une manière satisfaisante, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se trouve dans la nécessité de pourvoir lui-même à la sauvegarde de ses droits et intérêts et de recourir à cet effet à la force des armes.

L'Autriche-Hongrie, qui vient d'adresser à la Serbie une déclaration formelle conformément à l'article 1<sup>er</sup> de la convention du 18 octobre, 1907, relative à l'ouverture des hostilités, se considère dès lors en état de guerre avec la Serbie.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de l'Ambassade Royale de Grande-Bretagne le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de déclarer que l'Autriche-Hongrie se conformera au cours des hostilités, sous la réserve d'un procédé analogue de la part de la Serbie, aux stipulations des conventions de La Haye du 18 octobre, 1907, ainsi qu'à celles de la Déclaration de Londres du 26 février, 1909.

IN order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the Royal Servian Government a note, dated July 23, 1914, in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Servia a formal declaration, in conformity with article 1 of the convention of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Servia.

In bringing the above to notice of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the Conventions of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London of the 28th February, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Servia.

L'Ambassade est priée de vouloir bien communiquer, d'urgence, la présente notification à son Gouvernement.

The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate the present notification as soon as possible to the British Government.

No. 51.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

Sir,

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 51.

*Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin.*

(Translation.)

PAR une note en date du 25 de ce mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a fait connaître au Gouvernement de la République que, d'après Sir Edward Grey, la seule manière d'assurer, si c'était possible, le maintien de la paix dans le cas où les rapports entre la Russie et l'Autriche deviendraient plus tendus serait une démarche commune à Vienne et à Saint-Petersbourg des représentants de l'Angleterre, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en Autriche et en Russie; et il a exprimé le désir de savoir si le Gouvernement de la République était disposé à accueillir favorablement cette suggestion.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie qu'il a invité M. Jules Cambon\* à se concerter

IN a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the British Ambassador informed the Government of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action at Vienna and at St. Petersburg; and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disposed to welcome such a suggestion.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs *ad interim* has the honour to inform his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon\* to concert with

\* French Ambassador in Berlin.

avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre en Allemagne et à appuyer la démarche qu'ils jugeront opportune de faire auprès du Cabinet de Berlin.

Le Gouvernement de la République a, d'autre part, conformément au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement britannique et que son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie lui a transmis par une note en date du 26 de ce mois, autorisé M. Paul Cambon\* à prendre part à la réunion proposée par Sir Edward Grey pour rechercher avec lui et les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Italie à Londres, les moyens de résoudre les difficultés actuelles.

Le Gouvernement de la République est prêt également à donner aux agents français à Pétersbourg, à Vienne et à Belgrade des instructions pour qu'ils obtiennent des Gouvernements russe, autrichien et serbe de s'abstenir de toute opération militaire active en attendant les résultats de cette conférence. Il estime toutefois que les chances de succès de la proposition de Sir Edward Grey reposent essentiellement sur l'action que Berlin serait disposée à Vienne [*sic*]. Une démarche auprès du Gouvernement austro-hongrois pour amener la suspension des opérations militaires paraît vouée à l'échec si l'influence de l'Allemagne ne s'est pas exercée au préalable sur le Cabinet de Vienne.

Le Garde des Sceaux, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim, saisit cette occasion de renouveler, &c.

the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any representation which they may consider it advisable to make to the Berlin Cabinet.

In accordance with the desire expressed by the British Government and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 26th of this month, the Government of the Republic have also authorised M. Paul Cambon\* to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view to discovering in consultation with himself and the German and Italian Ambassadors in London a means of settling the present difficulties.

The Government of the Republic is likewise ready to instruct the French representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Servian Governments to abstain from all active military operations pending the results of this conference. He considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take at Vienna. Representations made to the Austrian-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about a suspension of military operations would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not beforehand exercise their influence on the Vienna Cabinet.

The President of the Council *ad interim* takes the opportunity, &c.

*Paris, le 27 juillet, 1914.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

\* French Ambassador in London.

## No. 52.

*Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914.*

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement de la République accepte la proposition de Sir Edward Grey relative à une intervention de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en vue d'éviter les opérations militaires actives sur les frontières autrichiennes, russes et serbes; il a autorisé M. P. Cambon\* à prendre part aux délibérations de la réunion à quatre, qui doit se tenir à Londres.

L'Ambassadeur de France à Berlin a reçu pour instructions, après s'être concerté avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Berlin, d'appuyer la démarche de ce dernier dans la forme et la mesure qui seraient jugées opportunes.

M. Viviani† est prêt à envoyer aux représentants français à Vienne, Saint-Petersbourg et Belgrade des instructions dans le sens suggéré par le Gouvernement britannique.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 27 juillet, 1914.*

THE Government of the Republic accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia; and they have authorised M. P. Cambon\* to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London.

The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate.

M. Viviani† is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the British Government.

*French Embassy, July 27, 1912.*

\* French Ambassador in London.

† French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 53.

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.)*

(Translation.)

*Saint-Petersbourg,  
(Télégraphique.)  
le 14 (27) juillet, 1914.*

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre est venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile que l'Angleterre prenne l'initiative de convoquer à Londres une conférence des

*St. Petersburg,  
(Telegraphic.)  
July 27, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the

représentants de l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie, pour étudier une issue à la situation actuelle.

J'ai répondu à l'Ambassadeur que j'ai entamé des pourparlers avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en conditions que j'espère favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore reçu de réponse à la proposition que j'ai faite d'une revision de la note entre les deux Cabinets.

Si des explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient irréalisables, je suis prêt à accepter la proposition anglaise, ou toute autre de nature à résoudre favorablement le conflit.

Je voudrais pourtant écarter dès aujourd'hui un malentendu qui pourrait surgir de la réponse donnée par le Ministre de la Justice français à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, concernant des conseils de modération à donner au Cabinet Impérial.

representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favourable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favourable solution of the conflict.

I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador, regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet.

#### No. 54.

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28, 1914.)*

*Saint-Pétersbourg,*  
le 15 (28) juillet, 1914.  
(Télégraphique.)

MES entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne confirment mon impression que l'Allemagne est plutôt favorable à l'intransigeance de l'Autriche.

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arrêter tout le développement de la crise, paraît n'exercer aucune action sur son alliée.

L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffisante la réponse de la Serbie.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg,*  
(Telegraphic.) July 15 (28), 1914.

MY interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient.



Cette attitude allemande est tout particulièrement alarmante.

Il me semble que mieux que toute autre Puissance l'Angleterre serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir à Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement allemand à l'action nécessaire. C'est à Berlin qu'indubitablement se trouve la clef de la situation.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

It seems to me that Great Britain is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

No. 55.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday,\* I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic.

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers throughout the conversations that would ensue.

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers.

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary.

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

\* See No. 44.

## No. 56.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburg, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Serbia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Serbia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Serbia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Serbia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 57.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 27, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Serbia, but he believes that if Serbia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer

action. Serbia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favourably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communication of the note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Serbia.

## No. 58.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

I COMMUNICATED to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded in your telegram\* to Berlin of the 27th July.

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace.

\* See No. 46.

## No. 59.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday\* to St. Petersburg.

He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossibility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Serbia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government.

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Serbia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.

\* See No. 47.

## No. 60.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

SECRETARY of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday\* to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.

\* See No. 43.

## No. 61.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike proceedings against Serbia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict.

## No. 62.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your telegram of 27th July\* to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said that, as mentioned in your speech,† which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was

\* See No. 46.

† "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933

both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Serbia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Serbia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed.

## No. 63.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 25th July to Paris.\*

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna.

\* See No. 27.

## No. 64.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

AT the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you:—

In a long conversation this morning Servian Chargé d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Serbia might still accept the whole Austrian note.

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Serbia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Serbia to accept without conditions.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation—such as slight verbal difference in sentence

regarding renunciation of propaganda—quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Chargé d’Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here.

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration.

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador.

No. 65.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d’Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nish, July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending efforts being made towards a peaceful solution.

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant-vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.

No. 66.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d’Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nish, July 28, 1914.*

TELEGRAM received here that war declared by Austria.

No. 67.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

EXPLANATION given in your telegram of the 27th July\* of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies.

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all.

\* See No. 43.

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and, if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.\*

\* See No. 46.

#### No. 68.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

GERMAN Government, having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

#### No. 69.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

IT is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th July.\*

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape.

\* See No. 55.

#### No. 70.

*Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 29, 1914.*

(1.) *Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914.*

IN consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Servia, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, Kieff,

Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

(2.) *Telegram to Count Benckendorff.\**

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Serbia is now most urgent.

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Serbia.

\* Russian Ambassador in London.

No. 71.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

AT invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would in his opinion have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Serbia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his



intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided" were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.

## No. 72.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram\* to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Serbia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangement for averting a European war would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Serbia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier.

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Serbia were attacked by Austria.

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions.

\* See No. 46.

## No. 73.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE received *note verbale* from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July\* in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government

\* See No. 4.

is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal declaration according to article 1 of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 26th February, 1909.

---

## No. 74.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who should be authorised accordingly.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned.

---

## No. 75.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees,

seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications.

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

#### No. 76.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli*. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French colleague said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Serbia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you.

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments.

## No. 77.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

I MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram of to-day.\* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.

\* See No. 75.

## No. 78.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

PARTIAL mobilisation was ordered to-day.

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant\* to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained, would only be directed against Austria.

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by mean of conversations with Ambassadors either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realised by the British public that it was not the fault of the Russian Government.

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of the 27th July,† which I mentioned to him,

\* See No. 67.

† See No. 57.

were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers provided it was acceptable to Servia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia. Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instant\* was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me to-day. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilisation, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colours, that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now declared war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilisation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.

\* See No. 69.

### No. 79.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

THERE is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Servia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people which has been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. This, however, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do.

## No. 80.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 29, 1914.*

IN your telegram of the 27th instant\* to Berlin, German Ambassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instant† from Berlin.

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,† but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburg fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communication.

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government must lend their co-operation in this.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect.

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.

\* See No. 46.

† See No. 43.

## No. 81.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday.\*

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there.

\* See No. 64.

## No. 82.

*Mr. Beaumont, British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, July 29, 1914.*

I UNDERSTAND that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule.

---

## No. 83.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nish, July 29, 1914.*

I HAVE been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant in the House of Commons.

---

## No. 84.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor to inform me that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. The press correspondents at St. Petersburg had been told that Russian Government would mobilise. The German Government had said that they were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations *à quatre* in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could

be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.

---

## No. 85.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I WAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victoriorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at



this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day\* to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.

\* See No. 77.

No. 86.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 29, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made to-day by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation. The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia.

No. 87.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

Sir,

AFTER telling M. Cambon\* to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon\* that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn

\* French Ambassador in London.

into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky\* not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

\* German Ambassador in London.

# No. 88.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

Sir,

I TOLD the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilisation. I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff,\* that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning, and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Servia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Servia. It was, of course, too late for all military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some

\* Russian Ambassador in London.

mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Serbia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to Berlin what I had said to him this morning.

I am, &c.,  
E. GREY.

---

No. 89.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

Sir,

AFTER speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

I am, &c.  
E. GREY.

---

No. 90.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.**Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

Sir,

IN addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July\* to your Excellency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's† telegram of the 28th July‡ and of my reply to it.§ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Serbia would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano¶ had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with Serbia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Serbia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian territory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn Serbia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently were taking precautions.

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found of preserving the peace of Europe.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

\* See No. 84.

† British Ambassador in Rome.

‡ See No. 64.

§ See No. 81.

¶ Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 91.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

THE Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long memorandum, which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of Serbia towards Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was.

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Serbia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff\* said that the war with Serbia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Serbia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State.

Count Mensdorff\* deprecated this.

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Serbia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

## No. 92.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

THE Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano\* suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

\* Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 93.

*Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 30, 1914.*

(1.)

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof.\**

(Translation.)

*Vienne,*

*le 15 (28) juillet, 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

J'AI entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold† dans le sens des instructions de votre Excellence. Je lui fis observer, en termes les plus amicaux, combien il était désirable de trouver une solution qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait à la Monarchie austro-hongroise des garanties sérieuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie.

J'attirais l'attention du Comte Berchtold† sur tous les dangers pour la paix de l'Europe, qu'entraînerait un conflit armé entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie.

Le Comte Berchtold† me répondit qu'il se rendait parfaitement compte du sérieux de la situation et des avantages d'une franche explication avec le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg. Il me dit que d'un autre côté le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, qui ne s'était décidé que très mal volontiers aux mesures énergiques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion aucune des termes de la note austro-hongroise.

Le Comte Berchtold† ajouta que la crise était devenue si aigue, et que l'excitation de l'opinion publique avait atteint tel degré,

I SPOKE to Count Berchtold† to-day in the sense of your Excellency's instructions. I brought to his notice, in the most friendly manner, how desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Servia.

I drew Count Berchtold's† attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be involved by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

Count Berchtold† replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided much against their will on the energetic measures which they had taken against Servia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold† added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, that

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

que le Gouvernement, le voulait-il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la réponse même de la Serbie donne la preuve du manque de sincérité de ses promesses pour l'avenir.

the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Servian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Servia's promises for the future.

---

(2.)

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.*

*Saint-Petersbourg,  
le 16 (29) juillet, 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'informe, au nom du Chancelier, que l'Allemagne n'a pas cessé d'exercer à Vienne une influence modératrice et qu'elle continuera cette action même après la déclaration de guerre. Jusqu'à ce matin il n'y avait aucune nouvelle que les armées autrichiennes aient franchi la frontière serbe. J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur de transmettre au Chancelier mes remerciements pour la teneur amicale de cette communication. Je l'ai informé des mesures militaires prises par la Russie, dont aucune, lui dis-je, n'était dirigée contre l'Allemagne ; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne préjugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, ces mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation de la plus grande partie de l'armée austro-hongroise.

L'Ambassadeur se prononçant en faveur d'explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne et nous, je répondis que j'y étais tout disposé, pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il parlait trouvent écho à Vienne.

*St. Petersburg,  
July 16 (29), 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

THE German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there had been no news that the Austrian army has crossed the Servian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenour of this communication. I have informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany ; I added that neither should they be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation being the mobilisation of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Ambassador said that he was in favour of direct explanations between the Austrian Government and ourselves, and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna.

En même temps je signalais que nous étions tout disposés à accepter le projet d'une conférence des quatre Puissances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, l'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas entièrement.

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour mettre à profit tous les moyens propres à produire une solution pacifique, consisterait en une action parallèle des pourparlers d'une conférence à quatre de l'Allemagne, de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie et d'un contact direct entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, à l'instar à peu près de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments les plus critiques de la crise de l'an dernier.

Je dis à l'Ambassadeur qu'après les concessions faites par la Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions restées ouvertes ne serait pas très difficile à trouver, à condition toutefois de quelque bonne volonté de la part de l'Autriche et à condition que toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence dans un sens de conciliation.

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account the most suitable methods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four Powers—Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

### (3.)

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.*

*Saint-Petersbourg,*  
le 16 (29) juillet, 1914.

(Télégraphique.)

Lors de mon entretien avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon télégramme précédent, je n'avais pas encore reçu le télégramme du 15 (28) juillet de M. Schébéko.\*

Le contenu de ce télégramme constitue un refus du Cabinet de

*St. Petersburg,*  
July 16 (29), 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

AT the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schébéko's\* telegram of the 15th (28th) July.

The contents of this telegram constitute a refusal of the Vienna

\* Russian Ambassador at Vienna.



Vienne de procéder à un échange d'idées direct avec le Gouvernement Impérial.

Dès lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'à nous en remettre entièrement au Gouvernement britannique pour l'initiative des démarches qu'il jugera utile de provoquer.

Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in any steps which they may consider advisable.

### No. 94.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

I LEARN that mobilisation of Russian corps destined to carry out operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realised, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless mediation, which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favourable spirit; if approached in a proper manner, he thought she would probably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers.

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia.

## No. 95.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Serbia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Serbia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Serbia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war.

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity.

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.

---

## No. 96.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their conversations, although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply.

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria.

---

## No. 97.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to  
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

FRENCH Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Serbia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof\* told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A.M., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof\* to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof\* accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is translation:—

“If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Serbia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations.”

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back, and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilisation.

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 98.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

SECRETARY of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's\* telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from here. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Serbia, will probably

\* German Ambassador in London.

find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French ambassador yesterday—Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram\* received from Prince Lichnowsky† last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in the way he had done.

\* See No. 102.

† German Ambassador in London.

## No. 99.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

PRESIDENT of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stops her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been modified, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation. The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific.

She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

---

## No. 100.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 30, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Servia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views.

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.

---

## No. 101.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 29th July.\*

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

\* See No. 85

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

#### No. 102.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

I HAVE warned Prince Lichnowsky\* that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky\* to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.†

\* German Ambassador in London.

† See No. 98.

#### No. 103.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and

Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof,\* as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,† and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† See No. 97.

#### No. 104.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

YOU should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan\* of to-day,† and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburg.

\* British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

† See No. 103.

#### No. 105.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir;

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

M. CAMBON\* reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of

\* French Ambassador in London.

Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit.

I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

---

Enclosure 1 in No. 105.

*Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.*

My dear Ambassador, *Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.*

FROM time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.

E. GREY.

---



## Enclosure 2 in No. 105.

*M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey.*

*L'Ambassade de France,  
Londres,  
ce 23 novembre, 1912.*

(Translation.)  
*French Embassy, London.  
November 23, 1912.*

Cher Sir Edward,

Dear Sir Edward.

PAR votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rappelé que, dans ces dernières années, les autorités militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne s'étaient consultées de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujours été entendu que ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberté, pour chaque Gouvernement, de décider dans l'avenir s'ils se prêteraient l'un l'autre le concours de leurs forces armées; que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre spécialistes n'étaient et ne devaient pas être considérées comme des engagements obligeant nos Gouvernements à agir dans certains cas; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si l'un ou l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'appréhender une attaque non provoquée de la part d'une tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur l'assistance armée de l'autre.

YOU reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Votre lettre répond à cette observation, et je suis autorisé à vous déclarer que, dans le cas où l'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'appréhender soit l'aggression d'une tierce puissance, soit quelque événement menaçant pour la paix générale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immédiatement avec l'autre si les deux Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prévenir l'aggression ou de

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two

sauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements délibéreraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposés à prendre en commun; si ces mesures comportaient une action, les deux Gouvernements prendraient aussitôt en considération les plans de leurs états majors et décideraient alors de la suite qui devrait être donnée à ces plans.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,  
PAUL CAMBON.

Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours &c.

PAUL CAMBON.

---

Enclosure 3 in No. 105.

*French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.*

(Translation.)

L'ARMÉE allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontières, hier; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire. Nos avant-postes sont en retraite à 10 kilom. en arrière de la frontière. Les populations ainsi abandonnées à l'attaque de l'armée adverse protestent; mais le Gouvernement tient à montrer à l'opinion publique et au Gouvernement britannique que l'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas la France. Tout le 16<sup>e</sup> Corps de Metz renforcé par une partie du 8<sup>e</sup> venu de Trèves et de Cologne occupe la frontière de Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15<sup>e</sup> Corps d'Armée de Strasbourg a serré sur la frontière. Sous menace d'être fusillés les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexés ne peuvent pas passer la frontière; des réservistes par dizaines de milliers sont rappelés en Allemagne; c'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation: or, nous n'avons rappelé aucun réserviste.

THE German Army had its advance-posts on our frontiers yesterday; German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilom. from the frontier. The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Trèves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. This is the last stage before mobilisation, whereas we have not called back a single reservist.

Comme vous le voyez, l'Allemagne l'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos informations concordent pour montrer que les préparatifs allemands ont commencé samedi,\* le jour même de la remise de la note autrichienne.

Ces éléments, ajoutés à ceux contenus dans mon télégramme d'hier, vous permettent de faire la preuve au Gouvernement britannique de la volonté pacifique de l'un et des intentions agressives de l'autre.

\* *Sic*: in original. The actual date of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum was, in fact, Thursday, July 23. The Servian reply was dated Saturday, July 25, and it is clearly to the latter document that reference is intended.

As you see, Germany has done so. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday,\* the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in.

These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive intentions of the other.

---

### No. 106.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

I LEARNED from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that might imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible.

## No 107.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

I DO not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication\* which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned.

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise.

\* See No. 84.

---

No. 108.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

CHANCELLOR informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor.

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.

---

## No. 109.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

I READ to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday.\* His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official document.

His Excellency agreed.

\* See No. 101.

## No. 110.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at*  
*St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia.

## No. 111.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1913.*

I HOPE that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above.

## No. 112.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

ACCORDING to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole Russian army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor tells me that "Kriegsgefahr"\* will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr"\* signified the

\* "Imminence of War."

taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

---

### No. 113.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to  
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)*

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

IT has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

---

### No. 114.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and  
Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.

A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is important to have an early answer.

---

### No. 115.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

IN view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is pre-

pared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

### No. 116.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.\*

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development.

\* See No. 99.

### No. 117.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

AT 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency.

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised.

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England.



German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminates. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 P.M. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place.

---

No. 118.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Serbia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognise such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Serbia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation.

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Serbia; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Serbia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace.

---

## No. 119.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

M. CAMBON\* referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson† this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

\* French Ambassador in London.

† British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 120.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to  
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July\* with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.† He trusted it would meet with your approval:—

“Si l’Autriche consentira à arrêter marche des ses troupes sur le territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d’une question d’intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d’Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d’État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s’engage à conserver son attitude expectante.”‡

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former’s telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier; it was, however of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress.

M. Sazonoff§ said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this.

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty’s Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

\* See No. 103.

† See No. 97.

‡ TRANSLATION.—“If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude.”

§ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 121.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 31st July.\*

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria.

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything.

\* See No. 111.

## No. 122.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

NEUTRALITY of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.\*

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very

\* See No. 114.

doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.

---

No. 123.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the reply\* of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

---

\* See No. 122.

## No. 124.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

ON the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,\* I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysée, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make.

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilisation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing up.

\* See No. 114.

## No. 125.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.\*

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows:—

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.

\* See No. 124.

## No. 126.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

I HAVE had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed

to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilisation, and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilise if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up.

## No. 127.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 1, 1914.*

GENERAL mobilisation of army and fleet.

## No. 128.

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 1, 1914.*

BELGIAN neutrality.

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday\* have been acted upon.

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

\* See No. 115.

## No. 129.

*Minister of State, Luxembourg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)*

(Translation.)

*Luxembourg, 2 août, 1914.*  
(Télégraphique.)

*Luxembourg, August 2, 1914.*  
(Telegraphic.)

MINISTRE d'État du Luxembourg Eyschen vient de recevoir par l'intermédiaire du Ministre d'Allemagne à Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un télégramme du Chancelier de l'Empire allemand Bethmann-Hollweg disant que les mesures militaires à Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile contre le Luxembourg, mais sont uniquement des mesures destinées à assurer contre attaque éventuelle d'une armée française. L'exploitation des voies ferrées affermées à l'Empire Luxembourg recevra complète indemnité pour dommages éventuels.

The Luxembourg Minister of State, Eyshen, has just received through the German Minister in Luxembourg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxembourg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxembourg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxembourg for any damage caused by using the railways which are leased to the Empire.

## No. 130.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant-ships.

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered.

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible.



## No. 131.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

I STILL believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.

## No. 132.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof\* to Count Benckendorff† of the 31st July communicated to me to-day:—

“(Urgent.)

“Formule amendée conformément à la proposition anglaise : ‘Si Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro serbe a assumé le caractère d’une question d’intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d’État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s’engage à conserver son attitude expectante.’”‡

(Above communicated to all the Powers.)

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† Russian Ambassador in London.

‡ TRANSLATION.—“Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal : ‘If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.’”

## No. 133.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

M. DE ETTER\* came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof,† dated the 31st July, which are as follows:—

\* Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London.

† Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory."

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

No. 134.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.

No. 135.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at  
St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of this acceptance

would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Serbia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government also by Russian Government.

## No. 136.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

MINISTER of War informed military attaché this afternoon that orders had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisation of the French Army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of "Kriegszustand,"\* the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation under another name.

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes.

\* "State of war."

## No. 137.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*  
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

I SAW the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Serbia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak.

Count Mensdorff\* called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg by Count Berchtold,† and gave me the substance.

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that the "door had been banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburg, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary.

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff\* to the fact that this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburg had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 138.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received August 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of to-day.\*

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to an answer as creating a state of war.

\* See No. 131.

## No. 139.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.*

MY telegram of 31st July.\*

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made.

In the evening M. Sazonof† had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Serbia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Serbia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment.

M. Sazonof† informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Serbia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg: the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof† was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria

\* See No. 120.

† Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

and Russia ; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate situation.

M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,\* had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.

\* See No. 120.

#### No. 140.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

THE Minister of War again sent for the military attaché this evening, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act.

#### No. 141.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 1, 1914.*

I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisation is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and

Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany.

## No. 142.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

ORDERS have just been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August.

## No. 143.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

DETENTION of British merchant ships at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August\* acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

\* See No. 130.

## No. 144.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

SECRETARY of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war.

## No. 145.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received August 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

MY telegram of 1st August.\*

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

\* See No. 143.

## No. 146.

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received August 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 2, 1914.*

THE news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.

## No. 147.

*Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)*

(Translation.)

(Télégraphique.)

*Luxembourg, le 2 août, 1914.*

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les faits suivants :

Dimanche, 2 août, de grand matin, les troupes allemandes, d'après les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand ducal à l'heure actuelle, ont pénétré sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant spécialement vers le sud du pays et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand Duché. Un certain nombre de trains blindés avec des troupes et des munitions ont été acheminés par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig à Luxembourg, où l'on s'attend de les voir arriver.

*Luxembourg,*

(Telegraphic.) *August 2, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts :—

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival



D'un instant à l'autre, ces faits impliquent des actes manifestement contraire à la neutralité du Grand Duché garantie par le Traité de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement luxembourgeois n'a pas manqué de protester énergiquement contre cette agression auprès des représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne à Luxembourg. Une protestation identique va être transmise télégraphiquement au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Etrangères à Berlin.

is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxembourg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

## No. 148.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon\* the following memorandum :—

“ I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

“ This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.”

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon\* asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

\* French Ambassador in London.

## No. 149.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 1st August.\*

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship "Sappho" at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August,† I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

\* See No. 143.

† See No. 130.

## No. 150.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 3, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 2nd August\*: Detention of British ships at Hamburg.

No information available.

\* See No. 149.

## No. 151.

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

FRENCH Government have offered through their military attaché the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been sent to-day:—

"We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take."

## No. 152.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.*

ON the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication:—

“ In reply to the German Government’s intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano\* replied :—

“ ‘ The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.’ ”

In making this communication, M. Cambon† was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the *casus fœderis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

\* Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† French Ambassador in London.

### No. 153.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

THE King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms :—

“ Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty’s friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty’s Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.”

His Majesty’s Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty’s Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

## No. 154.

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

GERMAN Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

---

## No. 155.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

YOU should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

---

## No. 156.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

I CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

---

## No. 157.

*German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

PLEASE dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating

most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

---

## No. 158.

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

MILITARY attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Liège has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed.

---

## No. 159.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

WE hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning\* be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

---

\* See No. 153.

## No. 160.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir,

*London, August 8, 1914.*

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant\* I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow† at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,‡ and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be

\* See No. 153.

† German Secretary of State.

‡ See No. 159.

reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow\* expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow\* wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between

\* German Secretary of State.

Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.\*

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow† a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann‡ said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann‡ left me, a flying sheet, issued by the "Berliner Tageblatt," was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow† at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow† came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that

\* This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

† German Secretary of State.

‡ German Under-Secretary of State.



effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the "pestilential 'Tageblatt,'" which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message:—

"The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles."

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow\* and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports—which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing—and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route *viâ* the Hook of Holland to that *viâ* Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A

\* German Secretary of State.

retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard,\* and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

\* American Ambassador in Berlin.

### No. 161.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.*  
*Sir,* *London, September 1, 1914.*

THE rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments.

The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tschirsky,\* who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn

\* German Ambassador at Vienna.

up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold\* during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the "Neue Freie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Serbia. The official "Fremdenblatt," however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications.

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Serbia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Serbian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl† had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning.

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Serbia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the

\* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Serbia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's\* peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Serbian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Serbia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands.† But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Serbian question by which Austrian fears of Serbian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Serbia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis.‡ On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons§ on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Serbia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Serbian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Serbia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His

\* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."

‡ See Hansard, Vol. 65, No. 107, columns 931-933.

Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia.

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirscky\* abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary† with full powers to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof.‡ Count Berchtold§ refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko|| again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko|| that Count Szapary† had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof‡ that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof,‡ M. Schebeko|| added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff,¶ to the effect that Austria had neither "banged

\* German Ambassador in Vienna.

† Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

‡ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

§ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

|| Russian Ambassador in Vienna.

¶ Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

the door " on compromise nor cut off the conversations.\* M. Schebeko† to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold,‡ and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,§ had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko† repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko† had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold‡ informed the foreign missions at Vienna that " the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia."

M. Schebeko† left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold‡ the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that

\* See No. 137.

† Russian Ambassador in Vienna.

‡ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

§ Austro-Hungarian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated.

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The "Neue Freie Presse" was violently insulting towards England. The "Fremdenblatt" was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgium neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the war.

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage.

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff,\* at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August.

After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold† received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff\* had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and other places throughout the country. I had already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of *Chargé des Archives*. He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message.

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 P.M. No disagreeable incidents occurred, Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.



### III.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK.

## CHAPTER I.

WARNINGS.  
(1913.)

## No. 1.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, March 17, 1913.*

OUR naval and military attachés are sending to their respective Ministers reports on the new German military law. I take this opportunity of drawing the attention of your Excellency to these important documents.

The consideration of the financial expedients by which Germany intends to provide for these military measures is the sole cause of the delay in the publication of the definite proposals of the Government. In spite of the patriotism with which the rich classes affect to accept the sacrifices asked of them, they are none the less, particularly the business circles, dissatisfied with the financial measures which have been announced, and they feel that a compulsory levy imposed in times of peace creates a formidable precedent for the future. On the other hand, the Federal Governments have strongly opposed an innovation which grants to the Empire resources derived from direct taxation. Hitherto, taxation of this kind has been reserved to the Federal States, and the latter see in the surrender of this principle a new declaration of the corporate unity (*personalité*) of the Empire, constituting a distinct diminution of their own sovereign power.

However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a possible crisis.

The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the Republic to re-establish the three years' service, and the manly determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals has been utilised by the Imperial Government for the purpose of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military strength; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the consequence of German initiative.

The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic sentiment. Every day the Emperor delights to revive

memories of 1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin, and speeches were delivered in which the present situation was compared to that of a hundred years ago. The trend of public opinion will find an echo in the speeches which will be delivered next month in the Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor himself will be forced to allude in his statements to the relations of France and Germany. It was of course to be expected that national patriotism would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counterpart would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force.

Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both countries makes the situation grave.

JULES CAMBON.

#### ENCLOSURE I.

*Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attaché  
to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Étienne,  
Minister of War.*

*Berlin, March 15, 1913.*

THE patriotic movement which has manifested itself in France has caused real anger in certain circles.

I do not, indeed, mean to say that the virulent article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* is the expression of prevalent opinion. It is rather the angry outburst of an impulsive journalist, which has been immediately disavowed by the Government.

However, in spite of its want of good manners the article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* cannot be disregarded; several important newspapers have approved of its substance, if not of its form, and it appears to express a real feeling, a latent anger.

It is interesting to note this fact, because it throws very vivid light on the meaning of the present armaments.

For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say, "It is a provocation; we will not allow it." More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany.

To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realising that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to outrun France completely.

To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much on the fact that the impending legislation, which French public opinion is too apt to consider as a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected consequence of the law of June, 1912.

This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliberately, according to German fashion, left regiments and other large units incomplete. It was evident that there would be no long delay in filling in the gaps.\* The Balkan crisis, coming just at the right moment, furnished a wonderful opportunity for exploiting the centenary of the War of Liberation, and obtaining with greater ease sacrifices through the memory of those made in days gone by, and that too at a time when Germany was opposed to France.

In order to show clearly the genesis of this military programme, I beg to recall what was written by my predecessor Colonel Pellé a year ago, when the law of 1912 was published :

"We are discovering every day how deep and lasting are the feelings of injured pride and revenge provoked against us by the events of last year.

"The Treaty of the 4th November 1911 has proved a complete disillusion.

The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even the Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their share in Morocco.

"It seemed, a year or so ago, as if the Germans had set out to conquer the world. They considered themselves so strong that no one would dare to oppose them. Limitless possibilities were opening out for German manufactures, German trade, German expansion.

"Needless to say, these ideas and ambitions have not disappeared to-day. Germany still requires outlets for commercial and colonial expansion. They consider that they are entitled to them, because their population is increasing every day, because the future belongs to them. They consider us, with our forty million inhabitants, as a second rate power.

"In the crisis of 1911, however, this second rate power successfully withstood them, and the Emperor and the Government gave way. Public opinion has forgiven neither them

---

\* The problem which is set us to-day would, therefore, only be set again a few years later, and in a much more acute fashion, since the decrease of our contingents is continually lowering the number of our effectives on a peace footing.

nor us. *People are determined that such a thing shall never happen again.*"

And at the moment when the second and formidable part of the programme is about to be realised, when German military strength is on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the occasion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction, France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said, "her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection." The disgust of Germany can well be understood.

Of course the Government points to the general situation in Europe and speaks of the "Slav Peril." As far as I can see, however, public opinion really seems indifferent to this "Peril," and yet it has accepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws.

On the 10th March last, being the centenary of the *levée en masse* of Germany against France, in spite of a downpour of rain, a huge crowd surged to the military parade in front of the Schloss, in the middle of the Tiergarten, in front of the statues of Queen Louise and Frederick William III., which were surrounded by heaps of flowers.

These anniversaries, recalling as they do the fight with France, will be repeated the whole year through. In 1914 there will be a centenary of the first campaign in France, the first entry of the Prussians into Paris.

To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France, as does the *Kölnische Zeitung*, we are in fact, and shall long remain the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our forty millions of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large.

Germans wish for peace—so they keep on proclaiming, and the Emperor more than anyone—but they do not understand peace as involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making the necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority of its army will be favourable to an explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless.

It must be emphasized again that the Government is doing everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with éclat all the various anniversaries of 1813.

The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France.

---

## ENCLOSURE II.

*M. de Faramond, Naval Attaché to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Baudin, Minister of Marine.*

*Berlin, March 15, 1913.*

IN reporting on the examination of the Naval budget by the Financial Committee of the Reichstag, I said that no Naval law would be introduced this year having as its object an increase of the fleet, and that the whole of the military effort would be directed against us.

Although the new Bill, having for its object the increase of the German effectives, has not yet been presented to the Reichstag, we know that it deals with "an increase of military strength of immense scope" to use the expression of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.

The official newspapers have also referred to the military proposal in terms which enable us to consider the communiqué of the *Lokal Anzeiger* as accurate.

The German effectives reach at the present moment 720,000 men. We are, therefore, entitled to conclude that on the 1st October 1914, the Imperial army will be raised to a figure not far removed from 860,000.

The importance of this figure would not be so great if the provisions of the proposed legislation (as far as one can gather from the official newspapers) did not tend, as, in fact, those of the law of 1912 tend, to place the army corps nearest to our frontier in a state which most nearly approaches a war footing, in order to be able on the very day of the outbreak of hostilities, to attack us suddenly with forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the operations.

The conditions under which the German Emperor would nowadays commence a campaign against France are not those of forty years ago. At the commencement of the war of 1870 the Prussian General Staff had considered the possibility of a victorious French offensive, and Moltke, seeing that we might conceivably get as far as Mayence, remarked to his sovereign, "There they will come to a stop." William II. cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of 25, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of young men from 20 to 25, must contain in its ranks a considerable proportion of Socialists.

It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to blows; but it will be very important

that the Imperial Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of the campaign and its final result.

On the last occasion when the recruits for the Guard took the oath at Potsdam I was struck to hear the Emperor take as a theme for his address to the young soldiers "the duty of being braver and more disciplined in adversity than in success."

And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such an incalculable effect on the Empire, that we find in all the plans worked out by the General Staff proposals for a crushing offensive movement against France.

In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France that the danger seems to them greatest. The *Kölnische Zeitung* has said as much in an article both spiteful and violent, the form rather than the substance of which has been disavowed by the Wilhelmstrasse.

But we must be willing to realise that the opinion expressed by the *Kölnische Zeitung* is at the present moment that of the immense majority of the German people.

In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a conversation which a member of our Embassy had the other evening with the old Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to reflect the opinions which dominate Court circles.

Referring to the new German military proposals Prince Donnersmarck spoke as follows :—

"French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbour evil designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect ourselves."

And the Prince added: "I have even been considered in France as one of those responsible for the war of 1870. That is quite false. Even if I took part in the war after it had begun, I did my utmost to prevent its outbreak. A short time before the war, happening to be at a dinner where there were some of the most important personages of the Imperial Government, I expressed my regret at the hostile sentiments which were already becoming manifest between France and Prussia. The answer was that, if I spoke like that, it was because I was afraid of a struggle in which the issue would certainly be unfavourable to Prussia. I replied, 'No, it is not because I am afraid, that I repudiate the idea of war between France and Prussia, but rather because I think that it is in the interest of both countries to avoid war. And since you have referred to the possible result of such

a struggle I will give you my opinion. I am convinced that you will be beaten and for this reason. In spite of the brilliant qualities which I recognise are possessed by the French and which I admire, you are not sufficiently accurate; by accuracy I do not mean arriving in time at a meeting, but I mean punctuality in the whole sense of the word. Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as punctual as Germans in the fulfilment of their duty. In the coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants from the top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute exactitude, however important or small it may be." And Prince Donnersmarck added: "An exactitude which played so great a rôle forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of moving masses far more numerous."

In this way the old Prince gave expression to the confidence shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military organisation.

When I spoke above of the new German proposal I only alluded to increased effectives. But the proposal will include also an increase of material and of defence works, the details of which are not known, but some idea of which may be gained by the figure estimated to be necessary to meet the expenses, viz., 1,250,000,000 francs.

The carrying into effect of the law of the quinquennium of 1911 did not necessitate any special financial measures.

The military and naval law of 1912 had been provisionally covered by the Budget surplus of the years 1910 and 1911, by the reform of the law with regard to alcohol and by delaying the reduction of the tax on sugar. (These last two resources only represent together the sum of 60,000,000 francs.)

It must also be remembered that large loans have recently been raised by the Empire and Prussia: 500,000,000 marks on the 29th January 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on the 7th March 1913. Quite an important part of these loans must have been applied to military expenses.

The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial measures.

According to the indications given by the semi-official press, the "non-recurring" expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while the "permanent" annual expenditure resulting from the increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks.

It seems certain that the "non-recurring" expenditure will be covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into effect.



The Government are afraid that among the rich and bourgeois classes this extraordinary tax of a milliard levied exclusively on acquired capital will cause permanent discontent. Accordingly they are doing everything in their power to persuade those on whom so heavy an exaction is to be levied that the security of the Empire is threatened, establishing for the purpose an analogy between the warlike times of 1813 and the present day.

By noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independence it is desired to convince people of the necessity of sacrifice, and to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy.

If it is established that the German Government are doing their utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be made in full, and not by way of instalment, and if, as some of the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before 1st July 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us, for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to obtain war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard.

With regard to the manner in which the permanent expenditure resulting from the application of the laws of 1912 to 1913 is to be met, nothing has yet been said. Further legislation will certainly be necessary in order that the required annual amounts may be forthcoming.

To sum up: In Germany the execution of military reforms always follows very closely the decision to carry them out. All the provisions made by the law of the quinquennium of 1911 and by the law of 1912 have already been put into operation. It is quite possible that part of the material, the purchase of which will be authorised by the new law, is already in course of manufacture. Military secrets are so well kept here that it is extremely difficult to follow the changes in *personnel* and *matériel*.

With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the very large number of reservists who are at the present time in training), a perfect military organisation and a public opinion which can be swayed by the warlike appeals of the Military and Naval Leagues, the German people is at the present moment a very dangerous neighbour.

If the three years' service is adopted and immediately applied in France, the conditions will be less unequal next year. The German effectives will still be considerably more numerous than ours, but the call to the Colours of all available contingents will no longer allow any selection, and will bring into the ranks of the German army elements of inferior quality and even some undesirable individuals. The morale of the active army will deteriorate.

Germany has wished to upset the equilibrium of the two camps which divide Europe by a supreme effort beyond which they can do little more.

They did not think that France was capable of a great sacrifice. Our adoption of the three years' service will upset their calculations.

FARAMOND.

---

No. 2.

*M. Etienne, Minister of War, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, April 2, 1913.*

I HAVE just received from a reliable source an official secret report concerning the strengthening of the German army. The report is divided into two parts; the first consisting of general statements, the second dealing with technicalities and describing in the greatest detail, for each branch of the service, the measures to be adopted. Especially striking are the instructions with regard to the employment of motor-traction and the utilisation of aircraft.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the first part of this document, which seems to merit your attention.

ÉTIENNE.

---

ENCLOSURE.

*Memorandum on the strengthening of the German Army.*

*Berlin, March 19, 1913.*

I.—GENERAL MEMORANDUM ON THE NEW MILITARY LAWS.

THE increase has taken place in three stages:—

(1) The Conference of Algeciras has removed the last doubt with regard to the existence of an *Entente* between France, Great Britain, and Russia. Moreover we have seen that Austria-Hungary was obliged to keep some of her forces mobilised against Servia and Italy; finally our fleet was not at that time sufficiently strong. At the end of the dispute the first matter taken in hand was the strengthening of our coast defences and the increase of our naval forces. To meet the British plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men to the Continent, it would be necessary to make a better formation of reserves to be used according to circumstances in the protection of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege operations. It was already clear at that time that it would be absolutely necessary to make a great effort.

(2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions brought on the incident of Agadir. At that time the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns

rendered an attack on France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by the British fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. This increase was from this moment considered as a minimum.

(3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a war in support of our ally. The new situation in the south of Austria-Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally could give us. On the other hand, France was strengthened by a new *loi des cadres*; it was accordingly necessary to anticipate the date of execution contemplated by the new military law.

Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active army, which would ensure Germany an honourable peace and the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end.

Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending *Deutschtum* (German influence) all the world over.

The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day increase their population. The employment of an army of black men in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.

## II.—AIM AND OBLIGATIONS OF OUR NATIONAL POLICY, OF OUR ARMY, AND OF THE SPECIAL ORGANISATIONS FOR ARMY PURPOSES.

Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defence as well as for offence. *We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French.* We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (*Losschlagen*) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our

financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed.

We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course in case of war we should openly recognise these secret allies ; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realisation. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication ; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose ; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World.

However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralised ; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavourable case, Denmark might be forced by Great Britain to abandon her neutrality ; but by this time the decision would already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offensive measures from this quarter.

In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank.

As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our north-western frontier cannot be viewed in quite

the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organise their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganisation, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive organisation was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests.

The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law.

Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her.

---

No. 3.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, May 6, 1913.*

I WAS talking this evening to the Secretary of State about the conference of Ambassadors and the results obtained at the meeting in London yesterday. The crisis with which Europe was threatened is in his opinion over, but only temporarily. "It seems to me," said Herr von Jagow, "that we are travelling in a mountainous district. We have just reached a difficult pass and we see other heights rising in front of us." "The

height which we have just surmounted," I replied, "was, perhaps, the most difficult to cross."

The crisis which we have just gone through has been very serious. Here the danger of war has been considered imminent. I have proof of the anxiety of the German Government by a number of facts which it is important that your Excellency should know.

I received yesterday a visit from one of my colleagues with whom I maintain special and cordial relations. On the occasion of the visit he paid to Herr von Jagow, the latter asked my colleague confidentially what was exactly the situation of Russia in the Far East, and whether this Power had at the present time any cause for fear which might necessitate the retention of its troops in that quarter. The Ambassador answered him that he knew of nothing, absolutely nothing, which could be a cause of preoccupation for the Russian Government, and that the latter have their hands free in Europe.

I said above that the danger of war had been regarded here as extremely near. The Government have not been satisfied with investigating the position in the Far East; preparations have even been made here.

The mobilisation of the German army is not restricted to the recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for the call, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call to "attention," and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible. If such a warning were given in France, a thrill would run through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next day.

This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations which I was carrying on with regard to Morocco.

Now it has been given again about ten days ago—that is to say, at the moment of the Austro-Albanian tension. I know that this is so, and I have it from several different sources, notably from officers of the reserve who have told it to their friends in the strictest confidence. These gentlemen have taken the necessary measures to put aside in a safe the means of existence for their families for a year. It has even been said that it was for this reason that the Crown Prince, who was to make the trial trip on the "Imperator," did not embark.

The decision which occasioned this preliminary mobilisation order is quite in keeping with the ideas of the General Staff. On this point I have been informed of some remarks made in a German *milieu* by General von Moltke, who is considered here as the most distinguished officer of the German army.

The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. "We must put on one side," said General von Moltke, "all commonplaces

as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favour. Success alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly," added the General, "we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance."

This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it corresponds to that of political circles; the latter, however, do not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy.

This is what was being thought and said privately a fortnight ago.

From these events the following conclusions may be drawn which comprise the facts stated above; these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps. *They wish to be always ready.*

As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of persistence; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defences of the country.

JULES CAMBON.

#### No. 4.

*M. Allizé, French Minister in Bavaria,  
to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Munich, July 10, 1913.*

FROM a political point of view people are asking what is the object of the new armaments. Recognising that no one threatens Germany, they consider that German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect German interests with success. As I pointed out the day after the Morocco agreement of 1911, it is thought that the Imperial Chancery will be as incapable in the future as in the past, of adopting an active foreign policy and of achieving, at least in this sphere, successes which would justify the burdens which the nation has assumed.

This frame of mind is all the more a cause of anxiety as the Imperial Government would find themselves supported by public opinion in any enterprise on which they might energetically embark, even at the risk of a conflict. The state of war to which all the events in the East have accustomed people's

minds for the last two years appears no longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the political and economic difficulties which will continue to increase.

May the example of Bulgaria exercise a salutary influence on Germany. As the Prince Regent recently said to me, "The fortune of war is always uncertain ; every war is an adventure, and the man is a fool who risks it believing himself sure of victory."

ALLIZÉ.

### No. 5.

*Report to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs (on Public Opinion in Germany according to the Reports of the Diplomatic and Consular Agents).*

Paris, July 30, 1913.

FROM observations which our agents in Germany have been able to collect from persons having access to the most diverse circles, it is possible to draw the conclusion that two feelings sway and irritate men's minds :—

- (1) The Treaty of the 4th November 1912 is considered a disappointment for Germany ;
- (2) France—a new France—undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911 is considered to be a warlike country, and to want war.

Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives to the Socialists, representing the most different districts of Germany, university people from Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Marburg, students, elementary school teachers, commercial clerks, bank clerks, bankers, artisans, merchants, manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, editors of Democratic and Socialistic newspapers, Jewish publicists, members of trade unions, clergymen and shopkeepers from the Mark of Brandenburg, country squires from Pomerania and shoemakers from Stettin celebrating the 505th anniversary of their association, country gentlemen, officials, priests, and large farmers from Westphalia, are unanimous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding to their position in society or their political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions :

The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck ; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma.



In July 1911, the "Coup of Agadir" made the Morocco question for the first time a national question affecting the life and expansion of the Empire. The revelations and the press campaign which followed, have sufficiently proved how the campaign has been organised, what Pan-German greed it had awakened, and what hatred it had left behind. If the Emperor was discussed, the Chancellor unpopular, Herr von Kiderlen was the best-hated man in Germany last winter. However, he begins to be merely thought little of, for he allows it to be known that he will have his revenge.

Thus, during the summer of 1911, German public opinion became restive when confronted with French opinion with regard to Morocco. And the attitude of France, her calmness, her re-born spiritual unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war, these things are the most persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion.

Why then did not Germany go to war during the summer of 1911, since public opinion although not so unanimous and determined as French public opinion, was certainly favourable? Apart from the pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and financial reasons made themselves felt.

But these events of 1911 have caused a profound disillusionment in Germany. A new France united, determined, resolved not to be intimidated any longer, has emerged from the shroud in which she had been seen burying herself for the last ten years. Public opinion in Germany, from December to May, from the columns of the press of all parties, which reproached the Imperial Government for their incapacity and cowardice has discovered with surprise mingled with irritation that the country conquered in 1870 had never ceased since then to carry on war, to float her flag and maintain the prestige of her arms in Asia and Africa, and to conquer vast territories; that Germany on the other hand had lived on her reputation, that Turkey is the only country in which during the reign of William II. she had made moral conquests, and these were now compromised by the disgrace of the Morocco solution. Each time that France made a colonial conquest this consolation was offered:—"Yes, but that does not prevent the decadence, anarchy, and dismemberment of France at home."

The public were mistaken and public opinion was misled.

Given this German public opinion that considers France as longing for war, what can be augured for the future as regards the possibility and proximity of war?

German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war.

There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganised and have no popular leaders. They consider

that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armour plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Great Britain.

The forces consist of the following elements :—

The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct.

Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business, such as the *grands seigneurs* of Silesia and a few other personages very influential at Court, who are sufficiently enlightened to realise the disastrous political and social consequences of war, even if successful.

Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital.

Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein—conquered, but not assimilated and sullenly hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans.

Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in the large southern states—Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden—are divided by these two opinions :—an unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great economic advantages ; a successful war would only profit Prussia and Prussianisation, against which they have difficulty in defending their political independence and administrative autonomy.

These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer peace to war ; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling.

An example will make this idea clear :—The 110 Socialist members of the Reichstag are in favour of peace. They would be unable to prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry excitement and enthusiasm.

Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the Emperor on the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a guarantee of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism gives free play to those who favour war.

People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey

the idea that Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as it is said of France that it is the country where the civil power is supreme. There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention than this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and more recent. There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a press either convinced or subsidised for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed.

Those in favour of war are divided into several categories; each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike desire.

Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is *inevitable*. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better.

Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on over-population, over-production, the need for markets and outlets; or for social reasons, *i.e.*, to provide the outside interests that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist masses.

Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of conversation or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets, the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are two historical facts mutually incompatible.

Others are bellicose from "Bismarckism" as it may be termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force. From their still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry disappointment is the unifying force of the *Wehrvereine*, and other associations of Young Germany.

Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary France; others finally from a feeling of rancour. These last are the people who heap up pretexts for war.

Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as follows:—The country squires represented in the Reichstag by the Conservative party want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting

of the session which has just closed, the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill, a Conservative speaker put forward the need for promotion among officers as an argument in its favour. Finally, this social class which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realises with dread the democratisation of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection threaten its material interests, but in addition, the number of its political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the aristocracy ; in 1898, 83 ; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 to the Centre, 7 to the Left, and one sits among the Socialists.

The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal Party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character.

The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at the democratisation of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in the Reichstag ; in 1874, 155 ; in 1887, 99 ; in 1912, 45. They do not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the leading rôle in parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas, they look to war to settle problems which their parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom—without France industrial unrest would be unknown.

Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armour plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity—all these regard war as good business.

Amongst the "Bismarckians" must be reckoned officials of all kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Conservatives or Imperial Party. This is the party of the "pensioned," whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the *Post*. They find disciples and political sympathisers in the various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools and universities.

The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by

statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the nations, it checks improvement in the lot of the masses, and assists the growth of socialism. France by clinging obstinately to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impotence; that is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem.

Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apologists of German *Kultur* wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is still her possession. From this source is derived the phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the *Kriegsvereine*, *Wehrvereine* and other similar associations too well known to need particular description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction caused by the treaty of November 4th has considerably swelled the membership of colonial societies.

We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancour and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are now in very bad odour in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part of the globe where France and Germany are in contact.

They must have their revenge, for they complain that they have been duped. During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike diplomatists exclaimed, "Germany will not be able to have any serious conversation with France until she has every sound man under arms."

In what terms will this conversation be couched? The opinion is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offence will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.

Must war then be considered as inevitable?

It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the *Entente Cordiale* and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that

victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained.

As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not believed that her co-operation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective.

People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a duel between France and Germany.

---

No. 6.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, November 22, 1913.*

I HAVE received from an absolutely reliable source an account of a conversation which took place a fortnight ago between the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff—General von Moltke. This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. I am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace.

The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II., whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the war-like tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William II. has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later. Naturally he believes in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its certain success.

General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success "for," he said, to the King, "this time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes."

The King of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense; and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators.

The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff nevertheless persisted in their point of view.

During the course of this conversation the Emperor moreover seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II. advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the German army, the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realised that Germany cannot go much further.

One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. Perhaps Germany would be glad to see Belgium less hostile to certain aspirations lately manifested here with regard to the Belgian Congo, but this last hypothesis does not seem to me to fit in with the interposition of General von Moltke.

For the rest, the Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his real thoughts escape him. Whatever may have been the object of the conversation related to me, the revelation is none the less of extreme gravity. It tallies with the precariousness of the general situation and with the state of a certain shade of public opinion in France and Germany.

If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, "we must keep our powder dry."

JULES CAMBON.

---

## CHAPTER II.

## PRELIMINARIES.

From the death of the Hereditary Archduke (June 28, 1914)  
to the Presentation of the Austrian Note to Servia  
(July 23, 1914).

---

## No. 7.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, June 28, 1914.*

NEWS has just arrived at Vienna that the Hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife have been to-day assassinated at Serajevo by a student belonging to Grahovo. Some moments before the attack to which they fell a victim, they had escaped the explosion of a bomb which wounded several officers of their suite.

The Emperor, who is now at Ischl, was immediately informed by telegraph.

DUMAINE.

---

## No. 8.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 2, 1914.*

THE crime of Serajevo arouses the most acute resentment in Austrian military circles, and among all those who are not content to allow Servia to maintain in the Balkans the position which she has acquired.

The investigation into the origin of the crime which it is desired to exact from the Government at Belgrade under conditions intolerable to their dignity would, in case of a refusal, furnish grounds of complaint which would admit of resort to military measures.

DUMAINE.

---

## No. 9.

*M. de Manneville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to  
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign  
Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 4, 1914.*

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday, and has to-day repeated to the Russian Ambassador,



that he hoped Serbia would satisfy the demands which Austria might have to make to her with regard to the investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices in the crime of Serajevo. He added that he was confident that this would be the case because Serbia, if she acted in any other way, would have the opinion of the whole civilised world against her.

The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible tension in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so.

DE MANNEVILLE.

No. 10.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to  
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign  
Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 6, 1914.*

IN the course of an interview which he had asked for with the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Sazonof pointed out in a friendly way the disquieting irritation which the attacks of the Austrian press against Serbia are in danger of producing in his country.

Count Czernin having given him to understand that the Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for the instigators of the crime of Serajevo on Servian territory, M. Sazonof interrupted him: "No country," he said, "has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers threaten Serbia? Do not embark on such a course."

May this warning not be in vain.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 11.

*M. d'Aphier le Maugin, French Consul-General at Budapest,  
to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister  
for Foreign Affairs.*

*Budapest, July 11, 1914.*

QUESTIONED in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Servian question M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was necessary to wait for the result of the judicial inquiry, as to which he refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. And the Chamber has given its full approval to this. He also showed himself equally discreet as to the decisions taken at the meeting of Ministers at Vienna, and did not give any indication whether the project of a *démarche*

at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both hemispheres are full, would be followed up. The Chamber assented without hesitation.

With regard to this *démarche* it seems that the word has been given to minimise its significance; the anger of the Hungarians has, as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the press, which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that for the word "*démarche*," with its appearance of a threat, there should be substituted the expression "*pourparlers*," which appears to them more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment all is for peace.

All is for peace, in the press. But the general public here believes in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every reason to have confidence have assured me that they knew that every day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities towards the frontier. Whether true or not this rumour has been brought to me from various quarters with details which agree with one another; at least it indicates what are the thoughts with which people are generally occupied. The Government, whether it is sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is *preparing a coup*, is now doing all that it can to allay these anxieties. This is why the tone of the Government newspapers has been lowered, first by one note, then by two, so that it is at the present moment almost optimistic. But they had themselves spread the alarm as it suited them (*à plaisir*). Their optimism to order is in fact without an echo; the nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of this; without exception stocks have fallen to an unaccountably low level; the Hungarian 4 per cents. were quoted yesterday at 79·95, a rate which has never been quoted since they were first issued.

D'APCHIER LE MAUGIN.

## No. 12.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 15, 1914.*

CERTAIN organs of the Vienna Press, discussing the military organisation of France and of Russia, represent these two countries as incapable of holding their own in European affairs; this would ensure to the Dual monarchy, supported by Germany, appreciable facilities for subjecting Serbia to any treatment which it might be pleased to impose. The *Militärische Rundschau* frankly admits it. "The moment is still favourable to us. If we do not decide for war, that war in

which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three years will be begun in far less propitious circumstances. At this moment the initiative rests with us: Russia is not ready, moral factors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the contest some day, let us provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a Great Power, our honour, are in question; and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned—to be or not to be—which is in truth the great matter to-day.”

Surpassing itself, the *Neue Freie Presse* of to-day reproaches Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he said, “Our relations with Servia require, however, to be made clear.” These words rouse its indignation. For it, tranquillity and security can result only from a *war to the knife* against Pan-Servism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the cursed Servian race.

DUMAINE.

No. 13.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 19, 1914.*

THE Chancellor of the Consulate, who has sent me his half-yearly report, in which he sums up the various economic facts which have been the subject of his study since the beginning of the year, has added a section containing political information emanating from a trustworthy source.

I asked him briefly to sum up the information which he has obtained regarding the impending presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, which the papers have for some days been persistently announcing.

You will find the text of this memorandum interesting on account of the accurate information which it contains.

DUMAINE.

No. 14.

*Memorandum.*

*(Extract from a Consular Report on the Economic and Political Situation in Austria)*

*Vienna, July 20, 1914.*

FROM information furnished by a person specially well informed as to official news, it appears that the French Government would be wrong to have confidence in disseminators of optimism; much will be demanded of Servia; she will be required to dissolve several propagandist societies, she will be summoned to repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in

co-operation with Austrian officials; to keep strict control over anti-Austrian tendencies in the schools; and it is a very difficult matter for a Government to consent to become in this way a policeman for a foreign Government. They foresee the subterfuges by which Servia will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply; that is why a short interval will perhaps be fixed for her to declare whether she accepts or not. The tenour of the note and its imperious tone almost certainly ensure that Belgrade will refuse. Then military operations will begin.

There is here, and equally at Berlin, a party which accepts the idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions, in other words, a conflagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be necessary to start before Russia has completed the great improvements of her army and railways, and before France has brought her military organisation to perfection. But on this point there is no unanimity in high circles; Count Berchtold and the diplomatists desire at the most localised operations against Servia. But everything must be regarded as possible. A singular fact is pointed out: generally the official telegraph agency, in its summaries and reviews of the foreign press, pays attention only to semi-official newspapers and to the most important organs; it omits all quotation from and all mention of the others. This is a rule and a tradition. Now, for the last ten days, the official agency has furnished daily to the Austro-Hungarian press a complete review of the whole Servian press, giving a prominent place to the least known, the smallest, and most insignificant papers, which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of the official agency has obviously for its aim the excitement of public feeling and the creation of opinion favourable to war. The fact is significant.

---

No. 15.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 21, 1914.*

It has come to my knowledge that the Servian representative at Berlin declared, at the Wilhelmstrasse, yesterday, that his Government was ready to entertain Austria's requirements arising out of the outrage at Serajevo, provided that she asked only for judicial co-operation in the punishment and prevention of political crimes; but that he was charged to warn the German Government that it would be dangerous to attempt, through that investigation, to lower the prestige of Servia.

In confidence I may also inform your Excellency that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at the diplomatic audience to-day mentioned this subject to Herr von Jagow. He said that he supposed the German Government now had full knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were therefore willing to give the assurance that the Austro-Servian difficulties would be localised. The Secretary of State protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note, and expressed himself in the same way to me. I could not help showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little with what circumstances lead one to expect.

I have also been assured that, from now on, the preliminary notices for mobilisation, the object of which is to place Germany in a kind of "attention" attitude in times of tension, have been sent out here to those classes which would receive them in similar circumstances. That is a measure to which the Germans, constituted as they are, can have recourse without indiscretion and without exciting the people. It is not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily followed by full mobilisation, as we have already seen, but it is none the less significant.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 16.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 21, 1914.*

I SPECIALLY draw your attention to information of which I am in receipt from Berlin; the French Ambassador notifies the extreme weakness of the Berlin Bourse yesterday, and attributes it to the anxiety which has begun to be aroused by the Servian question.

M. Jules Cambon has very grave reason for believing that when Austria makes the *démarche* at Belgrade which she judges necessary in consequence of the crime of Serajevo, Germany will support her with her authority, without seeking to play the part of mediator.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 17.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign  
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg,  
Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 22, 1914.*

M. JULES CAMBON having questioned Herr von Jagow on the tenour of the Austrian note at Belgrade, the latter replied that he knew nothing of the text; our Ambassador expressed

his great astonishment at this. He emphasizes that the weakness of the Berlin Bourse continues, and that pessimistic rumours are current.

M. Barrère also discussed the same question with the Marquis di San Giuliano, who appears disturbed by it, and gives the assurance that he is working at Vienna in order that Serbia may not be asked for anything beyond what is practicable, for instance, the dissolution of the Bosnian Club, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the crime of Serajevo.

In present circumstances, the most favourable presumption one can make is that the Cabinet at Vienna, finding itself carried away by the press and the military party, is trying to obtain the maximum from Serbia by starting to intimidate her, directly and indirectly, and looks to Germany for support in this.

I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna to use all his influence with Count Berchtold and to represent to him, in a friendly conversation, how much Europe would appreciate moderation on the part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Servia.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

### No. 18.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 22, 1914.*

NOTHING is known as to the decision which Count Berchtold, who is prolonging his stay at Ischl, is trying to obtain from the Emperor. The intention of proceeding against Servia with the greatest severity, of having done with her, of "treating her like another Poland," is attributed to the Government. Eight army corps are said to be ready to start on the campaign, but M. Tisza, who is very disturbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have intervened actively in order to exercise a moderating influence.

In any case it is believed that the *démarche* will be made at Belgrade this week. The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian Government with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to guarantees of control and police supervision, seem to be acceptable to the dignity of the Servians; M. Yovanovich believes they will be accepted. M. Pashitch wishes for a peaceful solution, but says that he is ready for a full resistance. He has confidence in the strength of the Servian army; besides, he counts on the union of all the Slavs in the Monarchy to paralyse the effort directed against his country.

Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognised here that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both

to the Austro-Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities governed by the Emperor, which has already been so much compromised.

Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, is showing himself a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancery would not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador, who left yesterday for the country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has confided to me that his Government will not raise any objection to steps directed towards the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the societies which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept requirements which would humiliate Servian national feeling.

DUMAINE.

---

No. 19.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 22, 1914.*

Your Excellency has been good enough to communicate to me the impressions which have been collected by our Ambassador at Berlin with regard to the *démarche* which the Austro-Hungarian Minister is proposing to make at Belgrade.

These impressions have been confirmed by a conversation which I had yesterday with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador, who stated to him that at Berlin a *démarche* of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Servian Government was expected. Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, but that up to the present time they had not been successful in this, and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a *démarche* of this kind. Sir Edward Grey answered Prince Lichnowsky that he would like to believe that, before intervening at Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Government had fully informed themselves as to the circumstances of the conspiracy to which the Hereditary Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenburg had fallen victims, and had assured themselves that the Servian Government had been cognisant of it and had not done all that lay in their power to prevent the consequences. For if it could not be proved that the Servian Government were responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse against them the opinion of Europe.

The communication of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the Italian

Ambassador, who also fears the possibility of fresh tension in Austro-Servian relations.

This morning the Servian Minister came to see me, and he shares the apprehensions of Sir Edward Grey. He fears that Austria may make of the Servian Government demands which their dignity, and above all the susceptibility of public opinion, will not allow them to accept without a protest. When I pointed out to him the quiet which appears to reign at Vienna, and to which all the Ambassadors accredited to that Court bear testimony, he answered that this official quiet was only apparent and concealed feelings which were most fundamentally hostile to Servia. But, he added, if these feelings take a public form (*démarche*) which lacks the moderation that is desirable, it will be necessary to take account of Servian public opinion, which has been inflamed by the harsh treatment to which the Austrian Government have constantly subjected that country, and which has been made less patient by the memory of two victorious wars which is still quite fresh. Notwithstanding the sacrifices which Servia has made for her recent victories she can still put 400,000 men in the field, and public opinion, which knows this, is not inclined to put up with any humiliation.

Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, asked him to recommend his Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from Servia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be carried away too far.

PAUL CAMBON.

---

No. 20.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Rome.*

*Paris, July 23, 1914.*

ACCORDING to information collected by the French Ambassador at Vienna, the first intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government had been to proceed with the greatest severity against Servia, while keeping eight army corps ready to start operations.

The disposition at this moment was more conciliatory ; in answer to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, whom I instructed to call the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian note, and the demands which would be formulated in it, allow us to count on a peaceful result. In view of the customary procedure of the Imperial Chancery I do not know what confidence ought to be placed in these assurances.



In any case the Austrian note will be presented in a very short space of time. The Servian Minister holds that as M. Pashitch wishes to come to an understanding, he will accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the outrage and to the guarantees for control and police supervision, but that he will resist everything which might affect the sovereignty and dignity of his country.

In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador is in favour of violent measures, while at the same time he confesses that the Imperial Chancery is perhaps not entirely in agreement with him on this point; the Russian Ambassador, trusting to assurances which have been given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure confided to M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any objection to the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the revolutionary associations, but that they could not accept requirements which were humiliating to the national sentiment of Servia.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 21.

*M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris.*

*Munich, July 23, 1914.*

THE Bavarian press seems to believe that a peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible but even probable; on the other hand official circles have for some time been assuming with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.

In particular the President of the Council said to me to-day that the Austrian note the contents of which were known to him (*dont il avait connaissance*) was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Servia, but that none the less the existing situation appeared to him to be very serious.

---

## CHAPTER III.

## THE AUSTRIAN NOTE AND THE SERVIAN REPLY.

(From Friday, July 24, to Saturday, July 25.)

## No. 22.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

I SHOULD be obliged if you would urgently send on to M. Dumaine the following information and instructions.

Reval, July 24, 1914, 1 a.m.

In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the dangers which might result from any step taken by Austria-Hungary in relation to Servia in connection with the crime of which the Hereditary Archduke has been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in thinking that we should not leave anything undone to prevent a request for an explanation or some *mise en demeure* which would be equivalent to intervention in the internal affairs of Servia, of such a kind that Servia might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might, by means of a friendly conversation with Count Berchtold, give him counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him understand how undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would appear to be a threat on the part of the Cabinet at Vienna.

The British Ambassador, who was kept informed by M. Sazonof, expressed the idea that his Government would doubtless associate itself with a *démarche* for removing any danger which might threaten general peace, and he has telegraphed to his Government to this effect.

M. Sazonof has addressed instructions to this effect to M. Schebeko. While there is no question in this of collective or concerted action at Vienna on the part of the representatives of the Triple Entente, I ask you to discuss the matter with the Russian and British Ambassadors, and to come to an agreement with them as to the best means by which each of you can make Count Berchtold understand without delay the moderation that the present situation appears to us to require.

Further, it would be desirable to ask M. Paul Cambon to bring the advantages of this procedure to the notice of Sir

Edward Grey, and to support the suggestion that the British Ambassador in Russia will have made to this effect to the Foreign Office. Count Benckendorff is instructed to make a similar recommendation.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 23.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, on  
board the "France."*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

I HAVE sent on your instructions to Vienna as urgent, but from information contained in this morning's papers it appears that the Austrian note was presented at Belgrade at 6 o'clock yesterday evening.

This note, the official text of which has not yet been handed to us by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, appears to be very sharp; it appears to aim not only at obtaining the prosecution of the Serbs who were directly implicated in the outrage of Serajevo but to require the immediate suppression of the whole of the anti-Austrian propaganda in the Servian press and army. It is said to give Servia till 6 o'clock on Saturday evening to make her submission.

In sending your instructions to M. Dumaine I requested him to come to an agreement with his British and Russian colleagues as to his action.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 24.

*Text of the Austrian Note.*

*See No. 4 of British Correspondence, p. 3.*

No. 25.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, on board  
the "France," and to London, Berlin, Vienna,  
St. Petersburg, Rome, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning left me a copy of the Austrian note which was handed in at Belgrade on Thursday evening. Count

Scézsén informs me that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives the Servian Government up to 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th for their answer.\*

The note is based on the undertaking made by Servia on the 31st March 1909, to recognise the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reproaches the Servian Government with having tolerated an anti-Austrian propaganda in which officials, the army, and the press have taken part, a propaganda which threatens the security and integrity of Austria, and the danger of which has been shown by the crime of the 28th June which, according to the facts established during the investigation, was planned at Belgrade.

The Austrian Government explain that they are compelled to put an end to a propaganda which forms a permanent danger to their tranquillity, and to require from the Servian Government an official pronouncement of their determination to condemn and suppress it, by publishing in the Official Gazette of the 26th a declaration, the terms of which are given, condemning it, stating their regret, and threatening to crush it. A general order of the King to the Servian army is at the same time to make these declarations known to the army. In addition to this, the Servian Government are to undertake to suppress publications, to dissolve the societies, to dismiss those officers and civil servants whose names would be communicated to them by the Austrian Government, to accept the co-operation of Austrian officials in suppressing the subversive acts to which their attention has been directed, as well as for the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and finally to proceed to the immediate arrest of a Servian officer and an official who were concerned in it.

Annexed to the Austrian memorandum is a note which sums up the facts established by the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and declares that it was planned at Belgrade ; that the bombs were provided for the murderers, and came from a dépôt of the Servian army ; finally that the murderers were drilled and helped by Servian officers and officials.

On visiting the Acting Political Director immediately after making this communication, Count Scézsén without any observa-

\* The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in a private letter on the 24th July sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following correction :—

"In the copy of the dispatch which I had the honour to send to your Excellency this morning, it was said that my Government expected an answer from the Cabinet at Belgrade at latest by 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th of this month. As our Minister at Belgrade did not deliver his note yesterday until 6 o'clock in the evening, the time allowed for the answer has in consequence been prolonged to 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening.

"I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency of this slight alteration in the termination of the period fixed for the answer to the Servian Government."

tions informed him that the note had been presented. M. Berthelot, on my instructions, confined himself to pointing out to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the feeling of anxiety which had been aroused by the information available this morning as to the contents of the Austrian note, and the painful feeling which could not fail to be aroused in French public opinion by the time chosen for so categorical a *démarche* with so short a time limit; that is to say, a time when the President of the Republic and the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic had left St. Petersburg and were at sea, and consequently were not able to exert, in agreement with those Powers which were not directly interested, that soothing influence on Serbia and Austria which was so desirable in the interest of general peace.

The Servian Minister has not yet received any information as to the intentions of his Government.

The German Ambassador has asked me to receive him at 5 o'clock this afternoon.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

## No. 26.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. Thiébaud, French Minister at Stockholm (for the  
President of the Council), and to Belgrade, Vienna,  
London, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburg.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

M. VESNITCH was this morning still without any telegram from his Government informing him as to their intentions, and did not know the contents of the Austrian note.

To a request for advice which he made to the Political Director, M. Berthelot said to him, speaking personally and for himself alone, that Serbia must try to gain time, as the limit of forty-eight hours perhaps formed rather a "*mise en demeure*" than an ultimatum in the proper sense of the term; that there might, for instance, be an opportunity of offering satisfaction on all those points which were not inconsistent with the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia; he was advised to draw attention to the fact that statements based on the Austrian investigations at Serajevo were one sided, and that Serbia, while she was quite ready to take measures against all the accomplices of a crime which she most strongly condemned, required full

information as to the evidence in order to be able to verify it with all speed; above all to attempt to escape from the direct grip of Austria by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe.

I have asked at London and St. Petersburg for the views and intentions of the British and Russian Governments. It appears on the other hand from our information that the Austrian note was not communicated to Italy until to-day, and that Italy had neither been consulted nor even informed of it.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 27.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade,  
London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Rome.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

THE French Ambassador at Vienna informs me that opinion has been startled by the sudden and exaggerated nature of the Austrian demands, but that the chief fear of the military party appears to be that Serbia may give way.

The Servian Minister in Austria thinks that his Government will show themselves very conciliatory in all that concerns the punishment of the accomplices of the crime, and the guarantees to be given as to the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda, but that they could not accept a general order to the army dictated to the King, nor the dismissal of officers who were suspected by Austria, nor the interference of foreign officials in Serbia. M. Yovanovitch considers that, if it were possible to start a discussion, a settlement of the dispute might still be arranged, with the assistance of the Powers.

Our Ambassador at Berlin gives an account of the excitement aroused by the Austrian note, and of the state of feeling of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who thinks that a large part of opinion in Germany would desire war. The tone of the press is threatening and appears to have as its object the intimidation of Russia. Our Ambassador is to see Herr von Jagow this evening.

M. Barrère informs us that Italy is exercising moderating influence at Vienna and is trying to avoid complications.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

## No. 28.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade,  
London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

HERR VON SCHOEN came to inform me of a note from his Government, of which he would not leave me a copy, but at my request he read it twice over to me.

The Note was almost word for word as follows :—

“The statements of the Austro-Hungarian newspapers concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Pan-Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts made known must also do away with all doubt that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is, at any rate, at work there, with the connivance of members of the Government and the army.

“The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Pan-Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the moderation and far-reaching self-restraint of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic intervention of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda has, since that time, continuously increased in extension and intensity. To its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to remain longer inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried

away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them."

The German Ambassador particularly called my attention to the last two paragraphs of his note before reading it, pressing the point that this was the important matter. I noted down the text literally; it is as follows:—"The German Government consider that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately concerned."

"The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the natural play of alliances be followed by incalculable consequences."

I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that while it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all those who were implicated in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Servia; the Servian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them, would risk being carried away by a revolution.

I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took into account two hypotheses: that of a pure and simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the part of Servia. The third hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken into consideration; that of Servia's acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the accomplices and full guarantees for the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.

I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be examined; if Servia gave obvious proof of goodwill it could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation.

Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest in Servia, to take an attitude which was in accord with the wishes of Germany to localise the dispute.

Herr von Schoen recognised the justice of these considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked him if we should give to the Austrian note the character of a simple *mise en demeure*, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that personally he had no views.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.



## No. 29.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.  
Berlin, July 24, 1914.*

THE delivery of the Austrian note to Servia has made a deep impression.

The Austrian Ambassador declares that his Government could not abate any of their demands. At the Wilhelmstrasse, as well as in the press, the same view is expressed.

Most of the *Chargés d'Affaires* present in Berlin came to see me this morning. They show little hope of a peaceful issue. The Russian *Chargé d'Affaires* bitterly remarked that Austria has presented her note at the very moment that the President of the Republic and the President of the Council had left St. Petersburg. He is inclined to think that a considerable section of opinion in Germany desires war and would like to seize this opportunity, in which Austria will no doubt be found more united than in the past, and in which the German Emperor, influenced by a desire to give support to the monarchic principle (*par un sentiment de solidarité monarchique*) and by horror at the crime, is less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude.

Herr von Jagow is going to receive me late in the afternoon.

JULES CAMBON.

## No. 30.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.  
Berlin, July 24, 1914.*

I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day, in the interview which I had with him, if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute with Servia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it.

Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the note was forcible, and that he approved it, the Servian Government having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria. Moreover, he considers this question to be a domestic one for Austria, and he hopes that it will be localised.

I then said to him that not having as yet received any instructions, the views which I wished to exchange with him were strictly personal. Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.

Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said, "It is only " because we are having a personal conversation that I allow " you to say that to me."

"Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself, domestic trouble will probably break out in Servia; that will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be led by Vienna?" I added that the language of the German newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betokened an active support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time limit given to Servia for submission would make an unpleasant impression in Europe.

Herr von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little excitement (*un peu d'émotion*) on the part of Servia's friends, but that he was counting on their giving her wise advice.

"I have no doubt," I then said to him, "that Russia would endeavour to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable concessions; but why not ask from one what is being asked from the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given at Belgrade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being given at Vienna from another quarter?"

The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended on circumstances; but immediately checked himself; he repeated that the difficulty must be localised. He asked me if I really thought the situation serious. "Certainly," I answered, "because if what is happening is the result of due reflection, I do not understand why all means of retreat have been cut off."

All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Austria's attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her Austro-Hungarian ally has shown for some years past, has weakened the confidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy to drag along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram and the Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and covered them with ridicule. All that was asked of the police was that they should be strong; the conviction is that they were violent.

An article which appeared in the *Lokal Anzeiger* this evening shows also that at the German Chancery there exists a state of mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that monarchies must stand together (*sentiment de la solidarité monarchique*). I am convinced that great weight must be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been affected, by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been a few days previously.

It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to every one that they were ignorant of the scope of the note sent by Austria to Servia.

JULES CAMBON.

## No. 31.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated to M. Sazonof a threatening note to Serbia.

The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers could not be more pacific, a fact of which the President of the Republic and the President of the Council have been able to satisfy themselves directly; but the ultimatum which the Austro-Hungarian Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at Belgrade introduces a new and disquieting element into the situation.

Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer violence to Serbia. The shortness of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum renders still more difficult the moderating influence that the Powers of the Triple Entente might exercise at Vienna.

On the other hand, M. Sazonof assumes that Germany will desire to support her ally and I am afraid that this impression is correct. Nothing but the assurance of the solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the German Powers from emphasising their provocative attitude.

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 32.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 24, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY having discussed with me his desire to leave no stone unturned to avert the crisis, we agreed in thinking that the British Cabinet might ask the German Government to take the initiative in approaching Vienna with the object of offering the mediation, between Austria and Serbia, of the four Powers which are not directly interested. If Germany agrees, time will be gained, and this is the essential point.

Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince Lichnowsky the proposal I have just explained. I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have despatched her ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.

Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter capital by the rumours of a naval entente between Russia and Great Britain, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in Germany.

The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the despatch of the ultimatum.

The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no way of arresting the course of events.

However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the *démarche* upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey.

PAUL CAMBON.

### No. 33.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 24, 1914.*

THE Servian Minister received to-night from M. Pashitch a telegram saying that the Austro-Hungarian Government had sent him their ultimatum, the time limit of which expires at 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening. M. Pashitch does not give the terms of the Austrian communication, but if it is of the nature reported in to-day's "Times," it seems impossible for the Servian Government to accept it.

In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely difficult for his Government not to support Servia, we have been asking ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict.

Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I propose to suggest that he should ask for the semi-official intervention of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack.

PAUL CAMBON.

## No. 34.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), Belgrade,  
St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

THE Austrian Ambassador having communicated his Government's note to Sir Edward Grey, the latter observed that no such formidable declaration had ever been addressed by one Government to another; he drew Count Mensdorff's attention to the responsibility assumed by Austria.

With the possibility of a conflict between Austria and Russia before him, Sir Edward Grey proposes to ask for the co-operation of the German Government with a view to the mediation of the four powers who are not directly interested in the Servian question, namely, England, France, Italy and Germany; this mediation to be exercised simultaneously at Vienna and at St. Petersburg.

I advised the Servian Minister to act cautiously, and I am willing to co-operate in any conciliatory action at Vienna, in the hope that Austria will not insist on the acceptance of all her demands as against a small State, if the latter shows herself ready to give every satisfaction which is considered compatible with her independence and her sovereignty.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

## No. 35.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Minister at Berlin, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THE Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of events.

He is of opinion that Austria and Germany have desired to take advantage of the fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances at the present moment, Russia and England appear to them to be threatened by domestic troubles, while in France the state of the army is under discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's *démarche*.

He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation.

He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted his holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be surprised, to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the whole affair by her two allies.

JULES CAMBON.

## No. 36.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council); and to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna.*

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador came at 12 o'clock to protest against an article in the *Echo de Paris* which applied the term "German threat" (*menace allemande*) to his *démarche* of yesterday. Herr von Schoen told a certain number of journalists, and came to state at the *Direction Politique*, that there has been no "concert" between Austria and Germany in connection with the Austrian note, and that the German Government had no knowledge of this note when it was communicated to them at the same time as to the other Powers, though they had approved it subsequently.

Baron von Schoen added, moreover, that there was no "threat"; the German Government had merely indicated that they thought it desirable to localise the dispute, and that the intervention of other Powers ran the risk of aggravating it.

The Acting Political Director took note of Baron von Schoen's *démarche*. Having asked him to repeat the actual terms of the last two paragraphs of his note, he remarked to him that the terms showed the willingness of Germany to act as intermediary between the Powers and Austria. M. Berthelot added that, as no private information had been given to any journalist, the information in the *Echo de Paris* involved this newspaper alone, and merely showed that the German *démarche* appeared to have been known elsewhere than at the Quai d'Orsay, and apart from any action on his part. The German Ambassador did not take up the allusion.

On the other hand, the Austrian Ambassador at London also came to reassure Sir Edward Grey, telling him that the Austrian note did not constitute an "ultimatum" but "a demand for a reply with a time limit"; which meant that if the Austrian demands are not accepted by 6 o'clock this evening, the Austrian Minister will leave Belgrade and the Austro-Hungarian Government will begin military "preparations" but not military "operations."

The Cabinet of London, like those of Paris and St. Petersburg, has advised Belgrade to express regret for any complicity which might be established in the crime of Serajevo, and to promise the most complete satisfaction in this respect. The Cabinet added that in any case it was Serbia's business to reply in terms which the interests of the country appeared to call for. The British Minister at Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues, and, if these have had corresponding instructions in the matter, advise the Servian Government to give satisfaction on all the points on which they shall decide that they are able to do so.

Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky (who, up to the present, has made no communication to him similar to that of Herr von Schoen at Paris) that if the Austrian note caused no difficulty between Austria and Russia, the British Government would not have to concern themselves with it, but that it was to be feared that the stiffness of the note and the shortness of the time limit would bring about a state of tension. Under these conditions the only chance that could be seen of avoiding a conflict would consist in the mediation of France, Germany, Italy and England, Germany alone being able to influence the Government at Vienna in this direction.

The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit this suggestion to Berlin, but he gave the Russian Ambassador, who is a relative of his, to understand that Germany would not lend herself to any *démarche* at Vienna.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 37.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 25, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador came to the Foreign Office to state that his Government would refuse to interfere in the dispute between Austria and Servia.

Sir Edward Grey replied that without the co-operation of Germany at Vienna, England would not be able to take action at St. Petersburg. If, however, both Austria and Russia mobilised, that would certainly be the occasion for the four other Powers to intervene. Would the German Government then maintain its passive attitude, and would it refuse to join with England, France and Italy?

Prince Lichnowsky does not think so, since the question would no longer be one of difficulties between Vienna and Belgrade, but of a conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Sir Edward Grey added this observation, that if war eventually broke out, no Power in Europe would be able to take up a detached attitude (*pourrait s'en désintéresser*).

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 38.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Government is about to endeavour to obtain from the Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum, in order that the Powers may be able to form an opinion on the judicial *dossier*, the communication of which is offered to them.

M. Sazonof has asked the German Ambassador to point out to his Government the danger of the situation, but he refrained from making any allusion to the measures which Russia would no doubt be led to take, if either the national independence or the territorial integrity of Serbia were threatened. The evasive replies and the recriminations of Count de Pourtalès left an unfavourable impression on M. Sazonof.

The Ministers will hold a Council to-morrow with the Emperor presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation. "We must avoid," he said to me, "everything which might precipitate the crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian Government come to blows with Serbia, we ought not to break off negotiations."

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 39.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.*

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Government has instructed its representative at Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time limit fixed for Serbia, so as to enable the Powers to form an opinion on the *dossier* which Austria has offered to communicate to them, and with a view to avoiding regrettable consequences for everyone.

A refusal of this demand by Austria-Hungary would deprive of all meaning the *démarche* which she made to the Powers by communicating her note to them, and would place her in a position of conflict with international ethics.

The Russian Government has asked that you should make a corresponding and urgent *démarche* to Count Berchtold. I beg you to support the request of your colleague. The Russian Government have sent the same request to London, Rome, Berlin and Bucharest.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 40.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 25, 1914.*

SIR Edward Grey has had communicated to him this morning the instructions which require the Russian Ambassador at Vienna to ask for an extension of the time limit given to Serbia by Austria's note of the day before yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian *démarche* should be supported by the British Embassy.



Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen to take the same action as his Russian colleague, and to refer to Austria's communication which was made to him late last night by Count Mensdorff, according to the terms of which the failure of Servia to comply with the conditions of the ultimatum would only result, as from to-day, in a diplomatic rupture and not in immediate military operations.

Sir Edward Grey inferred from this action that time would be left for the Powers to intervene and find means for averting the crisis.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 41.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THIS morning the British Chargé d'Affaires, acting under instructions from his Government, asked Herr von Jagow if Germany were willing to join with Great Britain, France and Italy with the object of intervening between Austria and Russia, to prevent a conflict and, in the first instance, to ask Vienna to grant an extension of the time limit imposed on Servia by the ultimatum.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that directly after the receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's despatch informing him of the intentions of Sir Edward Grey, he had already telegraphed this very morning to the German\* Ambassador at Vienna to the effect that he should ask Count Berchtold for this extension. Unfortunately Count Berchtold is at Ischl. In any case Herr von Jagow does not think that this request would be granted.

The British Chargé d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the Austrian note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria.

Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become essentially an international one.

JULES CAMBON.

\* In French text by an obvious error "de la Grande-Bretagne" is printed.

## No. 42.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to ask the German Government to make strong representations to the Cabinet at Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum.

Herr von Jagow not having made an appointment with him until late in the afternoon, that is to say, till the very moment when the ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent an urgent note addressed to the Secretary of State in which he points out that the lateness of Austria's communication to the Powers makes the effect of this communication illusory, inasmuch as it does not give the Powers time to consider the facts brought to their notice before the expiration of the time limit. He insists very strongly on the necessity for extending the time limit, unless the intention be to create a serious crisis.

JULES CAMBON.

---

## No. 43.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires has, in accordance with his instructions, approached the Secretary of State with a view to securing an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow replied that he had already transmitted to Vienna a suggestion of this nature, but that in his opinion all these *démarches* were too late.

M. Broniewski insisted that if the time limit could not be extended, action at least might be delayed so as to allow the Powers to exert themselves to avoid a conflict. He added that the Austrian note was couched in terms calculated to wound Servia and to force her into war.

Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of a war, but of an "*exécution*" in a local matter.

The Chargé d'Affaires in reply expressed regret that the German Government did not weigh their responsibilities in the event of hostilities breaking out, which might extend to the rest of Europe; to this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such consequences.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, like myself, has heard the rumour that Austria, while declaring that she did not desire an annexation of territory, would occupy parts of Servia until she had received complete satisfaction. "One knows," he said to

me, "what this word 'satisfaction' means." M. Broniewski's impressions of Germany's ultimate intentions are very pessimistic.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 44.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador has carried out at the Consulta the *démarche* which M. Sazonof requested the representatives of Russia at Paris, Berlin, Rome and Bucharest to undertake, the object of which was to induce these various Cabinets to take action similar to that of Russia at Vienna, with a view of obtaining an extension of the time limit imposed on Servia.

In the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, M. Salandra and M. di Martino replied that they would put themselves into communication with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his reply could not reach them until towards 6 o'clock, that is to say, too late to take any step at Vienna.

BARRÈRE.

No. 45.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires received instructions from his Government to ask for an extended time limit for the ultimatum to Servia at the very moment that Count Berchtold was leaving for Ischl, with the intention, according to the newspapers, of remaining there near the Emperor until the end of the crisis.

Prince Koudacheff informed him nevertheless of the *démarche* which he had to carry out, by means of two telegrams *en clair*, one addressed to him on his journey and the other at his destination. He does not expect any result.

Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to whom the Prince communicated the tenour of his instructions and of his telegrams, behaved with icy coldness when it was represented to him that to submit for consideration grievances with documentary proofs without leaving time for the *dossier* to be studied, was not consonant with international courtesy. Baron Macchio replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being courteous.

The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on Servia: it will accept no intervention from any Power until the blow had been delivered and received full in the face by Servia.

DUMAINE.

## No. 46.

*M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

M. PASHITCH has just acquainted me with the reply which will be sent this evening to the Austrian Minister.

The Servian Government agrees to publish to-morrow in the *Journal Officiel* the declaration which has been required of them; they will communicate it also to the army by means of an Order of the Day; they will dissolve the societies of national defence and all other associations which might agitate against Austria-Hungary; they undertake to modify the press law, to dismiss from service in the army, in the ministry of public instruction and in the other Government offices, all officials who shall be proved to have taken part in the propaganda; they only request that the names of these officials may be communicated to them.

As to the participation of Austrian officials in the enquiry, the Government ask that an explanation of the manner in which this will be exercised may be given to them. They could accept no participation which conflicted with international law or with good and neighbourly relations.

They accept all the other demands of the ultimatum and declare that if the Austro-Hungarian Government is not content with this, they are ready to refer the matter to the Hague Tribunal or to the decision of the Great Powers who took part in the preparation of the declaration of March 31, 1909.

BOPPE.

## No. 47.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THROUGHOUT the afternoon there has been a persistent rumour that Serbia had submitted to the Austrian demands. This evening the newspapers published extra editions which announce a rupture at Belgrade and the departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister.

The correspondent of the *Agence Havas* at the Wilhelmstrasse has just received confirmation of this rumour. Large crowds consisting of several hundred persons are collecting here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration of numbers of young people has just passed through the Pariser-platz shouting cries of "Hurrah" for Germany, and singing patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the *Siegessäul*, the Austrian and then the Italian Embassy. It is a significant outburst of chauvinism.

A German whom I saw this evening confessed to me that it had been feared here that Serbia would accept the whole Austrian note, reserving to herself the right to discuss the manner in which effect should be given to it, in order to gain time and to allow the efforts of the Powers to develop effectively before the rupture.

In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen, in view of the determined support which Germany is giving to Austria.

I, for my part, see in Great Britain the only Power which might be listened to at Berlin.

Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburg and London will not succeed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm and absolutely united front.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 48.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

YOUR telegram reaches me exactly at the moment when the time limit given to Serbia expires. On the other hand I have just informed you under what conditions the Russian Chargé d'Affaires has had to carry out his *démarche*. It seems useless to support him when there is no longer any time for it.

During the afternoon a rumour spread that Serbia had yielded to the ultimatum, while adding that she was appealing to the Powers against it. But the latest news is that at the last moment we are assured that the Austrian Minister has just left Belgrade hurriedly; he must have thought the Servian Government's acceptance of the conditions imposed by his Government inadequate.

DUMAINE.

No. 49.

*Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.*

(Communicated by M. Vesnitch, Servian Minister, July 27.)

*See No. 39 of British Correspondence, p. 31.*

CHAPTER IV.

---

FROM THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS,  
(JULY 25, 1914), TO THE DECLARATION  
OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERBIA (JULY 28, 1914).

---

## No. 50.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France,") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 26, 1914.*

THE events of Saturday can be summed up as follows:—refusal of Austria to grant the extension of the time limit asked for by Russia,—departure of the Austrian Minister from Belgrade after receiving a reply from Serbia which was considered insufficient although it reached the limit of any possible concession—order for mobilisation given in Serbia whose Government retired to Kragoujewatz, where it was followed by the French and Russian Ministers.

The Italian Government, to whom the Austrian note had been communicated on Friday, without any request for support or even advice, could not, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, who does not return till Tuesday make any reply to the suggestion of the Russian Government proposing to press at Vienna for an extension of time. It appears from a confidential communication by the Italian Ambassador to M. Paléologue that at Vienna people still soothe themselves with the illusion that Russia "will not hold firm." It must not be forgotten that Italy is only bound by the engagements of the Triple Alliance if she has been consulted beforehand.

From St. Petersburg we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Serbia to ask for British mediation. At the Council of Ministers on the 25th, which was held in presence of the Emperor, the mobilisation of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered; this mobilisation, however, would only be made effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Serbia, and not till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Serbia to be crushed.

In London the German *démarche* was made on the 25th in the same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to break out no Power in Europe could take up a detached attitude. He did not express himself more definitely and used very reserved language to the Servian Minister. The communication made on the evening of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador makes Sir Edward Grey more optimistic; since the diplomatic rupture does not necessarily involve immediate military operations, the Secretary of State is still willing to hope that the Powers will have time to intervene.

At Berlin the language used by the Secretary of State to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires is unsatisfactory and dilatory; when the latter asked him to associate himself with a *démarche* at Vienna for an extension of the time limit, he replied that he had already taken action in this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an extension of the time limit before active measures were taken, he replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with a war but with local operations. Herr von Jagow pretends not to believe that the Austrian action could lead to general consequences.

A real explosion of chauvinism has taken place at Berlin. The German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext before attacking us.

At Vienna, the French Ambassador has not had time to join in the *démarche* of his Russian colleague for obtaining an extension of the time limit fixed for Servia; he does not regret it, this *démarche* having been categorically rejected, and England not having had time to give instructions to her representative about it.

A note from the British Embassy has been delivered to me: it gives an account of the conversation between the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg and M. Sazonof and M. Paléologue. Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four Powers who are not directly interested ought to press both on Russia and Austria that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that they should give time to England, France, Germany and Italy to bring their mediation into play. If Germany accepts, the British Government has reason to think that Italy also would be glad to be associated in the joint action of England and France; the adherence of Germany is essential, for neither Austria nor Russia would tolerate any intervention except that of impartial friends or allies.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

## No. 51.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

A TELEGRAM from Vienna which has just been received at the Consulta informs them that the diplomatic rupture between Austria and Servia has taken place, and that Austria is proceeding to military measures.

The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fiuggi, will not return to Rome till the day after to-morrow.

To-day I had an interesting conversation with the President of the Council on the situation, the full gravity of which he recognises. From the general drift of his remarks, I have carried away the impression that the Italian Government would be willing, in case of war, to keep out of it and to maintain an attitude of observation.

M. Salandra said to me on this subject : " We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent peace being broken ; our situation is somewhat analogous to that of England. Perhaps we could do something in a pacific sense together with the English." M. Salandra stated definitely to me that the Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at the last moment.

BARRÈRE.

## No. 52.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

M. SAZONOF yesterday told the Italian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Russia would employ all diplomatic means to avoid a conflict, and that she did not give up hope that mediation might lead Austria to a less uncompromising attitude ; but that Russia could not be asked to allow Servia to be crushed.

I observe that the greater part of Italian public opinion is hostile to Austria in this serious business.

BARRÈRE.

## No. 53.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London.*

*Paris, July 26, 1914.*

M. PALÉOLOGUE sends me the following telegram :—

" M. Sazonof advises the Servian Government to ask for the mediation of the British Government."



In concurrence with M. Paul Cambon, I think that the French Government can only say that they hope to see the British Government accept, if an offer of this kind is made to them.

Be good enough to express yourself in this sense at the Foreign Office.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 54.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution. "Up to the last moment," he declared to me, "I shall show myself ready to negotiate."

It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szápáry to come to a "frank and loyal explanation." M. Sazonof commented in his presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article, making clear the insulting character of the principal clauses. "The intention which inspired this document," he said, "is legitimate if you pursued no aim other than the protection of your territory against the intrigues of Servian anarchists; but the procedure to which you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded: "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee you the result."

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this language; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the opinion of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof has decided to propose this evening to Count Berchtold the opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg on the changes to be introduced into the ultimatum.

This friendly and semi-official interposition of Russia between Austria and Servia has the advantage of being expeditious. I therefore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and likely to succeed.

PALEOLOGUE.

No. 55.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

M. SCHEBEKO has returned hastily from a journey to Russia; he had only undertaken it after he had received an assurance

from Count Berchtold that the demands on Servia would be thoroughly acceptable.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg spoke in the same sense to M. Sazonof the evening before the delivery of the note. This procedure, which is quite usual in the diplomacy of the Monarchy, and which Baron Macchio has also employed towards me, seems to have greatly added to the irritation of the Russian Government.

M. Schebeko will make an effort, however, to profit by the delay which is indispensable for mobilisation, in order to make a proposal for an arrangement, which will at least have the advantage of allowing us to measure the value of the pacific declarations of Germany.

While we were talking over the situation this evening, in company with Sir M. de Bunsen, the latter received instructions from the Foreign Office with reference to the *démarche* to be attempted by the representatives of the four Powers less directly interested. I am expecting, therefore, that we may have to consult to-morrow with the Duke d'Avarna and with M. Tschirsky, who, in order to refuse his concurrence, will almost certainly entrench himself behind the principle of localising the conflict.

My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, although surprised and perhaps regretting the vigour with which they have been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence military action.

DUMAINE.

#### No. 56.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France," and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 26, 1914.*

THE summary of the Servian reply to the Austrian note only reached us after twenty hours delay. Although the Servian Government had given way on all points, with the exception of two small reservations, the Austro-Hungarian Minister has broken off relations, thus proving the determined wish of his Government to proceed to execution on Servia.

According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon, the British Ambassador thinks that there is a slight yielding; when he observed to Herr von Jagow that Sir Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene between Austria and Servia, but, as this question ceased to be localised, to intervene with England, France and Italy at Vienna and St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State declared that he would do his best to maintain peace.

In the course of an interview between M. Barrère and the General Secretary of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the latter indicated that probably the Italian Government would not have approved the Austrian note; but as it was not communicated to them beforehand, the Government consider themselves by this fact relieved of all responsibility in the grave step taken by Austria.

The German Ambassador came this afternoon to make a communication to me relating to an intervention by France with Russia in a pacific sense. "Austria," he said to me, "has declared to Russia that she was not pursuing any territorial aggrandisement nor any attack on the integrity of the Kingdom of Serbia; her only intention is to ensure her own tranquillity and to take police measures. The prevention of war depends on the decision of Russia; Germany feels herself identified with France in the ardent desire that peace may be maintained, and has the firm hope that France will use her influence in this sense at St. Petersburg."

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she had not committed any act which allowed any doubt as to her moderation, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking a peaceful solution of the dispute. It therefore appeared to us that Germany on her side ought to act at Vienna, where her action would certainly be effective, with a view to avoiding military operations leading to the occupation of Serbia.

The Ambassador having observed to me that this could not be reconciled with the position taken up by Germany "that the question concerned only Austria and Serbia," I told him that the mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburg could be the act of the four other Powers less interested in the question.

Herr von Schoen then entrenched himself behind his lack of instructions in this respect, and I told him that in these conditions I did not feel myself in a position to take any action at St. Petersburg alone.

The conversation ended by the renewed assurances of the Ambassador of the peaceful intention of Germany, whom he declared to be on this point identified with France.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 57.

*Note for the Minister.*

*Paris, Sunday evening, July 26, 1914.*

AFTER the visit which he paid to the Minister at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Baron von Schoen went this evening at 7 o'clock to the *Direction Politique*, to ask that in order to

avoid the appearance in the newspapers of comments intended to influence public opinion, such as that in the *Echo de Paris* of the evening before, and in order to define exactly the sense of the *démarches* of the German Government, a brief statement should be communicated to the press on the interview between the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Herr von Schoen, in order to define what he had in his mind, suggested the following terms, which the Acting Political Director took down at his dictation : " During the afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit, and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation (*sentiment de solidarité pacifique*), they examined the means which might be employed to maintain general peace."

The Acting Political Director replied at once, " Then, in your opinion, every thing is settled, and you bring us the assurance that Austria accepts the Servian note or will enter into conversations with the Powers on this matter?" The Ambassador having appeared surprised and having vigorously denied the suggestion, it was explained to him that if there was no modification in Germany's negative attitude, the terms of the suggested " note to the press " were exaggerated, and of a nature to give a false security to French opinion by creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which were only too evident.

To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner quite personal and private, as man to man, quite freely and without regard to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen asked him to do so.

M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's attitude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war ; a purely objective analysis of the facts and the psychology of the Austro-German relations led logically to this conclusion. In the face of the repeated statement that Germany was ignorant of the contents of the Austrian note, it was no longer permissible to raise any doubt on that point ; but was it probable that Germany would have arrayed herself on the side of Austria in such an adventure with her eyes closed ? Did the psychology of all the past relations of Vienna and Berlin allow one to admit that Austria could have taken up a position without any possible retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the consequences of her uncompromising attitude ? How surprising appeared the refusal by Germany to exercise mediating influence at Vienna now that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian note ! What responsibility was the German Government assuming and what suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted in interposing between Austria and the

Powers, after what might be called the absolute submission of Servia, and when the slightest advice given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which weighed on Europe !

The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats of war, and the mobilisation which she was undertaking make peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from the day when Austrian troops crossed the Servian frontier, one would be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige the St. Petersburg Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of a war which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid.

Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note,<sup>1</sup> and had only approved it after its delivery ; she thought, however, that Servia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He declared besides that he did not know the text of the Servian reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often ill informed, represented it to be.

He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice given, for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone. According to him Austria was not uncompromising ; what she rejects is the idea of a formal mediation, the "spectre" of a conference : a peaceful word coming from St. Petersburg, good words said in a conciliatory tone by the Powers of the Triple Entente, would have a chance of being well received. He added, finally, that he did not say that Germany on her side would not give some advice at Vienna.

In these conditions the Political Director announced that he would ask the Minister if it appeared to him opportune to communicate to the press a short note in a moderate tone.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 21, p. 153. Letter from the French Minister in Munich stating that the Bavarian President of the Council said, on July 23, that he had read the Austrian note to Servia.

Cf. also the British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 95, page 74, in which Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, states :—

"Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."

## No. 58.

*M. Chevalley, French Minister at Christiania,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Christiania, July 26, 1914.*

THE whole German fleet in Norway has received orders to be put to sea. The German authorities at Bergen declare that it is to make straight for Germany.

German ships scattered in the Fjords to the north of Bergen were to join those which are in the neighbourhood of Stavanger.

CHEVALLEY.

---

## No. 59.

*M. d'Annville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Luxembourg,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxembourg, July 26, 1914.*

ACCORDING to information which I have just received from Thionville, the four last classes set at liberty have been ordered to hold themselves at the disposition of the *Kommandatur* at any moment.

Without being completely mobilised the reservists are forbidden to go away from their place of residence.

---

## No. 60.

*M. Farges, French Consul-General at Basle,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Basle, July 27, 1914.*

FOUR days ago the German officers on leave in this district received orders to break off their leave and return to Germany.

Moreover, I learn from two reliable sources that warning has been given to persons owning motor cars in the Grand Duchy of Baden to prepare to place them at the disposal of the military authorities, two days after a fresh order. Secrecy on the subject of this warning has been directed under penalty of a fine.

The population of Basle is very uneasy, and banking facilities are restricted.

FARGES.

---

## No. 61.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, on board the "La France" (for the President of the Council) and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

THE three steps taken by the German Ambassador at Paris seem characteristic:—On Friday he reads a note in which the German Government categorically place themselves between Austria and the Powers, approving the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia; and adding that "Germany warmly desires that the dispute should remain localised, since any intervention of another party must through the play of its alliances provoke incalculable consequences;"—the second day, Saturday, the effect having been produced, and the Powers having, on account of the surprise, the shortness of the time-limit, and the risks of general war, advised Serbia to yield, Herr von Schoen returns to minimise this step, pretending to be astonished at the impression produced, and protests that intentions are attributed to Germany which she does not harbour, "since," he says, "there was neither concert before nor threat afterwards;"—the third day, Sunday, the result having been obtained, since Serbia has yielded, as one might almost say, to all the Austrian demands, the German Ambassador appears on two occasions to insist on Germany's peaceful intentions, and on her warm desire to co-operate in the maintenance of peace, after having registered the Austrian success which closes the first phase of the crisis.

The situation at the moment of writing remains disturbing, on account of the incomprehensible refusal of Austria to accept Serbia's submission, of her operations of mobilisation, and of her threats to invade Serbia. The attitude taken up from the beginning by the Austrian Government, with German support, her refusal to accept any conversation with the Powers, practically do not allow the latter to intervene effectively with Austria without the mediation of Germany. However, time presses, for if the Austrian army crosses the frontier it will be very difficult to circumscribe the crisis, Russia not appearing to be able to tolerate the occupation of Serbia after the latter has in reality submitted to the Austrian note, giving every satisfaction and guarantee. Germany, from the very fact of the position taken up by her, is qualified to intervene effectively and be listened to at Vienna; if she does not do this she justifies all suspicions and assumes the responsibility for the war.

The Powers, particularly Russia, France, and England, have by their urgent advice induced Belgrade to yield; they have thus fulfilled their part; now it is for Germany, who is alone

able to gain a rapid hearing at Vienna, to give advice to Austria, who has obtained satisfaction and cannot, for a detail easy to adjust, bring about a general war.

It is in these circumstances that the proposal made by the Cabinet of London is put forward ; M. Sazonof having said to the British Ambassador that as a consequence of the appeal of Servia to the Powers, Russia would agree to stand aside, Sir Edward Grey has formulated the following suggestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin and Rome : the French, German and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek with Sir Edward Grey a means of resolving the present difficulties, it being understood that during this conversation Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who showed himself favourable to it ; it will be equally well received in Paris, and also at Rome, according to all probability. Here again it is Germany's turn to speak, and she has an opportunity to show her goodwill by other means than words.

I would ask you to come to an understanding with your British colleague, and to support his proposal with the German Government in whatever form appears to you opportune.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

### No. 62.

M. *Bienvenu-Martin*, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "*La France*") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna.

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

AFTER his *démarche* of yesterday tending to an intervention by France at St. Petersburg in favour of peace, the German Ambassador returned, as I have informed you, to the *Direction Politique* on the pretext that it might be desirable to communicate to the press a short note indicating the peaceful and friendly sense of the conversation ; he even suggested the following terms :—"During the afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation, they examined the means which might be employed to maintain general peace." He was told in answer, that the terms appeared exaggerated and of a nature to create in public opinion illusions on the real situation ; that, however, a brief note in the sense indicated, that is to say, giving an account of a conversation at which the means employed to safeguard peace, had been examined, might be issued if I approved it.



The note communicated was as follows:—"The German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have had a fresh interview, in the course of which they sought means of action by the Powers for the maintenance of peace." This phrasing, deliberately colourless, avoided an appearance of solidarity with Germany which might have been misinterpreted.

This morning Herr von Schoen addressed a private letter to the Political Director under pretext of resuming his interview with the Minister, and has added: "Note well the phrase in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation. This is not an idle phrase, but the sincere expression of the truth." The summary annexed to the letter was drawn up as follows:—"The Cabinet of Vienna has, formally and officially, caused it to be declared to that of St. Petersburg, that it does not seek any territorial acquisition in Servia, and that it has no intention of making any attempt against the integrity of the kingdom; its sole intention is that of assuring its own tranquillity. At this moment the decision whether a European war must break out depends solely on Russia. The German Government have firm confidence that the French Government, with which they know that they are at one in the warm desire that European peace should be able to be maintained, will use their whole influence with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg in a pacific spirit."

I have let you know the reply which has been given (a French *démarche* at St. Petersburg would be misunderstood, and must have as corollary a German *démarche* at Vienna, or, failing that, mediation by the four less interested Powers in both capitals).

Herr von Schoen's letter is capable of different interpretations; the most probable is that it has for its object, like his *démarche* itself, an attempt to compromise France with Russia and, in case of failure, to throw the responsibility for an eventual war on Russia and on France; finally, by pacific assurances which have not been listened to, to mask military action by Austria in Servia intended to complete the success of Austria.

I communicate this news to you by way of information and for any useful purpose you can put it to.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 63.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador allow it to be understood that they are sure that England

would preserve neutrality if a conflict were to break out. Sir Arthur Nicolson has told me, however, that Prince Lichnowsky cannot, after the conversation which he has had with him to-day, entertain any doubt as to the freedom which the British Government intended to preserve of intervening in case they should judge it expedient.

The German Ambassador will not have failed to be struck with this declaration, but to make its weight felt in Germany and to avoid a conflict, it seems indispensable that the latter should be brought to know for certain that they will find England and Russia by the side of France.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 64.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

M. SAZONOF has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues.

In spite of the public excitement, the Russian Government is applying itself successfully to restraining the press; in particular great moderation towards Germany has been recommended.

M. Sazonof has not received any information from Vienna or from Berlin since yesterday.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 65.

*M. Bompard, French Ambassador at Constantinople, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Therapia, July 27, 1914.*

THE Austro-Servian conflict holds the attention of the Ottoman Government, and the Turks are delighted at the misfortunes of Servia, but people here generally are led to believe that the conflict will remain localised. It is generally thought that once again Russia will not intervene in favour of Servia in circumstances which would extend the armed conflict.

The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her objects and that she will make Servia follow Bulgaria and enter into the orbit of the Triple Alliance.

BOMPARD.

## No. 66.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY told the German Ambassador this morning that if Austria were to invade Servia after the Servian reply, she would make it clear that she was not merely aiming at the settlement of the questions mentioned in her note of July 23, but that she wished to crush a small state. "Then," he added, "a European question would arise, and war would follow in which other Powers would be led to take a part."

The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement of the demobilisation of the fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty took this measure quietly on Friday on his own initiative; to-night, Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to make it public. This result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Servia and Russia.

DE FLEURIAU.

## No. 67.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

TO-DAY I have had a conversation with the Secretary of State on the proposal by England that Germany should join the Cabinets of London, Paris and Rome to prevent hostilities between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

I remarked to him that Sir Edward Grey's proposal opened the way to a peaceful issue. Herr von Jagow replied that he was disposed to join in, but he remarked to me that, if Russia mobilised, Germany would be obliged to mobilise at once, that we should be forced to the same course also, and that then a conflict would be almost inevitable. I asked him if Germany would regard herself as bound to mobilise in the event of Russia mobilising only on the Austrian frontier; he told me "No," and authorised me formally to communicate this limitation to you. He also attached the greatest importance to an intervention with Russia by the Powers which were friendly with and allied to her.

Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would be obliged to attack at once on her side. The intervention proposed by England at St. Petersburg and Vienna could, in his opinion, only come into operation if events were not precipitated. In that case, he does not despair that it might succeed. I expressed my regret that Austria, by

her uncompromising attitude had led Europe to the difficult pass through which we were going, but I expressed the hope that intervention would have its effect.

JULES CAMBON.

---

No. 68.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

YESTERDAY in the course of a conversation between M. Sazonof, M. Paléologue and Sir G. Buchanan, the Russian Minister said that Servia was disposed to appeal to the Powers, and that in that case his Government would be prepared to stand aside.

Sir E. Grey has taken these words as a text on which to formulate to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Rome a proposal with which Sir Francis Bertie will acquaint your Excellency. The four Powers would intervene in the dispute, and the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek, with Sir E. Grey, a means of solving the present difficulties.

It would be understood that, during the sittings of this little conference, Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who has shown himself favourable to it.

DE FLEURIAU.

---

No. 69.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

THE Servian Minister has not received instructions from his Government to ask for the mediation of England; it is, however, possible that the telegrams from his Government have been stopped on the way.

However, the British proposal for intervention by the four Powers intimated in my preceding telegram has been put forward, and ought I think to be supported in the first place.

DE FLEURIAU.

---

## No. 70.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador has communicated to me Sir E. Grey's proposal for common action by England, Germany, France and Italy at Vienna, Belgrade and St. Petersburg, to stop active military operations while the German, Italian and French Ambassadors at London examine, with Sir Edward Grey, the means of finding a solution for the present complications.

I have this morning directed M. Jules Cambon to talk this over with the British Ambassador at Berlin, and to support his *démarche* in whatever form he should judge suitable.

I authorise you to take part in the meeting proposed by Sir E. Grey. I am also ready to give to our representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburg and Belgrade, instructions in the sense asked for by the British Government.

At the same time I think that the chances of success of Sir E. Grey's proposal depend essentially on the action that Berlin would be disposed to take at Vienna; a *démarche* from this side, promoted with a view to obtain a suspension of military operations, would appear to me doomed to failure if Germany's influence were not first exercised.

I have also noted, during Baron Von Schoen's observations, that the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible when the words "mediation," "intervention," "conference" were used, and was more willing to admit "friendly advice" and "conversations."

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

## No. 71.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

I HAVE communicated to Sir Edward Grey your adherence to his proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference at London. The British Ambassador at Vienna has received the necessary instructions to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government as soon as his French, German, and Italian colleagues are authorised to make the same *démarche*.

The Italian Government have accepted intervention by the four Powers with a view to prevent military operations; they are consulting the German Government on the proposal for a conference and the procedure to be followed with regard to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The German Government have not yet replied.

DE FLEURIAU.

## No. 72.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 27, 1914.*

THE Marquis di San Giuliano has returned to Rome this evening, and I saw him immediately after his arrival. He spoke to me of the contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured me that he had not had any previous knowledge of it.

He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had not suspected that it could take such a form. I asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an ally towards Austria. "In no way:" the Minister replied: "we were not consulted; we were told nothing; it was not for us then to make any such communication to Vienna."

The Marquis di San Giuliano thinks that Servia would have acted more wisely if she had accepted the note in its entirety; to-day he still thinks that this would be the only thing to do, being convinced that Austria will not withdraw any of her claims, and will maintain them, even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration; he doubts whether Germany is disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserts, however, that Germany at this moment attaches great importance to her relations with London, and he believes that if any Power can determine Berlin in favour of peaceful action, it is England.

As for Italy she will continue to make every effort in favour of peace. It is with this end in view, that he has adhered without hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of the Ambassadors of those Powers which are not directly interested in the Austro-Servian dispute.

BARRÈRE.

## No. 73.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador, who returned to-day, saw the Secretary of State and discussed with him Sir Edward Grey's proposal. In his reply Herr von Jagow continued to manifest his desire for peace, but added that he could not consent to anything which would resemble a conference of the Powers; that would be to set up a kind of court of arbitration, the idea of which would only be acceptable if it were asked for by Vienna and St. Petersburg. Herr von Jagow's language confirms that used by Baron von Schoen to your Excellency.

In fact, a *démarche* by the four Powers at Vienna and St. Petersburg could be brought about by diplomatic means without assuming the form of a conference and it is susceptible of many modifications; the important thing is to make clear at Vienna and at St. Petersburg the common desire of the four Powers that a conflict should be avoided. A peaceful issue from the present difficulties can only be found by gaining time.

JULES CAMBON.

---

No. 74.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

I HAD a conversation to-day with the Secretary of State and gave support to the *démarche* which Sir E. Goschen had just made.

Herr von Jagow replied to me, as he had to the British Ambassador, that he could not accept the proposal that the Italian, French and German Ambassadors should be instructed to endeavour to find with Sir Edward Grey a method of resolving the present difficulties, because that would be to set up a real conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and Russia.

I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his answer, but that the great object which Sir Edward Grey had in view went beyond any question of form; that what was important was the co-operation of Great Britain and France with Germany and Italy in a work of peace; that this co-operation could take effect through common *démarches* at St. Petersburg and at Vienna; that he had often expressed to me his regret at seeing the two allied groups always opposed to one another in Europe; that there was here an opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by shewing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent a conflict.

Herr von Jagow evaded the point by saying that Germany had engagements with Austria. I observed to him that the relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with Russia, and that it was he himself who actually was putting the two groups of allies in opposition.

The Secretary of State then said to me that he was not refusing to act so as to keep off an Austro-Russian dispute, but that he could not intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. "The one is the consequence of the other," I said, "and it is a question of preventing the appearance of a new factor of such a nature as to lead to intervention by Russia."

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged to keep his engagements towards Austria, I asked him if he was bound to follow her everywhere with his eyes blindfolded, and if he had taken note of the reply of Servia to

Austria which the Servian Chargé d'Affaires had delivered to him this morning. "I have not yet had time," he said. "I regret it. You would see that except on some points of detail Servia has yielded entirely. It appears then that, since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which your support has procured for her, you might to-day advise her to be content or to examine with Servia the terms of her reply."

As Herr von Jagow gave me no clear reply, I asked him whether Germany wished for war. He protested energetically, saying that he knew what was in my mind, but that it was wholly incorrect. "You must then," I replied, "act consistently. When you read the Servian reply, I entreat you in the name of humanity to weigh the terms in your conscience, and do not personally assume a part of the responsibility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be prepared." Herr von Jagow protested anew, adding that he was ready to join England and France in a common effort, but that it was necessary to find a form for this intervention which he could accept, and that the Cabinets must come to an understanding on this point.

"For the rest," he added, "direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg have been entered upon and are in progress. I expect very good results from them and I am hopeful."

As I was leaving I told him that this morning I had had the impression that the hour of *détente* had struck, but I now saw clearly that there was nothing in it. He replied that I was mistaken; that he hoped that matters were on the right road and would perhaps rapidly reach a favourable conclusion. I asked him to take such action in Vienna as would hasten the progress of events, because it was a matter of importance not to allow time for the development in Russia of one of those currents of opinion which carry all before them.

In my opinion it would be well to ask Sir Edward Grey, who must have been warned by Sir Edward Goschen of the refusal to his proposal in the form in which it was made, to renew it under another form, so that Germany would have no pretext for refusing to associate herself with it, and would have to assume the responsibilities that belong to her in the eyes of England.

JULES CAMBON.

---

No. 75.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador came to see me to hand me a memorandum which amounted to an indictment of



Servia; he was instructed by his Government to state that since Servia had not given a satisfactory reply to the requirements of the Imperial Government, the latter found themselves obliged to take strong measures to induce Servia to give the satisfaction and guarantees that are required of her. To-morrow the Austrian Government will take steps to that effect.

I asked the Ambassador to acquaint me with the measures contemplated by Austria, and Count Scézszen replied that they might be either an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, or the crossing of the frontier, but he had no precise information on this point.

I then called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that Servia had accepted Austria's requirements on practically every point, and that the differences that remained on certain points might vanish with a little mutual goodwill, and with the help of the Powers who wished for peace; by fixing to-morrow as the date for putting her resolution into effect, Austria for the second time was making their co-operation practically impossible, and was assuming a grave responsibility in running the risk of precipitating a war the limits of which it was impossible to foresee.

I enclose for your information the memorandum that Count Scézszen handed to me.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

ENCLOSURE.

*Memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian Government, handed by Count Scézszen to M. Bienvenu-Martin on July 27, 1914.*

*(See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, page 461, et seq.)*

---

No. 75 (2).

*Official Communiqué of the Press Bureau.*

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

THE Austrian Minister at Belgrade has returned to Vienna and presented the text of the Servian reply.

A spirit of insincerity pervades the whole of this reply; it makes it clear that the Servian Government have no serious intention of putting an end to the culpable toleration which has given rise to the anti-Austrian intrigues. The Servian reply contains such restrictions and limitations, not only with regard to the principle of the Austro-Hungarian *démarche*, but also with regard to the claims advanced by Austria, that the concessions which are made are without importance.

In particular, under an empty pretext, there is a refusal to accept the participation of the Austro-Hungarian officials in the prosecution of the authors of the crimes who are resident in Servian territory.

In the same way, the Servian reply to the Austrian demand that the hostile intrigues of the press should be suppressed, amounts to a refusal.

The demand with regard to the measures to be taken to prevent associations hostile to Austria-Hungary from continuing their activity under another name and form after their dissolution, has not even been considered.

Inasmuch as these claims constitute the minimum regarded as necessary for the re-establishment of a permanent peace in the south-east of the Monarchy, the Servian reply is considered to be insufficient.

That the Servian Government is aware of this, appears from the fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by arbitration, and also from the fact that on the day on which their reply was due and before it was in fact submitted; they gave orders for mobilisation.

### No. 76.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*On board the "La France," July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE received from Copenhagen your telegram summarising the events of Saturday; the telegram describing the last visit of the German Ambassador; that relating to the mediation which Russia advises Serbia to ask for and to the British *démarches* at Berlin, as well as your telegram received this morning directly through the Eiffel Tower.

I fully approve the reply which you made to Baron von Schoen; the proposition which you maintained is self-evident; in the search for a peaceful solution of the dispute, we are fully in agreement with Russia, who is not responsible for the present situation, and has not taken any measure whatever which could arouse the least suspicion; but it is plain that Germany on her side would find it difficult to refuse to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government, whose action has provoked the crisis.

We must now continue to use the same language to the German Ambassador. Besides, this advice is in harmony with the two British proposals mentioned in your telegram. I entirely approve the combination suggested by Sir E. Grey, and I am myself requesting M. Paul Cambon to inform him of this. It is essential that it should be known at Berlin and at Vienna that our full concurrence is given to the efforts which the British Government is making with a view to seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian dispute. The action of the four less interested Powers cannot, for the reasons given above, be exerted only at Vienna and St. Petersburg. In proposing to exert it also at Belgrade which means, in fact, between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the

situation ; and, in not excluding St. Petersburg, he offers on the other hand to Germany, a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the *démarche* by which the German Government have caused it to be known at Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by them as purely Austro-Servian and without any general character.

Please communicate the present telegram to our representatives with the great Powers and to our Minister at Belgrade.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 77.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council on board the "La France."*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

In spite of the assurances given, both in Berlin and Paris by the German representatives, of the desire of their Government to assist in efforts for the maintenance of peace, no sincere action has been taken by them to hold back Austria ; the British proposal, which consists in action by the four less-interested Powers to obtain a cessation of military operations at Vienna, Belgrade, and St. Petersburg, and in a meeting at London of the German, French, and Italian Ambassadors under the chairmanship of Sir E. Grey, with a view of seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian difficulty, meets with objections at Berlin of such a nature as must lead to failure.

The Austrian Ambassador has proceeded to announce that his Government will to-morrow take energetic measures to compel Servia to give to them the satisfaction and guarantees which they demand from that Power ; Count Scezsen has given no explanation as to those measures ; according to our Military Attaché at Vienna, mobilisation dating from July 28 appears to be certain.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 78.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning ; he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's intentions, he declared that he did not know them, and was ignorant of the nature of the means of coercion which she was preparing.

Germany, according to Baron von Schoen, only asks that she may act with France for the maintenance of peace. Upon my observing to him that a proposal for mediation by the four Powers to which we had adhered, and which had obtained assent in principle from Italy and Germany, had been put forward by Great Britain, the Ambassador said that the German Government really only asked to associate themselves with the action of the Powers, provided that that action did not take the form of arbitration or a conference, which had been rejected by Austria.

I replied that, if it was the expression only which was an obstacle to the Austrian Government, the object might be attained by other means ; the German Government are in a good position to ask Austria to allow the Powers time to intervene and find a means of conciliation.

Baron von Schoen then observed to me that he had no instructions, and only knew that Germany refused to exercise any pressure on Austria, who does not wish for a conference. He accuses the French papers of attributing to Germany an attitude which she has not taken up, alleging that she is urging Austria on ; doubtless she approves Austria's attitude, but she had no knowledge of the Austrian note ; she did not see her way to check her too abruptly, for Austria must have guarantees against the proceedings of the Serbs.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 79.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

THROUGH the telegrams from our Embassies which I have forwarded to you, you are aware of the British proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference in London, as well as of our adherence to that suggestion, and of the conditional acceptance by Italy and of the reservations of Berlin.

Please keep yourself in touch on this subject with your British colleague, who has received the necessary instructions to acquaint the Austro-Hungarian Government with the British suggestion, as soon as his three colleagues have been authorised to make the same *démarche* ; you will adapt your attitude to his.

No. 80.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 28, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY yesterday received my Austro-Hungarian and German colleagues. The first continued to maintain that

the Servian reply was unacceptable. The second used language similar to that of Baron von Schoen at Paris. He emphasised the value of moderating action by Great Britain at St. Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey replied that Russia had shown herself very moderate from the beginning of the crisis, especially in her advice to the Servian Government, and that he would find it very embarrassing to give her pacific advice. He added that it was at Vienna that it was necessary to act and that Germany's help was indispensable.

On the other hand the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg has telegraphed that M. Sazonof had made a proposal to the Austrian Ambassador for a conversation on the Servian business. This information has been confirmed by the British Ambassador at Vienna, who has sent the information that the first interview between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Szápáry had produced a good effect at the Ballplatz.

Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that, if an agreement could be brought about by direct discussion between St. Petersburg and Vienna, it would be a matter for congratulation, but they raised some doubts as to the success of M. Sazonof's attempt.

When Sir George Buchanan asked M. Sazonof about the eventual meeting at London of a conference of representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, to seek a solution for the present situation, the latter replied "that he had begun *pourparlers* with the Austrian Ambassador under conditions which he hoped were favourable; that, however, he had not yet received any reply to his proposal for the revision of the Servian note by the two Cabinets." If direct explanations with the Cabinet of Vienna are impracticable, M. Sazonof declares himself ready to accept the British proposals or any other of such a nature as to bring about a favourable issue of the dispute.

In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct negotiations should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext for slipping out of the friendly intervention of the four Powers.

The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined effort to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's suggestion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best to await the result of the conversation which had been begun between St. Petersburg and Vienna. Sir E. Grey, has, in consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his *démarche* for the moment. In addition, the news that Austria has just officially declared war against Servia, opens a new phase of the question.

PAUL CAMBON.

## No. 81.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

M. SAZONOV's conversation with Count Szápáry was brought to the knowledge of Herr von Jagow by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires. The Secretary of State told him that in agreement with the remarks of the German Ambassador in Russia, since the Austrian Government did not refuse to continue their conversations with the Russian Government after the expiry of the ultimatum, there was ground for hope that Count Berchtold on his side might be able to converse with M. Schebeko, and that it might be possible to find an issue from the present difficulties. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires takes a favourable view of this state of mind, which corresponds to Herr von Jagow's desire to see Vienna and St. Petersburg enter into direct relations and to release Germany. There is ground, however, for asking whether Austria is not seeking to gain time to make her preparations.

To-day I gave my support to the *démarche* made by my British colleague with the Secretary of State. The latter replied to me, as he did to Sir Edward Goschen, that it was impossible for him to accept the idea of a kind of conference at London between the Ambassadors of the four Powers, and that it would be necessary to give another form to the British suggestion to procure its realisation. I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were in progress, and that from now on he expected a favourable result.

The British and Italian Ambassadors came to see me this morning together, to talk over with me the conversation which they had had with Herr von Jagow yesterday on the subject of Sir Edward Grey's proposal. To sum up, the Secretary of State used the same language to them as to me; accepting in principle the idea of joining in a *démarche* with England, Italy, and ourselves, but rejecting any idea of a conference.

My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government that they should change the wording of their proposal, which might take the character of a diplomatic *démarche* at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any *démarche* at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma by asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the Powers to avoid war could be brought about.

We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favour of peace compatible with our engagements towards our ally; but

to place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 82.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Government has not yet replied to the proposal of the Russian Government suggesting the opening of direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

M. Sazonof received the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors this afternoon. The impression which he got from this double interview is a bad one; "Certainly," he said to me, "Austria is unwilling to converse."

As the result of a conversation which I have just had with my two colleagues I have the same impression of pessimism.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 83.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

COUNT BERCHTOLD has just declared to Sir M. de Bunsen that any intervention, aiming at the resumption of the discussion between Austria and Serbia on the basis of the Servian reply, would be useless, and besides that it would be too late, as war had been officially declared at mid-day.

The attitude of my Russian colleague has never varied up to the present; in his opinion it is not a question of localising the conflict, but rather of preventing it. The declaration of war will make very difficult the initiation of *pourparlers* by the four Powers, as well as the continuation of the direct discussions between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry.

It is held here that the formula which seemed as if it might obtain the adherence of Germany—"Mediation between Austria and Russia,"—is unsuitable, inasmuch as it alleges a dispute between those two Empires which does not exist up to the present.

Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed her on to aggressive action against Serbia in order to be able herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circumstances which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under conditions which have been thoroughly considered.

DUMAINE.

CHAPTER V.

---

FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA  
ON SERVIA (JULY 28, 1914) TO THE GERMAN  
ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA (JULY 31, 1914).

---

## No. 84.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 29, 1914.*

THE Consulta considers that, in spite of the declaration of war by Austria on Servia, there is no reason why the diplomatic efforts for calling together a conference at London with a view to mediation should be interrupted.

BARRÈRE.

---

## No. 85.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna,  
Constantinople, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

THE Austro-German attitude is becoming clearer. Austria, uneasy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the opportunity of the crime of Serajevo in order to punish the Servian intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guarantees which, according as events are allowed to develop or not, will either affect only the Servian Government and army, or become territorial questions. Germany intervenes between her ally and the other Powers and declares that the question is a local one, namely, the punishment of a political crime committed in the past, and for the future sure guarantees that the anti-Austrian intrigues will be put an end to. The German Government thinks that Russia should be content with the official and formal assurances given by Austria, to the effect that she does not seek territorial aggrandisement and that she will respect the integrity of Servia; in these circumstances the danger of war can only come from Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is well defined. In these circumstances any action for the maintenance of peace must therefore take place at St. Petersburg alone.

This sophism, which would relieve Germany from intervening at Vienna, has been maintained unsuccessfully at Paris by Herr von Schoen, who has vainly endeavoured to draw us into identical Franco-German action at St. Petersburg; it has been



also expounded in London to Sir E. Grey. In France, as in England, a reply was given that the St. Petersburg Cabinet have, from the beginning, given the greatest proofs of their moderation, especially by associating themselves with the Powers in advising Serbia to yield to the requirements of the Austrian note. Russia does not therefore in any way threaten peace; it is at Vienna that action must be taken; it is from there that the danger will come, from the moment that they refuse to be content with the almost complete submission of Serbia to exorbitant demands; that they refuse to accept the co-operation of the Powers in the discussion of the points which remain to be arranged between Austria and Serbia; and, finally, that they do not hesitate to make a declaration of war as precipitate as the original Austro-Hungarian note.

The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to safeguard general peace by common action between the four Powers, the idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient being suggested, and while they refuse to take any positive action at Vienna. In the Austrian capital they would like to keep St. Petersburg in play with the illusion of an *entente* which might result from direct conversations, while they are taking action against Serbia.

In these circumstances it seems essential that the St. Petersburg Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis peacefully is manifest, should immediately give their adherence to the British proposal. This proposal must be strongly supported at Berlin in order to decide Herr von Jagow to take real action at Vienna capable of stopping Austria and preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic advantage by military successes. The Austro-Hungarian Government would, indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to impose on Serbia, under the elastic expression of "guarantees," conditions which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial aggrandisement was being sought, would in effect modify the status of Eastern Europe, and would run the risk of gravely compromising the general peace either at once or in the near future.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 86.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

I AM now in a position to assure Your Excellency that the Russian Government will acquiesce in any measures which France and Great Britain may propose in order to maintain peace. My British colleague is telegraphing to London to the same effect.

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 87.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, July 29, 1914.*

I REPORT the following impressions of my interview with M. Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact information. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies every apprehension ; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, according to a pre-conceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous arrangement with the Emperor William.

The German Government stand " with grounded arms " ready to take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and British colleagues share this feeling.

The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonise with the statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon that everything will be put in readiness for the defence of the neutrality of the country.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

---

No. 88.

*M. Ronssin, French Consul-General at Frankfort,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Frankfort, July 29, 1914.*

I NOTIFY you of important movements of troops yesterday and to-night. This morning several regiments in service dress arrived here, especially by the roads from Darmstadt, Cassel, and Mayence, which are full of soldiers. The bridges and railways are guarded under the pretext of preparations for the autumn manœuvres.

RONSSIN.

---

No. 89.

*M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Munich, July 29, 1914.*

I AM informed that the mills at Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) have been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary clients and to keep all their output for the army.

From Strassburg information has been received of the transport of motor guns used for firing on aeroplanes and dirigibles.

Under the pretext of a change in the autumn manoeuvres the non-commissioned officers and men of the Bavarian infantry regiments at Metz, who were on leave in Bavaria for the harvest, received orders yesterday to return immediately.

ALLIZÉ.

---

No. 90.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

THE French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilisation of the 8th army corps which had already been announced, and that of the Landwehr division of this army corps. The cavalry divisions in Galicia are also mobilising; regiments and cavalry divisions from Vienna and Budapest have already been transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are now being called together in this district.

There is a rumour that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in order to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps in order to impress St. Petersburg, intend to decide on a general mobilisation of their forces on the 30th July, or the 1st August. To conclude, it is certain the Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow.

DUMAINE.

---

No. 91.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

THE direct conversation, to which the Russian Government had invited the Austro-Hungarian Government in a friendly spirit, has been refused by the latter.

On the other hand, the Russian General Staff have satisfied themselves that Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilisation which has begun on the Galician frontier. As a result the order to mobilise will be despatched to-night to thirteen army corps, which are destined to operate eventually against Austria.

In spite of the failure of his proposal, M. Sazonof accepts the idea of a conference of the four Powers in London; further, he does not attach any importance to the title officially given to the discussions, and will support all British efforts in favour of peace.

PALÉOLOGUE.

---

## No. 92.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day how the question of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, which seemed to him yesterday the best means of arriving at a *détente*, stood. He answered that at St. Petersburg they seemed well disposed towards them and that he had asked Vienna to take this course. He was awaiting the reply. The British Government, after seeing the suggestion of a conference rejected, had let it be known that they would view with favour the inception of such conversations between Austria and Russia, and had asked Germany to urge Austria, which the Imperial Government are not failing to do.

I asked Herr von Jagow if he had at last received the Servian reply to Austria and what he thought of it. He replied that he saw in it a basis for possible negotiation. I added that it was just on that account that I considered the rupture by Austria, after she had received such a document, inexplicable.

The Secretary of State then remarked that with Eastern nations one could never obtain sufficient guarantees, and that Austria wished to be able to supervise the carrying out of promises made to her, a supervision which Serbia refused. This, in the eyes of the Secretary of State, is the cardinal point. I answered Herr von Jagow that Serbia, as she wished to remain independent, was bound to reject the control of a single Power, but that an International Commission would not have the same character. The Balkan States have more than one, for instance the Financial Commission at Athens. One could imagine, I said, for instance, among other combinations, a Provisional International Commission, charged with the duty of controlling the police inquiry demanded by Austria; it was clear, by this instance, that the reply of Serbia opened the door to conversations and did not justify a rupture.

I then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg to which Sir E. Grey had given his adherence, he did not think that common action could be exercised by the four Powers by means of their Ambassadors. He answered in the affirmative, adding that at this moment the London Cabinet were confining themselves to exercising their influence in support of direct conversations.

At the end of the afternoon the Imperial Chancellor asked the British Ambassador to come and see him. He spoke to him of the proposal of Sir E. Grey for the meeting of a conference; he told him that he had not been able to accept a proposal which seemed to impose the authority of the Powers on Austria; he assured my colleague of his sincere desire for

peace and of the efforts he was making to that effect at Vienna, but he added that Russia was alone able to maintain peace or let loose war.

Sir E. Goschen answered that he did not agree, and that if war broke out Austria would be chiefly responsible, for it was inadmissible for her to have broken with Servia after the reply of the latter.

Without discussing this point, the Chancellor said that he was trying his utmost to obtain direct conversations between Austria and Russia; he knew that England looked on such conversations with a favourable eye. He added that his own action would be rendered very difficult at Vienna, if it were true that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps on the Austrian frontier. He asked my colleague to call Sir E. Grey's attention to what he had said.

Sir E. Goschen has telegraphed to London to this effect.

The attitude of the Chancellor is very probably the result of the last interview of Sir E. Grey with Prince Lichnowsky. Up to quite the last days they flattered themselves here that England would remain out of the question, and the impression produced on the German Government and on the financiers and business men by her attitude is profound.

JULES CAMBON.

---

No. 93.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

THE opinion of my British, Russian and Italian colleagues agrees with mine concerning the impossibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Servia, since all attempts to avoid the collision have failed.

M. Schebeko had asked that the negotiations begun at St. Petersburg by MM. Sazonof and Szápáry should be continued and made more effective by special powers being conferred on the latter, but Count Berchtold has flatly refused. He showed in this way that Austria-Hungary does not tolerate any intervention which would prevent her from inflicting punishment and humiliation on Servia.

The Duke of Avarna admits that it is very probable that the imminence of a general insurrection among the Southern Slav inhabitants precipitated the resolutions of the Monarchy. He still clings to the hope that, after a first success of the Austro-Hungarian arms, but not before this, mediation might be able to limit the conflict.

DUMAINE.

---

## No. 94.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna,  
Constantinople, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

THE following communication was semi-officially made to me this morning by the German Ambassador :—

“The German Government are still continuing their efforts to obtain the consent of the Austrian Government to a friendly conversation which would give the latter an opportunity of stating exactly the object and extent of the operations in Servia. The Berlin Cabinet hope to receive declarations which will be of a kind to satisfy Russia. The German efforts are in no way impeded by the declaration of war which has occurred.” A similar communication will be made at St. Petersburg.

During the course of a conversation which I had this morning with Baron von Schoen, the latter stated to me that the German Government did not know what the intentions of Vienna were. When Berlin knows how far Austria wishes to go, there will be a basis of discussion which will make conversations with a view to intervention easier.

When I observed that the military operations which had been begun would not perhaps allow any time for conversation, and that the German Government ought to use their influence at Vienna to delay them, the Ambassador answered that Berlin could not exercise any pressure, but that he hoped that the operations would not be pushed forward very actively.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

## No. 95.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Constantinople,  
Rome, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

M. ISVOLSKY came to me by order of his Government to communicate a telegram addressed by M. Sazonof to Berlin. It appears from this information that, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Servia, the measures of mobilisation already taken with regard to the largest part of the Austro-Hungarian army, and finally the refusal of Count Berchtold to continue negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, Russia had decided to mobilise in the provinces of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan. While informing the German Government to this effect, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin was instructed to add that these military precautions were not in any way directed against Germany, and also did

not imply aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary; furthermore the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

The Russian Ambassador also gave me the substance of two telegrams addressed to London by M. Sazonof: the first, after pointing out that the declaration of war on Servia put an end to the conversations of the Russian Minister with the Austrian Ambassador, asked England to exercise her influence, as quickly as possible, with a view to mediation and to the immediate cessation of Austrian military operations (the continuation of which gave Austria time to crush Servia while mediation was dragging on); the second communicated the impression received by M. Sazonof from his conversations with the German Ambassador that Germany favours Austria's uncompromising attitude and is not exercising any influence on her. The Russian Minister thinks that the attitude of Germany is very disquieting, and considers that England is in a better position than the other Powers to take steps at Berlin with a view to exercising pressure on Vienna.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 96.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 29, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has been officially informed by the Russian Ambassador that his Government, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria on Servia and of the measures of mobilisation which were from this moment being taken by Austria, had given the order to mobilise in the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan. He added that this step had no aggressive character against Germany, and that the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

In speaking of this communication the Marquis di San Giuliano told me that unfortunately throughout this affair Austria and Germany had been, and were still, convinced that Russia would not move. In this connection he read to me a despatch from M. Bollati reporting an interview which he had had yesterday with Herr von Jagow, in which the latter had again repeated to him that he did not think that Russia would move. He based this belief on the fact that the Russian Government had just sent an agent to Berlin to treat about some financial questions. The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin also told his British colleague that he did not believe in a general war, since Russia was not in the mood or in the condition to make war.

The Marquis di San Giuliano does not share this opinion. He thinks that if Austria contents herself with humiliating

Servia and with exacting, besides the acceptance of the note, some material advantages which do not involve her territory, Russia can still find some means of coming to an agreement with her. But if Austria wishes either to dismember Servia or to destroy her as an independent State, he thinks that it would be impossible for Russia not to intervene by military measures.

In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs does not seem to me to despair of the possibility of an agreement. He thinks that England can still exercise a great deal of influence at Berlin in the direction of peace. He had yesterday, he told me, a long conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir R. Rodd, in order to show him to what extent British intervention might be effective. He said to me in conclusion, "If your Government are of the same opinion, they could on their side make representations to this effect in London."

BARRÈRE.

---

No. 97.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

I SHOULD be obliged if you would ask Sir E. Grey to be good enough to renew as soon as possible at Berlin, in the form which he may consider most opportune and effective, his proposal of mediation by the four Powers, which had in principle obtained the adherence of the German Government.

The Russian Government on their side will have expressed the same desire directly to the British Government; the declaration of war by Austria on Servia, her sending of troops to the Austro-Russian frontier, the consequent Russian mobilisation on the Galician frontier have in fact put an end to the direct Austro-Russian conversations.

The explanations which the German Government are going to ask for at Vienna, in accordance with the statement of Baron von Schoen which I have reported to you, in order to learn the intention of the Austrian Government, will allow the four Powers to exercise effective action between Vienna and St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.

I would ask you also to point out to the British Secretary of State how important it would be for him to obtain from the Italian Government the most whole-hearted continuance of their support in co-operating in the action of the four Powers in favour of peace.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---



## No. 98.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 29, 1914.*

IN his interview to-day with my German colleague, Sir E. Grey observed that, the overtures of M. Sazonof for direct conversations between Russia and Austria not having been accepted at Vienna, it would be well to return to his proposal of friendly intervention by the four Powers which are not directly interested. This suggestion has been accepted in principle by the German Government, but they have objected to the idea of a conference or of mediation. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has invited Prince Lichnowsky to ask his Government that they should themselves propose a new formula. Whatever it may be, if it admits of the maintenance of peace, it will be accepted by Great Britain, France and Italy.

The German Ambassador was to have forwarded Sir E. Grey's request to Berlin immediately. In giving me an account of this conversation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia concerning the mobilisation of four army corps on the Austrian frontier would allow us to realise the intentions of the German Government. My German colleague having asked Sir E. Grey what the intentions of the British Government were, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that he had nothing to state for the present.

Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the situation very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful solution.

PAUL CAMBON.

## No. 99.

*M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Belgrade, July 29, 1914.*

THE Crown Prince, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was received, telegraphed to the Tsar to ask his help. My Russian colleague tells me that he has just communicated to M. Pashitch His Majesty's reply.

The Tsar thanks the Prince for having turned to him at so critical a juncture; he declares that everything has been done to arrive at a peaceful solution of the dispute, and formally assures the Prince that, if this object cannot be attained, Russia will never cease to interest herself in the fate of Servia.

BOPPE.

## No. 100.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador came to tell M. Sazonof that if Russia does not stop her military preparations the German army will receive the order to mobilise.

M. Sazonof replied that the Russian preparations have been caused, on the one hand, by the obstinate and uncompromising attitude of Austria, and on the other hand by the fact that eight Austro-Hungarian army corps are already mobilised.

The tone in which Count Pourtales delivered this communication has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the mobilisation of the thirteen army corps which are to operate against Austria.

PALÉOLOGUE.

---

No. 101.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors  
at St. Petersburg and London.*

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

M. ISVOLSKY came to-night to tell me that the German Ambassador has notified M. Sazonof of the decision of his Government to mobilise the army if Russia does not cease her military preparations.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Tsar points out that these preparations were only commenced after Austria had mobilised eight army corps and had refused to arrange peacefully her differences with Servia. M. Sazonof declares that in these circumstances Russia can only expedite her arming and consider war as imminent, that she counts on the help of France as an ally, and that she considers it desirable that England should join Russia and France without loss of time.

France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance.

She will not neglect, however, any effort towards a solution of the conflict in the interests of universal peace. The conversation entered into between the Powers which are less directly interested still allows of the hope that peace may be preserved; I therefore think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary measures of defence which Russia thinks must go on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces.

Yesterday in the late afternoon the German Ambassador came and spoke to me of the military measures which the Government of the Republic were taking, adding that France was able to act in this way, but that in Germany preparations could not be secret and that French opinion should not be alarmed if Germany decided on them.

I answered that the French Government had not taken any step which could give their neighbours any cause for disquietude, and that their wish to lend themselves to any negotiations for the purpose of maintaining peace could not be doubted.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 102.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. René Viviani, President of the Council,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

M. SAZONOF, to whom I communicated your desire that every military measure that could offer Germany the pretext for general mobilisation should be avoided, answered that in the course of last night the General Staff had suspended all measures of military precaution so that there should be no misunderstanding. Yesterday the Chief of the Russian General Staff sent for the Military Attaché of the German Embassy and gave him his word of honour that the mobilisation ordered this morning was exclusively directed against Austria.

Nevertheless, in an interview which he had this afternoon with Count Pourtales, M. Sazonof was forced to the conclusion that Germany does not wish to pronounce at Vienna the decisive word which would safeguard peace. The Emperor Nicholas has received the same impression from an exchange of telegrams which he has just had personally with the Emperor William.

Moreover, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have received disquieting information concerning the preparations of the German army and navy.

In giving me this information M. Sazonof added that the Russian Government are continuing none the less their efforts towards conciliation. He repeated to me: "I shall continue to negotiate until the last moment."

PALÉOLOGUE.

---

## No. 103.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador came to-night and again urged on M. Sazonof, but in less categorical terms, that Russia should cease her military preparations, and affirmed that Austria would not infringe the territorial integrity of Servia :—

"It is not only the territorial integrity of Servia which we must safeguard," answered M. Sazonof, "but also her independence and her sovereignty. We cannot allow Servia to become a vassal of Austria."

M. Sazonof added : "The situation is too serious for me not to tell you all that is in my mind. By intervening at St. Petersburg while she refuses to intervene at Vienna, Germany is only seeking to gain time so as to allow Austria to crush the little Servian kingdom before Russia can come to its aid. But the Emperor Nicholas is so anxious to prevent war that I am going to make a new proposal to you in his name :

"If Austria, recognising that her dispute with Servia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which are damaging to the sovereignty of Servia, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations."

Count Pourtales promised to support this proposal with his Government.

In the mind of M. Sazonof, the acceptance of this proposal by Austria would have, as a logical corollary, the opening of a discussion by the Powers in London.

The Russian Government again show by their attitude that they are neglecting nothing in order to stop the conflict.

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 104.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

IN spite of the communication made yesterday by the Russian Ambassador to several of his colleagues, among them the German Ambassador, with reference to the partial mobilisation in his country, the Vienna press refrained from publishing the news. This enforced silence has just been explained at an interview of great importance between M. Schebeko and Count Berchtold, who examined at length the present formidable difficulties with equal readiness to apply to them mutually acceptable solutions.

M. Schebeko explained that the only object of the military preparations on the Russian side was to reply to those made by Austria, and to indicate the intention and the right of the Tsar to formulate his views on the settlement of the Servian question. The steps towards mobilisation taken in Galicia, answered Count Berchtold, have no aggressive intention and are only directed towards maintaining the situation as it stands. On both sides endeavours will be made to prevent these measures from being interpreted as signs of hostility.

With a view to settling the Austro-Servian dispute it was agreed that *pourparlers* should be resumed at St. Petersburg between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry; they had only been interrupted owing to a misunderstanding, as Count Berchtold thought that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed that the Austrian representative should be given powers which would allow him to modify the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Count Szápáry will only be authorised to discuss what settlement would be compatible with the dignity and prestige for which both Empires had equal concern.

It would therefore for the moment be in this direct form, and only between the two most interested Powers, that the discussion which Sir Edward Grey proposed to entrust to the four Powers not directly interested would take place.

Sir M. de Bunsen, who was with me, at once declared to M. Schebeko that the Foreign Office would entirely approve of this new procedure. Repeating the statement he made at the Ballplatz, the Russian Ambassador stated that his Government would take a much broader view than was generally supposed of the demands of the Monarchy; M. Schebeko did everything to convince Count Berchtold of the sincerity of Russia's desire to arrive at an agreement which would be acceptable to the two Empires.

The interview was carried on in a friendly tone and gave reason for thinking that all chances of localising the dispute were not lost, when the news of the German mobilisation arrived at Vienna.

DUMAINE.

---

### No. 105.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

HERR VON JAGOW telephoned to me at 2 o'clock that the news of the German mobilisation which had spread an hour before was false, and asked me to inform you of this urgently; the Imperial Government is confiscating the extra editions of

the papers which announced it. But neither this communication nor these steps diminish my apprehension with regard to the plans of Germany.

It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council held yesterday evening at Potsdam with the military authorities under the presidency of the Emperor decided on mobilisation, and this explains the preparation of the special edition of the *Lokal Anzeiger*, but that from various causes (the declaration of Great Britain that she reserved her entire liberty of action, the exchange of telegrams between the Tsar and William II.) the serious measures which had been decided upon were suspended.

One of the Ambassadors with whom I have very close relations saw Herr von Zimmermann at 2 o'clock. According to the Under-Secretary of State the military authorities are very anxious that mobilisation should be ordered, because every delay makes Germany lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless up to the present the haste of the General Staff, which sees war in mobilisation, had been successfully prevented. In any case mobilisation may be decided upon at any moment. I do not know who has issued in the *Lokal Anzeiger*, a paper which is usually semi-official, premature news calculated to cause excitement in France.

Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all the measures for mobilisation which can be taken before the publication of the general order of mobilisation have already been taken here, and that they are anxious here to make us publish our mobilisation first in order to attribute the responsibility to us.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 106.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

PLEASE inform Sir E. Grey of the following facts concerning French and German military preparations. England will see from this that if France is resolved, it is not she who is taking aggressive steps.

You will direct the attention of Sir E. Grey to the decision taken by the Council of Ministers this morning; although Germany has made her covering dispositions a few hundred metres from the frontier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops to their war positions, we have kept our troops ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer.

Our plan, conceived in the spirit of the offensive, provided, however, that the fighting positions of our covering troops should be as near to the frontier as possible. By leaving a strip of territory undefended against sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government of the Republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the responsibility for the attack.

In order to be convinced of this it is sufficient to compare the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier; in France, soldiers who were on leave were not recalled until we were certain that Germany had done so five days before.

In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz been pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reinforced by units transported by train from garrisons of the interior such as Trèves or Cologne; nothing like this has been done in France.

The arming of the frontier defences (clearing of trees, placing of armament, construction of batteries and strengthening of wire entanglements) was begun in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; with us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from taking similar measures.

The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; in France on Tuesday, the 28th.

Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have been recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of reserve have been summoned; in the interior the roads are closed, motor-cars only circulate with permits. It is the last stage before mobilisation. None of these measures has been taken in France.

The German army has its outposts on our frontier; on two occasions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory. The whole 16th army corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg; the 15th army corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier.

Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 107.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador has not been informed of Germany's reply to Sir E. Grey's request. He told me that Berlin had consulted Vienna and was still waiting to hear from her ally.

My Russian colleague has just told me that Herr von Jagow (to whom Count Pourtales had communicated the conciliatory formula suggested by M. Sazonof for an Austro-Russian understanding) had just told him that he found this proposal unacceptable to Austria, thus showing the negative action of German diplomacy at Vienna.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 108.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to  
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 30, 1914.*

PRINCE LICHNOWSKY has not brought any reply to the request addressed to him by Sir E. Grey yesterday to obtain from the German Government a formula for the intervention of the four Powers in the interest of peace. But my German colleague questioned the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs about the military preparations of England.

Sir E. Grey replied that they were not of an offensive character, but that in the present state of affairs on the continent it was natural to take some precautions; that in England, as in France, there was a desire to maintain peace, and that if in England, as in France, defensive measures were under consideration, it was not with the object of making any aggression.

The information which your Excellency has addressed to me on the subject of the military measures taken by Germany on the French frontier gave me the opportunity of remarking to Sir E. Grey that it is no longer a question of a conflict of influence between Russia and Austria-Hungary, but that there is a risk of an act of aggression which might provoke general war.

Sir E. Grey understood my feelings perfectly, and he thinks, as I do, that the moment has come to consider and discuss together every hypothesis.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 109.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. René Viviani, President of the Council,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

In the interview which I had to-day with the Secretary of State, I asked Herr von Jagow what reply he had made to Sir E. Grey, who had asked him to draw up himself the formula for the intervention of the disinterested Powers.



He answered that "to gain time," he had decided to act directly, and that he had asked Austria to tell him the ground on which conversations might be opened with her. This answer has the effect, under a pretext of proceeding more quickly, of eliminating Great Britain, France and Italy, and of entrusting to Herr von Tschirscky, whose Pan-German and Russophobe sentiments are well known, the duty of persuading Austria to adopt a conciliatory attitude.

Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation compromised the success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisation, and this might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and consequently that of Germany.

I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, and that this was not being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for the German army, and "that the words of which I reminded him did not constitute a firm engagement on his part."

The impression which I received from this conversation is that the chances of peace have again decreased.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 110.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 31, 1914.*

At the beginning of our conversation to-day Sir E. Grey told me that Prince Lichnowsky had asked him this morning if Great Britain would observe neutrality in the conflict which is at hand. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that, if the conflict became general, Great Britain would not be able to remain neutral, and especially that if France were involved Great Britain would be drawn in.

I then asked Sir E. Grey concerning the Cabinet Council which took place this morning. He replied that after having examined the situation, the Cabinet had thought that for the moment the British Government were unable to guarantee to us their intervention, that they intended to take steps to obtain from Germany and France an understanding to respect Belgian neutrality, but that before considering intervention it was necessary to wait for the situation to develop.

I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British Government would await the invasion of French territory. I insisted on the fact that the measures already taken on our frontier by Germany showed an intention to attack in the near future, and that, if a renewal of the mistake of Europe in 1870 was to be avoided, Great Britain should consider at once the circumstances in which she would give France the help on which she relied.

Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet had only been formed on the situation at the moment, that the situation might be modified, and that in that case a meeting of the Cabinet would be called together at once in order to consider it.

Sir A. Nicolson, whom I saw on leaving the room of the Secretary of State, told me that the Cabinet would meet again to-morrow, and confidentially gave me to understand that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be certain to renew the discussion.

According to your instructions, I have taken the necessary steps to secure that the autograph letter which the President of the Republic has addressed to His Majesty the King of England should be given to the King this evening. This step, which will certainly be communicated to the Prime Minister to-morrow morning, will, I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by the British Cabinet.

PAUL CAMBON.

---

No. 111.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxembourg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxembourg, July 31, 1914.*

THE Minister of State has just left the Legation, he has just told me that the Germans have closed the bridges over the Moselle at Schengen and at Remich with vehicles and the bridge at Wormeldange with ropes. The bridges at Wasserbillig and at D'Echternach over the Sûre have not been closed, but the Germans no longer allow the export from Prussia of corn, cattle or motor cars.

M. Eyschen requested me—and this was the real object of his visit—to ask you for an official declaration to the effect that France will, in case of war, respect the neutrality of Luxembourg. When I asked him if he had received a similar declaration from the German Government, he told me that he was going to the German Minister to get the same declaration.

*Postscript.*—Up to the present no special measure has been taken by the Cabinet of Luxembourg. M. Eyschen has returned from the German Legation. He complained of the measures showing suspicion which were taken against a neutral neighbour. The Minister of State has asked the German Minister

for an official declaration from his Government undertaking to respect the neutrality. Herr Von Buch is stated to have replied, "That is a matter of course, but it would be necessary for the French Government to give the same undertaking."

MOLLARD.

### No. 112.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador has handed me a note from his Government asking the French Government to support a proposal at St. Petersburg for the peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian conflict.

This note shows that the German Ambassador has informed Sir E. Grey of the intention of his Government to try to exercise influence on the Austro-Hungarian Government after the capture of Belgrade and the occupation of the districts bordering on the frontier, in order to obtain a promise not to advance further, while the Powers endeavoured to secure that Servia should give sufficient satisfaction to Austria; the occupied territory would be evacuated as soon as she had received satisfaction.

Sir E. Grey made this suggestion on the 29th July, and expressed the hope that military preparations would be suspended on all sides. Although the Russian Ambassador at London has informed the Secretary of State that he fears that the Russian condition (*if Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which endanger the principle of Servian sovereignty, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations*) cannot be modified, Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria stops her advance after the occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Government could agree to change their formula in the following way:—

That the Powers would examine how Servia should give complete satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereignty or independence of the Kingdom. In case Austria after occupying Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory should declare herself ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance and to discuss how an arrangement might be arrived at, Russia could also consent to the discussion and suspend her military preparations, provided that the other Powers acted in the same way.

In accordance with the request of Sir E. Grey, the French Government joined in the British suggestion, and in the

following terms asked their Ambassador at St. Petersburg to try to obtain, without delay, the assent of the Russian Government :—

“Please inform M. Sazonof urgently that the suggestion of Sir E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful basis for conversation between the Powers, who are equally desirous of working for an honourable arrangement of the Austro-Servian conflict, and of averting in this manner the dangers which threaten general peace.

“The plan proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by stopping the advance of the Austrian army and by entrusting to the Powers the duty of examining how Serbia could give full satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereign rights and the independence of the Kingdom, by thus affording Russia a means of suspending all military preparations, while the other Powers are to act in the same way, is calculated equally to give satisfaction to Russia and to Austria and to provide for Serbia an acceptable means of issue from the present difficulty.

“I would ask you carefully to be guided by the foregoing considerations in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof to give his adherence without delay to the proposal of Sir E. Grey, of which he will have been himself informed.”

RENÉ VIVIANI.

### No. 113.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to  
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister of  
Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

THE news of the bombardment of Belgrade during the night and morning of yesterday has provoked very deep feeling in Russia. One cannot understand the attitude of Austria, whose provocations since the beginning of the crisis have regularly followed Russia's attempts at conciliation and the satisfactory conversations exchanged between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

Nevertheless, desirous of leaving nothing undone in order to prove his sincere desire to safeguard peace, M. Sazonof informs me that he has modified his formula, as requested by the British Ambassador, in the following way :—

“If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian

Government, without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude."

## PALÉOLOGUE.

---

No. 114.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

THE efforts made up till now concurrently by Great Britain and Russia with the earnest support of France (obtained in advance for every peaceful effort) with the object of a direct understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg, or of the mediation of the four Powers in the most appropriate form, are being united to-day ; Russia, giving a fresh proof of her desire for an understanding, has hastened to reply to the first appearance of an overture made by Germany since the beginning of the crisis (as to the conditions on which Russia would stop her military preparations) by indicating a formula, and then modifying it in accordance with the request of Great Britain ; there ought to be hope, therefore, negotiations having also been begun again between the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors, that British mediation will complete at London that which is being attempted by direct negotiations at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Nevertheless, the constant attitude of Germany who, since the beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power her peaceful intentions, has actually, by her dilatory or negative attitude, caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and has not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising attitude of Vienna ; the German military preparations begun since the 25th July and subsequently continued without cessation ; the immediate opposition of Germany to the Russian formula, declared at Berlin unacceptable for Austria before that Power had even been consulted ; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could not be obtained, to make war.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

## No. 115.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

GENERAL mobilisation for all men from 19 to 42 years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this morning at 1 o'clock.

My Russian colleague still thinks that this step is not entirely in contradiction to the declaration made yesterday by Count Berchtold.

DUMAINE.

## No. 116.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

HERR VON JAGOW sent for me and has just told me that he was very sorry to inform me that in face of the total mobilisation of the Russian army, Germany, in the interest of the security of the Empire, found herself obliged to take serious precautionary measures. What is called "Kriegsgefahrzustand" (the state of danger of war) has been declared, and this allows the authorities to proclaim, if they deem it expedient, a state of siege, to suspend some of the public services, and to close the frontier.

At the same time a demand is being made at St. Petersburg that they should demobilise, as well on the Austrian as on the German side, otherwise Germany would be obliged to mobilise on her side. Herr von Jagow told me that Herr von Schoen had been instructed to inform the French Government of the resolution of the Berlin Cabinet and to ask them what attitude they intended to adopt.

JULES CAMBON.

## No. 117.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

THE German Government decided at mid-day to take all military measures implied by the state called "state of danger of war."

In communicating this decision to me at 7 o'clock this evening, Baron von Schoen added that the Government required

at the same time that Russia should demobilise. If the Russian Government has not given a satisfactory reply within twelve hours Germany will mobilise in her turn.

I replied to the German Ambassador that I had no information at all about an alleged total mobilisation of the Russian army and navy which the German Government invoked as the reason for the new military measures which they are taking to-day.

Baron von Schoen finally asked me, in the name of his Government, what the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia. He told me that he would come for my reply to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock.

I have no intention of making any statement to him on this subject, and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have regard to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not indeed give any account of her intentions except to her ally.

I ask you to inform M. Sazonof of this immediately. As I have already told you, I have no doubt that the Imperial Government, in the highest interests of peace, will do everything on their part to avoid anything that might render inevitable or precipitate the crisis.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 118.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to  
M. René Viviani, President of Council, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

As a result of the general mobilisation of Austria and of the measures for mobilisation taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days, the order for the general mobilisation of the Russian army has been given, Russia not being able, without most serious danger, to allow herself to be further out-distanced; really she is only taking military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany.

For imperative reasons of strategy the Russian Government, knowing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay the conversion of her partial mobilisation into a general mobilisation.

PALÉOLOGUE.

---

## No. 119.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

L'AGENCE HAVAS having announced that the state "of danger of war" had been declared in Germany, I told M. Davignon that I could assure him that the Government of the Republic would respect the neutrality of Belgium.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Government of the King had always thought that this would be so, and thanked me. The Russian Minister and the British Minister, whom I saw subsequently, appeared much pleased that in the circumstances I gave this assurance, which further, as the British Minister told me, was in accordance with the declaration of Sir E. Grey.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

---



## CHAPTER VI.

DECLARATION OF WAR BY GERMANY ON RUSSIA  
(SATURDAY, AUGUST 1, AT 7.10 P.M.);  
AND ON FRANCE (MONDAY, AUGUST 3, AT 6.45 P.M.).

## No. 120.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

Paris, August 1, 1914.

Two *démarches* were made yesterday evening by the Austrian Ambassadors—the one at Paris, which was rather vague, the other at St. Petersburg, precise and conciliatory.

Count Scézszen came to explain to me that the Austro-Hungarian Government had officially informed Russia that it had no territorial ambition, and would not touch the sovereignty of Servia; that it also repudiates any intention of occupying the Sandjak; but that these explanations of disinterestedness only retain their force if the war remains localised to Austria and Servia, as a European war would open out eventualities which it was impossible to foresee. The Austrian Ambassador, in commenting on these explanations, gave me to understand that if his Government could not answer the questions of the Powers speaking in their own name, they would certainly answer Servia, or any single Power asking for these conditions in the name of Servia. He added that a step in this direction was perhaps still possible.

At St. Petersburg the Austrian Ambassador called on M. Sazonof and explained to him that his Government was willing to begin a discussion as to the basis of the ultimatum addressed to Servia. The Russian Minister declared himself satisfied with this declaration, and proposed that the *pour-parlers* should take place in London with the participation of the Powers. M. Sazonof will have requested the British Government to take the lead in the discussion; he pointed out that it would be very important that Austria should stop her operations in Servia.

The deduction from these facts is that Austria would at last show herself ready to come to an agreement, just as the Russian Government is ready to enter into negotiations on the basis of the British proposal.

Unfortunately these arrangements which allowed one to hope for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been rendered useless by the attitude of Germany. This Power has in fact presented an ultimatum giving the Russian

Government twelve hours in which to agree to the demobilisation of their forces not only as against Germany, but also as against Austria; this time-limit expires at noon. The ultimatum is not justified, for Russia has accepted the British proposal which implies a cessation of military preparation by all the Powers.

The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she wishes for it against France. Yesterday when Herr von Schoen came to the Quai d'Orsay to ask what attitude France proposed to take in case of a Russo-German conflict, the German Ambassador, although there has been no direct dispute between France and Germany, and although from the beginning of the crisis we have used all our efforts for a peaceful solution and are still continuing to do so, added that he asked me to present his respects and thanks to the President of the Republic, and asked that we would be good enough to make arrangements as to him personally (*des dispositions pour sa propre personne*); we know also that he has already put the archives of the Embassy in safety. This attitude of breaking off diplomatic relations without any direct dispute, and although he has not received any definitely negative answer, is characteristic of the determination of Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed with Russia to begin negotiations.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 121.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

My Russian colleague received yesterday evening two telegrams from M. Sazonof advising him that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had explained that his Government was ready to discuss the note to Servia with the Russian Government even as to its basis; M. Sazonof answered that in his opinion these conversations should take place in London.

The ultimatum to Russia can only do away with the last chances of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The question may be asked whether in such circumstances the acceptance by Austria was serious, and had not the object of throwing the responsibility of the conflict on to Russia.

My British colleague during the night made a pressing appeal to Herr von Jagow's feelings of humanity. The latter answered that the matter had gone too far and that they must wait for the Russian answer to the German ultimatum. But he told Sir Edward Goschen that the ultimatum required that the Russians should countermand their mobilisation, not only as against Germany but also as against Austria; my British

colleague was much astonished at this, and said that it did not seem possible for Russia to accept this last point.

Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agreement seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Petersburg, is characteristic of her warlike policy.

In truth the conflict was between Russia and Austria only, and Germany could only intervene as an ally of Austria; in these circumstances, as the two Powers which were interested as principals were prepared for conversations, it is impossible to understand why Germany should send an ultimatum to Russia instead of continuing like all the other Powers to work for a peaceful solution, unless she desired war on her own account.

J. CAMBON.

No. 122.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, and to the French Minister at Brussels.*

Paris, August 1, 1914.

THE British Ambassador, under the instructions of his Government, came to ask me what would be the attitude of the French Government as regards Belgium in case of conflict with Germany.

I stated that, in accordance with the assurance which we had repeatedly given the Belgian Government, we intended to respect their neutrality.

It would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself brought to enter Belgian territory, with the object of fulfilling her obligations as a guaranteeing Power.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 123.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

THE British Ambassador has been instructed by his Government to make to the German Government a communication identical with that which he made to you on the subject of the neutrality of Belgium.

Herr von Jagow answered that he would take the instructions of the Emperor and the Chancellor, but that he did not think an answer could be given, for Germany could not disclose her military plans in this way. The British Ambassador will see Herr von Jagow to-morrow afternoon.

J. CAMBON.

## No. 124.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Rome, August 1, 1914.

I WENT to see the Marquis di San Giuliano this morning at half-past eight, in order to get precise information from him as to the attitude of Italy in view of the provocative acts of Germany and the results which they may have.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he had seen the German Ambassador yesterday evening. Herr von Flotow had said to him that Germany had requested the Russian Government to suspend mobilisation, and the French Government to inform them as to their intentions; Germany had given France a time limit of eighteen hours and Russia a time limit of twelve hours.

Herr von Flotow as a result of this communication asked what were the intentions of the Italian Government.

The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war undertaken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the consequences which might result from it according to the declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy could not take part in the war.

BARRÈRE.

## No. 125.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.*

Paris, August 1, 1914.

THE German Ambassador came to see me again at 11 o'clock this morning. After having recalled to his memory all the efforts made by France towards an honourable settlement of the Austro-Servian conflict and the difficulty between Austria and Russia which has resulted from it, I put him in possession of the facts as to the *pourparlers* which have been carried on since yesterday:—

- (1) A British compromise, proposing, besides other suggestions, suspension of military preparations on the part of Russia, on condition that the other Powers should act in the same way; adherence of Russia to this proposal.
- (2) Communications from the Austrian Government declaring that they did not desire any aggrandisement in Servia, nor even to advance into the Sandjak, and stating that they were ready to discuss *even the basis* of the Austro-Servian question at London with the other Powers.

I drew attention to the attitude of Germany who, abandoning all *pourparlers*, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment when this Power had just accepted the British formula (which implies the cessation of military preparations by all the countries which have mobilised) and regarded as imminent a diplomatic rupture with France.

Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the developments which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four hours, that there was perhaps in them a "glimmer of hope" for some arrangement, that he had not received any fresh communication from his Government, and that he was going to get information. He gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire to unite his efforts to those of France for arriving at a solution of the conflict. I laid stress on the serious responsibility which the Imperial Government would assume if, in circumstances such as these, they took an initiative which was not justified and of a kind which would irremediably compromise peace.

Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and did not make any fresh request for an answer to his question concerning the attitude of France in case of an Austro-Russian conflict. He confined himself to saying of his own accord that the attitude of France was not doubtful.

It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, on their side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous preparations on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the possibilities, and we should not cease to work towards an agreement. On her side France is taking all military measures required for protection against too great an advance in German military preparations. She considers that her attempts at solution will only have a chance of success so far as it is felt that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict is forced on her.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 126.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, August 1, 1914.

SIR Edward Grey said to me that, at a meeting this morning, the Cabinet had again considered the situation. As Germany had asked Great Britain to give a declaration of neutrality and had not obtained it, the British Government remained masters of their action; this could shape itself in accordance with different hypotheses.

In the first place, Belgian neutrality is of great importance to Great Britain. France has immediately renewed her engagement to respect it. Germany has explained "that she was not in a position to reply." Sir Edward Grey will put the Cabinet in possession of this answer and will ask to be authorised to state on Monday in the House of Commons, that the British Government will not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality.

In the second place, the British fleet is mobilised, and Sir Edward Grey will propose to his colleagues that he should state that it will oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the German fleet, or, if the German fleet should pass through (*venaient à le passer*), will oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two questions will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during this intervening period any incident took place, it was necessary not to allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable to think of intervening in time.

PAUL CAMBON.

### No. 127.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

Paris, August 1, 1914.

WE are warned through several channels that the German and the Austrian Governments are trying at this moment to influence England by making her believe that the responsibility for war, if it breaks out, will fall on Russia. Efforts are being made to obtain the neutrality of England by disguising the truth.

France has not ceased in co-operation with England to advise moderation at St. Petersburg; this advice has been listened to.

From the beginning M. Sazonof has exercised pressure on Serbia to make her accept all those clauses of the ultimatum which were not incompatible with her sovereignty.

He then engaged in a direct conversation with Austria; this was fresh evidence of his conciliatory spirit. Finally he has agreed to allow those Powers which are less interested to seek for means of composing the dispute.

In accordance with the wish expressed to him by Sir George Buchanan, M. Sazonof consented to modify the first formula which he had put forward, and he has drawn up a second which is shown not to differ materially from the declaration which Count Scézszen made yesterday to M. de Margerie. Count Scézszen affirms that Austria has no intention of seeking territorial aggrandisement and does not wish to touch the sovereignty of Serbia. He expressly adds that Austria has no designs on the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar.

It would then seem that an agreement between Sir Edward Grey's suggestion, M. Sazonof's formula and the Austrian declarations could easily be reconciled.

France is determined, in co-operation with England, to work to the very end for the realisation of this.

But while these negotiations were going on, and while Russia in the negotiations showed a goodwill which cannot be disputed, Austria was the first to proceed to a general mobilisation.

Russia has found herself obliged to imitate Austria, so as not to be left in an unfavourable position, but all the time she has continued ready to negotiate.

It is not necessary for me to repeat that, so far as we are concerned, we will, in co-operation with England, continue to work for the success of these *pourparlers*.

But the attitude of Germany has made it absolutely compulsory for us to make out the order for mobilisation to-day.

Last Wednesday, well in advance of Russian mobilisation, as I have already telegraphed to you, Herr von Schoen announced to me the impending publication of *Kriegsgefahrzustand*. This measure has been taken by Germany, and under the protection of this screen, she immediately began a mobilisation in the proper sense of the word.

To-day M. Paléologue telegraphed that Count Pourtalès had notified the Russian Government of German mobilisation.

Information which has been received by the Ministry of War confirms the fact that this mobilisation is really in full execution.

Our decree of mobilisation is then an *essential measure* of protection. The Government have accompanied it by a proclamation signed by the President of the Republic and by all the Ministers, in which they explain that mobilisation is not war, and that in the present state of affairs it is the best means for France of safeguarding peace, and that the Government of the Republic will redouble their efforts to bring the negotiations to a conclusion.

Will you be good enough to bring all these points urgently to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to point out to him that we have throughout been governed by the determination not to commit any act of provocation.

I am persuaded that in case war were to break out, British opinion would see clearly from which side aggression comes, and that it would realise the strong reasons which we have given to Sir Edward Grey for asking for armed intervention on the part of England in the interest of the future of the European balance of power.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

## No. 128.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Luxemburg, August 1, 1914.

THE Minister of State instructs me to ask from the French Government an assurance of neutrality similar to that which has been given to Belgium. M. Eyschen has stated that at present, as the declaration in question was made to the President of the Council of the Belgian Government by the French Minister at Brussels, he thought that the same procedure would be most suitable with regard to the Grand Duchy.

This is the reason why he has abstained from making a request direct to the Government of the Republic. As the Chamber of Deputies meets on Monday, M. Eyschen wishes to have the answer by that date; a similar *démarche* is being made at the same time with the German Minister at Luxemburg.

MOLLARD.

---

No. 129.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg.*

Paris, August 1, 1914.

BE good enough to state to the President of the Council that in conformity with the Treaty of London, 1867, the Government of the Republic intends to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, as they have shown by their attitude.

The violation of this neutrality by Germany would, however, be an act of a kind which would compel France from that time to be guided in this matter by care for her defence and her interests.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 130.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

SPECIAL editions of newspapers are being distributed in the streets of Berlin announcing that the general mobilisation of the army and the navy has been decreed and that the first day of the mobilisation is Sunday, 2nd August.

JULES CAMBON.

---



## No. 131.

*M. Eyschen, Minister of State for Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts:—

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

*The Minister of State,  
President of the Government.*

EYSCHEN.

## No. 132.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

THE Minister of State for Luxemburg, M. Eyschen, has just received, through Herr von Buch, German Minister at Luxemburg, a telegram from Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire, saying that the military measures taken by Germany in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against this country, but are solely measures tended to assure the use of the railways which have been leased to the Empire against the eventual attack of a French army. Luxemburg will receive a complete indemnity for any damage.

MOLLARD.

## No. 133.

*Note handed in by the German Ambassador.*

Paris, August 2, 1914.

THE German Ambassador has just been instructed, and hastens to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the military measures taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg do not constitute an act of hostility. They must be considered as purely preventive measures taken for the protection of the railways, which, under the treaties between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, are under German administration.

VON SCHOEN.

---

No. 134.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

St. Petersburg, August 2, 1914.

YESTERDAY at ten minutes past seven in the evening the German Ambassador handed to M. Sazonof a declaration of war by his Government ; he will leave St. Petersburg to-day.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has not received any instructions from his Government as to the declaration of war.

PALÉOLOGUE.

---

No. 135.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Representatives of France abroad.*

Paris, August 2, 1914.

THE Russian Ambassador informs me that Germany has just declared war on Russia, notwithstanding the negotiations which are proceeding, and at a moment when Austria-Hungary was agreeing to discuss with the Powers even the basis of her conflict with Servia.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 136.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.*

Paris, August 2, 1914.

THIS morning, French territory was violated by German troops at Ciry and near Longwy. They are marching on the

fort which bears the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle has twice been fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg.

You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact that the German Government is committing itself to acts of war against France without provocation on our part, or any previous declaration of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the zone of ten kilometres which we have maintained, even since the mobilisation, between our troops and the frontier.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 137.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 2, 1914.

AFTER the meeting of the Cabinet held this morning, Sir Edward Grey made the following declaration to me :—

“I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

“This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty’s Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty’s Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.”

Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and that of Luxemburg, the Secretary of State reminded me that the Convention of 1867, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from the Treaty referring to Belgium, in that Great Britain was bound to require the observance of this latter Convention without the assistance of the other guaranteeing Powers, while with regard to Luxemburg all the guaranteeing Powers were to act in concert.

The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so important that Great Britain will regard its violation by Germany as a *casus belli*. It is a specially British interest and there is no doubt that the British Government, faithful to the traditions of their policy, will insist upon it, even if the business world in which German influence is making tenacious efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Government committing itself against Germany.

PAUL CAMBON.

## No. 138.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

Paris, August 2, 1914.

I NOTE the points contained in your telegrams of the 27th, 30th, 31st July and the 1st August, and in that which you have sent to me to-day.

In communicating to the Chambers the declaration which Sir Edward Grey has made to you, the text of which is contained in your last telegram, I will add that in it we have obtained from Great Britain a first assistance which is most valuable to us.

In addition, I propose to indicate that the help which Great Britain intends to give to France for the protection of the French coasts or the French merchant marine, will be used in such a way that our navy will also, in case of a Franco-German conflict, be supported by the British fleet in the Atlantic as well as in the North Sea and Channel. In addition I would note that British ports could not serve as places for revictualling for the German fleet.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 139.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin.*

Paris, August 2, 1914.

GERMAN troops having to-day violated the eastern frontier at several points I request you immediately to protest in writing to the German Government. You will be good enough to take as your text the following note which, in the uncertainty of communications between Paris and Berlin, I have addressed directly to the German Ambassador:—

“The French administrative and military authorities in the eastern district have just reported several acts which I have instructed the Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin to bring to the knowledge of the Imperial Government.

“The first has taken place at Delle in the district of Belfort; on two occasions the French Customs station in this locality has been fired upon by a detachment of German soldiers. North of Delle two German patrols of the 5th mounted Jaegers crossed the frontier this morning and advanced to the villages of Joncherey and Baron, more than ten kilometres from the frontier. The officer who commanded the first has blown out the brains of a French

soldier. The German cavalry carried off some horses which the French mayor of Suarce was collecting and forced the inhabitants of the commune to lead the said horses.

"The Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin has been instructed to make a formal protest to the Imperial Government against acts which form a flagrant violation of the frontier by German troops in arms, and which are not justified by anything in the present situation. The Government of the Republic can only leave to the Imperial Government the entire responsibility for these acts."

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 140.

*M. Marcelin Pellet, French Minister at The Hague, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

The Hague, August 3, 1914.

THE German Minister called yesterday on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to explain the necessity under which, as he said, Germany was placed of violating the neutral territory of Luxemburg, adding that he would have a fresh communication to make to him to-day. He has now this morning announced the entry of German troops into Belgium in order, as he has explained, to prevent an occupation of that country by France.

PELLET.

---

No. 141.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

YESTERDAY evening the German Minister handed to the Belgian Government an ultimatum stating that his Government, having learnt that the French were preparing for operations in the districts of Givet and of Namur, were compelled to take steps, the first of which was to invite the Belgian Government to inform them, within seven hours, if they were disposed to facilitate military operations in Belgium against France. In case of refusal the fortune of war would decide.

The Government of the King answered that the information as to the French movements appeared to them to be inaccurate in view of the formal assurances which had been given by

France, and were still quite recent ; that Belgium, which since the establishment of her Kingdom, has taken every care to assure the protection of her dignity and of her interests, and has devoted all her efforts to peaceful development of progress, strongly protests against any violation of her territory from whatever quarter it may come : and that, supposing the violation takes place, she will know how to defend with energy her neutrality, which has been guaranteed by the Powers, and notably by the King of Prussia.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

No. 142.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

To the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium appealed to the guarantee of the Powers against the violation of her neutrality by Germany, France would at once respond to her appeal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered :

“It is with great sincerity that we thank the Government of the Republic for the support which it would eventually be able to offer us, but under present conditions we do not appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. At a later date the Government of the King will weigh the measures which it may be necessary to take.”

No. 143.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 3, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY has authorised me to inform you that you could state to Parliament that he was making explanations to the Commons as to the present attitude of the British Government, and that the chief of these declarations would be as follows :—

“In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection, in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state of war.”

Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the mention of an operation by way of the North Sea implied protection against a demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean.

The declaration concerning the intervention of the British fleet must be considered as binding the British Government. Sir Edward Grey has assured me of this and has added that the French Government were thereby authorised to inform the Chambers of this.

On my return to the Embassy I received your telephonic communication relating to the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium. I immediately communicated it to Sir Edward Grey.

PAUL CAMBON.

---

No. 144.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 3, 1914.

JUST as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for the meeting of the Cabinet, my German colleague, who had already seen him yesterday, came to press him to say that the neutrality of Great Britain did not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey refused all conversation on this matter.

The German Ambassador has sent to the press a *communiqué* saying that if Great Britain remained neutral Germany would give up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian coast as a *point d'appui*. My answer is that respecting the coast is not respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that the German ultimatum is already a violation of this neutrality.

PAUL CAMBON.

---

No. 145.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 3, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY has made the statement regarding the intervention of the British fleet. He has explained, in considering the situation, what he proposed to do with regard to Belgian neutrality; and the reading of a letter from King Albert asking for the support of Great Britain has deeply stirred the House.

The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked for ; from this moment its support is secured to the policy of the Government, and it follows public opinion which is declaring itself more and more in our favour.

PAUL CAMBON.

---

No. 146.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

Paris, August 3, 1914.

I AM told that the German Ambassador is said to have stated to the Foreign Office that yesterday morning eighty French officers in Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German frontier in twelve motor cars at Walbeck, to the west of Geldern, and that this formed a very serious violation of neutrality on the part of France.

Be good enough urgently to contradict this news which is pure invention, and to draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the German campaign of false news which is beginning.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 147.

*Letter handed by the German Ambassador to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, during his farewell audience, August 3, 1914, at 6.45 p.m.*

M. le Président,

THE German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country ; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel ; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

At the same time I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will detain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to



furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris.

Be good enough, M. le Président, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect.

(Signed)      SCHOEN.

---

No. 148.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives abroad.*

Paris, August 3, 1914.

THE German Ambassador has asked for his passports and is leaving this evening with the staffs of the Embassy, the German Consulate General and the Bavarian Legation. Baron von Schoen has given as his reason the establishment by the German administrative and military authorities of acts of hostility which are said to have been committed by French military aviators accused of having flown over territory of the Empire and thrown bombs. The Ambassador adds that the aviators are said to have also violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over Belgian territory. "In the presence of these acts of aggression," says the letter of Baron von Schoen, "the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power."

I formally challenged the inaccurate allegations of the Ambassador, and for my part I reminded him that I had yesterday addressed to him a note protesting against the flagrant violations of the French frontier committed two days ago by detachments of German troops.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 149.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin.*

*(Telegram communicated to French Representatives abroad.)*

Paris, August 3, 1914.

I REQUEST you to ask for your passports and to leave Berlin at once with the staff of the Embassy, leaving the charge of French interests and the care of the archives to the Spanish Ambassador. I request you at the same time to protest in writing against the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg by German troops, of which notice has been given by the Prime Minister of Luxemburg; against the ultimatum addressed to

the Belgian Government by the German Minister at Brussels to force upon them the violation of Belgian neutrality and to require of that country that she should facilitate military operations against France on Belgian territory ; finally against the false allegation of an alleged projected invasion of these two countries by French armies, by which he has attempted to justify the state of war which he declares henceforth exists between Germany and France.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 150.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich.*

Paris, August 3, 1914.

BE good enough to inform the Royal Bavarian Government that you have received instructions to adapt your attitude to that of our Ambassador at Berlin and to leave Munich.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 151.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constantinople, The Hague, Copenhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucharest, Athens, Belgrade.*

Paris, August 3, 1914.

I LEARN from an official Belgian source that German troops have violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich in the district of Verviers.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 152.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

THE Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends me a letter by which "the Government of the King declare that they are firmly decided to resist the aggression of Germany by all means in their power. Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France and Russia to co-operate as guarantors in the defence of her territory.

"There would be a concerted and common action having as its object the resistance of forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time to guarantee the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium in the future."

"Belgium is glad to be able to declare that she will ensure the defence of her fortified places."

KLOBUKOWSKI.

---

No. 153.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 4, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY has asked me to come and see him immediately in order to tell me that the Prime Minister would to-day make a statement in the House of Commons that Germany had been invited to withdraw her ultimatum to Belgium and to give her answer to Great Britain before 12 o'clock to-night.

PAUL CAMBON.

---

No. 154.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

THIS morning the German Minister informs the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian Government the Imperial Government find themselves compelled to carry out by force of arms those measures of protection which are rendered indispensable by the French threats.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

---

No. 155.

*M. Bapst, French Minister at Copenhagen, to M. Doumergue, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Copenhagen, August 6, 1914.

THE French Ambassador at Berlin asks me to communicate to your Excellency the following telegram:—

"I have been sent to Denmark by the German Government. I have just arrived at Copenhagen. I am accompanied by all

“ the staff of the Embassy and the Russian Chargé d’Affaires at Darmstadt with his family.” The treatment which we have received is of such a nature that I have thought it desirable to make a complete report on it to your Excellency by telegram.

On the morning of Monday, the 3rd August, after I had, in accordance with your instructions, addressed to Herr von Jagow a protest against the acts of aggression committed on French territory by German troops, the Secretary of State came to see me. Herr von Jagow came to complain of acts of aggression which he alleged had been committed in Germany, especially at Nuremberg and Coblenz by French aviators, who according to his statement “ had come from Belgium.” I answered that I had not the slightest information as to the facts to which he attached so much importance and the improbability of which seemed to me obvious; on my part I asked him if he had read the note which I had addressed to him with regard to the invasion of our territory by detachments of the German army. As the Secretary of State said that he had not yet read this note I explained its contents to him. I called his attention to the act committed by the officer commanding one of the detachments who had advanced to the French village of Joncherey, ten kilometres within our frontier, and had blown out the brains of a French soldier whom he had met there. After having given my opinion of this act I added: “ You will admit that under no circumstances could there be any comparison between this and the flight of an aeroplane over foreign territory carried out by private persons animated by that spirit of individual courage by which aviators are distinguished.

“ An act of aggression committed on the territory of a neighbour by detachments of regular troops commanded by officers assumes an importance of quite a different nature.”

Herr von Jagow explained to me that he had no knowledge of the facts of which I was speaking to him, and he added that it was difficult for events of this kind not to take place when two armies filled with the feelings which animated our troops found themselves face to face on either side of the frontier.

At this moment the crowds which thronged the Pariser Platz in front of the Embassy and whom we could see through the window of my study, which was half-open, uttered shouts against France. I asked the Secretary of State when all this would come to an end.

“ The Government has not yet come to a decision ” Herr von Jagow answered. “ It is probable that Herr von Schoen will receive orders to-day to ask for his passports and then you will receive yours.” The Secretary of State assured me that I need not have any anxiety with regard to my departure, and that all the proprieties would be observed with regard to me as well as my staff. We were not to see one another any more and we took leave of one another after an interview which had

been courteous and could not make me anticipate what was in store for me.

Before leaving Herr von Jagow I expressed to him my wish to make a personal call on the Chancellor, as that would be the last opportunity that I should have of seeing him.

Herr von Jagow answered that he did not advise me to carry out this intention as this interview would serve no purpose and could not fail to be painful.

At 6 o'clock in the evening Herr von Langwerth brought me my passports. In the name of his Government he refused to agree to the wish which I expressed to him that I should be permitted to travel by Holland or Belgium. He suggested to me that I should go either by way of Copenhagen, although he could not assure me a free passage by sea, or through Switzerland via Constance.

I accepted this last route; Herr von Langwerth having asked me to leave as soon as I possibly could it was agreed, in consideration of the necessity I was under of making arrangements with the Spanish Ambassador, who was undertaking the charge of our interests, that I should leave on the next day, the 4th August, at 10 o'clock at night.

At 7 o'clock, an hour after Herr von Langwerth had left, Herr von Lancken, formerly Councillor of the Embassy at Paris, came from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to tell me to request the staff of my Embassy to cease taking meals in the restaurants. This order was so strict that on the next day, Tuesday, I had to have recourse to the authority of the Wilhelmstrasse to get the Hotel Bristol to send our meals to the Embassy.

At 11 o'clock on the same evening, Monday, Herr von Langwerth came back to tell me that his Government would not allow our return by way of Switzerland under the pretext that it would take three days and three nights to take me to Constance. He announced that I should be sent by way of Vienna. I only agreed to this alteration under reserve, and during the night I wrote the following letter to Herr von Langwerth:—

“ M. le Baron,

Berlin, August 3, 1914.

I HAVE been thinking over the route for my return to my country about which you came to speak to me this evening. You propose that I shall travel by Vienna. I run the risk of finding myself detained in that town, if not by the action of the Austrian Government, at least owing to the mobilisation which creates great difficulties similar to those existing in Germany as to the movements of trains.

Under these circumstances I must ask the German Government for a promise made on their honour that the Austrian Government will send me to Switzerland, and that the Swiss Government will not close its frontier either to me or to the

persons by whom I am accompanied, as I am told that that frontier has been firmly closed to foreigners.

I cannot then accept the proposal that you have made to me unless I have the security which I ask for, and unless I am assured that I shall not be detained for some months outside my country.

JULES CAMBON."

In answer to this letter on the next morning, Tuesday, the 4th August, Herr von Langwerth gave me in writing an assurance that the Austrian and Swiss authorities had received communications to this effect.

At the same time M. Miladowski, attached to the Consulate at Berlin, as well as other Frenchmen, was arrested in his own house while in bed. M. Miladowski, for whom a diplomatic passport had been requested, was released after four hours.

I was preparing to leave for Vienna when, at a quarter to five, Herr von Langwerth came back to inform me that I would have to leave with the persons accompanying me at 10 o'clock in the evening, but that I should be taken to Denmark. On this new requirement I asked if I should be confined in a fortress supposing I did not comply. Herr von Langwerth simply answered that he would return to receive my answer in half an hour. I did not wish to give the German Government the pretext for saying that I had refused to depart from Germany. I therefore told Herr von Langwerth when he came back that I would submit to the order which had been given to me but "that I protested."

I at once wrote to Herr von Jagow a letter of which the following is a copy:

"Sir,

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

MORE than once your Excellency has said to me that the Imperial Government, in accordance with the usages of international courtesy, would facilitate my return to my own country and would give me every means of getting back to it quickly.

"Yesterday, however, Baron von Langwerth, after refusing me access to Belgium and Holland, informed me that I should travel to Switzerland via Constance. During the night I was informed that I should be sent to Austria, a country which is taking part in the present war on the side of Germany. As I had no knowledge of the intentions of Austria towards me, since on Austrian soil I am nothing but an ordinary private individual, I wrote to Baron von Langwerth that I requested the Imperial Government to give me a promise that the Imperial and Royal Austrian authorities would give me all possible facilities for continuing my journey and that Switzerland would not be closed to me. Herr von Langwerth has been good

enough to answer me in writing that I could be assured of an easy journey and that the Austrian authorities would do all that was necessary.

“It is nearly five o'clock, and Baron von Langwerth has just announced to me that I shall be sent to Denmark. In view of the present situation, there is no security that I shall find a ship to take me to England and it is this consideration which made me reject this proposal, with the approval of Herr von Langwerth.

“In truth no liberty is left me and I am treated almost as a prisoner. I am obliged to submit, having no means of obtaining that the rules of international courtesy should be observed towards me, but I hasten to protest to your Excellency against the manner in which I am being treated.

JULES CAMBON."

Whilst my letter was being delivered I was told that the journey would not be made direct but by way of Schleswig. At 10 o'clock in the evening, I left the Embassy with my staff in the middle of a great assembly of foot and mounted police.

At the station the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was only represented by an officer of inferior rank.

The journey took place with extreme slowness. We took more than twenty-four hours to reach the frontier. It seemed that at every station they had to wait for orders to proceed. I was accompanied by Major von Rheinbaben of the Alexandra Regiment of the Guard and by a police officer. In the neighbourhood of the Kiel Canal the soldiers entered our carriages. The windows were shut and the curtains of the carriages drawn down; each of us had to remain isolated in his compartment and was forbidden to get up or to touch his luggage. A soldier stood in the corridor of the carriage before the door of each of our compartments which were kept open, revolver in hand and finger on the trigger. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, the women and children and everyone were subjected to the same treatment.

At the last German station about 11 o'clock at night, Major von Rheinbaben came to take leave of me. I handed to him the following letter to Herr von Jagow.

" Sir,                      Wednesday Evening, August 5, 1914.

YESTERDAY before leaving Berlin, I protested in writing to your Excellency against the repeated change of route which was imposed upon me by the Imperial Government on my journey from Germany.

“To-day, as the train in which I was passed over the Kiel Canal an attempt was made to search all our luggage as if we might have hidden some instrument of destruction. Thanks to

the interference of Major von Rheinbaben, we were spared this insult. But they went further.

"They obliged us to remain each in his own compartment, the windows and blinds having been closed. During this time, in the corridors of the carriages at the door of each compartment and facing each one of us, stood a soldier, revolver in hand, finger on the trigger, for nearly half an hour.

"I consider it my duty to protest against this threat of violence to the Ambassador of the Republic and the staff of his Embassy, violence which nothing could even have made me anticipate. Yesterday I had the honour of writing to your Excellency that I was being treated almost as a prisoner. To-day I am being treated as a dangerous prisoner. Also I must record that during our journey which from Berlin to Denmark has taken twenty-four hours, no food has been prepared nor provided for me nor for the persons who were travelling with me to the frontier.

JULES CAMBON."

I thought that our troubles had finished, when shortly afterwards Major von Rheinbaben came, rather embarrassed, to inform me that the train would not proceed to the Danish frontier if I did not pay the cost of this train. I expressed my astonishment that I had not been made to pay at Berlin and that at any rate I had not been forewarned of this. I offered to pay by a cheque on one of the largest Berlin banks. This facility was refused me. With the help of my companions I was able to collect, in gold, the sum which was required from me at once, and which amounted to 3,611 marks 75 pfennig. This is about 5,000 francs in accordance with the present rate of exchange.\*

After this last incident, I thought it necessary to ask Major von Rheinbaben for his word of honour as an officer and a gentleman that we should be taken to the Danish frontier. He gave it to me, and I required that the policeman who was with us should accompany us.

In this way we arrived at the first Danish station, where the Danish Government had had a train made ready to take us to Copenhagen.

I am assured that my British colleague and the Belgian Minister, although they left Berlin after I did, travelled by the direct route to Holland. I am struck by this difference of treatment, and as Denmark and Norway are, at this moment, infested with spies, if I succeed in embarking in Norway, there is a danger that I may be arrested at sea with the officials who accompany me.

I do not wish to conclude this despatch without notifying your Excellency of the energy and devotion of which the whole staff of the Embassy has given unceasing proof during the

---

\* Subsequently the sum thus required from M. Jules Cambon was given to the Spanish Ambassador to be repaid to the French Ambassador.



course of this crisis. I shall be glad that account should be taken of the services which on this occasion have been rendered to the Government of the Republic, in particular by the Secretaries of the Embassy and by the Military and Naval Attachés.

JULES CAMBON.

---

No. 156.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Doumergue,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, August 5, 1914.

THE Minister of State came to see me at the Legation this morning, Tuesday, 4th August, 1914, at about half-past eight o'clock, in order to notify me that the German military authorities required my departure. On my answering that I would only give way to force M. Eyschen said that he understood my feelings in this matter, and it was just for that reason that he had himself come to make this communication which cost him so much, for it was just because force was used that he asked me to leave. He added that he was going to bring me written proof of this.

I did not conceal from M. Eyschen the grief and anxiety which I had in leaving my fellow-countrymen without defence, and asked him to be good enough to undertake their protection ; this he promised to do.

Just as he was leaving he handed me the enclosed letter (Enclosure I.) which is the answer of the Luxemburg Government to the declaration which I had made the evening before, according to telegraphic instructions of M. Viviani.

About 10 o'clock, the Minister of State came again to the Legation and left me with a short note from himself, a certified copy of the letter which the German Minister had addressed to him on the subject of my departure from Luxemburg. (Enclosures II. and III.)

At the same time he told me that he had informed Herr von Buch that the Luxemburg Government would be entrusted with the protection of the French and would have charge of the Legation and the Chancery. This news did not seem to be agreeable to my German colleague, who advised M. Eyschen to move me to entrust this responsibility to the Belgian Minister. I explained to the Minister of State that the situation was peculiar. As I was accredited to Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess and as my country was not in a state of war with Luxemburg, it was in these circumstances clearly indicated that it should be the Luxemburg Government which should look after the safety of my fellow-countrymen. M. Eyschen did not insist, and again accepted the service which I entrusted to him.

The Minister of State then asked me to be good enough to leave quietly in order to avoid any demonstration, which, as he said, would not fail to bring about reprisals on the part of the German military authorities against the French. I answered that I attached too much value to the safety of my countrymen to compromise it and that he had nothing to fear.

My departure, which was required to take place as soon as possible, was fixed for two o'clock; it was at the same time understood that I should leave in my motor car. As to a safe conduct, M. Eyschen told me that the German Minister was at that very moment at the German headquarters to ask for it, and that he would take care that I received it in good time.

At a quarter-past two the Minister of State accompanied by M. Henrion, Councillor of the Government, came to take leave of me and to receive the keys of the Legation and those of the Chancery.

He told me that orders had been given for my free passage, and that I must make for Arlon by way of the Merle, Mamers and Arlon roads. He added that a German officer would wait for me at the Merle road in order to go in front of my motor car.

I then left the Legation and made my way to Arlon by the road which had been determined on, but I did not meet anyone.

Your Excellency will have the goodness to find the enclosed text of the letter which I sent to the Minister of State before leaving my post (Enclosure IV.).

MOLLARD.

---

ENCLOSURE I.

*M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government,  
to M. Mollard, French Envoy Extraordinary and Minister  
Plenipotentiary at Luxemburg.*

Sir,

Luxemburg, August 4, 1914.

IN an oral communication made yesterday evening, your Excellency has had the goodness to bring to my knowledge that in accordance with the Treaty of London of 1867, the Government of the Republic intended to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg as they had shown by their attitude, but that the violation of this neutrality by Germany was nevertheless of such a kind as to compel France henceforth to be influenced in this matter by the care for her defence and her interests.

You will allow me to point out clearly that the decision of the Government of the Republic is based solely on the act of a third Power for which in truth the Grand Duchy is not responsible.

The rights of Luxemburg must then remain intact.

The German Empire has formally declared that only a temporary occupation of Luxemburg entered into their intentions.

I am glad to believe that the Government of the Republic will have no difficulty in establishing with me the fact that at all times and in all circumstances the Grand Duchy has fully and loyally fulfilled all the obligations of every kind which rested on it in virtue of the Treaty of 1867.

I remain, etc.,

EYSCHEN,

*Minister of State, President of the  
Government.*

#### ENCLOSURE II.

*Private Letter from M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government, to M. Mollard, French Minister, at Luxemburg.*

Sir,

A SHORT time ago I had with very great regret to inform you of the intentions of General von Fuchs with regard to your sojourn in Luxemburg.

As I had the honour to tell you, I asked for confirmation in writing of the decision taken by the military authorities in this matter.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I have at this moment received from the German Minister.

He has assured me that in carrying out this step there will be no want of the respect due to your position and person.

Be good enough to receive the renewed expression of my regret and my deep regard.

EYSCHEN.

#### ENCLOSURE III.

*To His Excellency the Minister of State, Dr. Eyschen.*

Your Excellency,

IN accordance with the instructions of his Excellency General Fuchs, I have the honour to ask you to be good enough to request the French Minister, M. Mollard, to leave Luxemburg as soon as possible and to return to France; otherwise the German military authorities would find themselves under the painful necessity of placing M. Mollard under the charge of a military escort and in the last extremity of proceeding to his arrest.

I beg your Excellency to have the goodness on this occasion to receive the assurance of my deepest regard.

VON BUCH.

## ENCLOSURE IV.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to His Excellency  
M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government  
of Luxemburg.*

Sir,

Luxemburg, August 4, 1914.

I HAVE just received your communication and I submit to force.

Before leaving Luxemburg it is my duty to provide for the fortunes and safety of my fellow-countrymen. Knowing the spirit of justice and equity of the Luxemburg Government, I have the honour to ask your Excellency to take them under your protection, and to watch over the safety of their lives and goods.

At the same time I will ask your Excellency to take charge of the Legation and the offices of the Chancery.

I should be much obliged to your Excellency if you would be good enough to lay before Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess the expression of my deepest respect, and my excuses for not having been able myself to express them to her.

In thanking you for all the marks of sympathy which you have given me I beg you to receive renewed assurances of my deep regard.

ARMAND MOLLARD.

No. 157.

*Notification by the French Government to the Representatives  
of the Powers at Paris.*

THE German Imperial Government, after having allowed its armed forces to cross the frontier, and to permit various acts of murder and pillage on French territory ; after having violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in defiance of the stipulations of the Convention of London, 11th May 1867, and of Convention V. of the Hague, 18th October 1907, *on the rights and duties of Powers and persons in case of war on land* (Articles 1 and 2), Conventions which have been signed by the German Government ; after having addressed an ultimatum to the Royal Government of Belgium with the object of requiring passage for German troops through Belgian territory in violation of the Treaties of the 19th April 1839, which had been signed by them, and in violation of the above Convention of the Hague Have declared war on France at 6.45 p.m. on the 3rd August 1914.

In these circumstances the Government of the Republic find themselves obliged on their side to have recourse to arms.

They have in consequence the honour of informing by these presents the Government of . . . that a state of war

exists between France and Germany dating from 6.45 p.m. on 3rd August 1914.

The Government of the Republic protest before all civilised nations, and especially those Governments which have signed the Conventions and Treaties referred to above, against the violation by the German Empire of their international engagements, and they reserve full right for reprisals which they might find themselves brought to exercise against an enemy so little regardful of its plighted word.

The Government of the Republic, who propose to observe the principles of the law of nations, will, during the hostilities, and assuming that reciprocity will be observed, act in accordance with the International Conventions signed by France concerning the law of war on land and sea.

The present notification, made in accordance with Article 2 of the Third Convention of the Hague of the 18th October 1907, relating to the opening of hostilities and handed to . . .

Paris, August 4, 1914, 2 p.m.

#### No. 158.

*Message from M. Poincaré, President of the Republic, read at the Extraordinary Session of Parliament, August 4, 1914.*

*(Journal Officiel of the 5th August 1914.)*

*(The Chamber rises and remains standing during the reading of the message.)*

"Gentlemen,

"FRANCE has just been the object of a violent and premeditated attack, which is an insolent defiance of the law of nations. Before any declaration of war had been sent to us, even before the German Ambassador had asked for his passports, our territory has been violated. The German Empire has waited till yesterday evening to give at this late stage the true name to a state of things which it had already created.

"For more than forty years the French, in sincere love of peace, have buried at the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate reparation.

"They have given to the world the example of a great nation which, definitely raised from defeat by the exercise of will, patience and labour, has only used its renewed and rejuvenated strength in the interest of progress and for the good of humanity.

"Since the ultimatum of Austria opened a crisis which threatened the whole of Europe, France has persisted in following and in recommending on all sides a policy of prudence, wisdom and moderation.

"To her there can be imputed no act, no movement, no word, which has not been peaceful and conciliatory.

"At the hour when the struggle is beginning, she has the right, in justice to herself, of solemnly declaring that she has made, up to the last moment, supreme efforts to avert the war now about to break out, the crushing responsibility for which the German Empire will have to bear before history. (*Unanimous and repeated applause.*)

"On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies were publicly expressing our hope of seeing negotiations which had been begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet carried to a peaceful conclusion, Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia, she has invaded the territory of Luxemburg, she has outrageously insulted the noble Belgian nation (*loud and unanimous applause*), our neighbour and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall upon us while we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. (*Fresh and repeated unanimous applause.*)

"But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, she was prepared; and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the screen behind which the mobilisation of our national forces will be methodically completed.

"Our fine and courageous army, which France to-day accompanies with her maternal thought (*loud applause*) has risen eager to defend the honour of the flag and the soil of the country. (*Unanimous and repeated applause.*)

"The President of the Republic interpreting the unanimous feeling of the country, expresses to our troops by land and sea the admiration and confidence of every Frenchman (*loud and prolonged applause*).

"Closely united in a common feeling, the nation will persevere with the cool self-restraint of which, since the beginning of the crisis, she has given daily proof. Now, as always, she will know how to harmonise the most noble daring and most ardent enthusiasm with that self-control which is the sign of enduring energy and is the best guarantee of victory (*applause*).

"In the war which is beginning France will have Right on her side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity be disregarded by nations any more than by individuals (*loud and unanimous applause*).

"She will be heroically defended by all her sons; nothing will break their sacred union before the enemy; to-day they are joined together as brothers in a common indignation against the aggressor, and in a common patriotic faith (*loud and prolonged applause and cries of 'Vive la France'.*)

"She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally (*loud and unanimous applause*); she is supported by the loyal friendship of Great Britain (*loud and unanimous applause*).

"And already from every part of the civilised world sympathy and good wishes are coming to her. For to-day once again she stands before the universe for Liberty, Justice and Reason (*loud and repeated applause*) 'Haut les cœurs et vive la France!' (*unanimous and prolonged applause*).

RAYMOND POINCARÉ."

No. 159.

*Speech delivered by M. René Viviani, President of the Council, in the Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1914.*

(*Journal Officiel, August 5, 1914.*)

M. René Viviani, *President of the Council.*

Gentlemen,

THE German Ambassador yesterday left Paris after notifying us of the existence of a state of war.

The Government owe to Parliament a true account of the events which in less than ten days have unloosed a European war and compelled France, peaceful and valiant, to defend her frontier against an attack, the hateful injustice of which is emphasised by its calculated unexpectedness.

This attack, which has no excuse, and which began before we were notified of any declaration of war, is the last act of a plan, whose origin and object I propose to declare before our own democracy and before the opinion of the civilised world.

As a consequence of the abominable crime which cost the Austro-Hungarian Heir-Apparent and the Duchess of Hohenburg their lives, difficulties arose between the Cabinets of Vienna and Belgrade.

The majority of the Powers were only semi-officially informed of these difficulties up till Friday, July 24th, the date on which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors communicated to them a circular which the press has published.

The object of this circular was to explain and justify an ultimatum delivered the evening before to Servia by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

This ultimatum in alleging the complicity of numerous Servian subjects and associations in the Serajevo crime, hinted that the official Servian authorities themselves were no strangers to it. It demanded a reply from Servia by 6 o'clock on the evening of Saturday, July 25th.

The Austrian demands, or at any rate many of them, without doubt struck a blow at the rights of a sovereign State. Notwithstanding their excessive character, Servia, on July 25th, declared that she submitted to them almost without reserve.

This submission, which constituted a success for Austria-Hungary, a guarantee for the peace of Europe, was not unconnected with the advice tendered to Belgrade from the first moment by France, Russia and Great Britain.

The value of this advice was all the greater since the Austro-Hungarian demands had been concealed from the Chanceries of the Triple Entente, to whom in the three preceding weeks the Austro-Hungarian Government had on several occasions given an assurance that their claims would be extremely moderate.

It was, therefore, with natural astonishment that the Cabinets of Paris, St. Petersburg and London learned on 26th July that the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after a few minutes' examination, declared that the Servian reply was unacceptable, and broke off diplomatic relations.

This astonishment was increased by the fact that on Friday, the 24th, the German Ambassador came and read to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs a *note verbale* asserting that the Austro-Servian dispute must remain localised, without intervention by the great Powers, or otherwise "incalculable consequences" were to be feared. A similar *démarche* was made on Saturday, the 25th, at London and at St. Petersburg.

Need I, Gentlemen, point out to you the contrast between the threatening expressions used by the German Ambassador at Paris and the conciliatory sentiments which the Powers of the Triple Entente had just manifested by the advice which they gave to Servia to submit?

Nevertheless, in spite of the extraordinary character of the German *démarche*, we immediately, in agreement with our Allies and our friends, took a conciliatory course and invited Germany to join in it.

We have had from the first moment regretfully to recognise that our intentions and our efforts met with no response at Berlin.

Not only did Germany appear wholly unwilling to give to Austria-Hungary the friendly advice which her position gave her the right to offer, but from this moment and still more in the following days, she seemed to intervene between the Cabinet at Vienna and the compromises suggested by the other Powers.

On Tuesday, 28th July, Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. This declaration of war, with its aggravation of the state of affairs brought about by the rupture of diplomatic relations three days before, gave ground for believing that there was a deliberate desire for war, and a systematic programme for the enslavement of Servia.

Thus there was now involved in the dispute not only the independence of a brave people, but the balance of power in the Balkans, embodied in the Treaty of Bukarest of 1913, and consecrated by the moral support of all the great Powers.

However, at the suggestion of the British Government with its constant and firm attachment to the maintenance of the



peace of Europe, the negotiations were continued, or, to speak more accurately, the Powers of the Triple Entente tried to continue them.

From this common desire sprang the proposal for action by the four Powers, England, France, Germany and Italy, which was intended, by assuring to Austria all legitimate satisfaction, to bring about an equitable adjustment of the dispute.

On Wednesday, the 29th, the Russian Government, noting the persistent failure of these efforts and faced by the Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war, fearing the military destruction of Servia, decided as a precautionary measure to mobilise the troops of four military districts, that is to say, the formations echeloned along the Austro-Hungarian frontier exclusively.

In taking this step, the Russian Government were careful to inform the German Government that their measures, restricted as they were and without any offensive character towards Austria, were not in any degree directed against Germany.

In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acknowledged this without demur.

On the other hand, all the efforts made by Great Britain, with the adherence of Russia and the support of France, to bring Austria and Servia into touch under the moral patronage of Europe were encountered at Berlin with a predetermined negative of which the diplomatic despatches afford the clearest proof.

This was a disquieting situation which made it probable that there existed at Berlin intentions which had not been disclosed. Some hours afterwards this alarming suspicion was destined to become a certainty.

In fact Germany's negative attitude gave place thirty-six hours later to positive steps which were truly alarming. On the 31st July Germany, by proclaiming "a state of danger of war," cut the communications between herself and the rest of Europe, and obtained for herself complete freedom to pursue against France in absolute secrecy military preparations which, as you have seen, nothing could justify.

Already for some days, and in circumstances difficult to explain, Germany had prepared for the transition of her army from a peace footing to a war footing.

From the morning of the 25th July, that is to say even before the expiration of the time limit given to Servia by Austria, she had confined to barracks the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine. The same day she had placed the frontier-works in a complete state of defence. On the 26th, she had indicated to the railways the measures preparatory for concentration. On the 27th, she had completed requisitions and placed her covering troops in position. On the 28th, the summons of individual reservists had begun and units which were distant from the frontier had been brought up to it.

Could all these measures, pursued with implacable method, leave us in doubt of Germany's intentions?

Such was the situation when, on the evening of the 31st July, the German Government, which, since the 24th, had not participated by any active step in the conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente, addressed an ultimatum to the Russian Government under the pretext that Russia had ordered a general mobilisation of her armies, and demanded that this mobilisation should be stopped within twelve hours.

This demand, which was all the more insulting in form because a few hours earlier the Emperor Nicholas II., with a movement at once confiding and spontaneous, had asked the German Emperor for his mediation, was put forward at a moment when, on the request of England and with the knowledge of Germany, the Russian Government was accepting a formula of such a nature as to lay the foundation for a friendly settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute and of the Austro-Russian difficulties by the simultaneous arrest of military operations and of military preparations.

The same day this unfriendly *démarche* towards Russia was supplemented by acts which were frankly hostile towards France; the rupture of communications by road, railway, telegraph and telephone, the seizure of French locomotives on their arrival at the frontier, the placing of machine guns in the middle of the permanent way which had been cut, and the concentration of troops on this frontier.

From this moment we were no longer justified in believing in the sincerity of the pacific declaration which the German representative continued to shower upon us (*hear, hear*).

We knew that Germany was mobilising under the shelter of the "state of danger of war."

We learnt that six classes of reservists had been called up, and that transport was being collected even for those army corps which were stationed a considerable distance from the frontier.

As these events unfolded themselves, the Government, watchful and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the measures of precaution which the situation required; the general mobilisation of our forces on land and sea was ordered.

The same evening, at 7.30, Germany, without waiting for the acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg of the English proposal, which I have already mentioned, declared war on Russia.

The next day, Sunday, the 2nd August, without regard for the extreme moderation of France, in contradiction to the peaceful declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, and in defiance of the rules of international law, German troops crossed our frontier at three different points.

At the same time, in violation of the Treaty of 1867, which guaranteed with the signature of Prussia the neutrality of Luxemburg, they invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy and so gave cause for a protest by the Luxemburg Government.

Finally, the neutrality of Belgium also was threatened. The German Minister, on the evening of the 2nd August, presented to the Belgian Government an ultimatum requesting facilities in Belgium for military operations against France, under the lying pretext that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us; the Belgian Government refused, and declared that they were resolved to defend with vigour their neutrality, which was respected by France and guaranteed by treaties, and in particular by the King of Prussia. (*Unanimous and prolonged applause.*)

Since then, Gentlemen, the German attacks have been renewed, multiplied, and accentuated. At more than fifteen points our frontier has been violated. Shots have been fired at our soldiers and Customs officers. Men have been killed and wounded. Yesterday a German military aviator dropped three bombs on Lunéville.

The German Ambassador, to whom as well as to all the great Powers, we communicated these facts, did not deny them or express his regrets for them. On the contrary, he came yesterday evening to ask me for his passports, and to notify us of the existence of a state of war, giving as his reason, in the teeth of all the facts, hostile acts committed by French aviators in German territory in the Eifel district, and even on the railway near Carlsruhe and near Nuremberg. This is the letter which he handed to me on the subject:—

“M. Le President,

“THE German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

“I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

“At the same time, I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will retain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

“My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris.

"Be good enough, M. le Président, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect.

"(Signed) SCHOEN."

Need I, Gentlemen, lay stress on the absurdities of these pretexts which they would put forward as grievances? At no time has any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, nor has any French aviator committed either in Bavaria or any other part of Germany any hostile act. The opinion of Europe has already done justice to these wretched inventions. (*Loud and unanimous applause.*)

Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the necessary steps; they are being carried out strictly, regularly, and with calmness.

The mobilisation of the Russian army also continues with remarkable vigour and unrestrained enthusiasm. (*Unanimous and prolonged applause, all the deputies rising from their seats.*) The Belgian army, mobilised with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid passion and magnificent ardour to defend the neutrality and independence of their country. (*Renewed loud and unanimous applause.*)

The entire British fleet is mobilised and orders have been given to mobilise the land forces. (*Loud cheers, all the deputies rising to their feet.*)

Since 1912 *pourparlers* had taken place between English and French General Staffs and were concluded by an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening communicated these letters to the House of Commons, and I have the honour, with the consent of the British Government, to acquaint you with the contents of these two documents.

Foreign Office,

November 22, 1912.

My dear Ambassador,

FROM time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,  
E. GREY.

To this letter our Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, replied on the 23rd November 1912 :—

Dear Sir Edward, London, November 23, 1912.

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.,  
PAUL CAMBON.

In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke of France amidst the applause of the members in a noble and warm-hearted manner and his language has

already found an echo deep in the hearts of all Frenchmen (*loud and unanimous applause*.) I wish in the name of the Government of the Republic to thank the British Government from this tribune for their cordial words and the Parliament of France will associate itself in this sentiment (*renewed, prolonged and unanimous applause*).

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made in particular the following declaration :—

“ In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state of war.”

From now onwards, the British fleet protects our northern and western coasts against a German attack. Gentlemen, these are the facts. I believe that the simple recital of them is sufficient to justify the acts of the Government of the Republic. I wish, however, to make clear the conclusion to be drawn from my story and to give its true meaning to the unheard-of attack of which France is the victim.

The victors of 1870 have, at different times, as you know, desired to repeat the blows which they dealt us then. In 1875, the war which was intended to complete the destruction of conquered France was only prevented by the intervention of the two Powers to whom we were to become united at a later date by ties of alliance and of friendship (*unanimous applause*), by the intervention of Russia and of Great Britain (*prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet*).

Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of her national forces and the conclusion of diplomatic agreements unswervingly adhered to, has succeeded in liberating herself from the yoke which even in a period of profound peace Bismarck was able to impose upon Europe.

She has re-established the balance of power in Europe, a guarantee of the liberty and dignity of all.

Gentlemen, I do not know if I am mistaken, but it seems to me that this work of peaceful reparation, of liberation and honour finally ratified in 1904 and 1907, with the genial co-operation of King Edward VII. of England and the Government of the Crown (*applause*), this is what the German Empire wishes to destroy to-day by one daring stroke.

Germany can reproach us with nothing.

Bearing in silence in our bosom for half a century the wound which Germany dealt us we have offered to peace an unprecedented sacrifice (*loud and unanimous applause*).

We have offered other sacrifices in all the discussions which since 1904 German diplomacy has systematically provoked, whether in Morocco or elsewhere in 1905, in 1906, in 1908, in 1911.

Russia also has given proof of great moderation at the time of the events of 1908, as she has done in the present crisis.

She observed the same moderation, and the Triple Entente with her, when in the Eastern crisis of 1912 Austria and Germany formulated demands, whether against Serbia or against Greece, which still were, as the event proved, capable of settlement by discussion.

Useless sacrifices, barren negotiations, empty efforts, since to-day in the very act of conciliation we, our allies and ourselves, are attacked by surprise (*prolonged applause*).

No one can honestly believe that we are the aggressors. Vain is the desire to overthrow the sacred principles of right and of liberty to which nations, as well as individuals, are subject; Italy with that clarity of insight possessed by the Latin intellect, has notified us that she proposes to preserve neutrality (*prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet*).

This decision has found in all France an echo of sincerest joy. I made myself the interpreter of this feeling to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires when I told him how much I congratulated myself that the two Latin sisters, who have the same origin and the same ideal, a common and glorious past, are not now opposed to one another (*renewed applause*).

Gentlemen, we proclaim loudly the object of their attack—it is the independence, the honour, the safety, which the Triple Entente has regained in the balance of power for the service of peace. The object of attack is the liberties of Europe, which France, her allies, and her friends, are proud to defend (*loud applause*).

We are going to defend these liberties, for it is they that are in dispute, and all the rest is but a pretext.

France, unjustly provoked, did not desire war, she has done everything to avert it. Since it is forced upon her, she will defend herself against Germany and against every Power which has not yet declared its intentions, but joins with the latter in a conflict between the two countries. (*Applause, all the deputies rising to their feet*.)

A free and valiant people that sustains an eternal ideal, and is wholly united to defend its existence; a democracy which knows how to discipline its military strength, and was not afraid a year ago to increase its burden as an answer to the armaments of its neighbour; a nation armed, struggling for its own life and for the independence of Europe—here is a sight which we are proud to offer to the onlookers in this desperate struggle, that has for some days been preparing with the greatest calmness and method. We are without reproach. We shall be without fear. (*Loud applause, all the deputies rising*)

to *their feet*.) France has often proved in less favourable circumstances that she is a most formidable adversary when she fights, as she does to-day, for liberty and for right (*applause*).

In submitting our actions to you, Gentlemen, who are our judges, we have, to help us in bearing the burden of our heavy responsibility, the comfort of a clear conscience and the conviction that we have done our duty (*prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet*).

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## CHAPTER VII.

No. 160.

### DECLARATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

(September 4, 1914.)

#### DECLARATION.

M. Delcassé, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors and Ministers abroad.

Paris, September 4, 1914.

The following declaration has this morning been signed at the Foreign Office at London :—

“The undersigned duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments hereby declare as follows :—

“The British, French and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed, no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies.”

(Signed) PAUL CAMBON.  
COUNT BENCKENDORFF.  
EDWARD GREY.

This declaration will be published to-day.

DELCASSÉ.



# IV.

THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK.

DOCUMENTS RESPECTING THE NEGOTIATIONS  
PRECEDING THE WAR, PUBLISHED BY  
THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT.

---

No. 1.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.*

Belgrade, July 10 (23), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE Austrian Minister, at 6 o'clock this evening, presented an ultimatum from his Government to the Minister of Finance, Patchou, in the absence of Pashitch, requiring the acceptance of the demands contained therein within forty-eight hours. Giesl added verbally that, in the event of failure to accept the note integrally within forty-eight hours, he was under instructions to leave Belgrade with the staff of the legation. Pashitch and the other Ministers, who are away electioneering, have been recalled and are expected at Belgrade to-morrow, Friday, at 10 A.M. Patchou, who communicated to me the contents of the note, solicits the help of Russia and declares that no Servian Government could accept the demands of Austria.

---

No. 2.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.*

Belgrade, July 10 (23), 1914.

(Telegram.)

TEXT of the note presented to the Servian Government by the Austro-Hungarian Minister to-day.

[Here follows the text of the note, for which see No. 4 in British Correspondence, page 3.]

---

## No. 3.

*Note verbale personally presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 10 A.M. on July 11 (24), 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on Thursday, the 10th (23rd) instant, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

[Here follows the text of the note.]

---

## No. 4.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna.*

St. Petersburg, July 11 (24), 1914.

<Telegram.)

PLEASE convey the following message to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs :—

[See No. 13 of British Correspondence, page 19.]

Communicated to London, Rome, Paris, and Belgrade.

---

## No. 5.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives at London, Berlin, Rome, and Paris.*

St. Petersburg, July 11 (24), 1914.

<Telegram.)

WITH reference to my telegram of to-day to Kudachef\* we trust that the Government to which you are accredited will share the Russian point of view and will at once instruct their Representative at Vienna to hold similar language.

Communicated to Belgrade.

---

## No. 6.

*Telegram from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Servia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.*

Belgrade, July 11 (24), 1914.

THE Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening presented to the Servian Government a note respecting the outrage at Serajevo. Servia, aware of her international obligations, has declared, ever since the horrible crime

\* Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Vienna.

was committed, that she condemned it, and that she was ready to open an enquiry in Serbia if the complicity of certain of her subjects were proved at the trial instituted by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are, however, unnecessarily humiliating for Serbia, and incompatible with her dignity as an independent State. For instance, we are peremptorily called upon to insert a declaration by the Government in the "Official Journal," and for an order from the Sovereign to the army, in which we are to check the spirit of hostility towards Austria and to blame ourselves for criminal weakness as regards our treacherous intrigues. We are further required to admit Austro-Hungarian officials into Serbia to take part with our officials at the trial and to superintend the carrying out of the other conditions laid down in the note. We are required to accept these demands in their entirety within forty-eight hours, failing which the Austro-Hungarian Legation will leave Belgrade. We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the position of an independent State, as well as those to which your Majesty may advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of the demands could not be carried out without changes in our legislation, which would need time. We have been allowed too short a time limit. We may be attacked at the expiration of the time limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concentrating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend ourselves and we beg your Majesty to come to our aid as soon as possible. The much appreciated goodwill which your Majesty has so often shown towards us inspires us with the firm belief that once again our appeal to your noble Slav heart will not pass unheeded.

At this critical moment I echo the feelings of the Servian people in praying your Majesty to be pleased to interest yourself in the fate of the Kingdom of Serbia.

---

No. 7.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 11 (24), 1914.

(Telegram.)

ALL the morning papers, even those few which recognise the impossibility of Serbia's accepting the prescribed conditions, warmly welcome the strong line adopted by Austria. The semi-official "Lokal-Anzeiger" is particularly violent; it describes as fruitless any possible appeals that Serbia may make to St. Petersburg, Paris, Athens, or Bucharest, and concludes by saying that the German people will breathe freely when they learn that the situation in the Balkan peninsula is to be cleared up at last.

---

## No. 8.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 11 (24), 1914.

(Telegram.)

A COPY of the note officially presented at Belgrade has been communicated to the French Government by the Austrian Ambassador. The German Ambassador later visited the Minister and read to him a communication containing the Austrian arguments, and indicating that in the event of a refusal on the part of Serbia, Austria would be obliged to resort to pressure, and, in case of need, to military measures. The communication ended with the observation that, in the opinion of Germany, this question ought to be settled between Austria and Serbia direct, and that it was to the interest of the Powers to localise the affair by leaving it to the interested parties. The Acting Head of the Political Department, who was present at the interview, asked the Ambassador whether the Austrian action should be considered as an ultimatum—in other words, whether, in the event of Serbia not submitting entirely to the Austrian demands, hostilities were inevitable. The Ambassador avoided a direct reply, alleging that he had no instructions.

---

## No. 9.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Belgrade, July 11 (24), 1914.

(Telegram.)

PASHITCH has returned to Belgrade. He intends to give an answer to Austria within the prescribed time limit—that is to say, to-morrow, Saturday, at 6 P.M.—showing the points which are acceptable or unacceptable. To-day an appeal will be addressed to the Powers to defend the independence of Serbia. Then, added Pashitch, if war is inevitable, we will make war.

---

## No. 10.

*Announcement by the Russian Government.*

St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914.

RECENT events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Serbia by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely following the course of the dispute between the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent.

---

## No. 11.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister  
for Foreign Affairs.*

Vienna, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Telegram.)

COUNT BERCHTOLD is at Ischl. In view of the impossibility of arriving there in time, I have telegraphed to him our proposal to extend the time limit of the ultimatum, and I have repeated this proposal verbally to Baron Macchio. The latter promised to communicate it in time to the Minister for Foreign Affairs but added that he had no hesitation in predicting a categorical refusal.

---

## No. 12.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister  
for Foreign Affairs.*

Vienna, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Telegram.)

IN continuation of my telegram of to-day I have just heard from Macchio that the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse our proposal to extend the time limit of the note.

---

## No. 13.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.*

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Delayed in transmission, received July 14 (27), 1914.)

(Telegram.)

FOLLOWING is the reply which the President of the Servian Cabinet to-day handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade before the expiration of the time limit of the ultimatum.

[Here follows the text of the Servian reply, for which see No. 39 in British Correspondence, page 31.]

---

## No. 14.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE received your telegram of the 11th (24th) July and have communicated its contents to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He tells me that the British Government have likewise urged him to advise Vienna to extend the time limit of the ultimatum. He has informed Vienna telegraphically

of this step, and he will do the same as regards Russia's action, but he fears that in the absence of Berchtold, who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time, his telegrams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance of Servia. I replied that a great Power such as Austria could give way without impairing her prestige, and I adduced every other similar argument, but failed, nevertheless, to obtain any more definite promise. Even when I gave him to understand that action must be taken at Vienna if the possibility of terrible consequences was to be avoided, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered each time in the negative.

---

## No. 15.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE received your telegram of the 11th (24th) July respecting the extension of the time limit of the Austrian ultimatum, and I have made the communication in accordance with your instructions. The French Representative at Vienna has been furnished with similar instructions.

---

## No. 16.

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE received your telegram of the 11th July. Grey has instructed the British Ambassador at Vienna to support our action for the extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. At the same time he explained to me that the Austrian Ambassador had come to see him, and had explained that the Austrian note should not be regarded as an ultimatum. It should be regarded as a step, which, in the event of no reply, or in the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations and the immediate departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister from Belgrade; without, however, entailing the immediate opening of hostilities. Grey added that as a result of this explanation he had told the British Ambassador at Vienna that, should it be too late to raise the question of extending the time limit of the ultimatum, the question of preventing hostilities might perhaps serve as a basis for discussion.

---

## No. 17.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.*

St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Telegram.)

IN the event of any change for the worse in the situation which might lead to joint action by the Great Powers, we count upon it that England will at once side definitely with Russia and France, in order to maintain the European balance of power, for which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which would certainly be compromised in the event of the triumph of Austria.

---

## No. 18.

*Note verbale handed to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914.*

(Translation.)

IL nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle répandue par quelques journaux d'après laquelle la démarche du Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade aurait été faite à l'instigation de l'Allemagne est absolument fausse. Le Gouvernement allemand n'a pas eu connaissance du texte de la note autrichienne avant qu'elle ait été remise, et n'a exercé aucune influence sur son contenu. C'est à tort qu'on attribue à l'Allemagne une attitude comminatoire.

L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme allié de l'Autriche les revendications à son avis légitimes du Cabinet de Vienne contre la Serbie.

Avant tout elle désire, comme elle l'a déjà déclaré dès le commencement du différend austro-serbe, que ce conflit reste localisé.

WE learn from an authoritative source that the news spread by certain newspapers, to the effect that the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade was instigated by Germany, is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was presented, and exercised no influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly attributed to Germany.

Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers justified.

Above all Germany wishes, as she has already declared from the very beginning of the Austro-Servian dispute, that this conflict should be localised.

---



## No. 19.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Telegram.)

PLEASE refer to my telegram of the 11th (24th) July.

A morning paper has to-day published, in a not altogether correct form, the declarations made yesterday by the German Ambassador, and has added comments in which it characterises these utterances as being in the nature of threats. The German Ambassador, who is much upset by these disclosures, to-day visited the Acting Head of the Political Department, and explained to him that his words in no wise bore the threatening character attributed to them. He stated that Austria had presented her note to Servia without any definite understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless approved of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly "the bolt once fired" (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided by her duties as an ally.

---

## No. 20.

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Telegram.)

GREY has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him that the German Government were not informed of the text of the Austrian note, but that they entirely supported Austria's action. The Ambassador at the same time asked if Great Britain could see her way to bring conciliatory pressure to bear at St. Petersburg. Grey replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as long as complications existed between Austria and Servia alone, British interests were only indirectly affected; but he had to look ahead to the fact that Austrian mobilisation would lead to Russian mobilisation, and that from that moment a situation would exist in which the interests of all the Powers would be involved. In that event Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action.

---

## No. 21.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Telegram.)

IN spite of the extremely conciliatory nature of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Austrian Minister has just informed the Servian Government, in a note handed in at

6.30 P.M. this evening, that, not having received a satisfactory answer within the time limit fixed, he was leaving Belgrade with the entire staff of the legation. The Skupchtina is convoked for the 14th (27th) July at Nish. The Servian Government and the Diplomatic Body are leaving this evening for that town.

---

## No. 22.

*Russian Ambassador at London to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Telegram.)

GREY has told the German Ambassador that in his opinion Austrian mobilisation must lead to Russian mobilisation, that grave danger of a general war will thereupon arise, and that he sees only one means of reaching a peaceful settlement; namely, that, in view of the Austrian and Russian mobilisations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain should abstain from immediate mobilisation, and should at once offer their good offices. Grey told me that the first essential of this plan was the consent of Germany and her promise not to mobilise. He has therefore, as a first step, made an enquiry on this point at Berlin.

---

## No. 23.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Rome.*

St. Petersburg, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Telegram.)

ITALY might play a part of the first importance in favour of preserving peace, by bringing the necessary influence to bear upon Austria, and by adopting a definitely unfavourable attitude towards the dispute on the ground that it could not be localised. You should express your conviction that Russia cannot possibly avoid coming to the help of Servia.

---

## No. 24.

*Acting Russian Consul at Prague to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Prague, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Telegram.)

MOBILISATION has been ordered.

---

## No. 25.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Vienna.*

St. Petersburg, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I HAD a long and friendly conversation to-day with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. After discussing the ten demands addressed to Serbia, I drew his attention to the fact that, quite apart from the clumsy form in which they were presented, some of them were quite impracticable, even if the Servian Government agreed to accept them. Thus, for example, points 1 and 2 could not be carried out without recasting the Servian press law and associations law, and to that it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupchtina. As for enforcing points 4 and 5, this might lead to most dangerous consequences, and even to the risk of acts of terrorism directed against the Royal Family and against Pashitch, which clearly could not be the intention of Austria. With regard to the other points it seemed to me that, with certain changes of detail, it would not be difficult to find a basis of mutual agreement, if the accusations contained in them were confirmed by sufficient proof.

In the interest of the maintenance of peace, which, according to the statements of Szapary, is as much desired by Austria as by all the Powers, it was necessary to end the tension of the present moment as soon as possible. With this object in view it seemed to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador should be authorised to enter into a private exchange of views in order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of the 10th (23rd) July in consultation with me. This method of procedure would perhaps enable us to find a formula which would prove acceptable to Serbia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of the chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and friendly manner.

Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy.

---

No. 26.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Berlin.*

St. Petersburg, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Telegram.)

PLEASE communicate the contents of my telegram to Vienna of to-day to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and express to him the hope that he, on his part, will be able to advise Vienna to meet Russia's proposal in a friendly spirit.

---

## No. 27.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE Director of the Political Department informs me that, upon his informing the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador of the contents of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Ambassador did not conceal his surprise that it had failed to satisfy Giesl. In the opinion of the Director of the Political Department, Servia's conciliatory attitude should produce the best impression in Europe.

---

## No. 28.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE German Ambassador again visited the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, and made to him the following declarations:—

(Translation.)

“L'Autriche a déclaré à la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas des acquisitions territoriales et qu'elle ne menace pas l'intégrité de la Serbie. Son but unique est d'assurer sa propre tranquillité. Par conséquent il dépend de la Russie d'éviter la guerre. L'Allemagne se sent solidaire avec la France dans le désir ardent de conserver la paix et espère fermement que la France usera de son influence à Pétersbourg dans un sens modérateur.”

“Austria has declared to Russia that she does not desire territorial acquisitions, and that she harbours no designs against the integrity of Servia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet, and consequently it rests with Russia to prevent war. Germany is at one with France in her ardent desire to preserve peace, and she sincerely hopes that France will exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg.”

The Minister pointed out that Germany on her part might well act on similar lines at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit displayed by Servia. The Ambassador replied that such a course was not possible, owing to the decision not to intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. The Minister then asked whether the four Powers—Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France—could not make representations at St. Petersburg and Vienna, for that the matter amounted, in effect, to a dispute between Austria and Russia. The Ambassador alleged that he had no instructions. Finally, the Minister refused to agree to the German proposal.

---

## No. 29.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE Director of the Political Department has expressed the personal opinion that the series of representations made by Germany at Paris aim at intimidating France and at securing her intervention at St. Petersburg.

---

## No. 30.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Telegram.)

ON the news reaching Berlin that the Austrian army had mobilised against Servia, a large crowd, in which the papers report the presence of an Austrian element, gave vent to a series of noisy demonstrations in favour of Austria. Late in the evening the crowd several times collected before the Imperial Russian Embassy and some anti-Russian shouting occurred. Hardly any police were present and no precautions were taken.

---

## No. 31.

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE received your telegram of the 13th (26th) July. Please inform me by telegraph whether you consider that your direct discussions with the Vienna Cabinet harmonise with Grey's scheme for mediation by the four Governments. Having heard from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that you would be prepared to accept such a combination, Grey decided to turn it into an official proposal, which he communicated yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and Rome.

---

## No. 32.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris and London.*

[See No. 53 of British Correspondence, page 47.]

---

## No. 33.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.*

St. Petersburg, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE taken note of the reply returned by the Servian Government to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our expectations in its moderation, and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfaction to Austria. We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria, unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with Servia.

---

## No. 34.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE German Ambassador discussed the situation again to-day at great length with the Director of the Political Department. The Ambassador laid great stress on the utter impossibility of any mediation or conference.

---

## No. 35.

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I DISCUSSED the situation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the presence of Berthelot, directly after my return to Paris. They both confirmed the information respecting the action taken by the German Ambassador, which Sevastopoulo has already telegraphed to you. This morning Baron von Schoen confirmed his declaration of yesterday in writing, *i.e.* :

1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial acquisitions and that she harbours no designs against the integrity of Servia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet.

2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war.

3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent desire to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating influence upon Russia.

Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of solidarity of Germany and France. The Minister of Justice is convinced that these steps on the part of Germany are taken with the evident object of alienating Russia and

France, of inducing the French Government to make representations at St. Petersburg, and of thus compromising our ally in our eyes; and finally, in the event of war, of throwing the responsibility not on Germany, who is ostensibly making every effort to maintain peace, but on Russia and France.

---

## No. 36.

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Telegram.)

It is clear from your telegrams of the 13th (26) July that you were not then aware of the reply of the Servian Government. The telegram from Belgrade informing me of it also took twenty hours to reach us. The telegram from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent the day before yesterday at 11 o'clock in the morning, at the special urgent rate, which contained instructions to support our representations, only reached its destination at 6 o'clock. There is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed by the Austrian telegraph office.

---

## No. 37.

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Telegram.)

ON the instructions of his Government, the Austrian Ambassador has informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that Servia's answer has not been considered satisfactory in Vienna, and that to-morrow, Tuesday, Austria will proceed to take "energetic action" with the object of forcing Servia to give the necessary guarantees. The Minister having asked what form such action would take, the Ambassador replied that he had no exact information on the subject, but it might mean either the crossing of the Servian frontier, or an ultimatum, or even a declaration of war.

---

## No. 38.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I BEGGED the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal in Vienna that Szapary should be authorised to draw up, by means of a private exchange of views with you, a

wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow answered that he was aware of this proposal and that he agreed with Pourtalès that, as Szapary had begun this conversation, he might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that he could not advise Austria to give way.

---

## No. 39.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Telegram.)

BEFORE my visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day his Excellency had received the French Ambassador, who endeavoured to induce him to accept the British proposal for action in favour of peace, such action to be taken simultaneously at St. Petersburg and at Vienna by Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon suggested that these Powers should give their advice to Vienna in the following terms: "To abstain from all action which might aggravate the existing situation." (*S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait aggraver la situation de l'heure actuelle.*) By adopting this vague formula, all mention of the necessity of refraining from invading Servia might be avoided. Jagow refused point-blank to accept this suggestion in spite of the entreaties of the Ambassador, who emphasised, as a good feature of the suggestion, the mixed grouping of the Powers, thanks to which the opposition between the Alliance and the Entente—a matter of which Jagow himself had often complained—was avoided.

---

## No. 40.

*Telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Servia, July 14 (27), 1914.*

WHEN your Royal Highness applied to me at a time of especial stress, you were not mistaken in the sentiments which I entertain for you, or in my cordial sympathy with the Servian people.

The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention, and my Government are using their utmost endeavour to smooth away the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your Highness and the Royal Servian Government wish to render that task easy by neglecting no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus both prevent the horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity of Servia.



So long as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, all our efforts must be directed to that end; but if in spite of our earnest wish we are not successful, your Highness may rest assured that Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Servia.

---

## No. 41.

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Vienna, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs is away. During a long conversation which I had with Macchio to-day I drew his attention, in a perfectly friendly way, to the unfavourable impression produced in Russia by the presentation of demands by Austria to Servia, which it was quite impossible for any independent State, however small, to accept. I added that this method of procedure might lead to the most undesirable complications, and that it had aroused profound surprise and general condemnation in Russia. We can only suppose that Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the German Representative at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout this crisis, has counted on the probable localisation of the dispute with Servia, and on the possibility of inflicting with impunity a serious blow upon that country. The declaration by the Russian Government that Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the face of such conduct has caused a great sensation here.

---

## No. 42.

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Telegram.)

GREY has just informed the German Ambassador, who came to question him as to the possibility of taking action at St. Petersburg, that such action ought rather to be taken at Vienna, and that the Berlin Cabinet were the best qualified to do so. Grey also pointed out that the Servian reply to the Austrian note had exceeded anything that could have been expected in moderation and in its spirit of conciliation. Grey added that he had therefore come to the conclusion that Russia must have advised Belgrade to return a moderate reply, and that he thought the Servian reply could form the basis of a peaceful and acceptable solution of the question.

In these circumstances, continued Grey, if Austria were to begin hostilities in spite of that reply, she would prove her

intention of crushing Servia. Looked at in this light, the question might give rise to a situation which might lead to a war in which all the Powers would be involved.

Grey finally declared that the British Government were sincerely anxious to act with the German Government as long as the preservation of peace was in question; but, in the contrary event, Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action.

---

No. 43.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.*

[See No. 54 of British Correspondence, page 48.]

---

No. 44.

*Russian Consul General at Fiume to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Fiume, July 15 (28), 1914.

(Telegram.)

STATE of siege has been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and the reservists of all classes have also been called up.

---

No. 45.

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

[See No. 93 (1) of British Correspondence, page 70.]

---

No. 46.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 15 (28), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian reply, although it was communicated to them. Up to the present this note has not appeared *in extenso* in any of the local papers, which, to all appearances, do not wish to publish it in their columns, being well aware of the calming effect which it would have on German readers.

---

## No. 47.

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE order for general mobilisation has been signed.

---

## No. 48.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.*

St. Petersburg, July 15 (28), 1914.

(Telegram.)

IN face of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia, it is necessary that Great Britain should take instant mediatory action, and that the military measures undertaken by Austria against Servia should be immediately suspended. Otherwise mediation will only serve as an excuse to make the question drag on, and will meanwhile make it possible for Austria to crush Servia completely and to acquire a dominant position in the Balkans.

Sent to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

---

## No. 49.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.*

[See No. 93 (2) of British Correspondence, page 71.]

---

## No. 50.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at London and Paris.*

[See No. 93 (3) of British Correspondence, page 72.]

---

## No. 51.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Telegram.)

ON my enquiry whether he had received from Vienna a reply respecting your proposal for private discussions at St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State answered in the negative.

He declares that it is very difficult for him to produce any effect at Vienna, especially openly. He even added, in speaking

to Cambon, that were pressure brought to bear too obviously, Austria would hasten to face Germany with a *fait accompli*.

The Secretary of State tells me that he received a telegram to-day from Pourtalès, stating that you seemed more inclined than you previously were to find a compromise acceptable to all parties. I replied that presumably you had been in favour of a compromise from the outset, provided always that it were acceptable, not only to Austria, but equally to Russia. He then said that it appeared that Russia had begun to mobilise on the Austrian frontier, and that he feared that this would make it more difficult for Austria to come to an understanding with us, all the more so as Austria was mobilising against Servia alone, and was making no preparations upon our frontier. I replied that, according to the information in my possession, Austria was mobilising upon the Russian frontier also, and that consequently we had to take similar steps. I added that whatever measures we might, perhaps, have taken on our side were in no wise directed against Germany.

---

No. 52.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Nish, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE Bulgarian Minister to-day declared to Pashitch, in the name of his Government, that Bulgaria would remain neutral.

---

No. 53.

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Telegram.)

FOR the information of the President of the French Republic on his return, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had prepared a short summary of the present political situation, approximately in the following terms: Austria, fearing internal disintegration, seized upon the assassination of the Archduke as an excuse for an attempt to obtain guarantees, which may assume the form of an occupation of Servian military lines or even Servian territory. Germany is supporting Austria. The preservation of peace depends upon Russia alone, for the question at issue must be "localised" between Austria and Servia; that question is the punishment of Servia for her previous policy and the obtaining of guarantees for the future. Germany concludes from this that a moderating influence should be

exerted at St. Petersburg. This sophism has been refuted both in Paris and in London. In Paris, Baron von Schoen vainly endeavoured to induce France to adopt joint action with Germany towards Russia for the preservation of peace. The same attempts were made in London. In both capitals the answer was given that any action taken should be at Vienna, as it was Austria's inordinate demands, her refusal to discuss Serbia's few reservations, and her declaration of war, that threatened to provoke a general war. France and England are unable to bring any moderating pressure to bear upon Russia, as, so far, that Power has shown the greatest moderation, more particularly in her advice to Serbia to accept as much as was possible of the Austrian note. Apparently Germany has now given up the idea of pressure upon Russia only and inclines towards mediatory action both at St. Petersburg and at Vienna, but at the same time both Germany and Austria are endeavouring to cause the question to drag on. Germany is opposing the conference without suggesting any other practical course of action. Austria is continuing discussions at St. Petersburg, which are manifestly of a procrastinating nature. At the same time she is taking active steps, and if these steps are tolerated, her claims will increase proportionately. It is highly desirable that Russia should lend all her support to the proposal for mediation which will be made by Sir E. Grey. In the contrary event, Austria, on the plea of "guarantees," will be able, in effect, to alter the territorial status of eastern Europe.

## No. 54.

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE communicated the contents of your telegrams of the 15th (28th) July to Grey. He informed the German Ambassador to-day that the direct discussions between Russia and Austria had been fruitless, and that press correspondents were reporting from St. Petersburg that Russia was mobilising against Austria in consequence of the latter's mobilisation. Grey said that, in principle, the German Government had declared themselves in favour of mediation, but that he was experiencing difficulties with regard to the form it should take. Grey has urged that the German Government should indicate the form which, in their opinion, would enable the four Powers to have recourse to mediation to prevent war; France, Italy, and Great Britain having consented, mediation could only come into play if Germany consented to range herself on the side of peace.

## No. 55.

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Telegram.)

VIVIANI has just confirmed to me the French Government's firm determination to act in concert with Russia. This determination is upheld by all classes of society and by the political parties, including the Radical Socialists who have just addressed a resolution to the Government expressing the absolute confidence and the patriotic sentiments of their party. Since his return to Paris, Viviani has telegraphed an urgent message to London that, direct discussions between St. Petersburg and Vienna having ended, the London Cabinet should again put forward their proposal for mediation by the Powers as soon as possible under one form or another. Before seeing me to-day Viviani saw the German Ambassador, and the latter again assured him of the peaceful intentions of Germany. Viviani having pointed out that if Germany wished for peace she should hasten to give her support to the British proposal for mediation, Baron von Schoen replied that the words "conference" or "arbitration" alarmed Austria. Viviani retorted that it was not a question of words, and that it would be easy to find some other form for mediation. In the opinion of Baron von Schoen, it was necessary for the success of the negotiations between the Powers to know what Austria intended to demand from Servia. Viviani answered that the Berlin Cabinet could quite easily make this enquiry of Austria, but that, meanwhile, the Servian reply might well form the basis of discussion; he added that France sincerely desired peace, but that she was determined at the same time to act in complete harmony with her allies and friends, and that he, Baron von Schoen, might have convinced himself that this determination met with the warmest approval of the country.

---

## No. 56.

*Telegram from His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Servia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.*

DEEPLY touched by the telegram which your Majesty was pleased to address to me yesterday, I hasten to thank you with all my heart. Your Majesty may rest assured that the cordial sympathy which your Majesty feels towards my country is especially valued by us, and fills our hearts with the belief that the future of Servia is secure now that it is the object of your Majesty's gracious solicitude. These painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds of deep attachment which bind Servia to Holy Slav Russia, and the sentiments of everlasting gratitude which we feel for the help and protection afforded to us by your Majesty will ever be cherished in the hearts of all the Serbs.

---

## No. 57.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Nish, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE communicated to Pashitch the text of the telegraphic reply returned by His Majesty the Emperor to Prince Alexander. On reading it, Pashitch crossed himself and exclaimed: "The Czar is great and merciful!" He then embraced me and was overcome with emotion. The heir-apparent is expected at Nish late to-night.

---

## No. 58.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris.*

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE German Ambassador to-day informed me of the decision of his Government to mobilise, if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now, in point of fact, we only began these preparations in consequence of the mobilisation already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Serbia.

As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten on our own military preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French Government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful to them for the declaration which the French Ambassador made to me on their behalf, to the effect that we could count fully upon the assistance of our ally, France. In the existing circumstances, that declaration is especially valuable to us.

Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany.

---

## No. 59.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Nish, July 17 (30), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE Prince Regent yesterday published a manifesto, signed by all the Servian Ministers, on the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia. The manifesto ends with the following words: "Defend your homes and Serbia with all your might." At the solemn opening of the Skupchtina the Regent read the speech from the Throne, in his own name. At the beginning

of his speech he pointed out that the place of their convocation showed the importance of present events. He followed this with a summary of recent events—the Austrian ultimatum, the Servian reply, the efforts of the Servian Government to do their utmost to avoid war that was compatible with the dignity of the State, and, finally, the armed aggression of their most powerful neighbour against Servia, at whose side stood Montenegro. Passing in review the attitude of the Powers towards the dispute, the Prince emphasised in the first place the sentiments which animated Russia, and the gracious communication from His Majesty the Emperor that Russia would in no case abandon Servia. At each mention of His Majesty the Czar and of Russia the hall resounded with loud bursts of wild cheering. The sympathy shown by France and England was also touched upon in turn, and called forth approving plaudits from the members. The speech from the throne ended by declaring the Skupchtina open, and by expressing the hope that everything possible would be done to lighten the task before the Government.

---

## No. 60.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome.*

St. Petersburg, July 17 (30), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might give—that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia—and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action :

“ Si l’Autriche, reconnaissant que la question austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d’une question européenne, se déclare prête à éliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s’engage à cesser ses préparatifs militaires.”

“ If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Servian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Servia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations.”

Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question, for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military preparations.

---



No. 61.

*Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I LEARN that the order for the mobilisation of the German army and navy has just been issued.

---

No. 62.

*Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned that the news of the mobilisation of the German army and fleet, which has just been announced, is false; that the news sheets had been printed in advance so as to be ready for all eventualities, and that they were put on sale in the afternoon, but that they have now been confiscated.

---

No. 63.

*Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE received your telegram of 16th (29th) July, and have communicated the text of your proposal to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have just seen. He told me that he had received an identic telegram from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and he then declared that he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal.

---

No. 64.

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 17 (30), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE communicated the substance of your telegrams of the 16th (29th) and 17th (30th) July to Grey, who looks upon the situation as most serious, but wishes to continue the discussions. I pointed out to Grey that—since you agreed with him to accept whatever proposal he might make in order to preserve peace, provided that Austria did not profit by any ensuing delays to crush Serbia—the situation in which you were placed had apparently been modified. At that time

our relations with Germany had not been compromised. After the declaration made by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg regarding German mobilisation, those relations had changed, and you had returned the only reply to his request that was possible from a Great Power. When the German Ambassador again visited you, and enquired what your conditions were, you had formulated them in altogether special circumstances. I also again emphasised to Grey the necessity of taking into consideration the new situation brought about by the fault of Germany in consequence of the German Ambassador's action. Grey replied that he fully understood this, and that he would remember these arguments.

---

## No. 65.

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 17 (30), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE German Ambassador has asked Grey why Great Britain was taking military measures both on land and sea. Grey replied that these measures had no aggressive character, but that the situation was such that each Power must be ready.

---

## No. 66.

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Vienna, July 18 (31), 1914.

(Telegram.)

IN spite of the general mobilisation, my exchange of views with Count Berchtold and his colleagues continues. They all dwell upon the absence on Austria's part of any hostile intentions whatsoever against Russia, and of any designs of conquest at the expense of Servia, but they are all equally insistent that Austria is bound to carry through the action which she has begun and to give Servia a serious lesson, which would constitute a sure guarantee for the future.

---

## No. 67.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome.*

St. Petersburg, July 18 (31), 1914.

(Telegram.)

PLEASE refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July. The British Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications in the formula which I suggested yesterday to the

German Ambassador. I replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send you the text of the modified formula which is as follows:—

“Si l’Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses armées sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d’une question d’intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d’Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d’État souverain et à son indépendance, —la Russie s’engage à conserver son attitude expectante.”

“If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory; and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude.”

No. 68.

*Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 18 (31), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told me that our discussions, which were already difficult enough on account of the mobilisation against Austria, were becoming even more so in view of the serious military measures that we were taking against Germany. He said that information on this subject was reaching Berlin from all sides, and this must inevitably provoke similar measures on the part of Germany. To this I replied that, according to sure information in my possession, which was confirmed by all our compatriots arriving from Berlin, Germany also was very actively engaged in taking military measures against Russia. In spite of this, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asserts that the only step taken in Germany has been the recall of officers from leave and of the troops from manœuvres.

No. 69.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.*

St. Petersburg, July 18 (31), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE requested the British Ambassador to express to Grey my deep gratitude for the firm and friendly tone which he has adopted in the discussions with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the hope of finding a peaceful issue to the present situation need not yet be abandoned.

I also requested him to inform the British Minister that in my opinion it was only in London that the discussions might still have some faint chance of success and of rendering the necessary compromise easier for Austria.

Communicated to Russian Ambassador in France.

---

No. 70.

*Secret Telegram to Russian Representatives abroad.*

July 19 (August 1), 1914.

(Telegram.)

AT midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, on the instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by midnight on Saturday, we had not begun to demobilise, not only against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it.

---

No. 71.

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 19 (August 1), 1914.

(Telegram.)

GREY tells me that he has telegraphed to Berlin that in his opinion the last formula accepted by the Russian Government offers the best prospect as a basis of negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. At the same time he expressed the hope that no Great Power would open hostilities before this formula had been considered.

---

No. 72.

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 19 (August 1), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE British Government have enquired of the French and German Governments whether they will respect the neutrality of Belgium.

France answered in the affirmative, but the German Government stated that they could not give any definite answer to the question.

---

## No. 73.

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE Austrian Ambassador yesterday visited Viviani and declared to him that Austria, far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Serbia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers. The French Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced that, under the guise of *Kriegszustand*, mobilisation is in reality being carried out.

---

## No. 74.

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914.

(Telegram.)

ON the receipt in Paris of the telegram from the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reporting the communication made to you by the German Ambassador respecting Germany's decision to order general mobilisation to-day, the President of the French Republic signed the order for mobilisation. Lists of the reservists recalled to the colours are being posted up in the streets. The German Ambassador has just visited Viviani, but told him nothing fresh, alleging the impossibility of decyphering the telegrams he has received. Viviani informed him of the signature of the order for mobilisation issued in reply to that of Germany, and expressed to him his amazement that Germany should have taken such a step at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was still in progress between Russia, Austria, and the Powers. He added that mobilisation did not necessarily entail war, and that the German Ambassador might stay in Paris as the Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

---

## No. 75.

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914.

(Telegram.)

I HEAR from the President that during the last few days the Austrian Ambassador emphatically assured both the President of the Council of Ministers and him that Austria had declared to Russia that she was ready to respect both the territorial integrity of Serbia and also her sovereign rights, but that Russia had intentionally received this declaration in silence. I contradicted this flatly.

---

## No. 76.

*Note presented by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 19 (August 1), at 7.10 P.M.*

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir qui lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre s'était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de Saint-Pétersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite de cette mesure menaçante ne motivée par aucun présage militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire allemand s'est trouvé vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril, il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation desdits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à (n'ayant pas cru devoir répondre à\*) cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus (cette attitude\*) que son action était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gou-

THE Imperial German Government have used every effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg; but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded to a general mobilisation of her forces both on land and sea. In consequence of this threatening step, which was not justified by any military proceedings on the part of Germany, the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary to answer\*) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude\*) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, on the instructions

\* Les mots placés entre parenthèses se trouvent dans l'original. Il faut supposer que deux variantes avaient été préparées d'avance et que par erreur elles ont été insérées toutes les deux dans la note.

\* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the note.

vernement, de faire savoir à votre Excellence ce qui suit :

Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire, relevant le défi, se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie.

of my Government, to inform your Excellency as follows :—

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia.

### No. 77.

#### *Announcement by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting Recent Events.*

July 20 (August 2), 1914.

A GARBLED version of the events of the last few days having appeared in the foreign press, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it his duty to publish the following brief account of the diplomatic discussions during the period under review :—

On the 10th (23rd) July, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade presented a note to the Prime Minister of Servia, in which the Servian Government were accused of having fostered the pan-Serb movement, which had led to the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. Austria-Hungary, therefore, demanded of the Servian Government, not only the condemnation in the most formal manner of the above-mentioned propaganda, but also the adoption, under Austrian supervision, of a series of measures for the discovery of the plot, for the punishment of any Servian subjects who had taken part in it, and for the prevention of any future attempts at assassination upon Austrian soil. A time limit of forty-eight hours was given to the Servian Government within which to reply to this note.

The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had communicated the text of the note seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade, having taken note of the demands contained therein, could not but perceive that some of these demands were impossible of execution as regards their substance, whilst others were presented in a form which was incompatible with the dignity of an independent State. Russia considered that the humiliation of Servia, involved in these demands, and equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions, were inadmissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a discussion of the note. The moderating influence of the four Powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful.

Despite the fact that Servia had reprobated the crime, and had shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction to an extent beyond the expectations, not only of Russia, but also of the other Powers—despite these facts, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade considered the Servian reply insufficient and left the town.

Recognising the exaggerated nature of the demands made by Austria, Russia had previously declared that she could not remain indifferent, while not desisting from doing her utmost to find a peaceful issue which might prove acceptable to Austria, and spare the latter's self-respect as a Great Power. At the same time Russia let it be clearly understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement of the question only so far as it involved no humiliation of Servia as an independent State. Unhappily all the efforts of the Russian Government to this end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Government, which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory intervention by the Powers in the Austrian dispute with Servia, proceeded to mobilise and declared war officially against Servia, and the following day Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accompanied the declaration of war openly accuses Servia of having prepared and carried out the crime of *Serajevo*. Such an accusation of a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State, aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy for Servia throughout all classes of European society.

In consequence of this behaviour of the Austro-Hungarian Government, in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain indifferent to the fate of Servia, the Russian Government considered it necessary to order mobilisation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Servian Government, and since the first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia halfway in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilisation of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered.

The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken by Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, either in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as suggested by Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the four Great Powers not directly interested, that is to say, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally unsuccessful. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of views with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join the proposed conference of the Powers.

Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace.



When questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions were Austria's recognition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Servia.

Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation of general mobilisation by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburg.

All this time hostilities were continuing on Servian territory, and Belgrade was bombarded afresh.

The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures.

The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that Russia was compelled to begin preparations so as to be ready for every emergency.

But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any proposed settlement of the problem that might be put forward, provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her.

In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German Government on the 18th (31st) July demanded of the Russian Government that they should suspend their military measures by midday on the 19th July (1st August), and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to general mobilisation.

On the following day, the 19th July (1st August), the German Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a declaration of war to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

---

### No. 78.

#### *Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives Abroad.*

St. Petersburg, July 20 (August 2), 1914.

(Telegram.)

It is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to mobilise by the immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was undertaking general mobilisation.

The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guarantee,

and after so many proofs of Russia's desire for peace, Germany neither could, nor had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independence of Servia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The European—nay, the world-wide—character of this dispute is infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs. By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment when negotiations were in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility.

---

### No. 79.

*Note presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 24 (August 6), 1914, at 6 P.M.*

ON the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform his Excellency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows:—

(Translation.)

“Vu l'attitude menaçante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et la Serbie et en présence du fait qu'en suite de ce conflit la Russie d'après une communication du Cabinet de Berlin a cru devoir ouvrir les hostilités contre l'Allemagne et que celle-ci se trouve par conséquent en état de guerre avec la dite Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considère également en état de guerre avec la Russie à partir du présent moment.”

“In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia; and of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that conflict, to open hostilities against Germany; and whereas Germany is consequently at war with Russia; Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with Russia from the present moment.”

---

V.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK.

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING  
THE WAR.(JULY 24—AUGUST 29.)

---

No. 1.

*Count Errembault de Dudzele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to  
M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia.

---

Enclosure in No. 1.

(Text of Austro-Hungarian note, for which see British  
Correspondence, No. 4, page 3.)

---

No. 2.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the  
Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and  
St. Petersburg.*

Brussels, July 24, 1914.

Sir,

THE Belgian Government have had under their consideration whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to address to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality a communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to fulfil the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war breaking out on her frontiers.

The Government have come to the conclusion that such a communication would be premature at present, but that events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad.

In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening.

I enclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary.

I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these instructions.

This telegram will be despatched when the order is given for the mobilisation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution.

---

Enclosure in No. 2.

Sir,

THE international situation is serious, and the possibility of a war between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Government.

Belgium has most scrupulously observed the duties of a neutral State imposed upon her by the treaties of April 19, 1839; and those duties she will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the circumstances may be.

The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been so often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon her frontiers.

All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of defence.

It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these measures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her international obligations; and it is obvious that they neither have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those Powers.

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to communicate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by the Belgian Government, and to request that you will be good enough to take note of it.

A similar communication has been made to the other Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.

---

No. 3.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.*

Brussels, July 25, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE addressed an undated circular note, a copy of which is enclosed, to the Belgian representatives accredited to the Powers guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

Should the danger of a war between France and Germany become imminent, this circular note will be communicated to the Governments of the guaranteeing Powers, in order to inform them

of our fixed determination to fulfil those international obligations that are imposed upon us by the treaties of 1839.

The communications in question would only be made upon telegraphic instructions from me.

If circumstances lead me to issue such instructions, I shall request you also, by telegram, to notify the Government to which you are accredited of the step we have taken, and to communicate to them a copy of the enclosed circular note for their information, and without any request that they should take note thereof.

My telegram will inform you of the date to be given to the circular note, which you should be careful to fill in on the copy which you hand to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It is unnecessary to point out that this despatch and its enclosure should be treated as strictly confidential until the receipt of fresh instructions from me.

---

Enclosure in No. 3.

(See Enclosure in No. 2.)

---

No. 4.

*M. Michotte de Welle, Belgian Minister at Belgrade, to  
M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the reply returned by the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note of the 10 (23) July.

---

Enclosure in No. 4.

[Text of the Servian reply, for which see British  
Correspondence, No. 39, page 31.]

---

No. 5.

*Communication made on July 26, 1914, by the Austro-Hungarian  
Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

M. PASHITCH gave the reply of the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note before 6 o'clock yesterday. This reply not having been considered satisfactory, diplomatic relations have been broken off and the Minister and staff of the Austrian Legation have left Belgrade. Servian mobilisation had already been ordered before 3 o'clock.

---

## No. 6.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

(Telegram.)

ACCORDING to a telegram from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, the Servian Government have given way on all the points of the Austrian note. They even allow the intervention of Austrian officials if such a proceeding is in conformity with the usages of international law. The British Chargé d'Affaires considers that this reply should satisfy Austria if she is not desirous of war. Nevertheless, a more hopeful atmosphere prevails here to-day, more particularly because hostilities against Servia have not begun. The British Government suggest mediation by Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy at St. Petersburg and Vienna in order to find some basis for compromise. Germany alone has not yet replied. The decision rests with the Emperor.

---

## No. 7.

*Count Errembault de Dudzele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to  
M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

(Telegram.)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has notified me of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia.

---

## No. 8.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian  
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome,  
The Hague, and Luxemburg.*

Brussels, July 29, 1914.

Sir,

THE Belgian Government have decided to place the army upon a strengthened peace footing.

This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation.

Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists, in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace footing consists of only one class of armed militia; on the strengthened peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army divisions and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the same strength as those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones of the neighbouring Powers.

This information will enable you to reply to any questions which may be addressed to you.

---

## No. 9.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.*

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

Sir,

THE French Minister came to show me a telegram from the Agence Havas reporting a state of war in Germany, and said :—

“I seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the French authorities.”

I thanked M. Klobukowski for his communication, and I felt bound to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in the loyal observance by both our neighbouring States of their engagements towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German Government will be the same as that of the Government of the French Republic.

---

## No. 10.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to all Heads of Belgian Missions abroad.*

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE Minister of War informs me that mobilisation has been ordered, and that Saturday, the 1st August, will be the first day.

---

## No. 11.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.*

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

Sir,

THE British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, and made the following communication, which he had hoped for some days to be able to present to me: Owing to the possibility of a European war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect Belgian neutrality provided that no other Power violated it :—

“In view of existing treaties, I am instructed to inform the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers will respect and maintain it.”



I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that neutrality.

I did not fail to state that our military forces, which had been considerably developed in consequence of our recent re-organisation, were sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves energetically in the event of the violation of our territory.

In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to mobilise our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands, had come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, moreover, the recent date of our new military system, and the temporary nature of the measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our neighbours and guarantors should see in this decision our strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves.

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which would be communicated to me.

## No. 12.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.*

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

Sir,

IN the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General of my Department had with Herr von Below this morning, he explained to the German Minister the scope of the military measures which we had taken, and said to him that they were a consequence of our desire to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours.

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he knew of the conversation which he had had with his predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to give.

In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a consequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the case of a Franco-German war Belgian neutrality would be violated by Germany.

The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declaration in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the two countries.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east.

Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly understood the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the proposed public declaration, and he recalled the fact that since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow had made reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality.

Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed.

---

Enclosure in No. 12.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, May 2, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to bring to your notice the declarations respecting Belgian neutrality, as published in the semi-official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, made by the Secretary of State and the Minister of War, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on April 29th:—

“A member of the Social Democrat Party said: ‘The approach of a war between Germany and France is viewed with apprehension in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany will not respect the neutrality of Belgium.’

“Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied: ‘Belgian neutrality is provided for by International Conventions and Germany is determined to respect those Conventions.’

“This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he had nothing to add to the clear statement he had made respecting the relations between Germany and Belgium.

“In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social Democrat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, replied: ‘Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed reorganisation of the German military system. That proposal is based on the situation in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty.’

“A member of the Progressive Party having once again spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declaration in regard to Belgium was sufficiently clear.”

---

## No. 13.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 1, 1914.

(Telegram.)

GREAT BRITAIN has asked France and Germany separately if they intend to respect Belgian territory in the event of its not being violated by their adversary. Germany's reply is awaited. France has replied in the affirmative.

---

## No. 14.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE British Ambassador has been instructed to inquire of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany would respect Belgian neutrality, and I understand that the Minister replied that he was unable to answer the question.

---

## No. 15.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the  
Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.*

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French Minister has made the following verbal communication to me:—

(Translation.)

“Je suis autorisé à déclarer qu'en cas de conflit international, le Gouvernement de la République, ainsi qu'il l'a toujours déclaré, respectera la neutralité de la Belgique. Dans l'hypothèse où cette neutralité ne serait pas respectée par une autre Puissance, le Gouvernement français, pour assurer sa propre défense, pourrait être amené à modifier son attitude.”

“I am authorised to declare that, in the event of an international war, the French Government, in accordance with the declarations they have always made, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary to modify their attitude.”

I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side had taken without delay all the measures necessary to ensure that our independence and our frontiers should be respected.

---

## No. 16.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

(Telegram.)

CARRY out instructions contained in my despatch of the 24th July.

(See No. 2.)

---

## No. 17.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, Luxembourg.*

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

(Telegram.)

CARRY out instructions contained in my despatch of the 25th July.

(See No. 3.)

---

## No. 18.

*M. Eyschen, President of the Luxembourg Government to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Luxembourg, August 2, 1914.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency with the following facts: On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxembourg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxembourg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxembourg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxembourg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxembourg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

---

## No. 19.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

Brussels, August 2, 1914.

Sir,

I WAS careful to warn the German Minister through M. de Bassompierre that an announcement in the Brussels press by M. Klobukowski, French Minister, would make public the formal declaration which the latter had made to me on the

1st August. When I next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern neighbours. I at once replied that all that we knew of their intentions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did not allow us to doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I added, however, that we should attach the greatest importance to the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of with joy and gratitude.

## No. 20.

*Note presented by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Belgien-Brüssel, den  
2. August 1914.

Imperial German Legation in Belgium.—Brussels, August 2, 1914.

(Translation.)

(Très Confidential.)

DER Kaiserlichen Regierung liegen zuverlässige Nachrichten vor über den beabsichtigten Aufmarsch französischer Streitkräfte an der Maas-Strecke Givet-Namur. Sie lassen keinen Zweifel über die Absicht Frankreichs, durch belgisches Gebiet gegen Deutschland vorzugehen.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung kann sich der Besorgniss nicht erwehren, dass Belgien, trotz besten Willens, nicht im Stande sein wird, ohne Hülfe einen französischen Vormarsch mit so grosser Aussicht auf Erfolg abzuwehren, dass darin eine ausreichende Sicherheit gegen die Bedrohung Deutschlands gefunden werden kann. Es ist ein Gebot der Selbsterhaltung für Deutschland, dem feindlichen Angriff zuvorkommen. Mit dem grössten Bedauern würde es daher die deutsche Regierung erfüllen, wenn Belgien einen Akt der Feindseligkeit gegen sich darin erblicken würde, dass die Massnahmen seiner Gegner Deutschland zwingen, zur Gegenwehr auch seinerseits belgisches Gebiet zu betreten.

(Very Confidential.)

RELIABLE information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

Um jede Missdeutung auszuschliessen, erklärt die Kaiserliche Regierung das Folgende :

1. Deutschland beabsichtigt keinerlei Feindseligkeiten gegen Belgien. Ist Belgien gewillt, in dem bevorstehenden Kriege, Deutschland gegenüber eine wohlwollende Neutralität einzunehmen, so verpflichtet sich die deutsche Regierung, beim Friedensschluss Besitzstand und Unabhängigkeit des Königreichs in vollem Umfang zu garantieren.

2. Deutschland verpflichtet sich unter obiger Voraussetzung, das Gebiet des Königreichs wieder zu räumen, sobald der Friede geschlossen ist.

3. Bei einer freundschaftlicher Haltung Belgiens ist Deutschland bereit, im Einvernehmen mit den Königlich Belgischen Behörden alle Bedürfnisse seiner Truppen gegen Barzahlung anzukaufen und jeden Schaden zu ersetzen, der etwa durch deutsche Truppen verursacht werden könnte.

4. Sollte Belgien den deutschen Truppen feindlich entgegen treten, insbesondere ihrem vorgehen durch Widerstand der Maas-Befestigungen oder durch Zerstörungen von Eisenbahnen, Strassen, Tunneln oder sonstigen Kunstbauten Schwierigkeiten bereiten, so wird Deutschland zu seinem Bedauern gezwungen sein, das Königreich als Feind zu betrachten. In diesem Falle würde Deutschland dem Königreich gegenüber keine Verpflichtungen übernehmen können, sondern müsste die spätere Regelung des Verhältnisses beider Staaten zu einander der Entscheidung der Waffen überlassen.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung giebt sich der bestimmten Hoffnung hin, dass diese Eventualität nicht eintreten, und dass die Königlich Belgische Regierung die geeigneten Massnahmen zu treffen wissen

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration :—

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in co-operation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms.

The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to

wird, um zu verhindern, dass Vorkommnisse, wie die vorstehend erwähnten, sich ereignen. In diesem Falle würden die freundschaftlichen Bande, die beide Nachbarstaaten verbinden, eine weitere und dauernde Festigung erfahren.

prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring.

### No. 21.

*Memorandum of an Interview asked for at 1.30 A.M., on August 3, by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, with Baron van der Elst, Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

At 1.30 A.M. the German Minister asked to see Baron van der Elst. He told him that he had been instructed by his Government to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international law, seeing that war had not been declared.

The Secretary-General asked Herr von Below where these incidents had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron van der Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand the object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to international law, would be committed by France.

### No. 22.

*Note communicated by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.*

Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 A.M.).

THE German Government stated in their note of the 2nd August, 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops.

The German Government, therefore, considered themselves compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms.

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government.

The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870 vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.

The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilisation of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights.

---

No. 23.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at St. Petersburg, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, The Hague.*

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

(Telegram.)

AT 7 P.M. last night Germany presented a note proposing friendly neutrality. This entailed free passage through Belgian territory, while guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence of Belgium and of her possessions on the conclusion of peace, and threatened, in the event of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was allowed within which to reply.

Our answer has been that this infringement of our neutrality would be a flagrant violation of international law. To accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honour of the nation. Conscious of her duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel any attack by all the means in her power.

---



## No. 24.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

Brussels, August 3, 1914 (12 noon).

Sir,

As you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an ultimatum which expires this morning, 3rd August, at 7 A.M. As no act of war has occurred up to the present, the Cabinet has decided that there is, for the moment, no need to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers.

The French Minister has made the following statement to me upon the subject :—

## Translation.

“ Sans être chargé d’une déclaration de mon Gouvernement, je crois cependant, m’inspirant de ses intentions connues, pouvoir dire que si le Gouvernement Royal faisait appel au Gouvernement français, comme Puissance garante de sa neutralité, nous répondrions immédiatement à son appel ; si cet appel n’était pas formulé, il est probable, à moins bien entendu que le souci de sa propre défense ne détermine des mesures exceptionnelles, qu’il attendra pour intervenir que la Belgique ait fait un acte de résistance effective.”

“ Although I have received no instructions to make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium’s appeal ; if such an appeal were not made it is probable, that—unless of course exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence—the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance.”

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done.

## No. 25.

*His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty King George.*

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

(Telegram.)

REMEMBERING the numerous proofs of your Majesty’s friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty’s Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.

## No. 26.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 3, 1914.

(Telegram.)

I SHOWED your telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has laid it before the Cabinet. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me that if our neutrality is violated it means war with Germany.

(See No. 23.)

## No. 27.

*Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(The original is in French.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 A.M.).

(Translation.)

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'AI été chargé et j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que par suite du refus opposé par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi aux propositions bien intentionnées que lui avait soumises le Gouvernement Impérial, celui-ci se verra, à son plus vif regret, forcé d'exécuter—au besoin par la force des armes—les mesures de sécurité exposées comme indispensables vis-à-vis des menaces françaises.

Veillez agréer, &c.

(Signé) VON BELOW.

Sir,

IN accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian Government to entertain the well-intentioned proposals made to them by the German Government, the latter, to their deep regret, find themselves compelled to take—if necessary by force of arms—those measures of defence already foreshadowed as indispensable, in view of the menace of France.

## No. 28.

*Note communicated by Sir Francis H. Villiers, British Minister at  
Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

I AM instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic Majesty's Government expect Belgium to resist with all the means at her disposal.

In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in tendering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a view to resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against Belgium, and also offering a guarantee for the maintenance of the future independence and integrity of Belgium.

---

## No. 29.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

The Hague, August 4, 1914.

Sir,

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday evening that the Netherlands Government would perhaps be obliged, owing to the gravity of the present situation, to institute war buoying on the Scheldt.

M. Loudon read me the draft of the note which would announce this decision to me.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note in question which was communicated to me yesterday evening.

As you will observe, the Scheldt will only be closed at night. By day navigation will be possible, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In this way both Dutch interests in the defence of their territory, and Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp will be safeguarded.

You will note that the Netherlands Government further ask that in the event of the war buoying being carried out, we should cause the lightships "Wielingen" and "Wandelaar" to be withdrawn in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch territory.

I would point out that the phrase used in this note, "sailing up the Scheldt," is not sufficiently explicit; sailing down would be permitted under the same conditions. The Minister has, however, given me this assurance.

As soon as the Netherlands Government have decided upon this exceptional measure I shall be informed of it.

About six hours are necessary to carry out war buoying.

I will at once telegraph to you.

---

Note enclosed in No. 29.

The Netherlands Government may be compelled, in order to maintain the neutrality of Dutch territory, to institute war buoying upon the Scheldt, that is to say, to move or modify a portion of the actual arrangement of buoys and lights.

At the same time this special arrangement of buoys has been so drawn up that when it is brought into force it will still be possible

to sail up the Scheldt as far as Antwerp by day, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In thus acting the Netherlands Government are convinced that they will be able to serve equally both the Dutch interests in the defence of Netherlands territory and Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp.

After the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt, there would be no further reason to enter the tidal water of Flushing at night, and as the presence of the lightships "Wielingen" and "Wandelaar" is not indispensable to navigation by day, the Netherlands Government would be much obliged if the Belgian Government would be good enough, in the event of the establishment of war buoying, to withdraw these boats in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch territory.

---

## No. 30.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at London and Paris.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE General Staff announces that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

---

## No. 31.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that from to-day the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your diplomatic status and cease to have official relations with you. Your Excellency will find enclosed the passports necessary for your departure with the staff of the legation.

---

## No. 32.

*Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 4th August, and to inform you that I have entrusted the custody of the German Legation of Brussels to the care of my United States colleague.

---

## No. 33.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

(Telegram.)

PLEASE ask the Spanish Government if they will be good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany, and whether in that event they will issue the necessary instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin.

---

## No. 34.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE German Minister is leaving to-night; you should ask for your passports. We are requesting the Spanish Government to authorise the Spanish Ambassador to be good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany.

---

## No. 35.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by the Imperial Chancellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian neutrality:—

“We are in a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows no law.

“Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international law. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait; we could not. A French attack upon our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as our military object is attained.

“Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is struggling for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with the means of extricating himself; we stand side by side with Austria.”

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognises, without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing a wrong against us.

---

No. 36.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 4, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that in the House of Commons this afternoon the Prime Minister made a fresh statement with regard to the European crisis.

After recalling the principal points set forth yesterday by Sir E. Grey, the Prime Minister read:—

1. A telegram received from Sir F. Villiers this morning which gave the substance of the second ultimatum presented to the Belgian Government by the German Government, which had been sent to you this morning (see No. 27).

2. Your telegram informing me of the violation of the frontier at Gemmenich, a copy of which I have given to Sir A. Nicolson.

3. A telegram which the German Government addressed to its Ambassador in London this morning with the evident intention of misleading popular opinion as to its attitude. Here is the translation as published in one of this evening's newspapers:—

"Please dispel any mistrust which may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively the formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory.

"Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality.

"It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland.

"Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information.

"Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."

Mr. Asquith then informed the House that in answer to this note of the German Government the British Government had repeated their proposal of last week, namely, that the German Government should give the same assurances as to Belgian neutrality as France had given last week both to England and to Belgium. The British Cabinet allowed the Berlin Cabinet till midnight to reply.

---

## No. 37.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 4, 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British Ministers in Norway, Holland, and Belgium, that Great Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist German pressure and observe neutrality. Should they resist they will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready in that event, should the three above-mentioned Governments desire it, to join France and Russia, in offering an alliance to the said Governments for the purpose of resisting the use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain the future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms. I observed to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered: This is in case her neutrality is violated.

---

## No. 38.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian  
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the course of recent events as regards the relations of Belgium with certain of the Powers which guarantee her neutrality and independence.

On the 31st July the British Minister made me a verbal communication according to which Sir E. Grey, in anticipation of a European war, had asked the German and French Governments separately if each of them were resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium should that neutrality not be violated by any other Power.

In view of existing treaties, Sir F. Villiers was instructed to bring this step to the knowledge of the Belgian Government, adding that Sir E. Grey presumed that Belgium was resolved to maintain her neutrality, and that she expected other Powers to respect it.

I told the British Minister that we highly appreciated this communication, which was in accordance with our expectation, and I added that Great Britain, as well as the other Powers who had guaranteed our independence, might rest fully assured of our firm determination to maintain our neutrality; nor did it seem possible that our neutrality could be threatened by any of those States, with whom we enjoyed the most cordial and frank relations. The Belgian Government, I added, had given

proof of this resolution by taking from now on all such military measures as seemed to them to be necessitated by the situation.

In his turn the French Minister made a verbal communication on August 1st to the effect that he was authorised to inform the Belgian Government that in case of an international war the French Government, in conformity with their repeated declarations, would respect Belgian territory, and that they would not be induced to modify their attitude except in the event of the violation of Belgian neutrality by another Power.

I thanked his Excellency, and added that we had already taken all the necessary precautions to ensure respect of our independence and our frontiers.

On the morning of the 2nd August I had a fresh conversation with Sir F. Villiers, in the course of which he told me that he had lost no time in telegraphing our conversation of July 31st to his Government, and that he had been careful to quote accurately the solemn declaration which he had received of Belgium's intention to defend her frontiers from whichever side they might be invaded. He added: "We know that France has given you formal assurances, but Great Britain has received no reply from Berlin on this subject."

The latter fact did not particularly affect me, since a declaration from the German Government might appear superfluous in view of existing treaties. Moreover, the Secretary of State had reaffirmed, at the meeting of the committee of the Reichstag of April 29th, 1913, "that the neutrality of Belgium is established by treaty which Germany intends to respect."

The same day Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister, called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 7 o'clock, and handed to me the enclosed note (see No. 20). The German Government gave the Belgian Government a time limit of twelve hours within which to communicate their decision.

No hesitation was possible as to the reply called for by the amazing proposal of the German Government. You will find a copy enclosed. (See No. 22.)

The ultimatum expired at 7 A.M. on August 3rd. As at 10 o'clock no act of war had been committed, the Belgian Cabinet decided that there was no reason for the moment to appeal to the guaranteeing powers.

Towards mid-day the French Minister questioned me upon this point, and said:—

"Although in view of the rapid march of events I have as yet received no instructions to make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable that—unless, of course, exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence—the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance."

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French



Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done.

Finally, at 6 A.M. on August 4th, the German Minister made the following communication to me. (See No. 27.)

The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on the question of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our neutrality.

No. 39.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 4, 1914.

(Telegram.)

GREAT BRITAIN this morning called upon Germany to respect Belgian neutrality. The ultimatum says that whereas the note addressed by Germany to Belgium threatens the latter with an appeal to the force of arms if she opposes the passage of German troops; and whereas Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich; and whereas Germany has refused to give Great Britain a similar assurance to that given last week by France; therefore Great Britain must once again demand a satisfactory reply on the subject of the respect of Belgian neutrality and of the treaty to which Germany, no less than Great Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum expires at midnight.

In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the British proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being. (See No. 37.)

No. 40.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British, French,  
and Russian Ministers at Brussels.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

Sir,

THE Belgian Government regret to have to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all the means in their power.

Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.

There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same

time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defence of her fortified places.

---

No. 41.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 5, 1914.

(Telegram.)

GERMANY, having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain has informed her that a state of war existed between the two countries as from 11 o'clock.

---

No. 42.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the  
Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.*

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

(Telegram.)

AFTER the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich, Belgium appealed to Great Britain, France, and Russia through their representatives at Brussels, to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.

Belgium undertakes the defence of her fortified places.

---

No. 43.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the  
Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.*

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

Sir,

IN my despatch of August 4 (see No. 38) I had the honour to inform you of the sequence of events which had attended the international relations of Belgium from July 31st to August 4th. I added that the Cabinet was considering the question whether Belgium, whose territory had been invaded since the morning, should appeal to the guarantee of the Powers.

The Cabinet had decided in the affirmative when the British Minister informed me that the proposal which he had communicated to me, and according to which the British Government were disposed to respond favourably to our appeal to her as a guaranteeing Power, was cancelled for the time being. (See No. 37.)

A telegram from London made it clear that this change of attitude was caused by an ultimatum from Great Britain giving Germany a time limit of ten hours within which to evacuate Belgian territory and to respect Belgian neutrality. (See No. 39.) During the evening, the Belgian Government addressed to France, Great Britain, and Russia, through their respective representatives at Brussels, a note, of which a copy is enclosed herewith. (See No. 40.)

As you will observe, Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory and in the maintenance for the future of the independence and integrity of her territory. She will herself undertake the defence of her fortified places.

As yet we are not aware how our appeal has been received.

#### No. 44.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic Relations with Belgium.*

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

Sir,

By the treaty of April 18th, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty runs: "Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually neutral." Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neutrality to be respected.

In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the obligations undertaken by treaty.

It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage against international law provoked by no act of ours.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality, and they recall the fact that, in virtue of article 10 of The Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be considered as a hostile act.

I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch to his Excellency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted at once you should make the communication in question in writing.

## No. 45.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, August 5, 1914.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE received my passports and shall leave Berlin to-morrow morning for Holland with the staff of the legation.

---

## No. 46.

*Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

St. Sebastian, August 5, 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE Spanish Government undertake the custody of Belgian interests in Germany, and are to-day sending telegraphic instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin.

(See No. 33.)

---

## No. 47.

*Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, August 5, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the notification of a state of war between France and Germany, which has been communicated to me to-day.

---

Enclosure in No. 47.

(See No. 157 of French Book, page 252.)

---

## No. 48.

*Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

I AM instructed to inform the Belgian Government that His Britannic Majesty's Government consider joint action with a view to resisting Germany to be in force and to be justified by the Treaty of 1839.

---

## No. 49.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 5, 1914.

(Telegram.)

GREAT BRITAIN agrees to take joint action in her capacity of guaranteeing Power for the defence of Belgian territory. The British fleet will ensure the free passage of the Scheldt for the provisioning of Antwerp.

---

## No. 50.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

The Hague, August 5, 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE war buoying is about to be established.

(See No. 29.)

---

## No. 51.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

(Telegram.)

PLEASE express to the Spanish Government the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government.

(See No. 46.)

---

## No. 52.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.*

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French and Russian Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me of the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, and to co-operate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian territory.

---

No. 53.

*Jonkheer de Weede, Netherlands Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 6, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of the special edition of the "Staatscourant," containing the declaration of the neutrality of the Netherlands in the war between Belgium and Germany, and between Great Britain and Germany.

---

Enclosure to No. 53.

LAWS, DECREES, NOMINATIONS, &c.

*Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies.*

(Translation.)

LES Ministres des Affaires Étrangères, de la Justice, de la Marine, de la Guerre et des Colonies, autorisés à cette fin par Sa Majesté la Reine, portent à la connaissance de tous ceux que la chose concerne, que le Gouvernement néerlandais observera dans la guerre qui a éclaté entre les Puissances amies des Pays-Bas, Grande-Bretagne et Allemagne, et Belgique et Allemagne, une stricte neutralité, et qu'en vue de l'observation de cette neutralité les dispositions suivantes ont été arrêtées :

#### ARTICLE 1<sup>er</sup>.

Dans les limites du territoire de l'État, comprenant le territoire du Royaume en Europe, outre les colonies et possessions dans d'autres parties du monde, aucun genre d'hostilités n'est permis et ce territoire ne peut servir de base pour des opérations hostiles.

#### ARTICLE 2.

Ni l'occupation d'une partie quelconque du territoire de l'État par un belligérant, ni le passage à travers ce territoire par voie de terre par des troupes ou des convois de munitions appartenant à

THE Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies, authorised to that effect by Her Majesty the Queen, make known to all whom it may concern that the Netherlands Government will observe strict neutrality in the war which has broken out between Great Britain and Germany, and Belgium and Germany, Powers friendly to the Netherlands, and that, with a view to the observance of this neutrality, the following dispositions have been taken:—

#### ARTICLE 1.

Within the limits of the territory of the State, including the territory of the Kingdom in Europe and the colonies and possessions in other parts of the world, no hostilities of any kind are permitted, neither may this territory serve as a base for hostile operations.

#### ARTICLE 2.

Neither the occupation of any part of the territory of the State by a belligerent nor the passage across this territory by land is permitted to the troops or convoys of munitions belonging

un des belligérants ne sont permis, non plus que le passage à travers le territoire situé à l'intérieur des eaux territoriales néerlandaises par des navires de guerre ou des bâtiments des belligérants assimilés à ceux-ci.

#### ARTICLE 3.

Les troupes ou les militaires, appartenant aux belligérants ou destinés à ceux-ci et arrivant sur le territoire de l'État par voie de terre seront immédiatement désarmés et internés jusqu'à la fin de la guerre.

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés à ces derniers, appartenant à un belligérant, qui contreviendront aux prescriptions des articles 2, 4 ou 7, ne pourront quitter ce territoire avant la fin de la guerre.

#### ARTICLE 4.

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés à ces derniers, qui appartiennent à un belligérant, n'auront pas accès au territoire de l'État.

#### ARTICLE 5.

La disposition de l'article 4 n'est pas applicable :

1° aux navires de guerre ou bâtiments d'un belligérant assimilés à ces derniers, et qui par suite d'avarie ou de l'état de la mer sont tenus d'entrer dans un des ports ou rades de l'État. Les navires pourront quitter lesdits ports ou rades dès que les circonstances qui les ont contraints de s'y réfugier auront cessé d'exister;

2° aux navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés, appartenant à un belligérant, et qui font escale dans un port ou une rade situés dans le territoire des colonies et possessions d'outre-mer, exclusivement dans le but de compléter leur provision de denrées alimentaires ou de combustibles. Ces navires devront repartir dès que

to the belligerents, nor is the passage across the territory situated within the territorial waters of the Netherlands by the warships or ships assimilated thereto of the belligerents permitted.

#### ARTICLE 3.

Troops or soldiers belonging to the belligerents or destined for them arriving in the territory of the State by land will be immediately disarmed and interned until the termination of the war.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, who contravenes the provisions of articles 2, 4, or 7 will not be permitted to leave the said territory until the end of the war.

#### ARTICLE 4.

No warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to any of the belligerents shall have access to the said territory.

#### ARTICLE 5.

The provisions of article 4 do not apply to:—

1. Warships or ships assimilated thereto which are forced to enter the ports or roadstead of the State on account of damages or the state of the sea. Such ships may leave the said ports or roadsteads as soon as the circumstances which have driven them to take shelter there shall have ceased to exist.

2. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent which anchor in a port or roadstead in the colonies or oversea possessions exclusively with the object of completing their provision of foodstuffs or fuel. These ships must leave as soon as the circumstances which have forced them to anchor shall have ceased

les circonstances qui les ont forcés à faire escale ont cessé d'exister, avec cette condition que le séjour en rade ou dans le port ne pourra durer plus de vingt-quatre heures ;

3° aux navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés, appartenant à un belligérant, et qui sont utilisés exclusivement pour une mission religieuse, scientifique, ou humanitaire.

#### ARTICLE 6.

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés appartenant à un belligérant, ne peuvent réparer leurs avaries dans les ports ou rades de l'État qu'en tant que cette réparation est indispensable à la sécurité de la navigation, et ils ne pourront en aucune façon accroître leurs capacités de combat.

#### ARTICLE 7.

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés, appartenant à un belligérant, et qui, au commencement de la guerre, se trouveraient sur le territoire de l'État, sont tenus de le quitter dans les vingt-quatre heures de la publication de la présente.

#### ARTICLE 8.

Si des navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés appartenant à divers belligérants se trouvent, en même temps, dans les conditions visées à l'article 5, dans une même partie du monde, et sur le territoire de l'État, un délai d'au moins vingt-quatre heures doit s'écouler entre le départ des navires de chacun des belligérants. A moins de circonstances spéciales, l'ordre de départ est déterminé par l'ordre d'arrivée. Un navire de guerre ou un bâtiment assimilé, appartenant à un belligérant, ne peut quitter le territoire de l'État que vingt-quatre heures après le départ

to exist, subject to the condition that their stay in the roadstead or port shall not exceed twenty-four hours.

3. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent employed exclusively on a religious, scientific, or humanitarian mission.

#### ARTICLE 6.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent may only execute such repairs in the ports and roadsteads of the State as are indispensable to their seaworthiness, and they may in no way increase their fighting capacities.

#### ARTICLE 7.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent who may at the commencement of war be within the territory of the State must leave within twenty-four hours from the moment of the publication of this declaration.

#### ARTICLE 8.

If warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to different belligerents find themselves at the same time, in the conditions set forth in article 5, in the same part of the world and within the territory of the State, a delay of at least twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of each respective belligerent ship. Except in special circumstances, the order of departure shall be determined by the order of arrival. A warship or ship assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent may only leave the territory of the State twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship



d'un navire de commerce portant le pavillon de l'autre belligérant.

#### ARTICLE 9.

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés, appartenant à un belligérant, visés à l'article 5 et à l'article 7, ne peuvent être ravitaillés en denrées alimentaires dans les ports et les rades du pays que dans la mesure nécessaire pour parfaire leurs provisions jusqu'à la limite normale du temps de paix.

De même, ils ne peuvent charger de combustible que dans la mesure nécessaire pour pouvoir atteindre, avec la provision qu'ils ont encore à bord, le port le plus rapproché de leur propre pays.

Un même bâtiment ne peut être ravitaillé à nouveau en combustible qu'à l'expiration d'une période de trois mois au moins après son précédent ravitaillement dans le territoire de l'État.

#### ARTICLE 10.

Une prise ne peut être amenée dans le territoire que lorsqu'elle est incapable de naviguer, qu'elle tient mal la mer, qu'elle manque de combustible ou de denrées alimentaires.

Elle doit s'éloigner dès que la cause de son entrée dans le territoire cesse d'exister.

Si elle ne le fait pas, l'ordre lui sera donné de partir immédiatement; en cas de refus, il sera fait usage des moyens disponibles pour libérer la prise avec ses officiers et son équipage et pour interner l'équipage placé à bord par le belligérant qui a fait la prise.

#### ARTICLE 11.

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'État, de former des corps combattants ou d'ouvrir des bureaux de recrutement au profit des belligérants.

which flies the flag of another belligerent.

#### ARTICLE 9.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent to which articles 5 and 7 are applicable may only be provisioned with foodstuffs in the ports and roadsteads of the country to the extent necessary to bring their provisions up to the normal limit in time of peace.

Similarly they can only be supplied with fuel to the extent necessary to enable them, with the stock they already have on board, to reach the nearest port of their own country.

The same vessel cannot again be provided with fuel until a period of at least three months shall have elapsed since it was last provisioned in the territory of the State.

#### ARTICLE 10.

A prize may only be brought into Dutch territory if such prize is unnavigable, or unseaworthy, or short of fuel or foodstuffs.

Such prize must leave as soon as the reasons which caused her to enter Dutch territory cease to exist.

Should such prize fail to do so, immediate orders shall be given her to leave. In the event of a refusal, all possible means shall be employed to liberate the prize, with her officers and crew, and to intern the crew placed on board by the belligerent who has taken it as prize.

#### ARTICLE 11.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to form a corps of combatants or to open recruiting offices on behalf of the belligerents.

## ARTICLE 12.

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'État, de prendre du service à bord de navires de guerre ou de bâtiments assimilés.

## ARTICLE 13.

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'État, d'aménager, d'armer ou d'équiper des navires destinés à des fins militaires au profit d'un belligérant, ou de fournir ou conduire à un belligérant de tels navires.

## ARTICLE 14.

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'État, de fournir des armes ou des munitions à des navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés appartenant à un belligérant, ou de leur venir en aide d'une manière quelconque en vue de l'augmentation de leur équipement ou de leur aménagement.

## ARTICLE 15.

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'État, sauf autorisation préalable des autorités locales compétentes, de faire des réparations aux navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés appartenant à un belligérant, ou de leur fournir des provisions de bouche ou de combustible.

## ARTICLE 16.

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'État, de coopérer au dégrèvement ou à la réparation de prises, sauf en ce qui est nécessaire pour les rendre propres à tenir la mer; ainsi que d'acheter des prises ou des marchandises confisquées, et de les recevoir en échange, en don ou en dépôt.

## ARTICLE 17.

Le territoire de l'État comprend la mer côtière sur une largeur de 3 milles marins à raison de 60 par degré de latitude, à partir de la laisse de la basse mer.

## ARTICLE 12.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to take service on board warships or ships assimilated thereto.

## ARTICLE 13.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to equip, arm, or man vessels intended for military purposes on behalf of a belligerent, or to furnish or deliver such vessels to a belligerent.

## ARTICLE 14.

It is forbidden in State territory to supply arms or ammunition to warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to come to their assistance in any manner whatsoever with a view to augment their crew or their equipment.

## ARTICLE 15.

It is forbidden in State territory failing previous authorisation by the competent local authorities, to repair warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to supply them with victuals or fuel.

## ARTICLE 16.

It is forbidden in State territory to take part in the dismantling or repairing of prizes except in so far as is necessary to make them seaworthy; also to purchase prizes or confiscated goods, and to receive them in exchange, in gift, or on deposit.

## ARTICLE 17.

The State territory comprises the coastal waters to a distance of 3 nautical miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude, from low-water mark.

En ce qui concerne les baies, cette distance de 3 milles marins est mesurée à partir d'une ligne droite tirée à travers la baie aussi près que possible de l'entrée, au point où l'ouverture de la baie ne dépasse pas 10 milles marins, à raison de 60 par degré de latitude.

## ARTICLE 18.

En outre, l'intention est attirée sur les articles 100, 1<sup>o</sup>, et 205 du Code pénal; "Indisch Staatsblad," 1905, No. 62; Art. 7, 4<sup>o</sup>, de la loi sur la qualité de Néerlandais et sur le domicile ("Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1892, No. 268; 1910, No. 216); art. 2, No. 3, de la loi sur la qualité de sujet néerlandais ("Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 55; "Indisch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 296; art. 54 et 55 du Code pénal de Suriname; art. 54 et 55 du Code pénal de Curaçao).

De même, l'attention des commandants de navires, armateurs et affréteurs, est attirée sur le danger et les inconvénients, auxquels ils s'exposeraient en ne respectant pas le blocus effectif des belligérants, en transportant de la contrebande de guerre ou des dépêches militaires pour les belligérants (à moins qu'il ne s'agisse du service postal régulier) ou en exécutant pour eux d'autres services de transport.

Quiconque se rendrait coupable d'actes prévus ci-dessus, s'exposerait à toutes les conséquences de ces actes, et ne pourrait obtenir à cet égard aucune protection ni intervention du Gouvernement néerlandais.

As regards inlets, this distance of 3 nautical miles is measured from a straight line drawn across the inlet at the point nearest the entrance where the mouth of the inlet is not wider than 10 nautical miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude.

## ARTICLE 18.

Further, attention is called to Articles 100, Section 1, and 205 of the Penal Code; "Indisch Staatsblad," 1905, No. 62; Article 7, Section 4, of the Law respecting the status of Netherlands nationality, and respecting domicile ("Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1892, No. 268; 1910, No. 216); Article 2, No. 3, of the Law respecting the status of Netherlands nationality ("Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 55; "Indisch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 296; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Surinam; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Curaçao).

Similarly, the attention of commanding officers, owners, and charterers of ships is called to the dangers and inconveniences to which they would expose themselves by disregarding the effective blockade of belligerents, by carrying contraband of war, or military despatches for belligerents (except in the course of the regular postal service), or by rendering them other transport services.

Any person guilty of the acts aforesaid would expose himself to all the consequences of those acts, and would not be able, as regards them, to obtain any protection or intervention on the part of the Netherlands Government.

No. 54.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

Brussels, August 6, 1914.

(Telegram.)

PLEASE communicate the following note to the Netherlands Government:—

The Belgian Government have taken note of the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt and of the fact that the Netherlands Government will ensure the maintenance of navigation.

It would be convenient that navigation should be possible from 30 minutes before sunrise to 30 minutes after sunset, and that the exchange of pilots should take place at Bath.

With every desire to fall in with the requests of the Netherlands Government, the Belgian Government think that it is desirable in the interests of the littoral ports to retain the lightships of Wielingen and of Wandelaar, and also the buoys of the Wielingen Channel.

(See No. 50.)

---

No. 55.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

The Hague, August 6, 1914.

(Telegram.)

NAVIGATION on the Scheldt is allowed from daybreak and so long as it is light. The Wielingen buoys will be replaced. The exchange of pilots at Hansweert is easier and better organised. Are you particularly anxious to have Bath?

---

No. 56.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

Brussels, August 7, 1914.

(Telegram.)

PLEASE express to the Netherlands Government the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government for the measures taken to secure navigation on the Scheldt. The Belgian Government are in agreement with the Netherlands Government on the subject of the extent of navigation. They had proposed Bath, but accept Hansweert, since this port has better facilities for the exchange of pilots.

---

## No. 57.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London.*

Brussels, August 7, 1914.

(Telegram.)

BELGIUM trusts that the war will not be extended to Central Africa. The Governor of the Belgian Congo has received instructions to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Please ask the French Government [British Government] whether they intend to proclaim the neutrality of the French Congo [British colonies in the conventional basin of the Congo], in accordance with article 11 of the General Act of Berlin. A telegram from Boma reports that hostilities are probable between the French and Germans in the Ubangi.

---

## No. 58.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London.*

Brussels, August 7, 1914.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram of this morning, I have the honour to request you to bring to the notice of the French [British] Government the following information :—

¶ While instructions have been sent to the Governor-General of the Congo to take defensive measures on the common frontiers of the Belgian colony and of the German colonies of East Africa and the Cameroons, the Belgian Government have suggested to that officer that he should abstain from all offensive action against those colonies.

In view of the civilising mission common to colonising nations, the Belgian Government desire, in effect, for humanitarian reasons, not to extend the field of hostilities to Central Africa. They will, therefore, not take the initiative of putting such a strain on civilisation in that region, and the military forces which they possess there will only go into action in the event of their having to repel a direct attack on their African possessions.

I should be glad to learn whether the French [British] Government share this view and in that case whether it is their intention, during the present conflict, to avail themselves of article 11 of the General Act of Berlin to neutralise such of their colonies as are contained in the conventional basin of the Congo.

I am addressing an identic communication to your colleague at London [Paris].

---

## No. 59.

*Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, August 8, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE had the honour of speaking to the President of the Republic with respect to your telegram of yesterday. I had received it during the evening and had immediately communicated it to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They asked for time to consider it before answering.

M. Poincaré has promised me to speak on this subject to-day to the Minister of the Colonies. At first sight he could see little difficulty in proclaiming the neutrality of the French Congo, but he nevertheless reserves his reply. He believes that acts of war have already taken place in the Ubangi. He has taken the opportunity to remind me that the protection accorded us by France extends also to our colonies and that we have nothing to fear.

## No. 60.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

The Hague, August 9, 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged me to convey to you the following information, the United States Minister at Brussels having declined to do so:—

The fortress of Liège has been taken by assault after a brave defence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody encounters should have resulted from the attitude of the Belgian Government towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium, it is only through the force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liège as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can be reconciled with their arrangements with France. (See No. 70.) Germany once more gives her solemn assurance that it is not her intention to appropriate Belgian territory to herself and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague to undertake this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken it to oblige him.

## No. 61.

*Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, August 9, 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE French Government are strongly inclined to proclaim the neutrality of the possessions in the conventional basin of the Congo and are begging Spain to make the suggestion at Berlin.

(See No. 59.)

## No. 62.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

The Hague, August 10, 1914.

Sir,

IN response to a call on the telephone, yesterday evening at 9 o'clock, I went to the Department for Foreign Affairs.

Jonkheer Loudon told me that my German colleague had just left his room, and had handed him a document which the United States representative at Brussels had declined to forward to you.

The United States official in charge of the German Legation at Brussels stated that he had received no special instructions from Washington to intervene officially with the Belgian Government in the interest of Germany.

The United States Minister consequently telegraphed to his colleague at The Hague, who informed the German representative of Mr. Whitlock's refusal.

The German Government, therefore, took the initial step by approaching the United States Ambassador at Berlin.

In these circumstances, and in view of the urgency of these matters, Herr von Müller begged Jonkheer Loudon to act as the intermediary of the German Government in this negotiation with you.

His Excellency read me the German text of the document. I did not hide my astonishment at this attempt at mediation, and its poor chance of success in this form; but, solely in order to oblige the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, I promised to telegraph to you immediately; and this I did yesterday.

You will find the German document enclosed in original and translation.

Enclosure 1 in No. 62.

Enclosure 2 in No. 62.

(Translation.)

DIE Festung Lüttich ist nach tapfrer Gegenwehr im Sturm genommen worden. Die Deutsche Regierung bedauert es auf das tiefste, dass es infolge der Stellungnahme der Belgischen

THE fortress of Liège has been taken by assault after a brave defence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody encounters should have resulted from the Belgian Go-

Regierung gegen Deutschland zu blütigen Zusammenstößen gekommen ist. Deutschland kommt nicht als Feind nach Belgien. Nur unter dem Zwang des Verhältnisse hat es angesichts der militärischen Massnahmen Frankreichs den schweren Entschluss fassen müssen, in Belgien einzurücken und Lüttich als Stützpunkt für seine weiteren militärischen Operationen besetzen zu müssen. Nachdem die Belgische Armee in heldenmutigem Widerstand gegen die grosse Überlegenheit ihre Waffenehre auf das glänzendste gewahrt hat, bittet die Deutsche Regierung seine Majestät den König und die Belgische Regierung, Belgien die weiteren Schrecken des Krieges zu ersparen. Die Deutsche Regierung ist zu jedem Abkommen mit Belgien bereit das sich irgendwie mit Rücksicht auf seine (*voir pièce No. 70*) Auseinandersetzung mit Frankreich vereinigen lässt. Deutschland versichert nochmals feierlichst, dass es nicht von der Absicht geleitet gewesen ist sich Belgisches Gebiet anzueignen, und dass ihm diese Absicht durchaus fern liegt. Deutschland ist noch immer bereit das Belgische Königreich unverzüglich zu räumen, sobald die Kriegslage es ihm gestattet. "Der hiesige Amerikanische Botschafter ist mit diesem Vermittlungsversuch seines Brüsseler Kollegen einverstanden."

vernment's attitude towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium. It is only through the force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liège as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms in the most brilliant manner by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can in any way be reconciled with their arrangements with France. (See No. 70.) Germany gives once more her solemn assurance that she has not been animated by the intention of appropriating Belgian territory for herself, and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador here concurs in this attempt at mediation by his colleague in Brussels.

---

No. 63.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

Brussels, August 10, 1914.

(Telegram.)

The Belgian Government have received the proposals made to them by the German Government through the intermediary of the Netherlands Government. They will forward a reply shortly.

(See No. 62 and Enclosures.)

---



## No. 64.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,  
Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

Brussels, August 10, 1914.

(Telegram.)

DOUBT exists as to the meaning of the word "*Auseinandersetzung*," which you translate by "arrangement." Please ascertain whether the German Government have in mind any arrangements which we may have come to with France, or a settlement of the dispute between France and Germany.

---

## No. 65.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the British,  
Russian, and French Ministers at Brussels.*

Brussels, August 10, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the Belgian Minister at The Hague, at the request of the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, has forwarded to us the following proposal from the German Government. (See No. 62, enclosure 2.)

The Belgian Government propose to return the following reply to this communication :—

(Translation.)

"La proposition que nous fait le Gouvernement allemand reproduit la proposition qui avait été formulée dans l'ultimatum du 2 août. Fidèle à ses devoirs internationaux, la Belgique ne peut que réitérer sa réponse à cet ultimatum, d'autant plus que depuis le 3 août sa neutralité a été violée, qu'une guerre douloureuse a été portée sur son territoire, et que les garants de sa neutralité ont loyalement et immédiatement répondu à son appel."

"The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats the proposal formulated in their ultimatum of August 2. Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3 her neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded loyally and without delay to her appeal."

The Belgian Government consider that the Powers guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium should have cognizance of these documents.

---

## No. 66.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian  
Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.*

Brussels, August 10, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the circumstances which led to the departure of the Belgian representative from Luxembourg.

The General Officer commanding the German troops in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg informed the German Minister in that town, on August 8, of the desire of the military authorities for the departure of the Belgian representative at the Grand Ducal Court.

Herr von Buch addressed to Monsieur Eyschen, President of the Government, a note, of which the following is a translation:—

*“Luxemburg,  
“August 8, 1914.*

“Your Excellency,

“In consequence of the completely hostile attitude adopted by Belgium towards Germany, the military authorities find themselves obliged to insist upon the departure of the Belgian Minister from Luxemburg.

“His Excellency the General Officer commanding begs Count van den Steen de Jehay to arrange his journey home in such a way that he may be able, within twenty-four hours, to see General von Ploetz at Coblenz, with a view to settling the details of the further stages of his journey. It is impossible for him to travel except *viâ Trèves-Coblenz*.

(Signed) “VON BUCH.”

Monsieur Eyschen forwarded this note the same day to Count van den Steen de Jehay, accompanied by a letter in the following terms:—

*“Luxemburg,  
“August 8, 1914.*

“Sir,

“I greatly regret to have to communicate to you the enclosed copy of a note from the German Minister, informing me that the German military authorities demand your departure.

“You will find in it the conditions which they attach thereto.

“Herr von Buch told me that the military authorities advise you to travel by railway, as an attempt to carry out your journey by motor would expose you to being too frequently stopped for reasons connected with the control of the roads. But the choice is left to you.

“The German Minister will come to me for your answer.

“I cannot tell you how painful it is to me to fulfil my present task. I shall never forget the pleasant relations which have existed between us, and I hope that your journey may be carried out under the best possible conditions.

(Signed) “EYSCHEN.”

The Belgian Government, considering that the Grand Ducal Government had no choice in their attitude, and that the course they had been obliged to adopt in no way implied any discourteous intention towards the King of the Belgians or towards Belgium, decided that there was no reason, in these circumstances, for requesting the Luxemburg Chargé d’Affaires to leave Belgium.

## No. 67.

*Mr. Whitlock, United States Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 11, 1914.

Sir,

THE United States Legation received a telegram to-day from Washington, conveying the information that the United States Government had, at the request of the German Government, consented, as a matter of international courtesy, to undertake the protection of German subjects in Belgium.

In accordance with the instructions contained in this telegram, we will, therefore, if you see no objection, undertake to use our good and friendly offices with the Belgian Government for the protection of German subjects. The pleasant relations which we have had with you in this matter up to the present convince me that we may continue them with the same object on the same pleasant footing.

---

## No. 68.

*Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 11, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE telegraphed to Sir E. Grey the German communication and the proposed reply.

I have received instructions to express to your Excellency the entire concurrence of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The latter can only declare their approval of the terms of the reply which the Belgian Government propose to give to this attempt to sow discord between the Powers at present united for the defence of the treaties violated by Germany.

(See No. 65.)

---

## No. 69.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 11, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the French Government give their entire concurrence to the reply which the Belgian Government propose to return to the new German ultimatum.

That reply is one which was to be expected from a Government and a people who have so heroically resisted the hateful violation of their territory.

France will continue to fulfil her duties as a guaranteeing Power of Belgian neutrality and as a faithful friend of Belgium.

(See No. 65.)

---

No. 70.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

The Hague, August 12, 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE German text contained a mistake: instead of "*seine Auseinandersetzung*," it should read "*ihre*," and thus be translated "their conflict with France."

(See No. 64.)

---

No. 71.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,  
Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

Brussels, August 12, 1914.

(Telegram.)

PLEASE communicate the following telegram to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August 2nd. Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3rd, her neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded loyally and without delay to her appeal.

---

No. 72.

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

St. Petersburg, August 13, 1914.

(Telegram.)

PLEASE thank the Belgian Government for their communication, and express to them the pleasure which the Russian Government feel at the firm and dignified attitude, upon which they are heartily to be congratulated.

(See No. 65.)

---

No. 73.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

The Hague, August 13, 1914.

Sir,

I HAD the honour to receive your telegram of yesterday, and I at once communicated to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Belgian reply to the second German proposal.

His Excellency undertook to forward the Belgian communication to the German Minister forthwith.

(See No. 71.)

No. 74.

*Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, August 16, 1914.

Sir,

IN the course of a conversation which I had this morning with M. de Margerie, I turned the conversation to colonial affairs and to the action which you had instructed me to take in your telegram and your despatch of the 7th instant.

M. de Margerie reminded me that the French Government had approached Spain, but the latter had not answered before knowing the views of Great Britain. It seems that the latter has still given no answer.

M. de Margerie considered that in view of the present situation Germany should be attacked wherever possible; he believes that such is also the opinion of Great Britain, who certainly has claims to satisfy; France wishes to get back that part of the Congo which she had been compelled to give up in consequence of the Agadir incident.

M. de Margerie added that a success would not be difficult to obtain.

(See Nos. 57 and 58.)

No. 75.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 17, 1914.

Sir,

IN reply to your despatch of August 7th, I have the honour to inform you that the British Government cannot agree to the Belgian proposal to respect the neutrality of the belligerent powers in the conventional basin of the Congo.

German troops from German East Africa have already taken the offensive against the British Central African Protectorate. Furthermore, British troops have already attacked the German port of Dar-es-Salaam, where they have destroyed the wireless telegraphy station.

In these circumstances, the British Government, even if they were convinced from the political and strategical point of view of the utility of the Belgian proposal, would be unable to adopt it.

The British Government believe that the forces they are sending to Africa will be sufficient to overcome all opposition. They will take every step in their power to prevent any risings of the native population.

France is of the same opinion as Great Britain on account of German activity which has been noticed near Bonar and Ekododo.

(See Nos. 57 and 58.)

No. 76.

*M. Tombeur, Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga, to  
M. Renkin, Belgian Minister for the Colonies.*

Elizabethville, August 26, 1914.

(Telegram.)

The Germans are continuing their skirmishes on Tanganyika and attacked the port of Lukuga, on August 22nd. Two of their natives were killed and two wounded. Fresh attacks are expected.

No. 77.

*Count Clary and Aldringen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.)

The Hague, August 28, 1914.

(Telegram.)

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform your Excellency as follows:—

“Vu que la Belgique, après avoir refusé d’accepter les propositions qui lui avaient été adressées à plusieurs reprises par l’Allemagne, prête sa coopération militaire à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne, qui, toutes deux ont déclaré la guerre à l’Autriche-Hongrie, et en présence du fait que, comme il vient d’être constaté, les ressortissants autrichiens

“Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas as has just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to submit,

et hongrois se trouvant en Belgique ont, sous les yeux des autorités Royales, dû subir un traitement contraire aux exigences les plus primitives de l'humanité et inadmissibles même vis-à-vis des sujets d'un État ennemi, l'Autriche-Hongrie se voit dans la nécessité de rompre les relations diplomatiques et se considère dès ce moment en état de guerre avec la Belgique. Je quitte le pays avec le personnel de la légation et confie la protection de mes administrés au Ministre des États-Unis d'Amérique en Belgique. De la part du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal les passeports sont remis au Comte Errembault de Dudzeele."

(Signé) CLARY.

under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity and inadmissible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations and considers herself from this moment in a state of war with Belgium. I am leaving the country with the staff of the legation and I am entrusting the protection of Austrian interests to the United States Minister in Belgium. The Austro-Hungarian Government are forwarding his passports to Count Errembault de Dudzeele."

---

No. 78.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

Antwerp, August 29, 1914.

(Telegram.)

PLEASE inform the Austrian Legation through the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I have received Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Belgium, and add the following:—

"La Belgique a toujours entretenu des relations d'amitié avec tous ses voisins sans distinction. Elle a scrupuleusement rempli les devoirs que la neutralité lui impose. Si elle n'a pas cru pouvoir accepter les propositions de l'Allemagne, c'est que celles-ci avaient pour objet la violation des engagements qu'elle a pris à la face de l'Europe, engagements qui ont été les conditions de la création du Royaume de Belgique. Elle n'a pas cru qu'un peuple, quelque faible qu'il soit, puisse méconnaître ses devoirs et sacrifier son honneur en s'inclinant devant la force. Le Gouvernement a attendu, non seulement les délais

"Belgium has always entertained friendly relations with all her neighbours without distinction. She had scrupulously fulfilled the duties imposed upon her by her neutrality. If she has not been able to accept Germany's proposals, it is because those proposals contemplated the violation of her engagements toward Europe, engagements which form the conditions of the creation of the Belgian Kingdom. She has been unable to admit that a people, however weak they may be, can fail in their duty and sacrifice their honour by yielding to force. The Government have waited, not only until the ultimatum had

de l'ultimatum, mais la violation de son territoire par les troupes allemandes avant de faire appel à la France et à l'Angleterre, garantes de sa neutralité au même titre que l'Allemagne et l'Autriche-Hongrie, pour coopérer au nom et en vertu des traités à la défense du territoire belge.

En repoussant par les armes les envahisseurs, elle n'a même pas accompli un acte d'hostilité aux termes de l'article 10 de la Convention de La Haye sur les droits et devoirs des Puissances neutres.

L'Allemagne a reconnu elle-même que son agression constitue une violation du droit des gens et ne pouvant la justifier elle a invoqué son intérêt stratégique.

La Belgique oppose un démenti formel à l'affirmation que les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrois auraient subi en Belgique un traitement contraire aux exigences les plus primitives de l'humanité.

Le Gouvernement Royal a donné, dès le début des hostilités, les ordres les plus stricts quant à la sauvegarde des personnes et des propriétés austro-hongroises.

(Signé) DAVIGNON.

expired, but also until Belgian territory had been violated by German troops, before appealing to France and Great Britain, guarantors of her neutrality, under the same terms as are Germany and Austria-Hungary, to co-operate in the name and in virtue of the treaties in defence of Belgian territory. By repelling the invaders by force of arms, she has not even committed an hostile act as laid down by the provisions of article 10 of The Hague Convention respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers.

"Germany herself has recognised that her attack constitutes a violation of international law, and, being unable to justify it, she has pleaded her strategical interests.

"Belgium formally denies the allegation that Austrian and Hungarian nationals have suffered treatment in Belgium contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity.

"The Belgian Government, from the very commencement of hostilities, have issued the strictest orders for the protection of Austro-Hungarian persons and property."

---

No. 79.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers abroad.*

Antwerp, August 29, 1914.

Sir,

UNDER date of the 17th August, I addressed a despatch to the Belgian Minister at London, in which I felt bound to call attention to certain allegations made by the German Government which are mentioned in the Blue Book recently published by the British Government.

I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy of the despatch in question and of its enclosures.

I request that you will bring its contents to the notice of the Government to which you are accredited.

---



## Enclosure 1 in No. 79.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London.*

Brussels, August 17, 1914.

Sir,

THE Blue Book recently published by the British Government contains (see No. 122, p. 92) the text of a telegram despatched from Berlin on the 31st July by Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, in which the following passage occurs:—

“It appears from what he [his Excellency the Secretary of State] said, that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.”

The incident to which the German Secretary of State alluded in his conversation with Sir E. Goschen, and which he considered as an hostile act on the part of Belgium, doubtless refers to the application of the Royal decree of the 30th July, which provisionally prohibited the export from Belgium of certain products. As you will see from the explanation in the following paragraph, the incident with which we are reproached has in no wise the character which Germany has wished to attribute to it.

The Royal decrees dated the 30th July and published in the *Moniteur belge* the following day forbade, provisionally, the export, both by land and by sea, of a series of products, more especially of cereals. On the 31st July the German Minister at Brussels called my attention to the fact that the Antwerp customs were detaining cargoes of grain addressed to Germany, which, as they were merely transshipped in our port, were in reality only in *transit*. Herr von Below Saleske requested that the vessels carrying these cargoes should be allowed to depart freely. The very day on which the German Minister's request was received, the Foreign Office brought the matter to the notice of the Ministry of Finance, and the following day, the 2nd August, that Department informed us that instructions had been forwarded to the Belgian Customs giving full and entire satisfaction to Germany.

I cannot do better than enclose, for your information, copies of the correspondence exchanged on this subject with Herr Below Saleske. You will observe that nothing in our attitude can be taken as showing any hostile dispositions towards Germany; the steps taken by the Belgian Government at that time were nothing more than those simple precautions which it is the right and duty of every State to adopt in such exceptional circumstances.

It would be as well that you should address a communication to the British Government in order to explain the real facts of the case.

Enclosure 2 in No. 79.

*Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

Sir,

I AM informed from Antwerp that the Customs have forbidden the despatch of vessels containing cargoes of grain for Germany.

In view of the fact that it is not in this case a question of the *export* of grain, but of grain in *transit*, the goods in question having been merely transhipped at Antwerp, I have the honour to ask your good offices in order that the vessels in question may be allowed to leave for Germany.

At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform me if the port of Antwerp is closed for the transit of those goods specified in the *Moniteur* of to-day.

Awaiting your Excellency's reply at your earliest possible convenience, I have, &c.

---

Enclosure 3 in No. 79.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von  
Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.*

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

Sir,

IN reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you that the Belgian decree of the 30th July concerns only the export and not the transit of the products mentioned.

I at once communicated your note to the Minister of Finance and begged him to issue precise instructions to the Customs officials in order that any error in the application of the above-mentioned decree might be avoided.

---

Enclosure 4 in No. 79.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von  
Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.*

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

Sir,

WITH reference to the note which your Excellency was good enough to address to me on the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you that the Minister of Finance has instructed the Customs that the prohibitions established by the Royal decrees of the 30th July last, only apply to actual exports, and do not, therefore, extend to goods regularly declared in transit at the time of import. Moreover, when duty-free goods are declared to be for

actual consumption, although they are really intended for export, they are commonly the object of special declarations of free entry which are considered as transit documents. In short, if it should happen that such goods had been declared as for consumption without restriction, as though they were to remain in the country, the Customs would still allow them to leave the country as soon as it had been duly established by despatch receipts, bills of lading, &c., that they were to be exported forthwith in transit.

I would add that the export of grain with which your note deals was authorised on the 1st August.

---



## APPENDIX.

---

DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE RELATIONS  
BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND BELGIUM  
PREVIOUSLY TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

## APPENDIX.

---

DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN  
GREAT BRITAIN AND BELGIUM PREVIOUSLY TO  
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

---

## No. 1.

*Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.\**

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 7, 1913.*

IN speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speaking unofficially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that this apprehension could have come from a British source.

The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk, in a British source which he could not name, of the landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to anticipate a possible despatch of German troops through Belgium to France.

I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if Belgian neutrality was violated by any Power. For us to be the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected, and as long as it was not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

---

\*A record of this despatch was communicated by Sir F. Villiers to the Belgian Minister for Foreign affairs.

## No. 2.

*Extract from a Despatch from Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated December 23, 1911.*

*(From the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," October 13, 1914.)*

## Translation.

"Von der französischen Seite her droht die Gefahr nicht nur im Süden von Luxemburg. Sie bedroht uns auf unserer ganzen gemeinsamen Grenze. Für diese Behauptung sind wir nicht nur auf Mutmassungen angewiesen. Wir haben dafür positive Anhaltspunkte.

"Der Gedanke einer Umfassungsbewegung von Norden her gehört zweifellos zu den Kombinationen der *Entente cordiale*. Wenn das nicht der Fall wäre, so hätte der Plan, Vlissingen zu befestigen, nicht ein solches Geschrei in Paris und London hervorgerufen. Man hat dort den Grund gar nicht verheimlicht, aus dem man wünschte, dass die Schelde ohne Verteidigung bliebe. Man verfolgte dabei den Zweck, unbehindert eine englische Garnison nach Antwerpen überführen zu können, also den Zweck, sich bei uns eine Operationsbasis für eine Offensive in der Richtung auf den Niederrhein und Westfalen zu schaffen und uns dann mit fortzureissen, was nicht schwer gewesen wäre. Denn nach Preisgabe unseres nationalen Zufluchtsortes hätten wir durch unsere eigene Schuld uns jeder Möglichkeit begeben, den Forderungen unserer zweifelhaften Beschützer Widerstand zu leisten, nachdem wir so unklug gewesen wären, sie dort zuzulassen. Die ebenso perfiden wie naiven Eröffnungen des Obersten Bardardiston zur Zeit des Abschlusses der *Entente cordiale* haben uns deutlich gezeigt, um was es sich handelte. Als es sich herausstellte,

"From the French side the danger threatens not only in the south from Luxemburg; it threatens us along our whole common frontier. For this assertion we are not dependent only on surmises. We have positive facts to go upon.

"The combinations of the *Entente cordiale* include, without doubt, the thought of an enveloping movement from the north. If that were not the case, the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have evoked such an outcry in Paris and London. No secret was made there about the reasons why it was wished that the Scheldt should remain unfortified. The object was to be able to ship a British garrison without hindrance to Antwerp, and to obtain in our country a base of operations for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia, and then to carry us along with them, which would not have been difficult. For after giving up our national place of refuge, we should by our own fault have deprived ourselves of any possibility of resisting the demands of our doubtful protectors after being so foolish as to admit them to it. The equally perfidious and naïf revelations of Colonel Bardardiston at the time of the conclusion of the *Entente cordiale* showed us clearly what was intended. When it became evident that we were not to be intimidated by the alleged threatening danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan

dass wir uns durch die angeblich drohende Gefahr einer Schliessung der Schelde nicht einschüchtern liessen, wurde der Plan zwar nicht aufgegeben, aber dahin abgeändert, dass die englische Hilfsarmee nicht an der belgischen Küste, sondern in den nächstliegenden französischen Häfen gelandet werden sollte. Hierfür zeugen auch die Enthüllungen des Kapitäns Faber, die ebensowenig dementiert worden sind, wie die Nachrichten der Zeitungen, durch die sie bestätigt oder in einzelnen Punkten ergänzt worden sind. Diese in Calais und Dünkirchen gelandete englische Armee würde nicht an unserer Grenze entlang nach Longwy marschieren, um Deutschland zu erreichen. Sie würde sofort bei uns von Nordwesten her eindringen. Das würde ihr den Vorteil verschaffen, sofort in Aktion treten zu können, die belgische Armee in einer Gegend zu treffen, in der wir uns auf keine Festung stützen können, falls wir eine Schlacht riskieren wollen. Es würde ihr ermöglichen, an Ressourcen aller Art reiche Provinzen zu besetzen, auf alle Fälle aber unsere Mobilmachung zu behindern oder sie nur zuzulassen, nachdem wir uns formell verpflichtet hätten, die Mobilmachung nur zum Vorteil Englands und seines Bundesgenossen durchzuführen.

“Es ist dringend geboten, im voraus einen Schlachtplan für die belgische Armee auch für diese Eventualität aufzustellen. Das gebietet sowohl das Interesse an unserer militärischen Verteidigung als auch die Führung unserer auswärtigen Politik im Falle eines Kieges zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich.”

was not indeed abandoned, but altered in so far as the British auxiliary force was not to be landed on the Belgian coast, but in the nearest French harbours. The revelations of Captain Faber, which have been no more denied than the information of the newspapers by which they were confirmed or elaborated in certain particulars, are evidence of this. This British army, landed at Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately invade us from the north-west. This would gain for it the advantage of going into action at once, of meeting the Belgian army in a region where we cannot obtain support from any fortress, in the event of our wishing to risk a battle. It would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in every kind of resource, but in any case to hinder our mobilisation or to allow it only when we had formally pledged ourselves to complete mobilisation solely for the benefit of Great Britain and her allies.

“I would strongly urge that a plan of action should be drawn up for this eventuality also. This is demanded as much by the requirements of our military defence as by the conduct of our foreign policy in the case of a war between Germany and France.



## No. 3.

*Circular Telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives Abroad.\**

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 14, 1914.*

THE story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 1906 published in the German press, and based on documents said to have been found at Brussels, is only a story which has been reproduced in various forms and denied on several occasions. No such agreement has ever existed.

As the Germans well know, General Grierson is dead, and Colonel (now General) Barnardiston is commanding the British forces before Tsing-tao. In 1906 General Grierson was on the General Staff at the War Office and Colonel Barnardiston was military attaché at Brussels. In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side, some academic discussions may, through the instrumentality of Colonel Barnardiston, have taken place between General Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what assistance the British army might be able to afford to Belgium should one of her neighbours violate that neutrality. Some notes with reference to the subject may exist in the archives at Brussels.

It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 1906, was the year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911, adopted a threatening attitude towards France with regard to Morocco, and, in view of the apprehensions existing of an attack on France through Belgium, it was natural that possible eventualities should be discussed.

The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any agreement of the nature indicated, or to any design for the violation of Belgian neutrality, is clearly shown by the reiterated declarations that she has made for many years past that she would resist to the utmost any violation of her neutrality from whatever quarter and in whatever form such violation might come.

It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive designs on the part of other Powers are made by Germany, who, since 1906, has established an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren thinly-populated tract, deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon Belgium which was carried out two months ago.

\* NOTE.—This telegram was sent on receipt of a summary of the documents contained in No. 4, issued by the German Government on the 13th October in advance of the publication of the documents themselves.

---

## No. 4.

*Documents as published in facsimile in a special Supplement to the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of November 25, 1914.*

## (1.)

(Translation.)

*Lettre à M. le Ministre de la Guerre au sujet des Entretiens confidentiels.*

*Letter [from the Chief of the Belgian General Staff] to the [Belgian] Minister of War respecting the confidential Interviews.*

(Confidentielle.) *Bruxelles,  
le 10 avril, 1906.*

(Confidential.) *Brussels, April 10, 1906.*

M. le Ministre,

Sir,

J'AI l'honneur de vous rendre compte sommairement des entretiens que j'ai eus avec le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston et qui ont fait l'objet de mes communications verbales.

I HAVE the honour to furnish herewith a summary of the conversations which I have had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, which I have already reported to you verbally.

La première visite date de la mi-janvier. M. Barnardiston me fit part des préoccupations de l'état-major de son pays relativement à la situation politique générale et aux éventualités de guerre du moment. Un envoi de troupes, d'un total de 100,000 hommes environ, était projeté pour le cas où la Belgique serait attaquée.

His first visit was in the middle of January. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston told me of the pre-occupation of the British General Staff concerning the general political situation and the existing possibilities of war. Should Belgium be attacked, it was proposed to send about 100,000 men.

Le lieutenant-colonel m'ayant demandé comment cette action serait interprétée par nous, je lui répondis que, au point de vue militaire, elle ne pourrait qu'être favorable; mais que cette question d'intervention relevait également du pouvoir politique et que, dès lors, j'étais tenu d'en entretenir le Ministre de la Guerre.

The lieutenant-colonel having asked me how we should interpret such a step, I answered that, from the military point of view, it could only be advantageous; but that this question of intervention had also a political side, and that I must accordingly consult the Minister of War.

M. Barnardiston me répondit que son Ministre à Bruxelles en parlerait à notre Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston replied that his Minister at Brussels would speak about it to our Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Il continua dans ce sens: le débarquement des troupes anglaises se ferait sur la côte de France, vers Dunkerque et Calais, de façon à hâter le plus possible le

He continued as follows: The disembarkation of the British troops would take place on the French coast, in the neighbourhood of Dunkirk and Calais, in

mouvement.\* Le débarquement par Anvers demanderait beaucoup plus de temps, parce qu'il faudrait des transports plus considérables et d'autre part la sécurité serait moins complète.

Ceci admis, il resterait à régler divers autres points, savoir : les transports par chemin de fer, la question des réquisitions auxquelles l'armée anglaise pourrait avoir recours, la question du commandement supérieur des forces alliées.

Il s'informa si nos dispositions étaient suffisantes pour assurer la défense du pays durant la traversée et les transports des troupes anglaises, temps qu'il évaluait à une dizaine de jours.

Je répondis que les places de Namur et de Liège étaient à l'abri d'un coup de main et que, en quatre jours, notre armée de campagne, forte de 100,000 hommes, serait en état d'intervenir. Après avoir exprimé toute sa satisfaction au sujet de mes déclarations, mon interlocuteur insista sur le fait que : (1) notre conversation était absolument confidentielle ; (2) elle ne pouvait lier son Gouvernement ; (3) son Ministre, l'état-major général anglais, lui et moi étions seuls, en ce moment, dans la confidence ; (4) il ignorait si son Souverain avait été pressenti.

Dans un entretien subséquent, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston m'assura qu'il n'avait jamais reçu de confidences d'autres attachés militaires au sujet de notre

such a manner that the operation might be carried out in the quickest possible way.\* Landing at Antwerp would take much longer, as larger transports would be required, and, moreover, the risk would be greater.

This being so, several other points remained to be decided, viz., transport by rail, the question of requisitions to which the British Army might have recourse, the question of the chief command of the allied forces.

He enquired whether our arrangements were adequate to secure the defence of the country during the crossing and transport of the British troops—a period which he estimated at about ten days.

I answered that the fortresses of Namur and Liège were safe against a surprise attack, and that in four days our field army of 100,000 men would be ready to take the field. After having expressed his entire satisfaction at what I had said, my visitor emphasised the following points : (1) Our conversation was absolutely confidential ; (2) it was in no way binding on his Government ; (3) his Minister, the British General Staff, he, and myself were the only persons then aware of the matter ; (4) he did not know whether his Sovereign had been consulted.

At a subsequent meeting Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston assured me that he had never received any confidential information from other military attachés

\* The following marginal note occurs in the facsimile :—

(Translation.)

“L'entrée des Anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'après la violation de notre neutralité par l'Allemagne.”

“The entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.”

armée. Il précisa ensuite les données numériques concernant les forces anglaises ; nous pouvions compter que, en douze ou treize jours, seraient débarqués : deux corps d'armée, quatre brigades de cavalerie, et deux brigades d'infanterie montée.

Il me demanda d'examiner la question du transport de ces forces vers la partie du pays où elles seraient utiles et, dans ce but, il me promit la composition détaillée de l'armée de débarquement.

Il revint sur la question des effectifs de notre armée de campagne en insistant pour qu'on ne fit pas de détachements de cette armée à Namur et à Liège, puisque ces places étaient pourvues de garnisons suffisantes.

Il me demanda de fixer mon attention sur la nécessité de permettre à l'armée anglaise de bénéficier des avantages prévus par le règlement sur les prestations militaires. Enfin, il insista sur la question du commandement suprême.

Je lui répondis que je ne pouvais rien dire quant à ce dernier point, et je lui promis un examen attentif des autres questions.

Plus tard, l'attaché militaire anglais confirma son estimation précédente : douze jours seraient au moins indispensables pour faire le débarquement sur la côte de France. Il faudrait beaucoup plus (un à deux mois et demi) pour débarquer 100,000 troupes à Anvers.

\* Sur mon objection qu'il était inutile d'attendre l'achèvement du débarquement pour commencer les transports par chemin de fer, et qu'il valait mieux les faire au fur et à mesure des arrivages, à la côte, le Lieutenant-Colonel Bar-

about our army. He then gave me a detailed statement of the strength of the British forces : we might rely on it that, in twelve or thirteen days, two army corps, four cavalry brigades, and two brigades of mounted infantry would be landed.

He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to that part of the country where they would be most useful, and with this object in view he promised me a detailed statement of the composition of the landing force.

He reverted to the question of the effective strength of our field army, and considered it important that no detachments from that army should be sent to Namur and Liège, as those fortresses were provided with adequate garrisons.

He drew my attention to the necessity of letting the British Army take full advantage of the facilities afforded under our regulations respecting military requirements. Finally, he laid stress on the question of the chief command.

I replied that I could say nothing on the latter point, and I promised that I would study the other questions with care.

Later, the British military attaché confirmed his previous estimate : twelve days at least were indispensable to carry out the landing on the coast of France. It would take much longer (from one to two and a half months) to land 100,000 men at Antwerp.

On my objecting that it would be useless to wait till the disembarkation was finished, before beginning the transport by rail, and that it would be better to send on the troops by degrees as they arrived on the coast, Lieu-

nardiston me promit des données exactes sur l'état journalier du débarquement.

Quant aux prestations militaires, je fis part à mon interlocuteur que cette question serait facilement réglée.

A mesure que les études de l'état-major anglais avançaient, les données du problème se précisaient. Le colonel m'assura que la moitié de l'armée anglaise pourrait être débarquée en huit jours, et que le restant le serait à la fin du douzième ou treizième jour, sauf l'infanterie montée, sur laquelle il ne fallait compter que plus tard.

Néanmoins, je crus devoir insister à nouveau sur la nécessité de connaître le rendement journalier, de façon à régler les transports par chemin de fer de chaque jour.

L'attaché anglais m'entretint ensuite de diverses autres questions, savoir : (1) nécessité de tenir le secret des opérations et d'obtenir de la presse qu'elle l'observât soigneusement ; (2) avantages qu'il y aurait à adjoindre un officier belge à chaque état-major anglais, un traducteur à chaque commandant de troupes, des gendarmes à chaque unité pour aider les troupes de police anglaises.

Dans une autre entrevue, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston et moi examinâmes les opérations combinées dans le cas d'une agression de la part de l'Allemagne ayant comme objectif Anvers et dans l'hypothèse d'une traversée de notre pays pour atteindre les Ardennes françaises.

Par la suite, le colonel me marqua son accord sur le plan que je lui avais présenté et m'assura de

tenant-Colonel Barnardiston promised me precise details of the daily disembarkation table.

With regard to the question of military requirements, I informed my visitor that that question would easily be arranged.

As the plans of the British General Staff advanced, the details of the problem were worked out with greater precision. The colonel assured me that half the British Army could be landed in eight days, and the remainder at the end of the twelfth or thirteenth day, except the mounted infantry, on which we could not count till later.

Nevertheless, I felt bound once more to urge the necessity of knowing the numbers to be landed daily, so as to work out the railway arrangements for each day.

The British attaché then spoke to me of various other questions, viz. : (1) The necessity of maintaining secrecy about the operations, and of ensuring that the Press should observe this carefully ; (2) the advantages there would be in attaching a Belgian officer to each British staff, an interpreter to each commanding officer, and gendarmes to each unit to help the British military police.

At another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I examined the question of combined operations in the event of a German attack directed against Antwerp, and on the hypothesis of our country being crossed in order to reach the French Ardennes.

Later on, the colonel signified his concurrence in the scheme I had laid before him, and assured

l'assentiment du Général Grier-son, chef de l'état-major anglais.

D'autres questions secondaires furent également réglées, notamment en ce qui regarde les officiers intermédiaires, les traducteurs, les gendarmes, les cartes, les albums des uniformes, les tirés à part traduits en anglais de certains règlements belges, le règlement des frais de douane pour les approvisionnements anglais, l'hospitalisation des blessés de l'armée alliée, &c. Rien ne fut arrêté quant à l'action que pourrait exercer sur la presse le Gouvernement ou l'autorité militaire.

Dans les dernières rencontres que j'ai eues avec l'attaché anglais, il me communiqua le rendement journalier des débarquements à Boulogne, Calais et Cherbourg. L'éloignement de ce dernier point, imposé par des considérations d'ordre technique, occasionne un certain retard. Le premier corps serait débarqué le dixième jour, et le second corps le quinzième jour. Notre matériel des chemins de fer exécuterait les transports, de sorte que l'arrivée, soit vers Bruxelles-Louvain, soit vers Namur-Dinant, du premier corps serait achevée le onzième jour, et celle du deuxième corps, le seizième jour.

J'ai insisté une dernière fois et aussi énergiquement que je le pouvais, sur la nécessité de hâter encore les transports maritimes de façon que les troupes anglaises fussent près de nous entre le onzième et le douzième jour; les résultats les plus heureux, les plus favorables peuvent être obtenus par une action convergente et simultanée des forces alliées. Au

me of the assent of General Grier-son, Chief of the British General Staff.

Other questions of secondary importance were likewise disposed of, particularly those respecting intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms, English translations of extracts from certain Belgian regulations, the regulation of customs dues chargeable on the British supplies, hospital accommodation for the wounded of the allied army, &c. Nothing was settled as to the possible control of the Press by the Government or the military authorities.

In the course of the last meetings which I had with the British attaché he communicated to me the daily disembarkation table of the troops to be landed at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg. The distance of the latter place, included owing to certain technical considerations, would cause a certain delay. The first corps would be landed on the tenth day, the second corps on the fifteenth day. Our railways would carry out the transport operations in such a way that the arrival of the first corps, either towards Brussels-Louvain or towards Namur-Dinant, would be completed on the eleventh day and that of the second corps on the sixteenth day.

I finally urged once again, as forcibly as was within my power, the necessity of accelerating the transport by sea in order that the British troops might be with us between the eleventh and the twelfth day; the very best and most favourable results would accrue from the concerted and simultaneous action by the allied forces. On the other hand, a

contraire, ce sera un échec grave si cet accord ne se produit pas. Le Colonel Barnardiston m'a assuré que tout sera fait dans ce but.

Au cours de nos entretiens, j'eus l'occasion de convaincre l'attaché militaire anglais de la volonté que nous avions d'entraver, dans la limite du possible, les mouvements de l'ennemi et de ne pas nous réfugier, dès le début, dans Anvers. De son côté, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston me fit part de son peu de confiance actuellement dans l'appui ou l'intervention de la Hollande. Il me confia également que son Gouvernement projetait de transporter la base d'approvisionnements anglaise de la côté française à Anvers, dès que la mer du nord serait nettoyée de tous les navires de guerre allemands.

Dans tous nos entretiens le colonel me communiqua régulièrement les renseignements confidentiels qu'il possédait sur l'état militaire et la situation de notre voisin de l'est, &c. En même temps, il insista sur la nécessité impérieuse pour la Belgique de se tenir au courant de ce qui se passait dans les pays rhénans qui nous avoisinent. Je dus lui confesser que, chez nous, le service de surveillance au delà de la frontière, au temps de paix, ne relève pas directement de notre état-major ; nous n'avons pas d'attachés militaires auprès de nos légations. Je me gardai bien, cependant, de lui avouer que j'ignorais si le service d'espionnage, qui est prescrit par nos règlements, était ou non préparé. Mais il est de mon devoir de signaler ici cette situation qui nous met en état d'infériorité flagrante vis-à-

serious check would ensue if such co-operation could not be achieved. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything would be done with that end in view.

In the course of our conversations I took the opportunity of convincing the military attaché of our resolve to impede the enemies' movements as far as lay within our power, and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the outset. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, on his side, informed me that he had at present little confidence in the support or intervention of Holland. He likewise confided to me that his Government intended to move the British base of supplies from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been cleared of all German warships.

At all our interviews the colonel regularly communicated to me any confidential information he possessed respecting the military condition and general situation of our eastern neighbour, &c. At the same time he laid stress on the imperative need for Belgium to keep herself well informed of what was going on in the neighbouring Rhine country. I had to admit to him that in our country the intelligence service beyond the frontier was not, in times of peace, directly under our General Staff. We had no military attachés at our legations. I took care, however, not to admit to him that I was unaware whether the secret service, prescribed in our regulations, was organised or not. But it is my duty here to call attention to this state of affairs, which places us in a position of glaring inferiority

vis de nos voisins, nos ennemis éventuels.

Le Général-Major, Chef d'É.-M.

to that of our neighbours, our possible enemies.

*Major-General,  
Chief of General Staff.*

(Initialled.)

*Note.*—Lorsque je rencontrai le Général Grierson à Compiègne, pendant les manœuvres de 1906, il m'assura que la réorganisation de l'armée anglaise aurait pour résultat non seulement d'assurer le débarquement de 150,000 hommes, mais de permettre leur action dans un délai plus court que celui dont il est question précédemment.

*Fin septembre 1906.*

*Note.*—When I met General Grierson at Compiègne at the manœuvres of 1906 he assured me that the reorganisation of the British army would result not only in ensuring the landing of 150,000 men, but in enabling them to take the field in a shorter period than had been previously estimated.

*End of September 1906.*

(Initialled.)

(2.)

(Translation.)

(Confidentielle.)

L'attaché militaire anglais a demandé à voir le Général Jungbluth. Ces messieurs se sont rencontrés le 23 avril.

Le Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges a dit au général que l'Angleterre disposait d'une armée pouvant être envoyée sur le continent, composée de six divisions d'infanterie et huit brigades de cavalerie, soit en tout 160,000 hommes. Elle a aussi tout ce qu'il lui faut pour défendre son territoire insulaire. Tout est prêt.

Le Gouvernement britannique, lors des derniers événements, aurait débarqué immédiatement chez nous, même si nous n'avions pas demandé de secours.

Le général a objecté qu'il faudrait pour cela notre consentement.

L'attaché militaire a répondu qu'il le savait, mais que comme nous n'étions pas à même d'empêcher les Allemands de passer chez nous, l'Angleterre aurait

(Confidential.)

The British military attaché asked to see General Jungbluth. These gentlemen met on the 23rd April.

Lieutenant - Colonel Bridges told the general that Great Britain had, available for despatch to the Continent, an army composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry, in all 160,000 men. She had also all that she needed for home defence. Everything was ready.

The British Government, at the time of the recent events, would have immediately landed troops on our territory, even if we had not asked for help.

The general protested that our consent would be necessary for this.

The military attaché answered that he knew that, but that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans passing through our territory, Great Britain would



débarqué ses troupes en Belgique en tout état de cause.

Quant au lieu de débarquement, l'attaché militaire n'a pas précisé ; il a dit que la côte était assez longue ; mais le général sait que M. Bridges a fait, d'Ostende, des visites journalières à Zeebrugge pendant les fêtes de Pâques.

Le général a ajouté que nous étions, d'ailleurs, parfaitement à même d'empêcher les Allemands de passer.

*Le 24 avril, 1912.*

have landed her troops in any event.

As to the place of landing, the military attaché was not explicit. He said the coast was rather long ; but the general knows that Mr. Bridges made daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostend during the Easter holidays.

The general added that, after all, we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from going through.

*April 24, 1912.*

### No. 5.

*Extract from a brochure entitled "On the Violation of Belgian Neutrality," by M. J. Van den Heuvel, Belgian Minister of State.*

(Translation.)

An official communiqué appeared at once in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, of the 13th October. The whole German press hastened to echo the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. Large notices were posted on the walls in Brussels and innumerable little yellow notices made their appearance in the public places of other occupied towns. The discovery was of paramount importance ; it was bound to prove to all impartial people the guilt of the Governments both of England and of Belgium and to show the foresight and correctitude of Germany.

According to the communiqué, it appeared from documents found in Brussels that, at the request of Great Britain, at the beginning of the year 1906, Belgium had, in anticipation of the violation of her neutrality by Germany, concluded with the Powers of the Entente a convention which had for its object the defence of her territory. Although a marginal note on the *dossier* of 1906 stated expressly that "the entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of her neutrality by Germany," the suggestion was that Belgium, in settling the arrangements for this contingent entry, had seriously misunderstood the duties of neutrals. Germany alone was the object of her suspicion and she had not "also foreseen the violation of Belgian neutrality by France, and to provide for that event, concluded with Germany a convention analogous to that concluded with France and Great Britain."

The communiqué recognises that it was open to Belgium, in the interests of self-protection, to make arrangements with the Powers which had guaranteed her international position. Indeed a neutralised State retains the right of making defensive treaties. The fact that the inviolability of such a State is under the ægis or guarantee of certain Powers does not deprive her of this right. But the arrange-

ments which such a State can make with the guaranteeing Powers to guard against a contingent invasion are, after all, nothing but measures for carrying out the pre-existing engagements of the guarantee.

The grievance alleged by the communiqué is that a convention should have been made by Belgium in anticipation of a penetration of hostile troops into Belgian territory, without notice being given to Germany, and without the latter Power being appealed to to make a similar convention in anticipation of an invasion of Belgium by French or British troops.

If a convention really existed, as the communiqué states, it is just to observe that a State which has prepared a plan of invasion is in an anomalous position in addressing reproaches to a State which limits its action to putting itself on guard and organising necessary measures of defence. And we must remember that the invasion of Belgium by Germany was, according to Herr von Jagow, forced upon the German General Staff by an event of long standing, namely, the Franco-Russian Alliance.

As a matter of fact the convention which forms the gravamen of the German charges never existed.

Belgium did not make any special arrangements in anticipation of the violation of her territory by Germany, either with England or with France, either in 1906 or at any other date. It is in vain that Germany has searched and will search our archives, she will not find there any proof of her allegation.

The official communiqué of the 13th October published three documents; the second communiqué of the 24th November added a fourth document to the *dossier*. None of these documents establishes the existence of any convention whatever.

The first document is a report made to the Minister of War on the 10th April, 1906, by General Ducarne, Chief of the Belgian General Staff. It relates to the conversations which took place at the request of Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, the British military attaché, between himself and General Ducarne, on the subject of the arrangements that England might be disposed to make to assist Belgium in the event of a German invasion. According to the German notices :—

The Chief of the Belgian General Staff worked out a comprehensive plan for joint operations by a British Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men with the Belgian Army against Germany in repeated conferences with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, at the instigation of the latter. The plan was approved by the Chief of the British General Staff, Major-General Grierson. The Belgian General Staff were supplied with all data as to the strength and organisation of the British forces. . . . The latter thoroughly prepared for the transport. . . . Co-operation was carefully worked out in every detail. . . . Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne were contemplated as the points of disembarkation for the British troops.

This document shows that though the Belgian General Staff did not take the initiative, yet it did not refuse to discuss with the British military attaché a plan for the help which Britain, acting as guaranteeing Power, would be able, in case of need, to send to Belgium to repulse a German attack.

But what accusation against Belgium can be based on this ?

Since it is recognised that Belgium has the right to make defensive agreements for putting into operation the guarantees given by the guaranteeing Powers, the Belgian General Staff would have found it difficult to refuse entirely to consider suggestions made by the military attachés of those Powers. Such discussions do not interfere in any way with the freedom or responsibility of the Government, and it is they alone who can decide whether it is expedient or opportune to enter into a convention and, if so, what convention they should make, having regard to the duties and interests of the country.

In 1906 the Government believed that it was proper for them to rest content, as they had rested for more than sixty years, with the general guarantee embodied in the Treaty of 1839, and that the details of carrying out the guarantee could not be fixed beforehand, that in their very nature they must vary according to circumstances. Thus no convention was entered upon. The work of the British military attaché and the Belgian officers resulted in nothing but the submission of a report to the Minister of War by the Chief of the General Staff.

The second document is a military map. "A map showing the method of deployment of the French army was found in the secret dossier."

The only inference to be drawn from this document—which is not connected in any way with the report already mentioned—is that the Belgian General Staff has always sought, as is the duty of all General Staffs, to obtain the most precise information possible as to the military plans of neighbouring Powers.

But to pretend to argue from the mere possession of this map that France must have been a party to the alleged convention, of which Britain and Belgium are wantonly accused, is to transcend the bounds of fancy.

The third document is a report on the international position of Belgium sent by Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister Plenipotentiary at Berlin, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Brussels on the 23rd December, 1911.

Baron Greindl thought that a "French invasion was as probable as a German invasion."

The combinations of the Entente Cordiale include, without doubt, the thought of an enveloping movement from the north. . . . The equally perfidious and naïf revelations of Colonel Barnardiston . . . showed us clearly what was intended. . . . This British army, landed at Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately invade us from the north-west. . . .

*I would strongly urge that a plan of action should be drawn up for this eventuality also.*

The inference to be drawn from this document is that the plans of the Belgian General Staff communicated to Baron Greindl dealt with the contingency either of an entry into Belgium through the gap of the Meuse or of an invasion of Luxemburg by one or other of the belligerents. Baron Greindl thought it his duty to lay stress upon another hypothesis, namely, the danger of an enveloping movement by the north of France, which he had so often heard talked about in Berlin. But the whole of this report rebuts the accusation that Belgium had

formed any engagements either with England or with France. Baron Greindl's attitude towards Barnardiston's suggestions proves conclusively that he knew that these suggestions had not resulted in any convention.

Such are the three documents published on the 13th October by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and placarded everywhere with such a flourish of trumpets. They do not contain the smallest scrap of evidence to support the German charge. No criticism adverse to Belgium can be based upon them. The German Government themselves understood this so well that they ordered fresh searches to be made in the archives.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of 24th November gave us the result of this second search. It is a fourth document, reporting a conversation which took place between the British military attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, and General Jungbluth. It bears date the 23rd April, 1912 :—

Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the general that Great Britain had . . . an army of 160,000 men. . . . The British Government at the time of the recent events would have immediately landed troops in Belgium even if we had not asked for help. The general protested that *our consent would be necessary for this*. The military attaché answered that he knew that, but, that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans from passing through Belgium, Great Britain would have landed her troops in any event. As to the place of landing the military attaché was not explicit. . . . The general added that we were perfectly well able to prevent the Germans from going through.

The inference to be drawn from this document is that, in a private conversation between two officers of high rank, which had no reference to any official mission, the British officer expressed the personal opinion that in case of war Great Britain could land "immediately" troops in Belgium "even if we had not asked for help." The Belgian general at once protested. He insisted that "our consent" was necessary, and that there was all the less reason for dispensing with it since we "were perfectly well able" to stop the Germans; that is to say, to make them lose sufficient time to deprive them of the advantage of a sudden attack.

How is it possible to draw any inference unfavourable to Great Britain from the personal opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges when, from what has since happened, it is certain that the British Government did not intend to send, and did not in fact send, troops to Belgium, except upon a request from the Belgian Government put forward after the violation of her territory?

How is it possible to draw an inference unfavourable to Belgium from this conversation? General Jungbluth defended her freedom and her neutrality. And the very fact that the discussion took place, and the vagueness which remained as to the places of landing, both prove that Belgium was not bound by any convention determining the manner in which help should be furnished by England.

Germany ought then to cease to accuse the Belgian Government of having given themselves since 1906 into the hands of the Powers of the Triple Entente. The first three documents which the Germans have

taken from the files of the General Staff, like the fourth which has been brought up to support them, far from establishing any improper action whatever on the part of the Belgian authorities, show clearly that they have always taken the most scrupulous care to reconcile the precautions exacted by the necessity of safeguarding the independence and maintaining the honour of the country with the duties of the strictest neutrality.

The loyal attitude of Belgium and Great Britain is clearly shown by the action which preceded the German ultimatum.

When Belgium saw the storm-clouds gathering on the darkened horizon she wanted to accelerate her military re-organisation. She worked at it for years. In 1902 she strengthened her cadres. After two years of discussion in 1905 and 1906 she decided to finish the fortifications of the fortress of Antwerp and to raise her defensive organisation to a pitch commensurate with the offensive force then at the disposal of the armies of Europe. Then came the renewal of the artillery, then the introduction of *service personnelle*, finally the imposition of general liability to serve. These stages were arrived at with considerable difficulty because the nation, relying on treaties and determined herself to observe neutrality with the strictest impartiality, could not believe that in the twentieth century anyone could be cruel enough to think of violating the rights of a peaceful people.

In addition Belgium had faith in the energy and the valour of her army, and she counted on the help of her guarantors should need arise.

No. 6.

*Viscount Haldane, Lord High Chancellor, to Dr. A. E. Shipley,  
Master of Christ's College, Cambridge.*

November 14, 1914.

Dear Master of Christ's,

THE enclosed memoranda have been specially prepared for me by the Foreign Office in answer to your question.

Yours truly,  
(Signed) HALDANE.

Enclosure 1.

Memorandum.

It is quite untrue that the British Government had ever arranged with Belgium to trespass on her country in case of war, or that Belgium had agreed to this. The strategic dispositions of Germany, especially as regards railways, have for some years given rise to the apprehension that Germany would attack France through Belgium. Whatever military discussions have taken place before this war have been limited entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to defend France if Germany attacked her through Belgium. The Germans have

stated that we contemplated sending troops to Belgium. We had never committed ourselves at all to the sending of troops to the Continent, and we had never contemplated the possibility of sending troops to Belgium to attack Germany. The Germans have stated that British military stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a French fortress near the Belgian frontier, before the outbreak of the war, and that this is evidence of an intention to attack Germany through Belgium. No British soldiers and no British stores were landed on the Continent till after Germany had invaded Belgium, and Belgium had appealed to France and England for assistance. It was only after this appeal that British troops were sent to France; and, if the Germans found British munitions of war in Maubeuge, these munitions were sent with our expedition to France after the outbreak of the war. The idea of violating the neutrality of Belgium was never discussed or contemplated by the British Government.

The extract enclosed, which is taken from an official publication of the Belgian Government, and the extract from an official statement by the Belgian Minister of War, prove that the Belgian Government had never connived, or been willing to connive, at a breach of the Treaty that made the maintenance of Belgian neutrality an international obligation. The moment that there appeared to be danger that this Treaty might be violated, the British Government made an appeal for an assurance from both France and Germany, as had been done in 1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that neither of those countries would violate the neutrality of Belgium if the other country respected it. The French agreed, the Germans declined to agree. The appeal made by the British Government is to be found in the Parliamentary White Paper published after the outbreak of the war (see No. 114 of British Correspondence, page 87). The reason why Germany would not agree was stated very frankly by Herr von Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin; and it is recorded in the second White Paper (see No. 160 of British Correspondence, page 110) that we published. The attitude of the British Government throughout has been to endeavour to preserve the neutrality of Belgium, and we never thought of sending troops to Belgium until Germany had invaded it, and Belgium had appealed for assistance to maintain the international Treaty.

We have known for some years past that, in Holland, in Denmark, and in Norway, the Germans have inspired the apprehension that, if England was at war with Germany, England would violate the neutrality of those countries and seize some of their harbours. This allegation is as baseless as the allegation about our intention to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and events have shown it to be so. But it seems to be a rule with Germany to attribute to others the designs that she herself entertains; as it is clear now that, for some long time past, it has been a settled part of her strategic plans to attack France through Belgium. A statement is enclosed, which was issued by us on October 14 last, dealing with this point.

This memorandum and its enclosures should provide ample material for a reply to the German statements.

Foreign Office, 9th November, 1914.

## Enclosure 2.

*Despatch No. 22 in the Belgian Grey Book.*

(See pp. 311-12.)

---

## Enclosure 3.

*Extract from "The Times" of 30th September, 1914.*

## NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM.

## Official Statement.

The German press has been attempting to persuade the public that if Germany herself had not violated Belgian neutrality France or Great Britain would have done so. It has declared that French and British troops had marched into Belgium before the outbreak of war. We have received from the Belgian Minister of War an official statement which denies absolutely these allegations. It declares, on the one hand, that "before August 3 not a single French soldier had set foot on Belgian territory," and again, "it is untrue that on August 4 there was a single English soldier in Belgium." It adds:—

For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian army would oppose by force a "preventive" disembarkation of British troops in Belgium. The Belgian Government did not hesitate at the time of the Agadir crises to warn foreign Ambassadors, in terms which could not be misunderstood, of its formal intention to compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by every means at its disposal, and against attempts upon it from any and every quarter.


---

## Enclosure 4.

*Circular telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives abroad on the 14th October, 1914.*

(See page 353.)

---





## VI.

THE SERBIAN BLUE BOOK.

## THE SERBIAN BLUE BOOK.

## No. 1.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, June 16/29, 1914.*

THE Vienna Press asserts that the magisterial enquiry has already shown that the Serajevo outrage was prepared at Belgrade; further, that the whole conspiracy in its wider issues was organised at Belgrade among youths inspired with the Great Serbian idea, and that the Belgrade Press is exciting public opinion by publishing articles about the intolerable conditions prevailing in Bosnia. Press articles of this kind, according to the Vienna Press, are exercising a strong influence, as Serbian newspapers are being smuggled in large quantities into Bosnia.

---

## No. 2.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, June 17/30, 1914.*

THE tendency at Vienna to represent, in the eyes of Europe, the outrage committed upon the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince as the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia is becoming more and more apparent. The idea is to use this as a political weapon against us. The greatest attention ought, therefore, to be paid to the tone adopted by our press in its articles on the Serajevo outrage.

---

## No. 3.

*Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, June 17/30, 1914.*

THE Berlin Press, in publishing articles based on information from Vienna and Budapest, in which the Serajevo outrage is connected with Serbia, is misleading German public opinion.

---

## No. 4.

*Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, June 17/30, 1914.*

THE hostility of public opinion in Germany towards us is growing, and is being fostered by false reports coming from Vienna and Budapest. Such reports are being diligently spread in spite of the contradictions issued by some newspapers and news agencies.

---

## No. 5.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, June 17/30, 1914.*

As Count Berchtold was not able to receive me when I called, I spoke to the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs concerning the Serajevo outrage. In the course of our conversation I adopted the following line of argument:—

“The Royal Serbian Government condemn most energetically the Serajevo outrage and on their part will certainly most loyally do everything to prove that they will not tolerate within their territory the fostering of any agitation or illegal proceedings calculated to disturb our already delicate relations with Austria-Hungary. I am of opinion that the Government are prepared also to submit to trial any persons implicated in the plot, in the event of its being proved that there are any in Serbia. The Royal Serbian Government, notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto placed in their way by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy (creation of an independent Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the Adriatic, demand for revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the September ultimatum, &c.) remained loyal in their desire to establish a sound basis for our good neighbourly relations. You know that in this direction something has been done and achieved. Serbia intends to continue to work for this object, convinced that it is practicable and ought to be continued. The Serajevo outrage ought not to and cannot stultify this work.”

Baron Macchio has taken note of the above and promised to communicate to Count Berchtold all that I said to him.

On the same day I communicated to the French and Russian Ambassadors the substance of this conversation.

I have, &c.

---

## No. 6.

*M. M. Georgevitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Constantinople, June 17/30, 1914.*

I HAD to-day a long conversation with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador here concerning the Serajevo outrage. I expressed the hope that this regrettable event—whatever is said about it in certain diplomatic circles—would not unfavourably influence the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary which lately had shown considerable improvement.

He replied that such an eventuality was impossible, and ought not to be contemplated. He was also of opinion that Serbo-Austro-Hungarian relations had much improved lately. He added that the work in that direction ought to be persevered in. He informed me that from his latest conversations with Count Berchtold he understood that the latter was satisfied with the attitude adopted by the Serbian Government, and that he, on his part, sincerely desired friendly relations with Serbia.

I have, &c.

## No. 7.

*M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister in London, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*London, June 18/July 1, 1914.*

BASING their information upon reports coming from Austrian sources, nearly all the English newspapers attribute the Serajevo outrage to the work of Serbian revolutionaries.

## No. 8.

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Royal Serbian Legations abroad.*

*Belgrade, June 18/July 1, 1914.*

THE Austrian and Hungarian press are blaming Serbia more and more for the Serajevo outrage. Their aim is transparent, viz., to destroy that high moral reputation which Serbia now enjoys in Europe, and to take the fullest advantage politically against Serbia of the act of a young and ill-balanced fanatic. But, in Serbia itself, the Serajevo outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as unofficial, immediately recognised that this outrage would be most prejudicial not only to our good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary but also to our co-nationalists in that country, as recent occurrences

have proved. At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to improve her relations with the neighbouring Monarchy, it is absurd to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events she will redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such elements existing within her borders will take the severest measures against them. Moreover, Serbia will do everything in her power and use all the means at her disposal in order to restrain the feelings of ill-balanced people within her frontiers. But Serbia can on no account permit the Vienna and Hungarian press to mislead European public opinion, and lay the heavy responsibility for a crime committed by an Austrian subject at the door of the whole Serbian nation and on Serbia, who can only suffer harm from such acts and can derive no benefit whatever.

Please act in the sense of the above views, and use all available channels in order to put an end as soon as possible to the anti-Serbian campaign in the European press.

---

## No. 9.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, June 18/July 1, 1914.*

THERE were demonstrations last night in front of the Legation. I may say that the police showed considerable energy. Order and peace were maintained. As soon as I obtain positive information that the Serbian flag has been burned, I will lodge a complaint in the proper quarters. I will report to you the result. Hatred against Serbians and Serbia is being spread among the people, especially by the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna press, and military circles. Please do what is possible to prevent demonstrations taking place in Serbia, and to induce the Belgrade press to be as moderate as possible in tone. The tendency towards us here is still the same. It is expected that the decision as to the attitude to be adopted towards Serbia and the Serbians will be taken after the funeral.

---

## No. 10.

*Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, June 19/July 2, 1914.*

THE French Government advise us to maintain an attitude of the greatest possible calm and composure in official circles as well as in public opinion.

---

## No. 11.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,  
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, June 20/July 3, 1914.*

YESTERDAY being the day on which the remains of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were brought from Serajevo to Vienna, I gave instructions that the national flag at my residence should be hoisted at half-mast as a sign of mourning.

Yesterday evening, on this account, protests were made by the concierge, the other tenants, the landlord's agent, and the landlord himself, who demanded the removal of the flag. Explanations proved of no avail, and the assistance of the police authorities was requested. The latter privately asked that the flag should be removed in order to avoid further disorders. The flag was not removed, and accordingly noisy demonstrations took place last night in front of the Legation. The conduct of the police was energetic, and nothing happened to the flag or to the building which might constitute an insult. At 2 a.m. the crowd dispersed. To-day's papers, more particularly the popular clerical papers, publish articles under the heading "Provocation by the Serbian Minister," in which the whole incident is falsely described.

The flag on the Legation building remained flying the whole time up to the conclusion of the service at the Court Chapel. As soon as this ceremony was concluded, the flag was removed. People from all over the quarter in which I live went to the Prefecture, the Municipality, and the State Council to demand the removal of our flag.

The crowd was harangued by Dr. Funder, director in chief of the Catholic *Reichspost*, Hermengild Wagner, and Leopold Mandl, all of whom are known as the chief instigators of the attacks in the Austrian and German press against Serbia and the Serbians.

I have, &c.

## No. 12.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,  
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, June 20/July 3, 1914.*

In the course of a conversation which I had with the Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office on the subject of the Serajevo outrage, Baron Macchio severely criticised the Belgrade press and the tone of its articles. He argued that the Belgrade press was under no control and created *die Hetzereien gegen die Monarchie*. I told him that the press in Serbia was absolutely free, and that as a result private people as well as the Government very often suffered; there were, however, no means of proceeding against the press except by

going to law. I told him that in the present instance the fault lay with the Austrian and Hungarian press which was controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Was it not true that during the past two years the Austrian and Hungarian press had been attacking Serbia, in such a manner as to offend her most sensitive feelings? The anniversary of the unfortunate war with Bulgaria had taken place a few days ago. I had myself witnessed the great lack of respect with which the Vienna press had written about Serbia and the Serbian army during and after the war, as well as in many other matters. The press in Belgrade was much more moderate. For instance, in the present case, a terrible crime had been committed and telegrams were being sent from Vienna to the whole world accusing the entire Serbian nation and Serbia of being accomplices of the detestable Serajevo outrage. All the Austrian newspapers were writing in that strain. Was it possible to remain indifferent? Even if the criminal was a Serbian, the whole Serbian nation and the Kingdom of Serbia could not be held guilty, nor could they be accused in such a manner.

Baron Macchio replied, "Nobody accuses the Kingdom of Serbia nor its Government, nor the whole Serbian nation. We accuse those who encourage the Great Serbian scheme and work for the realisation of its object."

I told him that it appeared to me that from the first the nationality of the criminal had been deliberately put forward in order to involve Belgrade and to create the impression that the outrage had been organised by Serbia. This had struck me immediately, as I knew that up till now the Serbians of Bosnia had been spoken of as *die Bosniaken*, *bosnische Sprache*, *die Orthodoxen aus Bosnien*, while now it was being said that the assassin was *ein Serbe*, but not that he was a Bosnian nor that he was an Austrian subject. . . .

"I repeat," said Baron Macchio, "that we do not accuse the Serbian Government and the Serbian nation but the various agitators. . . ."

I begged him to use his influence in order to induce the Vienna press not to make matters more difficult by its accusations in this critical moment, when Serbo-Austrian relations were being put to a severe test.

I have, &c.

No. 13.

*Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Paris, June 21/July 4, 1914.*

I HAD a long conversation on Wednesday last on the subject of the Serajevo outrage with M. Viviani, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was somewhat concerned at what had occurred. I made use of this opportunity to describe to him briefly the causes which had led to the outrage, and which were to be found, in the first place, in the irksome system of Government in force in the

annexed provinces, and especially in the attitude of the officials, as well as in the whole policy of the Monarchy towards anything orthodox. He understood the situation, but at the same time expressed the hope that we should preserve an attitude of calm and dignity in order to avoid giving cause for fresh accusations in Vienna.

After the first moment of excitement public opinion here has quieted down to such an extent that the Minister-President himself considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to soften the expressions used in the statement which he had made earlier on the subject in the Senate.

I have, &c.

No. 14.

*Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Petrograd, June 21/July 4, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that the outrages committed upon Serbs in Bosnia will increase the sympathy of Europe for us. He is of opinion that the accusations made against us in Vienna will not obtain credence. The chief thing is for public opinion in Serbia to remain calm.

No. 15.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, June 23/July 6, 1914.*

THE excitement in military and Government circles against Serbia is steadily growing owing to the tone of our press, which is diligently exploited by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade.

No. 16.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, June 23/July 6, 1914.*

THE principal lines and tendencies to be found in the articles of the Vienna press on the subject of the Serajevo outrage are as follows :—

As long ago as Sunday afternoon, June 15/28 last, when the Vienna newspapers issued extra editions regarding the outrage upon the Crown Prince, the headlines announced that both the perpetrators were Serbians; moreover, this was done in such a manner as to leave the impression that they were Serbs from Serbia



proper. In the later reports, which described the outrage, there was a marked tendency to connect it with Serbia. Two circumstances were especially emphasised and were intended to indicate Belgrade as the place of origin of the outrage, viz. : (1) the visit to Belgrade of both of the perpetrators ; and (2) the origin of the bombs. As the third and last link in this chain of evidence, the Vienna papers began to publish the evidence given by the assassins at the trial. It was characteristic to find that the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau, and the Hungarian newspapers, especially the *Az Eszt* were alone in a position to know all about this "evidence." This evidence mainly tends to show : (1) that it has been established that the perpetrators, while in Belgrade, associated with the *comitadji* Mihaylo Ciganovitch ; and (2) that the organiser and instigator of the outrage was Major Pribitchevitch.

Another tendency became apparent at the same time, viz. : to hold the "Narodna Odbrana" responsible for this outrage. Further, on Friday last, the latest announcement which the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau made to the newspapers stated :—

"The enquiries made up to the present prove conclusively that this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the two perpetrators, a large number of persons have been arrested, mostly young men, who are also, like the perpetrators, proved to have been employed by the Belgrade Narodna Odbrana in order to commit the outrage, and who were supplied in Belgrade with bombs and revolvers."

On the same day, late at night, the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau sent the following request to the newspapers :—

"We beg the Editor not to publish the report relating to the Serajevo outrage, which appeared in our evening's bulletin."

At the same time the Vienna Korrespondenzbureau published the following official statement :—

"We learn from authoritative quarters that the enquiries relating to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret. All the details, therefore, which have appeared in the public press should be accepted with reserve."

Nevertheless, the Budapest newspapers continued to publish alleged reports on the enquiry. In the last "report" of the Budapest newspaper *A Nap*, which was reprinted in yesterday's Vienna papers, the tendency to lay the responsibility for the outrage on the Narodna Odbrana is still further emphasised. According to this report the accused Gabrinovitch had stated that General Yankovitch is the chief instigator of the outrage.

I have, &c.

No. 17.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, June 24/July 7, 1914.*

IN influential circles the excitement continues undiminished. Though the Emperor has addressed a letter to the Prime Ministers of Austria and Hungary respectively, and to the Minister of Finance,

Herr Bilinski, in which an appeal is made for calmness, it is impossible to determine what attitude the Government will adopt towards us. For them one thing is obvious; whether it is proved or not that the outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must sooner or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian agitation within the Habsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will do this and what means they will employ to that end has not as yet been decided; this is being discussed especially in high Catholic and military circles. The ultimate decision will be taken only after it has been definitely ascertained what the enquiry at Serajevo has brought to light. The decision will be in accordance with the findings of the enquiry.

In this respect, Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the following courses: either to regard the Serajevo outrage as a national misfortune and a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with the evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's co-operation in the work will be requested in order to prevent the perpetrators escaping the extreme penalty; or, to treat the Serajevo outrage as a Pan-Serbian, South-Slav and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every manifestation of the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom. There are many indications that influential circles are being urged to adopt the latter course: it is therefore advisable to be ready for defence. Should the former and wiser course be adopted, we should do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this respect.

I have, &c.

No. 18.

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to all the Serbian Legations abroad.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, June 26/July 9, 1914.*

THE Crown Prince Alexander is receiving threatening letters from Austria-Hungary nearly every day. Make use of this in course of conversation with your colleagues and journalists.

No. 19.

*Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch,  
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 1/14, 1914.*

THE Secretary of State has told me that he could not understand the provocative attitude of the Serbian press and the attacks made by it against Austria-Hungary, who, as a Great Power, could not tolerate such proceedings.

## No. 20.

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to all the Serbian Legations abroad.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 1/14, 1914.*

(1) The Austrian Korrespondenzbureau is showing a marked tendency to excite public opinion in Europe. This Bureau interprets neither correctly nor sincerely the tone adopted by the Belgrade press. It selects the strongest expressions from such articles as contain replies to insults, threats and false news designed to mislead public opinion, and submits them to the Austro-Hungarian public.

(2) The Korrespondenzbureau quotes especially extracts from articles from those Serbian newspapers which are not the organs of any party or corporation.

(3) As far back as the annexation crisis, Austria-Hungary prohibited the entry into the country of all Serbian political and other newspapers, and thus our Press would not be in a position to excite public opinion in Austria-Hungary and Europe if the Korrespondenzbureau did not lay stress on and spread broadcast the items of news which it gathers from various Serbian papers, in every instance exaggerating them. Six days ago the entry into Austria-Hungary of the *Odyek*, the organ of the Independent Radical Party, was prohibited; thus all our papers are now prevented from entering Austria-Hungary.

(4) With us the press is absolutely free. Newspapers can be confiscated only for *lèse-majesté* or for revolutionary propaganda; in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There is no censorship of newspapers.

In these circumstances, you should point out for their information, where necessary, that we have no other constitutional or legal means at our disposal for the control of our press. Nevertheless, when the articles in our papers are compared with those of Austria-Hungary, it is evident that the Austro-Hungarian papers originate the controversy, while ours merely reply.

Please also emphasise the fact that public opinion in Serbia is relatively calm, and that there is no desire on our part to provoke and insult Austria-Hungary. No one in Europe would know what our newspapers were writing if the Korrespondenzbureau did not publish these items of news with the intention of doing as much harm as possible to Serbia.

## No. 21.

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to all the Serbian Legations abroad.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 1/14, 1914.*

DURING the past few days the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have been spreading reports to the effect that there have been demonstrations at Belgrade against the Austro-Hungarian Legation, that

some Hungarian journalists were killed; that Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade were maltreated and are now panic-stricken; that at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig Serbian students made a demonstration against the Austro-Hungarian Minister, &c. All these reports are absolutely untrue and imaginary. Complete calm prevails in Belgrade and there were no demonstrations of any kind this year, nor has there been any question of disorder. Not only do the Austro-Hungarian Minister and his staff walk about the town without being molested in any way, but no Austro-Hungarian subject has been in any way insulted, either by word or deed, as is reported by the Viennese papers; still less was any attack made upon the house of any Austro-Hungarian subject or were any of their windows broken. Not a single Austro-Hungarian subject has had the slightest cause for any complaint. All these false reports are being purposely spread in order to arouse and excite Austro-Hungarian public opinion against Serbia.

The whole of Belgrade and the entire diplomatic body were present to-day at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig; there was not the slightest sign of resentment shown by anybody. During the whole ceremony exemplary order was maintained; so much so that foreigners were impressed with the good behaviour of the crowd, which was such as does not always prevail on similar occasions even in their own countries.

Be good enough to communicate the above to the Government to which you are accredited and to the press.

## No. 22.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,  
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

Vienna, July 1/14, 1914.

ONCE more public opinion has been excited against us by the Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. With the exception of the *Zeit* and the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, all the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have obtained from that Bureau the material and tone of their articles on the subject of the Serajevo outrage. You have yourself seen what kind of material and tone this is.

I am reliably informed that official German circles here are especially ill-disposed towards us. These circles have had some influence upon the writings of the Vienna press, especially upon those of the *Neue Freie Presse*.

This latter paper is still anti-Serbian *à l'outrance*. The *Neue Freie Presse*, which is widely read and has many friends in high financial circles, and which—if so desired—writes in accordance with instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau, briefly summarises the matter as follows: "We have to settle matters with Serbia by war; it is evident that peaceable means are of no avail. And if it must come to war sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter through now."

The Bourse is very depressed. There has not been such a fall in prices in Vienna for a long time. Some securities have fallen 45 kronen.

I have, &c.

---

No. 23.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,  
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, July 2/15, 1914.*

THE most important question for us is, what, if any, are the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government as regards the Serajevo outrage. Until now I have been unable to find this out, and my other colleagues are in a similar position. The word has now been passed round here not to tell anybody anything.

The evening before last the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy held a meeting. It has not been possible to learn anything about the object and the result of this meeting. The communiqué issued on the subject was brief and obscure. It appears that the consequences of the Serajevo outrage were discussed at length, but that nothing was decided. It is not clear whether the Chief of Staff and the Naval Commander-in-Chief were present, as was rumoured. After this meeting Count Berchtold travelled to Ischl to report to the Emperor, who, after the funeral of Franz Ferdinand, had returned there to recover his health. In the Hungarian Parliament Count Tisza has replied to the interpellations of the opposition concerning the Serajevo incident; you are acquainted with his statements. His speech was not clear, and I believe it was intentionally obscure. Some people saw in it signs of an intention quietly to await the development of events and of calmness in the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government, while others saw in it hidden intentions for (I should say) an action as yet undecided. It was noted that there was no occasion for haste until the results of the magisterial enquiry were announced. Some time has now elapsed; the matter has been spoken of, discussed, written about and distorted; then came the death of Hartwig and the alarm of Baron Giesl. In connection with this again came the interpellations addressed to Count Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament; you have read his reply. Many hold the opinion here that this second speech is much more restrained than the first, and that this is to be attributed to an order from the Emperor. (The Bourse has now recovered; both the War Minister and the Chief of Staff have gone on leave.) I am loath to express an opinion. In the above-mentioned speech it is to be noted that the possibility of war is not excluded, in the event of the demands of Austria-Hungary in regard to the Serajevo outrage not being complied with.

One thing is certain: Austria-Hungary will take diplomatic steps at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo is completed and the matter submitted to the Court.

I have, &c.

---

## No. 24.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, July 2/15, 1914.*

IT is thought here that the magisterial enquiries and investigations have not produced sufficient evidence to justify bringing an official accusation against Serbia, but it is believed that the latter will be accused of tolerating within her borders certain revolutionary elements. Diplomatic circles here criticise and condemn the mode of procedure of the Austro-Hungarian Government, especially the attitude throughout of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna press. There are many who consider our attitude to be correct and in accordance with the dignity of a nation. They find fault only with the views expressed in some of our newspapers, though they all admit that it is provoked by the Vienna press.

In spite of the fact that it appears that the German Foreign Office does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy of Vienna, the German Embassy here is at this very moment encouraging such a policy.

I have, &c.

## No. 25.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, July 2/15, 1914.*

WHAT steps will be taken? In what form? What demands will Austria-Hungary make of Serbia? I do not believe that to-day even the Ballplatz itself could answer these questions clearly and precisely. I am of opinion that its plans are now being laid, and that again Count Forgach is the moving spirit.

In an earlier report I mentioned that Austria-Hungary has to choose between two courses: either to make the Serajevo outrage a domestic question, inviting us to assist her to discover and punish the culprits; or to make it a case against the Serbians and Serbia, and even against the Jugo-Slavs. After taking into consideration all that is being prepared and done, it appears to me that Austria-Hungary will choose the latter course. Austria-Hungary will do this in the belief that she will have the approval of Europe. Why should she not profit by humiliating us, and, to a certain extent, justify the Friedjung and Agram trials? Besides, Austria-Hungary desires in this manner to justify in the eyes of her own people and of Europe the sharp and reactionary measures which she contemplates undertaking internally in order to suppress the Great Serbian propaganda and the Jugo-Slav idea. Finally, for the sake of her prestige, Austria-Hungary must take some action in the belief that she will thus raise her prestige internally as well as externally. . . .

Austria-Hungary will, I think, draw up in the form of a memorandum an accusation against Serbia. In that accusation will be set forth all the evidence that has been collected against us since April, 1909, until to-day ; and I believe that this accusation will be fairly lengthy. Austria-Hungary will communicate this accusation to the Cabinets of the European Powers with the remark that the facts contained therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps at Belgrade, and to demand that Serbia should in the future fulfil all the obligations of a loyal neighbour. At the same time Austria-Hungary will also hand us a note containing her demands, which we shall be requested to accept unconditionally.

I have, &c.

---

No. 26.

*Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 3/16, 1914.*

THE Secretary of State has informed me that the reports of the German Minister at Belgrade point to the existence of a Great Serbian propaganda, which should be energetically suppressed by the Government in the interest of good relations with Austria-Hungary.

---

No. 27.

*M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister at London, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*London, July 4/17, 1914.*

THE Austrian Embassy is making very great efforts to win over the English press against us, and to induce it to favour the idea that Austria must give a good lesson to Serbia. The Embassy is submitting to the news editors cuttings from our newspapers as a proof of the views expressed in our press. The situation may become more acute during the next few weeks. No reliance should be placed in the ostensibly peaceable statements of Austro-Hungarian official circles, as the way is being prepared for diplomatic pressure upon Serbia, which may develop into an armed attack. It is probable that as soon as Austria-Hungary has taken action at Belgrade she will change her attitude and will seek to humiliate Serbia.

---

No. 28.

*M. Ljub Michailovitch, Minister at Rome, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 4/17, 1914.*

I HAVE obtained reliable information to the effect that the Marquis di San Giuliano has stated to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador that

any step undertaken by Austria against Serbia which failed to take into account international considerations would meet with the disapproval of public opinion in Italy, and that the Italian Government desire to see the complete independence of Serbia maintained.

---

No. 29.

*Dr. M. Spalaikovitsh, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Petrograd, July 5/18, 1914.*

I HAVE spoken to the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the provocative attitude of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna press.

M. Sazonoff told me a few days ago that he wondered why the Austrian Government were doing nothing to put a stop to the futile agitation on the part of the press in Vienna which, after all, frightened nobody, and was only doing harm to Austria herself.

---

No. 30.

*M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Serbian Missions abroad.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 6/19, 1914.*

IMMEDIATELY after the Serajevo outrage the Austro-Hungarian press began to accuse Serbia of that detestable crime, which, in the opinion of that press, was the direct result of the Great Serbian idea. The Austrian press further contended that that idea was spread and propagated by various associations, such as the "Narodna Odbrana," "Kolo Srpskich Sestara," &c., which were tolerated by the Serbian Government.

On learning of the murder, the Serbian Royal Family, as well as the Serbian Government, sent messages of condolence, and at the same time expressed severe condemnation of and horror at the crime that had been committed. All festivities which had been fixed to take place on that day in Belgrade were immediately cancelled.

Nevertheless, the press of the neighbouring Monarchy continued to hold Serbia responsible for the Serajevo outrage. Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian press began to spread in connection with it various false reports, designed to mislead public opinion, which provoked the Belgrade press to reply in self-defence, and sometimes to active hostility in a spirit of embitterment aroused by the misrepresentation of what had occurred. Seeing that the Austro-Hungarian press was intentionally luring the Belgrade press into a awkward and delicate controversy, the Serbian Government hastened to warn the press in Belgrade, and to recommend it to remain calm and to confine itself to simple denials and to the suppression of false and misleading reports. The action of the Serbian Government was ineffectual in the case of some of the less important papers, more especially in view of the fact that newly invented



stories were daily spread abroad with the object of serving political ends not only against Serbia but also against the Serbs in Austria-Hungary. The Serbian Government were unable to avert these polemics between the Serbian and the Austrian press, seeing that Serbian law, and the provisions of the constitution itself, guarantee the complete independence of the press and prohibit all measures of control and the seizure of newspapers. These polemics were further aggravated by the fact that the Vienna and Budapesth journals selected passages from such of the Serbian newspapers as have practically no influence upon public opinion, strengthened still further their tone, and, having thus manipulated them, passed them on to the foreign press with the obvious intention of exciting public opinion in other European countries and of representing Serbia as being guilty.

Those who have followed the course of these polemics will know that the Belgrade newspapers merely acted in self-defence, confining their activities to denials and to the refutation of falsehoods designed to mislead public opinion, at the same time attempting to convince foreign Governments (which, being occupied with other and more serious affairs, had no time to go into the matter themselves) of the intention of the Austro-Hungarian press to excite public opinion in its own country and abroad.

The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness to hand over to justice any of their subjects who might be proved to have played a part in the Serajevo outrage. The Serbian Government further stated that they had prepared a more drastic law against the misuse of explosives. The draft of a new law in that sense had already been laid before the State Council, but could not be submitted to the Skupshtina, as the latter was not sitting at the time. Finally, the Serbian Government stated that they were ready, as heretofore, to observe all those good neighbourly obligations to which Serbia was bound by her position as a European State.

During the whole of this period, from the date of the perpetration of the outrage until to-day, not once did the Austro-Hungarian Government apply to the Serbian Government for their assistance in the matter. They did not demand that any of the accomplices should be subjected to an enquiry, or that they should be handed over to trial. In one instance only did the Austrian Government ask for information as to the whereabouts of certain students who had been expelled from the Pakratz Teachers' Seminary, and had crossed over to Serbia to continue their studies. All available information on this point was supplied.

The campaign against Serbia, however, was unremittingly pursued in the Austrian press, and public opinion was excited against her in Austria as well as in the rest of Europe. Matters went so far that the more prominent leaders of political parties in Austria-Hungary began to ask questions in Parliament on the subject of the outrage, to which the Hungarian Prime Minister replied. It is evident from the discussions in this connection that Austria is contemplating some action, but it is not clear in what sense. It is not stated whether the measures which are to be taken—more especially military measures—will depend upon the reply and the conciliatory attitude of the Serbian

Government. But an armed conflict is being hinted at in the event of the Serbian Government being unable to give a categorically satisfactory reply.

On the sudden death of the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, at the residence of the Austrian Minister, the polemics in the newspapers became still more acute; nevertheless this sad event did not lead to any disorders even during the funeral of M. Hartwig. On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Legation was so perturbed by certain false reports that Austrian subjects began to conceal themselves, some of them taking refuge in the Semlin and Belgrade hotels, and others in the Legation itself. At 5 p.m. on the day of the King's birthday, which passed in the most orderly manner, I was informed by the Austrian Minister, through the Vice-Consul, M. Pomgraz, that preparations were being made for an attack that night on the Austrian Legation and on Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade. He begged me to take the necessary steps for the protection of Austro-Hungarian subjects and of the Legation, stating at the same time that he held Serbia responsible for all that might occur. I replied that the responsible Serbian Government were not aware of any preparations of this kind being made, but that I would in any case at once inform the Minister of the Interior, and beg him at the same time to take such measures as might be necessary. The next day showed that the Austrian Legation had been misled by false rumours, for neither any attack nor any preparations for attack were made. Notwithstanding this, the Austro-Hungarian press took advantage of this incident to prove how excited public opinion was in Serbia and to what lengths she was ready to go. It went even further and tried to allege that something really had been intended to happen, since M. Pashitch himself had stated that he had heard of such rumours. All this indicates clearly the intention to excite public opinion against Serbia whenever occasion arises.

When all that has been said in the Hungarian Parliament is taken into consideration, there is reason for apprehension that some step is being prepared against us which may produce a disagreeable effect upon the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. There is still further ground for such apprehension, as it is abundantly evident that the enquiry which is being made is not to be limited to the perpetrators and their possible accomplices in the crime, but is most probably to be extended to Serbia and the Great Serbian idea.

By their attitude and the measures they have taken, the Serbian Government have irrefutably proved that they are working to restrain excitable elements, and in the interests of peace and the maintenance of good relations with all their neighbours. The Government have given their particular attention to the improvement and strengthening of their relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which had lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and of the questions which arose therefrom. With that object in view, the Serbian Government proceeded to settle the question of the Oriental Railway, the new railway connections, and the transit through Serbia of Austro-Hungarian goods for Constantinople, Sofia, Salonica, and Athens.

The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests require that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans should be firmly and lastingly established. And for this very reason they fear lest the excited state of public opinion in Austria-Hungary may induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to make a *démarche* which may humiliate the dignity of Serbia as a State, and to put forward demands which could not be accepted.

I have the honour therefore to request you to impress upon the Government to which you are accredited our desire to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to suppress every attempt directed against the peace and public safety of the neighbouring Monarchy. We will likewise meet the wishes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the event of our being requested to subject to trial in our independent Courts any accomplices in the outrage who are in Serbia—should such, of course, exist.

But we can never comply with demands which may be directed against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be unacceptable to any country which respects and maintains its independence.

Actuated by the desire that good neighbourly relations may be firmly established and maintained, we beg the friendly Governments to take note of these declarations and to act in a conciliatory sense should occasion or necessity arise.

---

No. 31.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,  
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, July 7/20, 1914.*

It is very difficult, indeed almost impossible, to ascertain here anything positive as to the real intentions of Austria-Hungary. The word has been passed round to maintain absolute secrecy about everything that is being done. Judging by the articles in our newspapers, Belgrade is taking an optimistic view of the questions pending with Austria-Hungary. There is, however, no room for optimism. There is no doubt that Austria-Hungary is making preparations of a serious character. What is chiefly to be feared, and is highly probable, is, that Austria is preparing for war against Serbia. The general conviction that prevails here is that it would be nothing short of suicide for Austria-Hungary once more to fail to take advantage of the opportunity to act against Serbia. It is believed that the two opportunities previously missed—the annexation of Bosnia and the Balkan war—have been extremely injurious to Austria-Hungary. In addition, the conviction is steadily growing that Serbia, after her two wars, is completely exhausted, and that a war against Serbia would in fact merely mean a military expedition to be concluded by a speedy occupation. It is also believed that such a war could be brought to an end before Europe could intervene.

The seriousness of Austrian intentions is further emphasised by the military preparations which are being made, especially in the vicinity of the Serbian frontier.

I have, &c.

No. 32.

*Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, to Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Belgrade, July 10/23, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to Your Excellency herewith the enclosed Note which I have received from my Government, addressed to the Royal Serbian Government.

I have, &c.

Handed personally at 6 p.m.

[See No. 4 of *British Correspondence*, page 3.]

No. 33.

*Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 10/23, 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Minister handed me this afternoon at 6 p.m. a note in regard to the Serajevo outrage embodying the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and insisting on a reply from the Serbian Government within two days, *i.e.*, by Saturday, at 6 p.m. He informed me orally that he and his staff would leave Belgrade unless a favourable answer were forthcoming within the stipulated time.

Some of the Ministers being absent from Belgrade the Serbian Government have not as yet come to any decision, but I am in a position to state now that the demands are such that no Serbian Government could accept them in their entirety.

No. 34.

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914.*

I INFORMED the Russian Chargé d'Affaires that I would hand in the reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum on Saturday at 6 p.m. I told him that the Serbian Government would appeal to the Governments of the friendly Powers to protect the independence of Serbia. If war was inevitable, I added, Serbia would carry it on.

## No. 35.

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
M. M. Boschkovitch, Minister in London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914.*

I INFORMED the British Chargé d'Affaires to-day that the Austro-Hungarian demands were such that no Government of an independent country could accept them in their entirety. I expressed the hope that the British Government might possibly see their way to induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to moderate them. I did not conceal my anxiety as to future developments.

---

## No. 36.

*Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime  
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Petrograd, July 11/24, 1914.*

As I was leaving M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated the contents of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, I met the German Ambassador. He seemed to be in very good spirits. During the conversation which followed in regard to the Austro-Hungarian *démarche* I asked Count Pourtales to indicate to me some way out of the situation created by the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. The Ambassador replied that this depended on Serbia alone, since the matter in question must be settled between Austria and Serbia only, and did not concern anyone else. In reply I told Count Pourtales that he was under a misapprehension, and that he would see before long that this was not a question merely between Serbia and Austria, but a European question.

---

## No. 37.

*His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander to His Imperial  
Majesty the Emperor of Russia.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914.*

[See No. 6 of *Russian Orange Book*, page 267.]

---

## No. 38.

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all  
the Serbian Legations abroad.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.*

A BRIEF summary of the reply of the Royal Government was communicated to the representatives of the allied Governments at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-day. They were informed that

the reply would be quite conciliatory on all points, and that the Serbian Government would accept the Austro-Hungarian demands as far as possible. The Serbian Government trust that the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless they are determined to make war at all costs, will see their way to accept the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian reply.

---

## No. 39.

*Reply of Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian Note.—Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.*

[See No. 39 of *British Correspondence*, page 31.]

---

## No. 40.

*Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.*

As the time limit stipulated in the note, which, by order of my Government, I handed to His Excellency M. Patchou, on Thursday, the day before yesterday, at 6 p.m., has now expired, and as I have received no satisfactory reply, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I am leaving Belgrade to-night together with the staff of the Imperial and Royal Legation.

The protection of the Imperial and Royal Legation, together with all its appurtenances, annexes, and archives, as well as the care of the subjects and interests of Austria-Hungary in Serbia, is entrusted to the Imperial German Legation.

Finally, I desire to state formally that from the moment this letter reaches Your Excellency the rupture in the diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary will have the character of a *fait accompli*.

I have, &c.

---

## No. 41.

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs to all the Serbian Legations abroad.*

*Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.*

I COMMUNICATED the reply to the Austro-Hungarian note to-day at 5.45 p.m. You will receive the full text of the reply to-night. From it you will see that we have gone as far as was possible. When I handed the note to the Austro-Hungarian Minister he stated that he would have to compare it with his instructions, and that he would then give an immediate answer. As soon as I returned to the Ministry, I was informed in a note from the Austro-Hungarian Minister

that he was not satisfied with our reply, and that he was leaving Belgrade the same evening, with the entire staff of the Legation. The protection of the Legation and its archives, and the care of Austrian and Hungarian interests had been entrusted by him to the German Legation. He stated finally that on receipt of the note diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary must be considered as definitely broken off.

The Royal Serbian Government have summoned the Skupshtina to meet on July 14/27 at Nish, whither all the Ministries with their staffs are proceeding this evening. The Crown Prince has issued, in the name of the King, an order for the mobilisation of the army, while to-morrow or the day after a proclamation will be made in which it will be announced that civilians who are not liable to military service should remain peaceably at home, while soldiers should proceed to their appointed posts and defend the country to the best of their ability, in the event of Serbia being attacked.

---

## No. 42.

*Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna.*

Sir,

*Vienna, July 12/25, 1914.*

As no satisfactory reply has been given to the note which the Imperial and Royal Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary handed to the Royal Government on the 10/23 instant, I have been compelled to instruct Baron Giesl to leave the Serbian capital and to entrust the protection of the subjects of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty to the German Legation.

I regret that the relations which I have had the honour to maintain with you, M. le Ministre, are thus terminated, and I avail myself of this opportunity to place at your disposal the enclosed passports for your return to Serbia, as well as for the return of the staff of the Royal Legation.

I have, &c.

---

## No. 43.

*His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Serbia.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Petrograd, July 14/27, 1914.*

[See No. 40 of *Russian Orange Book*, page 280.]

---

## No. 44.

*His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nish, July 17/30, 1914.*

[See No. 56 of *Russian Orange Book*, page 286.]

---

## No. 45.

*Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. N. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 15/28, 1914.*

THE Royal Serbian Government not having answered in a satisfactory manner the note of July 10/23, 1914, presented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in state of war with Serbia.

---

## No. 46.

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nish, July 15/28, 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia at noon to-day by an open telegram to the Serbian Government.

---

## No. 47.

*Dr. M. Spalaikovitich, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Your Excellency,

*Petrograd, July 15/28, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have received from M. Pashitch the following urgent telegram despatched from Nish at 2.10 p.m.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia to-day at noon by an open telegram to the Serbian Government."

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of this regrettable act, which a Great Power had the courage to commit against a small Slav country which only recently emerged from a long series of heroic but exhausting battles, and I beg leave on this occasion of deep gravity for my country, to express the hope that this act, which disturbs the peace of Europe and revolts her conscience, will be condemned by the whole civilised world and severely punished by Russia, the protector of Serbia.

I beg Your Excellency to be so kind as to lay this petition from the whole Serbian nation before the throne of His Majesty.

I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my loyalty and respect.

I have, &c.

---



## No. 48.

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd.*

Sir,

*Petrograd, July 17/30, 1914.*

I HAD the honour to receive your note of July 15/28, No. 527, in which you communicated to me the contents of the telegram received by you from His Excellency, M. Pashitch, in regard to the declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary. I sincerely regret this sad event, and will not fail to lay before His Majesty the petition by the Serbian nation, whose interpreter you are.

I have, &c.

---

## No. 49.

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nish, July 22/August 4, 1914.*

PLEASE inform the Imperial Government that you have received instructions to leave Germany, together with the staffs of the Legation and Consulate. You should leave immediately.

---

## No. 50.

*The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the German Legation at Nish.*

*Nish, July 21/August 6, 1914.*

THE Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform the Imperial Legation that, in view of the state of war which now exists between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, and of that between Russia and Germany, the ally of Austria-Hungary, the Royal Serbian Government, in view of the solidarity of her interests with Russia and her allies, considers the mission of Baron Gieslingen, the Imperial German Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary, to be at an end. The Royal Serbian Government requests His Excellency to leave Serbian territory with the staff of the Legation. The necessary passports are enclosed herewith.

---

## No. 51.

*Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 24/August 6, 1914.*

ON the occasion of my visit to the Under-Secretary of State, M. Zimmermann, for the purpose of breaking off diplomatic relations, he stated, in the course of conversation, that Germany had always cherished friendly feelings towards Serbia, and that he

regretted that owing to the political *groupement* our relations had to be broken off. He blames Russia only, as the instigator of Serbia, for the developments which have occurred, and which will have grave consequences for all nations. If Russia, at the last moment—just when it appeared possible that an armed conflict might be avoided—had not ordered the mobilisation of her whole forces, there would have been no war, for Germany had used her whole influence in Austria-Hungary in order to bring about an understanding with Russia. Austria-Hungary would have probably been satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade, when negotiations would have begun with a view to regularising the relations between Serbia and Austria.

---

## No. 52.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Nish, August 3/16, 1914.*

FROM June 17/30 the Serbian Legation at Vienna was practically surrounded by police and gendarmes, while the staff were under constant police supervision. Our movements and our communications with the outer world were, as you can imagine, rendered extremely difficult; the attitude of the population towards the Legation and its staff was inclined to be menacing.

After the beginning of July (o.s.) even telegraphic communication with you became difficult, while matters developed with such rapidity that I was unable to report to you some of the events which preceded our armed conflict with Austria-Hungary. I accordingly do so now.

Up to the end of June (o.s.) the whole question of the Serajevo outrage appeared to be developing normally. At the commencement of July, however, a change took place as regards the question of the consequences of the Serajevo affair. There were no tangible proofs that a radical change had taken place, but it was to some extent indicated by certain vague signs and symptoms which betrayed the existence of some hidden intentions. First of all, the Vienna and Budapest press, in conformity with instructions issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ceased to publish reports of the magisterial enquiry relating to the Serajevo outrage. The press began also to represent the whole matter as a question which must be settled between Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone—eventually by war.

Moreover, statements to this effect were communicated to the leading Vienna newspapers by the German Embassy. Exceptions were: the semi-official *Fremdenblatt*, which was, in general, more moderate in the tone of its articles; *Die Zeit*; and the *Arbeiter Zeitung*.

Simultaneously with this new attitude on the part of the press, a very unsettled condition of affairs developed on the Bourse, such as it had not witnessed during the whole course of recent events in the Balkans. In private conversations also and in high financial circles

the "settlement with Serbia" was declared to be the only way out of the general financial and economic crisis prevailing in Austria-Hungary ever since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under secret instructions it was ordered that gold should be gradually withdrawn from circulation, and a corresponding rise in exchange took place.

A further indication was the clumsy explanation given of the reasons which had induced the Minister for War, Krobatin, and the Chief of the General Staff, Hetzendorf, to interrupt their leave of absence and return to Vienna. The Chief of Staff constantly travelled to the south, east, and north of Austria, and at that time had had an interview with the Chief of the German General Staff, Count Moltke, in Bohemia, I believe, at Carlsbad.

All the reserves which had been called out for the June manœuvres in Bosnia and Herzegovina were kept with the colours beyond the stipulated period.

The number of soldiers belonging to the permanent establishment in Austria-Hungary allowed to go home on short leave of absence in order to gather in the harvest, and to attend to other private affairs, was much larger than is usually the case; at the same time those whose duties were of a military-administrative nature were called upon in ever increasing numbers.

Another indication was the non-committal nature of the answers given to several interpellations in the Hungarian Diet by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, a statesman who is very clear as a rule in his political statements.

The attitude of the Ballplatz was especially characteristic. None of the usual weekly receptions by Count Berchtold was held. They suddenly ceased at the Ballplatz to discuss the Serajevo outrage with the representatives of foreign countries; or, if discussion did arise, it seemed as if instructions had been issued on the subject; that is to say, it was mentioned to everyone in such a manner as to dispel all apprehensions and suspicion that Austria-Hungary was preparing some serious step against Serbia. They acknowledged that some step would be undertaken at Belgrade as soon as the results of the magisterial enquiry should have sufficiently established the connection between Belgrade and the Serajevo outrage. But, at the same time, it was said that this step would not be such as to give rise to any uneasiness. The Russian Ambassador, who spoke several times on the subject with Count Forgach, in the absence of Count Berchtold, was unable to discover the true nature of Austria's intentions. M. Schebeko told me that Count Szapary, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Petrograd, who, for family reasons, was at that time stopping in Vienna, had said to him that the step to be taken at Belgrade would be of conciliatory character. According to M. Schebeko, Count Szapary had also assured M. Sazonof that the intended Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia would not be such as to cause Russia any dissatisfaction. The French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, who, under instructions from his Government, had drawn the attention of the Ballplatz to the complications which might arise should the eventual demands which it was intended to make of Serbia

not be of a moderate nature, was told by the principal Under-Secretary, Baron Macchio, that the Austro-Hungarian Government, appreciating the friendly and conciliatory action of the French Government, would only put forward such demands, embodied in a note to the Serbian Government, as Serbia would be able to accept without difficulty. I drew the attention of the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente to the fact that such an assurance might well conceal the true nature of the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and that the Powers of the Triple Entente might then be confronted by certain *faits accomplis* which Europe would be compelled to accept in order to avoid a general European war.

The line followed by the Ballplatz was, moreover, comparatively successful, as all those of my colleagues whom I saw during that period were more or less dissuaded from believing that Austria-Hungary contemplated any serious step which could provoke European complications. Many of the members of the diplomatic body were so firmly convinced of this that they were preparing at that time to quit Vienna on long leave of absence at various watering places.

Nevertheless, it was known that a note was being drawn up at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which would contain the accusations against Serbia, and also the demands of Austria-Hungary. This task was entrusted to Count Forgach, formerly Austro-Hungarian Minister in Serbia. At the same time it was universally believed that of the foreign representatives, the German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirsky, was the only one who was kept informed of the note even in its minutest details, while I had reason to believe that he was also co-operating in drafting it. In view of the above, the representatives of the friendly Powers agreed with me in thinking that the note would impose very difficult terms on Serbia, but that there would be no unacceptable demands. When the contents of the note were published all of them were surprised, not to say dumbfounded.

In the same way as the contents of the note were kept secret, a similar amount of secrecy was observed in regard to the date of its presentation. On the very day that the note was presented at Belgrade, the French Ambassador had a prolonged conversation with the Principal Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs—Count Berchtold was again absent at Ischl—on the subject of the note. Yet Baron Macchio did not tell M. Dumaine that the note would be presented at Belgrade that afternoon, and published in the newspapers on the following day.

On the publication in the Vienna papers on the morning of July 11/24 of the contents of the note, which Baron Giesl had presented to the Serbian Government, a feeling of dejection came over the friends both of Serbia and of the peace of Europe. It was only then realised that serious European complications might ensue, though it was not believed that it was the intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to provoke them. This feeling of depression was increased by the tone of the articles in the Viennese newspapers, with the exception of *Die Zeit* and *Arbeiter Zeitung* and by demonstrations in the streets, which clearly showed that war would be a most welcome solution—a war with Serbia, of course.

On that day, after having two or three conversations, I realised that an armed conflict between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy was inevitable, even should Serbia accept all the demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian Note, from the first to the last. The attitude of the people in the streets towards our Legation was such that I expected even personal attacks upon the members of the staff.

The French Ambassador, the British Ambassador, and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires held the view that the step taken by Austria-Hungary should be considered not as a note but as an ultimatum. They disapproved of the form, the contents, and the time limit of the note; they also declared it to be unacceptable.

In the course of conversation with them on the subject of the note I pointed out that those passages in it which dealt with the order by the King to the Army, with the dismissal of officers and Government officials, and especially that which referred to the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the "Suppression of the subversive movement in Serbia against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy," would be unacceptable as not being compatible with the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia. Only a victorious war, I said, could enforce the acceptance of conditions which were so humiliating to an independent State. In reply to their enquiry whether it would not perhaps be better to accept the conditions and avoid war for the present, I said that the Austro-Hungarian Note, which amounted in fact to a declaration of war upon Serbia, was worded in such a way that, even if Serbia should accept all the conditions without reserve, Austria-Hungary would still find an excuse for her army to march into Serbia at any time. It was in the belief that the conflict would be limited to Serbia and Austria-Hungary that Austria-Hungary had drafted such a note.

To M. Dumaine, Sir M. de Bunsen, and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, the unexpected character of the note was the cause not only of surprise but also of alarm, in view of the complications which they feared might ensue. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, previously to the presentation of the note, had stated on several occasions to his colleagues that Russia could not remain indifferent to any step taken by Austria-Hungary, which might have as an object the humiliation of Serbia. He also expressed the same view at the Ballplatz. Hence the apprehension felt by the three Ambassadors, who at once foresaw the possibility of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The day after the note was presented, Prince Koudacheff went to see Count Berchtold to discuss the matter. In reply to his statement, that the note as it stood was unacceptable, and that Russia could not watch with indifference the humiliation of Serbia, Count Berchtold said that Austria-Hungary had been obliged to take this step as her very existence was threatened; that she could not withdraw nor alter the demands made in the note, and that he considered that the matter in dispute concerned Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone and that no other Power had any grounds for interference.

Count Berchtold's reply did not allow of any further doubts as to the intention of Austria-Hungary to chastise Serbia by force of arms without the consent of the European concert. From conversations

which I had at that time with the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente—who, during the whole of that difficult period showed every kindness and attention to me and to the staff of the Legation—it seemed quite clear that Austria-Hungary had been assured, and felt convinced, that the Serbo-Austro-Hungarian conflict would be localised, as she would otherwise not have decided upon a note which undoubtedly meant war. It was also clear that Austria-Hungary was confirmed in this impression especially—and perhaps solely—by Herr von Tschirsky, the German Ambassador in Vienna. Herr von Tschirsky was the only one who thought, and even stated publicly, that Russia would remain quiet while Austria-Hungary carried out her punitive expedition against Serbia. He declared that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would easily control the Pan Slavists, in the same way as he had done last year, and that Russia was not disposed at the moment to begin a discussion of the many vexed questions in Europe and Asia which were her main concern. It was necessary, according to Herr von Tschirsky, to give Serbia a lesson. Russia had no right to interfere. As far as Germany, he said, was concerned, she was in the fullest sense of the word conscious of what she was doing in giving Austria-Hungary her support in the matter.

These statements of Herr von Tschirsky have induced many to hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke a European war, on the ground that it was better to have war with Russia before the latter had completed her military reorganisation, *i.e.*, before the spring of 1917. This point of view had formerly been freely discussed and even written about in Vienna. "The longer the matter is postponed, the smaller will become the chances of success of the Triple Alliance." On the other hand, rumours from the most authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelmstrasse did not approve of Austria's policy on this question, and that Herr von Tschirsky has exceeded the instructions given to him.

The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, on his return from Petrograd, did his utmost at the Ballplatz to obtain an extension of the brief time limit given to the Serbian Government for a reply to the Austro-Hungarian Note, and to discover some way which might lead to an exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd in regard to the whole question, but until July 13/26, when we met, his efforts had proved unavailing. From the conversations I then had with him, I gathered that the Austro-Hungarian Note, in its contents and in its form, was regarded as a challenge to Russia and not to Serbia, and that Russia would not permit the humiliation of Serbia, even if war were to be the price.

On the day of my departure from Vienna, M. Schebeko told me that, in spite of the many great difficulties to be overcome, there was a prospect of arriving at a solution by which an armed conflict might be avoided by means of discussion between the Russian Government and Count Szapary. A feeling of depression, however, prevailed in Vienna as soon as reports began to be spread that the Austro-Serbian conflict would bring about a war between Russia and the Dual Monarchy.

## APPENDIX.

---

DESPATCH FROM THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR  
AT ROME CONTAINING A REPORT OF A  
SPEECH DELIVERED ON THE 5th DECEM-  
BER, 1914, BY SIGNOR GIOLITTI, FORMERLY  
PRIME MINISTER OF ITALY.

## APPENDIX.

## No. 1.

*Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey,  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Rome, December 6, 1914.*

WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday's date reporting the vote of confidence in the Government recorded in the Italian Chamber, I have the honour to inform you that in his speech which closed the discussion, Signor Giolitti stated, in illustration and justification of the attitude of Italy in separating herself from her allies and remaining neutral, that on the 9th August, 1913, being himself absent from Rome, he had received a telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the late Marquis di San Giuliano, to the following effect :—

"Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *casus foederis* of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that therefore we do not consider that the *casus foederis* arises."

Signor Giolitti's answer was as follows :—"If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a *casus foederis* cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure."

This, he said, was done, and the action of Italy in no respect disturbed her relations with her allies. He explained this point in order to make it clear in the eyes of Europe that Italy had acted with entire loyalty, as she would do to the end.

It is interesting to notice that it was on the following day, the 10th August, that the peace of Bucharest, against which Austria was disposed to promulgate reserves, was signed.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

---



## No. 2.

*Speech of Signor Giolitti before the Italian Chamber of Deputies on the 5th December, 1914.*

(Translated from the Official Report of the Proceedings of the Chamber.)

SIGNOR GIOLITTI: The President of the Council, when speaking of the declaration of neutrality made by Italy on the outbreak of war, recalled the fact that this decision was the subject of heated debates and divided counsels, but that later, both in Italy and abroad, the view gradually prevailed that we were only exercising a right secured to us.

Therefore, inasmuch as I hold it necessary that Italy's loyal observance of international treaties shall be considered as being above any possibility of dispute—(*Hear, hear*)—I feel it my duty to recall a precedent, which proves that the interpretation placed by the Government on the Treaty of the Triple Alliance is the correct interpretation, and was admitted as correct in identical circumstances by the Allied Powers.

During the Balkan War, on the 9th August, 1913, about a year before the present war broke out, during my absence from Rome, I received from my hon. colleague, Signor di San Giuliano, the following telegram :—

“Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *casus foederis* of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. (*Sensation.*)

“I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, therefore, we do not consider that the *casus foederis* arises.

“Please telegram to me at Rome if you approve.”

I replied :—

“If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a *casus foederis* cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure.” (*Hear, hear.*)

This course was taken, and our interpretation was upheld and recognised as proper, since our action in no way disturbed our relations with the two Allied Powers. The declaration of neutrality made by the present Government conforms therefore in all respects to the precedents of Italian policy, and conforms also to an interpretation of the Treaty of Alliance which has been already accepted by the Allies.

I wish to recall this, because I think it right that in the eyes of all Europe it should appear that Italy has remained completely loyal to the observance of her pledges. (*Loud applause.*)

Let I should like now to make a very short statement in explanation of my vote on this question. I approve the Government's programme of an armed and vigilant neutrality for the guardianship of the vital interests of Italy. The Honourable President of the Council said truly that the vast upheaval becomes greater every day, and that it is given to none to foresee the end. The immense military and financial resources which the belligerent Powers have at their disposal exclude the possibility of an early termination of the conflict. As long as the necessity does not arise for us to come down into the arena to preserve our own vital interests, we ought all loyally to observe neutrality, since it is only by such loyal observance that we can preserve intact that great source of strength which is freedom of action. (*Loud applause.*)

In this conflict, which is without precedent in history, the political life of Italy may be at stake. The greatest prudence is therefore incumbent on all; and it is incumbent above all, not only on the Government and on Parliament, but also on that great force, the Press—(*Hear, hear*)—to keep a single eye to the great interests of Italy and to remember only that they are Italians. (*Loud applause.*)

In conclusion, I hope from the bottom of my heart that the men who at this supreme moment have the responsibility of Government may deserve the full gratitude of the country. (*Loud cheers and applause, during which many Deputies went up to the speaker and congratulated him.*)

---

## VII.

### THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK.

---

[NOTE.—This document is a reprint of a pamphlet published by Messrs. Liebheit and Thiesen of Berlin under the title “The German White Book : the only authorised translation.” The Imperial Chancellor’s speech to the Reichstag on the 4th August has been added as an Appendix, and a few footnotes have been inserted to point out certain discrepancies between the translation and the German original. Otherwise the document is reproduced textually.]

# GERMANY'S REASONS FOR WAR WITH RUSSIA.

**How Russia and her Ruler betrayed  
Germany's confidence and thereby  
made the European War.**

---

(WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.)

---

FOREIGN OFFICE,  
Berlin, August, 1914.

On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by a member of a band of Servian conspirators. The investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Arch-Duke and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade with the co-operation of Servian officials, and executed with arms from the Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the entire civilised world, not only in regard to the aims of the Servian policies directed against the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which the pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these aims.

The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing and final separation of the south-easterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Servia. This direction of Servia's policy has not been altered in the least in spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies towards Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good and neighbourly relations.

In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 years Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war.

It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its intentions by Russia.

Russia, soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolution of 1908, endeavoured to found a union of the Balkan states under Russian patronage and directed against the existence of Turkey. This union which succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her European possessions, collapsed over the question of the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dismayed over this failure. According to the idea of the Russian statesmen a new Balkan union under Russian patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balkan, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balkan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of French propaganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this conception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Serbia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval.

We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbours. We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations.

Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Government a note, in which the direct connection between the murder at Sarajevo and the pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but actively supported by the Servian Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for the accomplishment of her desire the participation of some Austrian officials in the preliminary examination on Servian territory and the final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of 48 hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.

The Servian Government started the mobilisation of its army one day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note.

As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a reply which, though complying in some points with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavour through procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands of the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with Serbia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further Servian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently experienced.

From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Serbia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war.

From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that there were here concerned the affairs of Austria *alone*, which it would have to settle with Serbia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the localising of the war, and toward convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the position that no civilised country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the Servians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed our representatives with the foreign powers. see exhibits 1 and 2.

Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Serbia implied merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly behaviour of Serbia towards the monarchy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balkan. see exhibit 3.

In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, and aimed at, a localisation of the conflict, both the French and the English Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these endeavours did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in the Austro-Servian disagreement.

The Russian Government submitted an official communiqué on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the Servio-Austrian conflict. \*The same was declared by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonof, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, in the afternoon of July 26th. see exhibit 4. The German Government declared again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial gain in Serbia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg. see exhibit 5.

\* NOTE.—This passage takes a somewhat different form in the German text, a translation of which is as follows:—

“The same was declared by the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonof, to the Imperial Ambassador, Count Pourtalès. (See exhibit 4.) On the afternoon of July 26th the Imperial and Royal (*that is the Austrian*) Government declared again through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace on her frontiers. (See exhibit 5.) In the course of the same day, however, the first news of Russian mobilisation reached Berlin. (See exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 9.) On the evening of the 26th, the German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed energetically to point out the danger of this Russian mobilisation. (See exhibits 10, 10a, and 10b.) After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that she did not claim territorial gain in Serbia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government.”

see exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9. The same day the first news of Russian mobilisation reached Berlin in the evening.

see exhibits 10, 10a, 10b. The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian mobilisation. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government :\*

“ Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army.

“ But mobilisation means war.

“ As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding.”

see exhibit 11. On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchomlinof, gave the German military attaché his word of honour that no order to mobilise had been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, *i.e.*, Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilised, under no circumstances those situated on the German frontier, *i.e.*, St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military attaché then pointed to these mobilisation measures against Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany.

In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilisation came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.

On July 27th, the first information was received concerning preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manœuvres and returned to its garrison.

In the meantime we had endeavoured to localise the conflict by most emphatic steps.

On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in regard to this proposal that we could not,

\* See note on preceding page.



however much we approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before a European tribunal.

see exhibit  
12.

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected.

*Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavours to bring about an understanding between these two powers.*

see exhibits  
13,  
14.

*We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities having already been opened.*

see exhibit  
15.

see exhibit  
16.

*In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the monarchy.*

Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France.

On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilised. At the same time further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on land.

see exhibit  
17.

On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as follows :

"The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my  
"Government to participate in a quadruple conference\* to  
"find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those  
"demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Serbia.  
"I could merely promise to report the conversation and  
"took the position that, after Russia had decided upon  
"the baneful step of mobilisation, every exchange of  
"ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible.  
"Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to  
"Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was  
"being blamed for with regard to Serbia, i.e., an infraction  
"of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to  
"consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial  
"aspiration—a great concession on the part of a state  
"engaged in war—should therefore be permitted to attend  
"to its affairs with Serbia alone. There would be time at  
"the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance  
"towards the sovereignty of Serbia.

\* NOTE.—The German word translated "conference" is *konversation*: the German text also contains the words *auf freundschaftlichem Wege* ("in a friendly manner").

“I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I endeavoured to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger.  
 “It was impossible to dissuade Sasonof from the idea that “Serbia could not now be deserted by Russia.”

On July 29th, the German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg wired the following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army :

“The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, “and he has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. “He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate “once more that everything had remained as the Secretary “had informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation “in writing and gave me his word of honour in the most “solemn manner that nowhere there had been a mobilisation, “viz., calling in of a single man or horse up to the present “time, *i.e.*, 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume “a guarantee for the future, but he could emphasise that “in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty “desired no mobilisation.

“As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning “the calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country “also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his “statements placed me before a riddle. On his officer's “word of honour he replied that such news was wrong, but “that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been “given.

“I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us “as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view “of the abundant and positive information about the calling “in of reserves.”

In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with Sasonof. Count Szapary was empowered to explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia, though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sasonof all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations.

Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured incessantly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her

conditions in Servia, *i.e.*, after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would accept this basis.

During the interval from July 29th to July 31st\* there appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilisation. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilisation was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honour.

Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilisation.

During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His Majesty called the attention of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian mobilisation during the continuance of his own mediating activities. see exhibits  
18, 20, 21, 22,  
23, 23a.

On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty the Kaiser :

"I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the  
"hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is  
"technically impossible to discontinue our military prepara-  
"tions which have been made necessary by the Austrian  
"mobilisation. It is far from us to want war. As long as  
"the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue,  
"my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give  
"You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my  
"faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of  
"Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries  
"and the peace of Europe."

"Your cordially devoted  
"NICOLAS."

This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, sent by H.M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m. :

"Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my  
"aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government  
"and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this  
"action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilised  
"against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have  
"already communicated to You, my mediation has become

\* NOTE.—The following words appear here in the German text: *während diese unsere Bemühungen um Vermittelung, von der englischen Diplomatie unterstützt, mit steigender Dringlichkeit fortgeführt wurden* ("whilst these endeavours of ours for mediation were being continued with increasing energy, supported by English diplomacy.")

“almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilised world. It rests in your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honour and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary.”

Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilisation of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered during the afternoon\* of the 31st of July, was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon.

After the Russian general mobilisation became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the afternoon of July 31st to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared the state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilisation of the Russian army and navy which must be followed by mobilisation if Russia did not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notified Germany thereof.

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed to demand from the French Government a declaration within 18 hours, whether it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.

The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilisation, menacing the security of our country, the laborious action at mediation of the European cabinets.† The Russian mobilisation in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that Russia wanted war.

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to M. Sazonof on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight.

The reply of the Russian Government has *never* reached us.

*Two hours after the expiration of the time limit* the Czar telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser, as follows :

\* NOTE.—The German text says here *vormittag* (morning).

† NOTE.—The German text adds here *kurz vor dem Erfolge* (“just as it was on the point of succeeding”).

"I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are  
 "forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from You the  
 "same guarantee which I have given You, viz., that these  
 "measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to  
 "negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the  
 "universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the  
 "aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship  
 "to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full  
 "confidence Your urgent reply."

To this H.M. the Kaiser replied :

"I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to  
 "Your Government the way through which alone war may  
 "yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day  
 "noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me  
 "with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have  
 "been forced to mobilise my army. An immediate, clear  
 "and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole  
 "way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply  
 "I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject  
 "of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You,  
 "without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no  
 "circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."

As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilisation of the entire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5 p.m.

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after the refusal of our demands. However, <sup>see exhibit</sup> before a confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, <sup>26.</sup> that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1st, i.e., the same afternoon on which the telegram of the Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory.

Thus Russia began the war against us.

Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m.

The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on August 1st at 1 p.m., which gave no clear idea of the position <sup>see exhibit</sup> of France, as he limited himself to the explanation that France would <sup>27.</sup> do that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the mobilisation of the entire French Army and Navy was ordered.

On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities.

## THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.

### The Note of Austria-Hungary to Servia

Presented July 23rd in Belgrade.

"On March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Minister to the Court of Vienna made the following statement, by order of his Government :—

"Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the  
 "situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore  
 "adapt herself to the decisions which the Powers are going  
 "to arrive at in reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty.  
 "By following the councils of the Powers, Servia binds  
 "herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistance which  
 "she has assumed since last October, relative to the annexa-  
 "tion, and she binds herself further to change the direction  
 "of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and,  
 "in the future, to live with the latter in friendly and neigh-  
 "bourly relations.

"The history of the last years, and especially the painful events of June 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a subversive movement in Servia whose aim it is to separate certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This movement, which developed under the eyes of the Servian Government, has found expression subsequently beyond the territory of the kingdom, in acts of terrorism, a series of assassinations and murders.

"Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in the declaration of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. She suffered the criminal doings of the various societies and associations directed against the monarchy, the unbridled language of the Press, the glorification of the originators of assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in subversive intrigues; she suffered the unwholesome propaganda in public education, and lastly permitted all manifestations which would mislead the Servian people into hatred of the monarchy and into contempt for its institutions.

"This sufferance of which the Royal Servian Government made itself guilty, has lasted up to the moment in which the events of June 28th demonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences of such sufferance.

"*It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the criminal authors of the outrage of June 28th, that the murder at Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombs with which they were equipped, from Servian officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Servian frontier officials.*

“The cited results of the investigation do not permit the Imperial and Royal Government to observe any longer the attitude of waiting, which it has assumed for years towards those agitations which have their centre in Belgrade, and which from there radiate into the territory of the monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a permanent menace for the peace of the monarchy.

“In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal Government is forced to demand official assurance from the Servian Government that it condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, *i.e.*, the entirety of the machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from the monarchy which belong to it, and that she binds herself to suppress with all means this criminal and terrorising propaganda.

“In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the Royal Servian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ of July 26th, 1914, the following declaration :—

“The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda  
 “directed against Austria-Hungary, *i.e.*, the entirety of  
 “those machinations whose aim it is to separate from the  
 “Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging thereto,  
 “and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of these  
 “criminal actions.

“The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers  
 “and officials have participated in the propaganda, cited  
 “above, and have thus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which the Royal Government was solemnly  
 “bound to cultivate by its declaration of March 31st, 1909.

“The Royal Government, which disapproves and rejects every  
 “thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations  
 “of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers  
 “it its duty to call most emphatically to the attention of  
 “its officers and officials, and of the entire population of the  
 “kingdom, that it will henceforward proceed with the  
 “utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions,  
 “to prevent and suppress which it will make every effort.”

“This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the cognisance of the Royal Army through an order of H.M. the King, and it is to be published in the official organ of the Army.

“The Royal Servian Government binds itself, in addition, as follows :

1. to suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and whose general tendency is directed against the latter's territorial integrity ;
2. to proceed at once with the dissolution of the society Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and associations in Servia which occupy themselves with

- the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may not continue their activities under another name or in another form ;
3. without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Serbia, so far as the corps of instructors, as well as the means of instruction are concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ;
  4. to remove from military service and the administration in general all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of the material which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the Royal Government ;
  5. to consent that in Serbia officials of the Imperial and Royal Government co-operate in the suppression of a movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy ;
  6. to commence a judicial investigation against the participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government, will participate in the examinations ;
  7. to proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Servian State officials, who have been compromised through the result of the investigation ;
  8. to prevent through effective measures the participation of the Servian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the frontier and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and Loznica who assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo in crossing the frontier.
  9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries in Serbia and abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their official position, to express themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28th.
  10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the Royal Government at the latest until Saturday, 25th inst., at 6 p.m. A memoir concerning the results of the investigations at Sarajevo, so far as they concern points 7 and 8, is enclosed with this note."

#### Enclosure.

The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and accomplices in the Court of Sarajevo, on account of the assassination on June 28th has, so far, yielded the following results :

1. The plan to murder Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his stay in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko, Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic.



2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by the criminals were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major Tankosic, and presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade.
3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of the Servian Army in Kragujevac.
4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades and gave instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez in a forest near the target practice field of Topshider—(outside Belgrade).
5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the smuggling of their arms, a secret system of transportation was organised by Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected by the frontier captains of Shabatatz (Rade Popowic) and of Loznica, as well as by the custom house official Rudivoy Grbic of Loznica with the aid of several other persons.

### The Servian Answer.

Presented at Vienna, July 25th, 1914.

(With Austria's commentaries [in italics].)

The Royal Government has received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 23rd inst. and is convinced that its reply will dissipate any misunderstanding which threatens to destroy the friendly and neighbourly relations between the Austrian monarchy and the kingdom of Servia.

The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere there have been renewed protests against the great neighbourly monarchy like those which at one time were expressed in the Skuptschina, as well as in the declaration and actions of the responsible representatives of the state at that time, and which were terminated by the Servian declaration of March 31st, 1909; furthermore that since that time neither the different corporations of the kingdom, nor the officials have made an attempt to alter the political and judicial condition created in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The Royal Government states that the I. and R. Government has made no protestation in this sense excepting in the case of a textbook, in regard to which the I. and R. Government has received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has given during the time of the Balkan crisis in numerous cases evidence of her pacific and moderate policy, and it is only owing to Servia and the sacrifices which she has brought in the interest of the peace of Europe that this peace has been preserved.

*The Royal Servian Government limits itself to establishing that since the declaration of March 31st, 1909, there has been no attempt on the part of the Servian Government to alter the position of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.*

*With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note, as we have not insisted that she and her officials have undertaken anything official in this direction. Our gravamen is that in spite of the obligation assumed in the cited note, she has omitted to suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.*

*Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the entire direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly and neighbourly relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and not only not to interfere with the possession of Bosnia.*

The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for expressions of a private character, as for instance newspaper articles and the peaceable work of societies, expressions which are of very common appearance in other countries; and which ordinarily are not under the control of the state. This, all the less, as the Royal Government has shown great courtesy in the solution of a whole series of questions which have arisen between Servia and Austria-Hungary, whereby it has succeeded to solve the greater number thereof, in favour of the progress of both countries.

*The assertion of the Royal Servian Government that the expressions of the press and the activity of Servian associations possess a private character and thus escape governmental control, stands in full contrast with the institutions of modern states and even the most liberal of press and society laws, which nearly everywhere subject the press and the societies to a certain control of the state. This is also provided for by the Servian institutions. The rebuke against the Servian Government consists in the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise its press and its societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be hostile to the monarchy.*

The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised by the assertions that citizens of Servia had participated in the preparations of the outrage in Sarajevo. The Government expected to be invited to co-operate in the investigation of the crime, and it was ready, in order to prove its complete correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard to whom it would receive information.

*This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government was accurately informed about the suspicion resting upon quite definite personalities and not only in the position, but also obliged by its own laws to institute investigations spontaneously. The Servian Government has done nothing in this direction.*

According to the wishes of the I. and R. Government, the Royal Government is prepared to surrender to the court, without regard to position and rank, every Servian citizen for whose participation in the crime of Sarajevo it should have received proof. It binds itself particularly on the first page of the official organ of the 26th of July to publish the following enunciation :

“The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda  
 “which should be directed against Austria-Hungary, *i.e.*,  
 “the entirety of such activities as aim towards the separa-  
 “tion of certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian

“monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the lamentable consequences of these criminal machinations.”

*The Austrian demand reads :*

“*The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda against Austria-Hungary . . .*”

*The alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which has been made by the Royal Servian Government, is meant to imply that a propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, and that it is not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and the Servian Government reserves itself the subterfuge for later occasions that it had not disavowed by this declaration the existing propaganda, nor recognised the same as hostile to the monarchy, whence it could deduce further that it is not obliged to suppress in the future a propaganda similar to the present one.*

The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication of the I. and R. Government certain Servian officers and functionaries have participated in the propaganda just referred to, and that these have therefore endangered the amicable relations for the observation of which the Royal Government had solemnly obliged itself through the declaration of March 31st, 1909.

The Government . . . identical with the demanded text.

*The formula as demanded by Austria reads :*

“*The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries . . . have participated . . .*”

*Also with this formula and the further addition “according to the declaration of the I. and R. Government,” the Servian Government pursues the object, already indicated above, to preserve a free hand for the future.*

The Royal Government binds itself further :

1. During the next regular meeting of the Skuptschina to embody in the press laws a clause, to wit, that the incitement to hatred of, and contempt for, the monarchy is to be most severely punished, as well as every publication whose general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the constitution to embody an amendment into Art. 22 of the constitutional law which permits the confiscation of such publications as is at present impossible according to the clear definition of Art. 22 of the constitution.

*Austria had demanded :*

1. “*To suppress every publication which incites to hatred and contempt for the monarchy, and whose tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.*”

*We wanted to bring about the obligation for Servia to take care that such attacks of the press would cease in the future.*

*Instead Serbia offers to pass certain laws which are meant as means towards this end, viz. :*

- (a) *A law according to which the expressions of the press hostile to the Monarchy can be individually punished, a matter which is immaterial to us, all the more so, as the individual prosecution of press intrigues is very rarely possible and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the few cases of this nature would not be punished. The proposition, therefore, does not meet our demand in any way, and it offers not the least guarantee for the desired success.*
- (b) *An amendment to Art. 22 of the constitution, which would permit confiscation, a proposal which does not satisfy us, as the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no use to us. For we want the obligation of the Government to enforce it and that has not been promised us.*

*These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and evasive as we are not told within what time these laws will be passed, and as in the event of the not passing of these laws by the Skupstchina everything would remain as it is, excepting the event of a possible resignation of the Government.*

2. The Government possesses no proofs and the note of the I. and R. Government does not submit them that the society Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed, up to the present, any criminal actions of this manner through any one of their members. Notwithstanding this, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the I. and R. Government and dissolve the society Narodna Odbrana, as well as every society which should act against Austria-Hungary.

*The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies hostile to the monarchy fills the entire public life of Serbia ; it is therefore an entirely unacceptable reserve if the Servian Government asserts that it knows nothing about it. Aside from this, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we have asked besides :*

- “ To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies to prevent  
“ the reformation of the dissolved societies under another  
“ name and in another form.”*

*In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly silent, so that through this semi-concession there is offered us no guarantee for putting an end to the agitation of the associations hostile to the Monarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana.*

3. The Royal Servian Government binds itself without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Serbia anything which might further the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary provided the I. and R. Government furnishes actual proofs.

*Also in this case the Servian Government first demands proofs for a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the public instruction of Serbia while it must know that the textbooks introduced in the Servian schools contain objectionable matter in this direction and that a large portion*

of the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies.

Furthermore the Servian Government has not fulfilled a part of our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the addition desired by us : "as far as the body of instructors is concerned, as well as the means of instruction"—a sentence which shows clearly where the propaganda hostile to the Monarchy is to be found in the Servian schools.

4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those officers and officials from the military and civil services in regard to whom it has been proved by judicial investigation that they have been guilty of actions against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy ; it expects that the I. and R. Government communicate to it for the purpose of starting the investigation the names of these officers and officials, and the facts with which they have been charged.

By promising the dismissal from the military and civil services of those officers and officials who are found guilty by judicial procedure, the Servian Government limits its assent to those cases, in which these persons have been charged with a crime according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand the removal of such officers and officials as indulge in a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, which is generally not punishable in Servia, our demands have not been fulfilled in this point.

5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear about the sense and the scope of that demand of the I. and R. Government which concerns the obligation on the part of the Royal Servian Government to permit the co-operation of officials of the I. and R. Government on Servian territory, but it declares that it is willing to accept every co-operation which does not run counter to international law and criminal law, as well as to the friendly and neighbourly relations.

The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to do with this question ; it is purely a matter of the nature of state police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible and on account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties.

6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a matter of course to begin an investigation against all those persons who have participated in the outrage of June 28th and who are in its territory. As far as the co-operation in this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as this is a violation of the constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet in some cases the result of the investigation might be communicated to the Austro-Hungarian officials.

*The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable :—*

1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants in the outrage.
2. Participation by I. and R. Government officials in the examinations ("Recherche" in contrast with "enquête judiciaire").
3. It did not occur to us to let I. and R. Government officials participate in the Servian court procedure ; they were to co-operate only in the police researches which had to furnish and fix the material for the investigation

*If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between "enquête judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the co-operation of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in great numbers) it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our demands as impossible.*

7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening of the day on which the note was received the arrest of Major Voislav Tankosic. However, as far as Milan Ciganowic is concerned, who is a citizen of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who has been employed till June 28th with the Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to locate him, wherefor a warrant has been issued against him.

The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, as soon as possible, for the purpose of conducting the investigation, the existing grounds for suspicion and the proofs of guilt, obtained in the investigation at Sarajevo.

*This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation, Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, it is therefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Servian service on June 28th. In the second place, we add that the prefect of police at Belgrade, who had himself caused the departure of this Ciganowic and who knew his whereabouts, declared in an interview that a man by the name of Milan Ciganowic did not exist in Belgrade.*

8. The Servian Government will amplify and render more severe the existing measures against the suppression of smuggling of arms and explosives.

It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once against, and punish severely, those officials of the frontier service on the line Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty and who have permitted the perpetrators of the crime to cross the frontier.

9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations about the expressions which its officials in Serbia and abroad have made in interviews after the outrage and which, according to the assertion of the I. and R. Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as the I. and R. Government points out in detail where those expressions were made and succeeds in proving that those expressions have actually been made by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government itself will take care that the necessary evidences and proofs are collected therefor.

*The Royal Servian Government must be aware of the interviews in question. If it demands of the I. and R. Government that it should furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews and if it reserves for itself the right of a formal investigation, it shows that it is not its intention seriously to fulfil the demand.*

10. The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. Government, so far as this has not been already done by the present note, of the execution of the measures in question as soon as one of those measures has been ordered and put into execution.

The Royal Servian Government believes it to be to the common interest not to rush the solution of this affair and it is therefore, in case the I. and R. Government should not consider itself satisfied with this answer, ready, as ever, to accept a peaceable solution, be it by referring the decision of this question to the International Court at the Hague or by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who have participated in the working out of the declaration given by the Servian Government on March 31st, 1909.

The Servian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time.

**Exhibit 1.**

The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, on Juli 23rd, 1914.

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the Assassination of the Austrian successor to the throne and his consort took place, disclose clearly the aims which the pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and the means which it utilizes for their realization. Through the published facts the last doubt must disappear that the centre of action of the efforts for the separation of the south Slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with the Servian Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where it displays its activity with the connivance of members of the Government and of the Army.

The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. In a specially marked manner the pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on the part of Servia, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour which the Servian Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; at its door is to be laid the latest crime the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity nor with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view any longer idly the doings across the border through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion as well as by the Government in Servia does not preclude the fear that the Servian Government will decline to meet these demands and that it will allow itself to be carried away into a provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary. Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a great Power, but to press its demands with the Servian Government, and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be left with it.

I have the honour to request you to express yourself in the sense indicated above to (the present representative of M. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (M. Sazonof) and therewith give special emphasis to the view that in this question there is concerned an affair which should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavour of the powers to insure. We anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because



every intercession of another power on account of the various treaty-alliances would precipitate inconceivable consequences.

I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report about the course of your interview.

### Exhibit 2.

The Chancellor to the Governments of Germany.

Confidential. Berlin, July 28, 1914.

You will make the following report to the Government to which you are accredited :

In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published in its note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne has fallen a victim, was prepared in Servia, to say the least with the connivance of members of the Servian Government and army. It is a product of the pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years have become a source of permanent disturbance for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe.

The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which Austro-Hungary was exposed at that time, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour, which the Servian Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to increase in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with its dignity nor with its right to self-preservation if the Austro-Hungarian Government persisted to view idly any longer the intrigues beyond the frontier, through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable.

The reply of the Servian Government to the demands which the Austro-Hungarian Government put on the 23rd inst., through its representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in Servia are not inclined to cease their former policies and agitation. There will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian Government than to press its demands, if need be, through military action, unless it renounces for good its position as a great Power.

Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of course and a task of Russia's, to actively become a party to Servia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the European conflagration which would result from a similar step by Russia, the "Nowoje Wremja" believes itself justified in making Germany responsible in so far as it does not induce Austria-Hungary to yield.

The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. It is not Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia,

but it is Serbia which, through unscrupulous favour toward pan-Serb aspirations, even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, threatens the same in her existence and creates conditions, which eventually found expression in the wanton outrage at Sarajewo. If Russia believes that it must champion the cause of Serbia in this matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must realise that it makes the Serb activities its own, to undermine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility if out of the Austro-Servian affair, which all other Great Powers desire to localise, there arises a European war. This responsibility of Russia's is evident and it weighs the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire Servian territory or to touch the existence of the Servian Kingdom, but only desires peace against the Servian intrigues threatening its existence.

The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clearly indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in Austria-Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the scattering or weakening of the Triple Alliance with a complete isolation of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty, if at all possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, points to the support by ourselves of those endeavours which aim at the localisation of the conflict, faithful to the course of those policies which we have carried out successfully for forty-four years in the interest of the preservation of the peace of Europe.

Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of Russia the fire be spread, we should have to support, faithful to our duty as allies, the neighbour-monarchy with all the power at our command. We shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the clear consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will bring upon the peoples of Europe.

### Exhibit 3.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna  
to the Chancellor on July 24th, 1914.

Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Chargé d'affaires in order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially Austria-Hungary's point of view toward Serbia. After recapitulation of the historical development of the past few years, he emphasized that the Monarchy entertained no thought of conquest toward Serbia. Austria-Hungary would not claim Servian territory. It insisted merely that this step was meant as a definite means of checking the Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstances, Austria-Hungary must have a guaranty for continued amicable relations with Serbia. It was far from him to intend to bring about a change in the balance of powers in the Balkan. The Chargé d'affaires who had received no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the discussion of the Secretary "ad referendum" with the promise to submit it immediately to Sasonof.

**Exhibit 4.**

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor on July 24th, 1914.

I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged interview with Sasonof. The Secretary (Sasonof) indulged in unmeasured accusations toward Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated. He declared most positively that Russia could not permit under any circumstances that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the parties concerned.

**Exhibit 5.**

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor.  
Telegram of July 26th, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview with Sasonof this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory impression as they told me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had no idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace at last at her frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary.

**Exhibit 6.**

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancellor on July 25th, 1914.

Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary aide de camp to the Czar).

The manœuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The manœuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At headquarters there obtains great excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the impression that complete preparations for mobilisation against Austria are being made.

**Exhibit 7.**

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancellor on July 26th, 1914.

The military attaché requests the following message to be sent to the general staff :

I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere.

**Exhibit 8.**

Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.  
Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war.

**Exhibit 9.**

Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor  
on July 27th, 1914.

Have learned reliably that French XIVth corps has discontinued manœuvres.

**Exhibit 10.**

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London.  
Urgent. July 26th, 1914.

Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and solemnly that it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that it will not touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires to establish peaceful conditions. According to news received here, the call for several classes of the reserves is expected immediately which is equivalent to mobilisation.\* If this news proves correct, we shall be forced to countermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our desire to localize the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis.

**Exhibit 10a.**

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at  
Paris. July 26th, 1914.

After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of the Kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war rests solely with Russia which has to bear the entire responsibility. We depend upon France with which we are at one in the desire for the preservation of the peace of Europe that it will exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favour of peace.

**Exhibit 10b.**

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at  
St. Petersburg on July 26th, 1914.

After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial disinterestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia. We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threaten seriously the peace of Europe.

**Exhibit 11.**

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the  
Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.

Military Attaché reports a conversation with the Secretary of War.

Sasonof has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation. The Secretary of War has given me his word of honour that no order

\* NOTE.—The German text adds here *auch gegen uns* ("also against us").

to mobilise has as yet been issued. Though general preparations are being made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, such military districts as are directed toward Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilised. Under no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilni, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilisation against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilisation even against Austria as very menacing.

#### **Exhibit 12.**

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July 27th, 1914.

We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold a quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to place our ally in his dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict.

#### **Exhibit 13.**

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July 25th, 1914.

The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any more than England, and as heretofore we take the position that this question must be localised by virtue of all powers refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that Russia will refrain from any action in view of her responsibility and the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other powers.

#### **Exhibit 14.**

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 28th, 1914.

We continue in our endeavour to induce Vienna to elucidate in St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declaration of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter.

#### **Exhibit 15.**

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July 27th, 1914.

We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sasonof for a direct parley with Vienna.

**Exhibit 16.**

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July 28th, 1914.

Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal. He states, however, that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears belated.

**Exhibit 17.**

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July 29th, 1914.

News received here regarding French preparations of war multiplies from hour to hour. I request that You call the attention of the French Government to this and accentuate that such measures would call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening state of war (*drohende Kriegsgefahr*), and while this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilisation, yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace.

**Exhibit 18.**

Telegram of the Military Attaché at St. Petersburg to H.M. the Kaiser on July 30th, 1914.

Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday, after causing Your Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas: Thank God that a telegram of Your Emperor has come. He has just told me the telegram has made a deep impression upon the Czar but as the mobilisation against Austria had already been ordered and Sasonof had convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. I then told him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay at the door of premature mobilisation against Austria-Hungary which after all was involved merely in a local war with Servia, for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility rested upon Russia which ignored Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilised against Servia and not against Russia and there was no ground for an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in Germany one could not understand any more Russia's phrase that "she could not desert her brethren in Servia," after the horrible crime of Sarajevo. I told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilised.

**Exhibit 19.**

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on July 31st, 1914.

We have continued to negotiate between Russia and Austria-Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty the Kaiser and His Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with

Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilisation of Russia all our efforts have been greatly handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite of pacifying assurances Russia is\* taking such far-reaching measures against us that the situation is becoming continually more menacing.

### Exhibit 20.

#### I. His Majesty to the Czar.

July 28th, 10.45 p.m.

I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The inscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Servia, has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin

(Signed) WILHELM.

### Exhibit 21.

#### II. The Czar to His Majesty.

Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 p.m.

I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going too far.

(Signed) NICOLAS.

### Exhibit 22.

#### III. His Majesty to the Czar.

July 29th, 6.30 p.m.

I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the conservation of peace. However: I cannot—as I told You in my first telegram—consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an

\* NOTE.—The German text adds here *allen uns zugegangenen Nachrichten zufolge* ("according to all the information that has reached us").

"ignominious war." Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which—as I have already telegraphed You—my Government endeavours to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which—upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid—I willingly accepted.

(Signed)      WILHELM.

#### Exhibit 23.

#### IV. His Majesty to the Czar.

July 30th, 1 a.m.

My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisation. I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilised only against Serbia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilises against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders, You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.

(Signed)      WILHELM.

#### Exhibit 23a.

#### V. The Czar to His Majesty.

Peterhof, July 30th, 1914, 1.20 p.m.

I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.

NICOLAS.



**Exhibit 24.**

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.

In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilisation, Russia has mobilised her *entire* army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these Russian measures, we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war, which does not yet imply mobilisation. Mobilisation, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this at once to M. Sasonof and wire hour of communication.

**Exhibit 25.**

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.

Russia has ordered mobilisation of her entire army and fleet, therefore also against us in spite of our still pending mediation.\* We have therefore declared the threatening state of war which is bound to be followed by mobilisation unless Russia stops within 12 hours all measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilisation inevitably implies war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in 18 hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed necessary.

**Exhibit 26.**

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg on August 1st, 12.52 p.m. Urgent.

If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement :

“Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir que lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer.

A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun préparatif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement

\* NOTE.—The German text adds here *und obwohl wir selbst keinerlei Mobilisierungsmassnahmen getroffen haben* (“and although we ourselves have taken no measures towards mobilisation”).

Allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies en sistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus, que son action était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce qui suit :

Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain au nom de l'Empire relève le défi et Se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie."

Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this instruction by Russian time.

Please ask for Your passports and turn over protection and affairs to the American Embassy.

### Exhibit 27.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris, to the  
Chancellor on August 1st, 1.05 p.m.

Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister declared that France would do that which her interests dictated.

---

## APPENDIX.

---

REPORT OF A SPEECH DELIVERED BY HERR  
VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG, GERMAN  
IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, ON AUGUST  
4th, 1914.

## APPENDIX.

SPEECH OF THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR BEFORE THE  
GERMAN REICHSTAG, ON AUGUST 4TH, 1914.

A stupendous fate is breaking over Europe. For forty-four years, since the time we fought for and won the German Empire and our position in the world, we have lived in peace and have protected the peace of Europe. In the works of peace we have become strong and powerful, and have thus aroused the envy of others. With patience we have faced the fact that, under the pretence that Germany was desirous of war, enmity has been awakened against us in the East and the West, and chains have been fashioned for us. The wind then sown has brought forth the whirlwind which has now broken loose. We wished to continue our work of peace, and, like a silent vow, the feeling that animated everyone from the Emperor down to the youngest soldier was this: Only in defence of a just cause shall our sword fly from its scabbard.

The day has now come when we must draw it, against our wish, and in spite of our sincere endeavours. Russia has set fire to the building. We are at war with Russia and France—a war that has been forced upon us.

Gentlemen, a number of documents, composed during the pressure of these last eventful days, is before you. Allow me to emphasise the facts that determine our attitude.

From the first moment of the Austro-Servian conflict we declared that this question must be limited to Austria-Hungary and Servia, and we worked with this end in view. All Governments, especially that of Great Britain, took the same attitude. Russia alone asserted that she had to be heard in the settlement of this matter.

Thus the danger of a European crisis raised its threatening head.

As soon as the first definite information regarding the military preparations in Russia reached us, we declared at St. Petersburg in a friendly but emphatic manner that military measures against Austria would find us on the side of our ally, and that military preparations against ourselves would oblige us to take countermeasures; but that mobilization would come very near to actual war.

Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her desire for peace, and declared that she was making no military preparations against us.

In the meantime, Great Britain, warmly supported by us, tried to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

On July 28th the Emperor telegraphed to the Czar asking him to take into consideration the fact that it was both the duty and the right of Austria-Hungary to defend herself against the pan-Serb agitation, which threatened to undermine her existence. The

Emperor drew the Czar's attention to the solidarity of the interests of all monarchs in face of the murder of Serajevo. He asked for the latter's personal assistance in smoothing over the difficulties existing between Vienna and St. Petersburg. About the same time, and before receipt of this telegram, the Czar asked the Emperor to come to his aid and to induce Vienna to moderate her demands. The Emperor accepted the role of mediator.

But scarcely had active steps on these lines begun, when Russia mobilized all her forces directed against Austria, while Austria-Hungary had mobilized only those of her corps which were directed against Servia. To the north she had mobilized only two of her corps, far from the Russian frontier. The Emperor immediately informed the Czar that this mobilization of Russian forces against Austria rendered the role of mediator, which he had accepted at the Czar's request, difficult, if not impossible.

In spite of this we continued our task of mediation at Vienna and carried it to the utmost point which was compatible with our position as an ally.

Meanwhile Russia of her own accord renewed her assurances that she was making no military preparations against us.

We come now to July 31st. The decision was to be taken at Vienna. Through our representations we had already obtained the resumption of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, after they had been for some time interrupted. But before the final decision was taken at Vienna, the news arrived that Russia had mobilized her entire forces and that her mobilization was therefore directed against us also. The Russian Government, who knew from our repeated statements what mobilization on our frontiers meant, did not notify us of this mobilization, nor did they even offer any explanation. It was not until the afternoon of July 31st that the Emperor received a telegram from the Czar in which he guaranteed that his army would not assume a provocative attitude towards us. But mobilization on our frontiers had been in full swing since the night of July 30th-31st.

While we were mediating at Vienna in compliance with Russia's request, Russian forces were appearing all along our extended and almost entirely open frontier, and France, though indeed not actually mobilizing, was admittedly making military preparations. What was our position? For the sake of the peace of Europe we had, up till then, deliberately refrained from calling up a single reservist. Were we now to wait further in patience until the nations on either side of us chose the moment for their attack? It would have been a crime to expose Germany to such peril. Therefore, on July 31st we called upon Russia to demobilize as the only measure which could still preserve the peace of Europe. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also instructed to inform the Russian Government that in case our demand met with a refusal, we should have to consider that a state of war (*Kriegszustand*) existed.

The Imperial Ambassador has executed these instructions. We have not yet learnt what Russia answered to our demand for demobilization. Telegraphic reports on this question have not reached

us even though the wires still transmitted much less important information.

Therefore, the time limit having long since expired, the Emperor was obliged to mobilize our forces on the 1st August at 5 p.m.

At the same time we had to make certain what attitude France would assume. To our direct question, whether she would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German War, France replied that she would do what her interests demanded. That was an evasion, if not a refusal.

In spite of this, the Emperor ordered that the French frontier was to be unconditionally respected. This order, with one single exception, was strictly obeyed. France, who mobilized at the same time as we did, assured us that she would respect a zone of 10 kilometres on the frontier. What really happened? Aviators dropped bombs, and cavalry patrols and French infantry detachments appeared on the territory of the Empire! Though war had not been declared, France thus broke the peace and actually attacked us.

Regarding the one exception on our side which I mentioned, the Chief of the General Staff reports as follows :—

“Only one of the French complaints about the crossing of the frontier from our side is justified. Against express orders, a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, apparently led by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 2nd. They seem to have been shot down, only one man having returned. But long before this isolated instance of crossing the frontier had occurred, French aviators had penetrated into Southern Germany and had thrown bombs on our railway lines. French troops had attacked our frontier guards on the Schlucht Pass. Our troops, in accordance with their orders, have remained strictly on the defensive.” This is the report of the General Staff

Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity (*Notwehr*), and necessity (*Not*) knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory.

Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. It is true that the French Government declared at Brussels that France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as her adversary respected it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A French attack on our flank on the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained.

He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through (*durchhauen*).

Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary.

As for Great Britain's attitude, the statements made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons yesterday show the standpoint assumed by the British Government. We have informed the British Government that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France, and that we will not violate the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. These assurances I now repeat before the world, and I may add that, as long as

Great Britain remains neutral, we would also be willing, upon reciprocity being assured, to take no warlike measures against French commercial shipping.

Gentlemen, so much for the facts. I repeat the words of the Emperor: "With a clear conscience we enter the lists." We are fighting for the fruits of our works of peace, for the inheritance of a great past and for our future. The fifty years are not yet past during which Count Moltke said we should have to remain armed to defend the inheritance that we won in 1870. Now the great hour of trial has struck for our people. But with clear confidence we go forward to meet it. Our army is in the field, our navy is ready for battle—behind them stands the entire German nation—the entire German nation united to the last man.

Gentlemen, you know your duty and all that it means. The proposed laws need no further explanation. I ask you to pass them quickly.

---





## VIII.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK.

Servian names are spelt as in the German original according to the Croatian system. The following is the signification of the sounds :—

š	=	sh	in the English	"ship."
č		ch	„ „	"church."
ć			(the same, softer).	
c		ts	in the English	"mats."
j		y	„ „	"yell."
gj		dj	„ „	"adjourn."
ž		j	in the French	"jour."

## INTRODUCTION.

Since the dynasty of the Kargeorgević ascended the blood-stained throne of Servia, and surrounded itself with those who had conspired against the life of King Alexander, the Kingdom has continually, though by different paths and with varied intensity, pursued the aim of undermining by hostile propaganda and revolutionary plots, those territories of Austria-Hungary which are inhabited by the Southern Slavs, in order to tear them away from the Monarchy, whenever the general political condition might be favourable to the realisation of the Great-Servian claims.

To what a pitch the hopes of the kingdom on the Save had been raised, and how near she thought herself to the attainment of their aspirations, appeared in the embittered animosity and the deep disappointment which were created in this crazy and deluded country by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and which brought her to the verge of war.

Left in the lurch by Russia, the protecting Power, who did not at the moment consider herself sufficiently prepared, in the spring of 1909 the Servian Government found themselves compelled to give a solemn declaration before Europe, that they recognised the new political and international conditions which had been created by the annexation, and to acknowledge that the interests of Servia had not been affected thereby. They were also compelled to dissolve the gangs of armed men which had been raised against the Monarchy, and to undertake for the future to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary.

The expectations were not fulfilled that it would now be possible for the Monarchy to live in peace and good neighbourly relations with Servia, as she had lived during the rule of the Obrenović, and, as was then the case, to show good will to, and further the interests of this State, which owes to Austria-Hungary the recognition of her independence at the Berlin Congress. The Servian Government who, by their promise, were under an obligation to maintain friendly and neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, permitted their press to foment hatred against the Monarchy in an unprecedented way; they permitted associations formed on Servian territory under the leadership of high officers, civil servants, teachers and judges, publicly to pursue their aims with the object of stirring up revolution in the territories of Austria-Hungary; they did not prevent prominent members of their military and civil administration from poisoning the public conscience in such a way that common assassination was regarded as the best weapon in the struggle against the Monarchy. From the atmosphere created by this malicious agitation there sprang up a whole series of murderous attacks on high functionaries of the Monarchy, which ended in the execrable crime against the exalted person of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which had been carefully prepared in

Servia. However, the sacrifice of his life for the Fatherland, by which our enemies in their mad folly expected that the downfall of the Monarchy would be accelerated, brought all the peoples of Austria-Hungary together in fiery unanimity around the dynasty. The whole world learned how unshakable were the foundations on which the Monarchy rests, and how firmly and loyally her sons cling to one another. All felt it; there was no room for any doubt that our honour, our self-respect and our deepest interest peremptorily demanded that we should deal with the criminal conspiracies of Servia and obtain guarantees for the security of Austria-Hungary.

The unhappy experience which the Imperial and Royal Government had had with this dishonest neighbour showed us the only way by which our interests could be secured.

It was necessary to present to Servia all such demands and to require from her such guarantees as would ensure the punishment of the accomplices in this shameful outrage and the suppression of the Great-Servian projects. Since the unparalleled patience of Austria-Hungary had been interpreted as weakness by Servia, the Belgrade Government must be made to understand that the Monarchy was determined if necessary to go to the utmost limit in order to maintain her prestige and the integrity of her territories; and that she could not tolerate any longer the intrigues of the Save Kingdom, which were meant to deceive the Powers, by an apparent agreement to the demands of Austria-Hungary, while at the same time she kept open the possibility of continuing her underhand attack against the Monarchy as she had done after the solemn promise of 1909. Against the usual Servian tactics of using the most reprehensible means to work for the separation of the Southern-Slav territories of Austria-Hungary, and then, when the Monarchy called her to account, of seeking protection and impunity from the Powers, there was only one way open to the Imperial and Royal Government of protecting their territory, and making an end of the injury done to their commercial life by the constant repetition of the intolerable attacks engendered by Servian aspirations, if they were to avoid endangering the peace of Europe. From the beginning, the Imperial and Royal Government met the apprehensions of the Powers with the assurance that the Monarchy would not go beyond what was necessary for the protection of her own interests, and did not propose any annexation of territory. Within these limits, which she had imposed upon herself, she must, however, insist that the controversy with Servia should be carried through as a question directly concerning Austria-Hungary and this State. The request made by Russia for an extension of the time given to Servia for answering our demands would have given the Belgrade Government an opportunity for new subterfuges and for further procrastination, and would have opened the door to the interference of single Powers in the interests of Servia. It was therefore necessary to refuse any prolongation of the time limit. Although before sending her crafty and evasive answer, Servia had ordered general mobilisation, and thereby publicly proclaimed her hostility, the Monarchy waited two days before proceeding to a declaration of war. The suggestion of the British Government that

the settlement of the Servian controversy should be entrusted to a conference of the Powers did not reach Vienna until after the opening of hostilities, and was therefore outstripped by events. This proposal was, however, in itself, not well suited to securing the interests of the Monarchy. Nothing but the integral acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian demands on the part of the Belgrade Government would have given a guarantee for a tolerable relationship with Servia. The Entente Powers, however, were guided by the desire of substituting for the effective demands of Austria-Hungary, which were painful to Servia, a method of compromise, by which every security for a future correct attitude on the part of the Save Kingdom would have been lost, and Servia would have been encouraged to continue her endeavours to bring about a separation of the Southern territories of Austria-Hungary.

When the Imperial and Royal Government demanded from Servia that she should punish those accomplices in the crime of Serajevo who were in Servian territory, and fulfil the duties which are a necessary condition for friendly relationship between neighbouring States, their only object was to protect our dynasty from outrage and the territory of the Monarchy from criminal intrigues. They were representing the common interest of the civilised world that murder and outrage should not be used with impunity as a weapon in political controversy, and that Servia should not continue incessantly to menace the peace of Europe by her aspirations.

The Entente Powers were guilty of a serious wrong when, under the spell of their own political interests, they closed their ears to these postulates of public morality and humanity, and ranged themselves beside the Kingdom with its load of guilt. Had they listened to the assurances of the Monarchy which, by her conservative policy and her love of peace during the violent changes which had taken place in the Balkan Peninsula, had gained full right to their confidence, and had they maintained a waiting attitude towards the Servian conflict, the world-war would have been avoided. It is they who must be made answerable before history for the immeasurable suffering which has come upon the human race.

There can be no doubt that the small Servian State would never have ventured, with an animosity which was scarcely concealed, to work for the separation from the great neighbouring Monarchy of the territories which were inhabited by Southern Slavs, if she had not been sure of the secret approval and protection of Russia, and if she had not been able to depend on the powerful pan-Slavist tendency in the Empire of the Czar forcing the Russian Government, if necessary, to come to the aid of the Kingdom in her struggle for the realisation of the Great-Servian projects.

In the course of the two last centuries the Russian Empire has extended over gigantic areas with the elementary force of a glacier, and has, again and again, subdued fresh races under the Muscovite rule, suppressing their culture, religion and language. As the supreme and inflexible aim of this restless pressure towards universal dominion there stands before her the possession of the Dardanelles, which would secure to the Russian Empire predominance

in the near East and in Asia Minor, and gain for Russian exports an opening independent of the will of other countries.

As the realisation of these plans would injure important interests of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and as it was therefore bound to encounter the inevitable opposition of these Powers, it was the endeavour of Russian policy to weaken their power of resistance. The powerful central European union which barred the way to the universal dominion of Russia must be shattered, and Germany must be isolated. The first step was to hem in the Hapsburg Monarchy by the creation of the Balkan Union, and to undermine its authority by the pan-Slavist and Servian intrigues in its frontier territories. A necessary condition for carrying out this plan was the overthrow and expulsion of the Turks in order that the increased power of the Christian Balkan States should be available against the two central Powers.

When the Balkan Union broke up owing to the quarrel over the territory which had been torn from Turkey, and the Russian plans were threatened with failure, "the Protector of the Slavs" allowed Bulgaria to be overthrown, humiliated and deprived of the largest share of the territory which she had won. The Balkan Union which, after the overthrow of the Turks, could now be directed rather against Austria-Hungary and Germany, and could be used by Russia and France for changing the relations of the European Powers, was to be set on foot again by the prospect of the acquisition of fresh territories, planned at the cost of the Monarchy, through a successive pushing forward of frontier from east to west. In this criminal game of Russian diplomacy, which threatened the existence of the Monarchy and the peace of the world, Serbia was a catspaw which Russia would not give up even in order to avoid general war.

The Imperial and Royal Government—and the documents provided in this collection give ample evidence of this—again and again almost up to the outbreak of war assured the Cabinet of St. Petersburg that they would not violate any Russian interest, would not annex any Servian territory, and would not touch the sovereignty of Serbia, and that they were ready to enter into negotiations with the Russian Government on Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests. Russia, however, had not expressed herself as satisfied with the solemn declarations of the Imperial and Royal Government; as early as the 24th July, in the communiqué of that date, she assumed a threatening tone, and on the 29th July, although Austria-Hungary had not mobilised a single man against Russia, she ordered the mobilisation of the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kasan; this was a threat to the Monarchy; on the 31st July she ordered general mobilisation, disregarding the repeated warnings of the Imperial and Royal Ambassador, and the declaration of the German Government, which had been made on the 26th, that preparatory military measures on the part of Russia would force Germany to counter measures which must consist in the mobilisation of the army, and that mobilisation meant war.

On the 24th July the Imperial and Royal Ambassador in conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, laid stress on the

peaceful disposition of the Monarchy. Her only object was to make an end to the menace to our dynasty from Servian bombs, and to our territory from the revolutionary machinations of Servia.

The attainment of this end was a vital question to the Monarchy. She could not, therefore, allow herself to be terrorised by the possibility of a conflict with Russia, in the event of that country taking Servia under her protection ; she must make an end of the intolerable situation, that a Russian charter should give the Servian Kingdom continued impunity in her hostility to Austria-Hungary.

On the 30th July the British Secretary of State again suggested that Austria-Hungary, in her conflict with Servia, should avail herself of the mediation of the Powers. Guided by their desire to do the utmost in their power to maintain general peace, the Imperial and Royal Government declared themselves ready to accept this mediation. The honour and the interest of Austria-Hungary, however, required that this should not take place under the pressure of the threatening measures of Russia. It was, therefore, a paramount necessity for her to require that the hostile measures of mobilisation in the Empire of the Czar should, first of all, be revoked. This demand the St. Petersburg Cabinet answered by mobilising the whole of the Russian forces.

In alliance with the self-seeking policy of Great Britain, and the desire for *revanche* of the French Republic, the St. Petersburg Government disdained no means of securing predominance in Europe to the Triple Entente and paving the way for their boldest schemes.

Russia's unscrupulous hands tried to weave the threads of her policy into a snare to be cast over the head of the Monarchy. When Austria-Hungary, following the dictates of self-preservation, determined to tear the web to pieces, Russia attempted to stay the hand of the Imperial and Royal Government and to humiliate the Monarchy.

Exposed to the greatest danger in their vital interests, Austria-Hungary and Germany saw themselves confronted with the choice of protecting their rights and their safety, or of giving way before the threats of Russia.

They took the road pointed out by honour and duty.

---

## No. 1.

*Ritter von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold.*

*Belgrade, June 29, 1914.*

UNDER the terrible shock of yesterday's catastrophe it is difficult for me to give any satisfactory judgment on the bloody drama of Serajevo with the necessary composure and judicial calm. I must ask you, therefore, to allow me for the moment to limit myself to putting on record certain facts.

Yesterday, the 15/28, the anniversary of the battle of the Amsel-feld, was celebrated with greater ceremony than usual, and there were celebrations in honour of the Servian patriot, Miloš Obilić, who, in 1389 with two companions treacherously stabbed the victorious Murad.

Among all Servians, Obilić is regarded as the national hero. In place of the Turks, however, we are now looked on as the hereditary enemy, thanks to the propaganda which has been nourished under the aegis of the Royal Government and the agitation which has for many years been carried on in the press.

A repetition of the drama on the field of Kossovo seems, therefore, to have hovered before the minds of the three young criminals of Serajevo, Princip, Čabrinović and the third person still unknown, who also threw a bomb. They also shot down an innocent woman, and may therefore think that they have surpassed their model.

For many years hatred against the Monarchy has been sown in Servia. The crop has sprung up and the harvest is murder.

The news arrived at about 5 o'clock; the Servian Government at about 10 o'clock caused the Obilić festivities to be officially stopped. They continued, however, unofficially for a considerable time after it was dark. The accounts of eye-witnesses say that people fell into one another's arms in delight, and remarks were heard, such as: "It serves them right, we have been expecting this for a long time," or "This is revenge for the annexation."

## No. 2.

*Ritter Von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, June 30, 1914.*

TO-DAY I sent an enquiry to Herr Gruić, General Secretary of the Foreign Office, to ask the obvious question what measures the Royal police had taken, or proposed to take, in order to follow up the clues to the crime which notoriously are partly to be found in Servia.

The answer was that the matter has not yet engaged the attention of the Servian police.



## No. 3.

*M. Jehlitschka, Consul-General, to Count Berchtold.*

*Uskub, July 1, 1914.*

ON the 15/28 June the Feast of St. Vitus (Corpus Christi Day), which on this occasion coincided with the 525th anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld (1389), was for the first time officially celebrated as the "Festival of the Liberation" of the Servian nation.

For four months a special committee had worked at making this celebration an especially solemn and magnificent demonstration of Servian nationality.

The propaganda connected with this at the same time extended to Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia, but especially to Hungary; those who took part in it received free passes on the Servian State railways; food and lodging at low prices, maintenance by public bodies, &c., were promised.

The agitation was carried on with energy, and was with a definite end in view.

The visitors to the celebration at Prestina were brought in special trains.

The various speeches ran riot in historical reminiscences, which were connected with the scene of the celebration, and dealt under different aspects with the well-known theme of the union of all Servia and the "liberation of our brethren in bondage" beyond the Danube and the Save, even as far as Bosnia and Dalmatia.

When, during the course of the evening, the news of the horrible crime of which Serajevo had been the scene was circulated, the feeling which animated the fanatical crowd was, to judge by the numerous expressions of applause reported to me by authorities in whom I have absolute confidence, one that I can only characterise as inhuman.

In view of this attitude of the population, which was also displayed at Uskub, all attempts of the Servian press to divest Servia of the moral responsibility for a deed which was received by a representative gathering with such unvarnished satisfaction, collapse miserably.

## No. 4.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 4, 1914.*

TO-DAY I communicated to M. Poincaré the thanks of the Imperial and Royal Government for their sympathy.

In referring to the hostile demonstrations against Servia among us, he mentioned that after the murder of President Carnot, all Italians throughout France were exposed to the worst persecutions on the part of the people.

I drew his attention to the fact that that crime had no connection with any anti-French agitation in Italy, while in the present case it

must be admitted that for years past there has been an agitation in Servia against the Monarchy fomented by every means, legitimate and illegitimate.

In conclusion, M. Poincaré expressed his conviction that the Servian Government would meet us with the greatest willingness in the judicial investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices. No State could divest itself of this duty.

---

No. 5.

*Herr Hoflehner, Consular Agent, to Count Berchtold.*

*Nish, July 6, 1914.*

THE news of the terrible crime at Serajevo, which had been only too successful, created here a sensation in the fullest sense of the word. There was practically no sign of consternation or indignation; the predominant mood was one of satisfaction and even joy, and this was often quite open without any reserve, and even found expression in a brutal way. This is especially the case with the so-called leading circles—the intellectuals, such as professional politicians, those occupied in education, officials, officers and the students. Commercial circles adopted a rather more reserved attitude.

All explanations made by official Servian circles or individual higher personalities purporting to give expression to indignation at the crime and condemnation of it, must have the effect of the bitterest irony on anyone who has had an opportunity, during the last few days, of gaining an insight at first hand into the feelings of the educated Servian people.

On the day of the crime the undersigned had gone to a coffee garden at about 9 o'clock in the evening without any suspicion of what had happened, and here received from an acquaintance his first information as to the very definite rumour which was being circulated. It was painful in the highest degree to see and hear what a feeling of real delight seized the numerous visitors who were present, with what obvious satisfaction the deed was discussed, and what cries of joy, scorn and contempt burst out—even one who has long been accustomed to the expression of political fanaticism which obtains here, must feel the greatest depression at what he observed.

---

No. 6.

*Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.*

*Belgrade, July 21, 1914.*

AFTER the lamentable crime of June 28th, I have now been back at my post for some time, and I am able to give some judgment as to the tone which prevails here.

After the annexation crisis the relations between the Monarchy and Servia were poisoned on the Servian side by national chauvinism, animosity and an effective propaganda of Great-Servian aspirations carried on in that part of our territory where there is a Servian population; since the last two Balkan Wars, the success of Servia has

increased this chauvinism to a paroxysm, the expression of which in some cases bears the mark of insanity.

I may be excused from bringing proof and evidence of this; they can be had easily everywhere among all parties, in political circles as well as among the lower classes. I put it forward as a well-known axiom that the policy of Serbia is built up on the separation of the territories inhabited by Southern Slavs, and as a corollary to this on the abolition of the Monarchy as a Great Power; this is its only object.

No one who has taken the trouble to move and take part in political circles here for a week can be blind to this truth.

The hatred against the Monarchy has been further intensified as a result of the latest events which influence political opinion here; among them I count the crime of Serajevo, the death of Hartwig and the electoral campaign.

The crime at Serajevo has aroused among the Servians an expectation that in the immediate future the Hapsburg States will fall to pieces; it was this on which they had set their hopes even before; there has been dangled before their eyes the cession of those territories in the Monarchy which are inhabited by the Southern Slavs, a revolution in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the unreliability of the Slav regiments—this is regarded as ascertained fact and had brought system and apparent justification into their nationalist madness.

Austria-Hungary, hated as she is, now appears to the Servians as powerless, and as scarcely worthy of waging war with; contempt is mingled with hatred; she is ripe for destruction, and she is to fall without trouble into the lap of the Great-Servian Empire, which is to be realised in the immediate future.

Newspapers, not among the most extreme, discuss the powerlessness and decrepitude of the neighbouring Monarchy in daily articles, and insult its officials without reserve and without fear of reprimand. They do not even stop short of the exalted person of our ruler. Even the official organ refers to the internal condition of Austria-Hungary as the true cause of this wicked crime. There is no longer any fear of being called to account. For decades the people of Serbia has been educated by the press, and the policy at any given time is dependent on the party press; the Great-Servian propaganda and its monstrous offspring the crime of June 28th, are a fruit of this education.

I pass over the suspicions and accusations with regard to the death of Hartwig, which are on the verge of insanity, and were characterised by "The Times" as "ravings"\*; I do not mention the lying campaign in the press which, however, might strengthen Servians in the conviction that the Government and the representatives of Austria-Hungary are outlaws, and that appellations such as murderer, rogue, cursed Austrian, &c., are suitable stock epithets for us.

\* "The latest suggestion made in one of them (the Servian newspapers) is that M. de Hartwig's sudden death in the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade the other day was due to poison. Ravings of that kind move the contempt as well as the disgust of cultivated people, whatever their political sympathies may be."—*The Times*, July 16, 1913.

The death of Hartwig and the recognition of the gravity of this loss to the Servian political world, have let loose a fanatical cult of the deceased ; in this people were influenced not only by gratitude for the past, but also by anxiety for the future, and outbid one another in servile submissiveness to Russia in order to secure her goodwill in time to come.

As a third factor the electoral campaign has united all parties on a platform of hostility against Austria-Hungary. None of the parties which aspire to office will incur the suspicion of being held capable of weak compliance towards the Monarchy. The campaign, therefore, is conducted under the catchword of hostility towards Austria-Hungary.

For both internal and external reasons the Monarchy is held to be powerless and incapable of any energetic action, and it is believed that the serious words which were spoken by leading men among us are only "bluff."

The leave of absence of the Imperial and Royal Minister of War and Chief of the Staff have strengthened the conviction that the weakness of Austria-Hungary is now obvious.

I have allowed myself to trespass too long on the patience of Your Excellency, not because I thought that in what I have said I could tell you anything new, but because I considered this picture led up to the conclusion which forces itself upon me that a reckoning with Servia, a war for the position of the Monarchy as a Great Power, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided.

If we delay in clearing up our relations with Servia, we shall share the responsibility for the difficulties and the unfavourable situation in any future war which must, however, sooner or later be carried through.

For any observer on the spot, and for the representative of Austro-Hungarian interests in Servia, the question takes the form that we cannot any longer put up with any further injury to our prestige.

Should we therefore be determined to put forward far-reaching requirements joined to effective control—for this alone could clear the Augean stable of Great-Servian intrigues—then all possible consequences must be considered, and from the beginning there must be a strong and firm determination to carry through the matter to the end.

Half measures, the presentation of demands, followed by long discussions and ending only in an unsound compromise, would be the hardest blow which could be directed against Austria-Hungary's reputation in Servia and her position in Europe.

---

No. 7.

*Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Giesl in Belgrade.*

*Vienna, July 22, 1914.*

Austrian Note to Servia.

[See No. 4 of *British Correspondence*, page 3.]

---

## No. 8.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg and Constantinople.*

*Vienna, July 22, 1914.*

(Translated from the French.)

THE Imperial and Royal Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Royal Servian Government on Thursday, the 23rd instant, through the medium of the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade (see instructions to the Imperial and Royal Envoy in Belgrade of July 22nd, 1914).

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of

Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a *dossier* elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

---

No. 9.

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 23, 1914.*

As among the Entente Powers, Great Britain might be most easily led to form an impartial judgment on the step which we are to-day taking at Belgrade, I request Your Excellency in the conversation which you will have on the 24th instant on the occasion when you hand in our circular note at the Foreign Office, to point out among other matters that it would have been within the power of Servia to render less acute the serious steps which she must expect from us, by spontaneously doing what is necessary in order to start an inquiry on Servian soil against the Servian accomplices in the crime of 28th June, and by bringing to light the threads, which, as has been proved, lead from Belgrade to Servia.

Up to the present time, although a number of notorious indications point to Belgrade, the Servian Government have not taken any steps in this direction; on the contrary, they have attempted to wipe out the existing traces.

Thus, from a telegraphic despatch from our Legation at Belgrade, it is to be gathered that the Servian civil servant Ciganović, who is compromised by the independent testimony of the affidavits of both criminals, on the day of the outrage was still in Belgrade, and three days afterwards, when his name was mentioned in the papers, had already left the town. As is well known also, the director of the Servian press declared that Ciganović is completely unknown in Belgrade.

With regard to the short time-limit attached to our demand, this must be attributed to our long experience of the dilatory arts of Servia.

The requirements which we demand that Servia should fulfil, and which indeed contain nothing which is not a matter of course in the intercourse between States which are to live in peace and friendship, cannot be made the subject of negotiations and compromise; and, having regard to our economic interests, we cannot take the risk of a method of political action by which it would be open to Servia at pleasure to prolong the crisis which has arisen.

#### No. 10.

*Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*London, July 24, 1914.*

HAVE just handed the circular note to Sir Edward Grey, who read it carefully. At the fifth heading, he asked what it meant; to introduce officials of our Government in Servia would be equivalent to the end of Servian political independence. I answered that co-operation of, e.g., police officials, in no way affected the sovereignty of the State.

He regretted the time-limit, as in this way we should be deprived of the possibility of quieting the first outbreak of excitement and bringing pressure to bear upon Belgrade to give us a satisfactory answer. It was always possible to send an ultimatum if answer not satisfactory.

I developed our point of view at length. (Necessity of defence against continued revolutionary undertakings which threaten the territory of the Monarchy, protection of our most vital interests, complete failure of the conciliatory attitude which we had hitherto often shown to Servia, who had had more than three weeks to set on foot of her own accord investigations as to accomplices in outrage, &c.)

The Secretary of State repeated his objections to the short time-limit, but recognised that what was said as to complicity in the crime of Serajevo, as well as many of our other requirements, was justified.

He would be quite ready to look on the affair as one which only concerned Austria-Hungary and Servia. He is, however, very "apprehensive" that several Great Powers might be involved in a war.

Speaking of Russia, Germany and France, he observed that the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance might be more or less to the same effect as those of the Triple Alliance.

I fully explained to him our point of view, and repeated with emphasis that in this case we must stand firm so as to gain for ourselves some sort of guarantees, as hitherto Servian promises have never been kept. I understood that in the first place he considered the question only as it influences the position of Europe. He must, however, in order to be fair to our point of view, put himself in our situation.

He would not go into any more detailed discussion on this subject, said he must have time to study the note more carefully. He was to see the German and the French Ambassadors, as he must first of all exchange ideas with the Powers who are allies of Austria-Hungary and Russia respectively, but have themselves no direct interest in Servia.

---

No. 11.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

I HAVE just read instructions of the 22nd instant to the Minister of Justice, who is entrusted with the representation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in his absence, and left copy.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, who had received information as to the contents of our *démarche* at Belgrade through this morning's papers, seemed to be considerably impressed by my communication. Without entering on any more detailed discussion of the text, he readily agreed that recent events and the attitude of the Servian Government made energetic action on our side quite comprehensible.

Point 5 in the note handed in at Belgrade seemed to make a special impression on the Minister as he asked me to read it to him twice.

The Minister thanked me for my communication which, he said, would be carefully examined. I took the opportunity to impress on him that the question was one which must be brought to an issue directly between Servia and us, but that it was in the general interests of Europe that the trouble which for years past had been kept up by Servian intrigues against us should at last make way for a clear situation.

All friends of peace and order, and I placed France in the first rank of these, should therefore give serious advice to Servia completely to change her attitude, and to satisfy our just demands.

The Minister said that it was the duty of Servia to proceed energetically against any accomplices of the murderers of Serajevo, a duty which she could not escape. While laying special stress on the sympathy of France for Austria-Hungary, and on the good relations which existed between our two countries, he expressed the hope that



the controversy would be brought to an end peacefully in a manner corresponding to our wishes.

The Minister avoided every attempt to palliate or to defend in any way the attitude of Servia.

## No. 12.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

BARON SCHOEN will, in accordance with instructions, make a communication here to-day that according to the view of the Berlin Cabinet, our controversy with Servia is a matter which concerns only Austria-Hungary and Servia.

In this connection, he would give them to understand that in case third States should wish to intervene, Germany, true to the obligations of her alliance, would be on our side.

## No. 13.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

BARON SCHOEN has just made the *démarche* as he was instructed.

M. Bienvenu-Martin said to him he could not yet express himself definitely. He could, however, already say this, that the French Government are also of opinion that our controversy with Servia concerns Belgrade and Vienna alone, and that it was hoped here that the question would find a direct and peaceful solution.

The Servian Minister here had already been advised that his Government should give way in every point so far as it was possible, with the limitation, however, "so far as their sovereign rights were not affected."

Baron Schoen laid stress on the European necessity that the focus of constant disturbance at Belgrade must at last be done away with.

## No. 14.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs on receiving me, said that he knew what brought me to him, and he would at once explain to me that he could not take up any definite attitude towards my *démarche*. I began by

reading out my instructions. The Minister interrupted me for the first time on the mention of the series of outrages, and, on my explanation, asked if then it had been proved that they all had originated at Belgrade. I laid stress on the fact that they all sprang from Servian instigation. In the further course of the reading he said that he knew what it was all about: we wanted to make war on Servia, and this was to serve as a pretext. I replied that our attitude during recent years was a sufficient proof that we neither sought nor required pretexts against Servia. The formal declaration which is required did not elicit any objection from the Minister; he only continued to maintain that Pasić had already expressed himself to this effect. This I corrected. "*Il dira cela 25 fois si vous voulez*" said he. I said to him that no one among us was attacking the integrity of Servia or the dynasty. M. Sazonof expressed himself most vigorously against the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana, which Servia would never undertake. The participation of Imperial and Royal officials in the suppression of the revolutionary movements elicited further protest on the part of the Minister. Servia then will no longer be master in her own house. "You will always be wanting to intervene again, and what a life you will lead Europe." I answered that if Servia shows goodwill it will be a quieter life than hitherto.

The commentary added to the communication of the note was listened to by the Minister with fair composure; at the passage that our feelings were shared by those of all civilised nations, he observed that this was a mistake. With all the emphasis I could command, I pointed out how regrettable it would be if we could not come to an understanding with Russia on this question, in which everything which is most sacred to us was at stake and, whatever the Minister might say, everything which is sacred in Russia. The Minister attempted to minimise the Monarchical side of the question.

With regard to the dossier which was put at the disposal of the Governments, M. Sazonof wanted to know why we had given ourselves this trouble, as we had already delivered the ultimatum. This was the best proof that we did not really desire an impartial examination of the matter. I said to him that the results which had been attained by our own investigations were quite sufficient for our procedure in this matter, which had to do with Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that we were only ready to give the Powers further information if it interested them, as we had nothing to keep secret.

M. Sazonof said that now that the ultimatum had been issued he was not in the least curious. He represented the matter as if we only wanted to make war with Servia whatever happened. I answered that we were the most peace-loving Power in the world, but what we wanted was security for our territory from foreign revolutionary intrigues, and the protection of our dynasty from bombs.

In the course of the further discussion, M. Sazonof again made the observation that we certainly had created a serious situation.

In spite of his relative calm, the attitude of the Minister was throughout unaccommodating and hostile.

---

## No. 15.

*Communiqué of the Russian official Gazette.**St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

THE St. Petersburg telegraphic agency announces:—

The official journal publishes the following communiqué:—

Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Serbia by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely following the course of the dispute between the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent.

## No. 16.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

AFTER a Council of Ministers which lasted for five hours, M. Sazonof this evening received the German Ambassador, and had a long conversation with him.

The Minister took the point of view, which is probably to be considered as the outcome of the Council of Ministers, that the Austro-Hungarian-Servian conflict was not a matter confined to these States, but a European affair, as the settlement arrived at in the year 1909 by the Servian declaration had been made under the auspices of the whole of Europe.

The Minister pointed out particularly that he had been disagreeably affected by the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had offered a dossier for investigation when an ultimatum had already been presented. Russia would require an international investigation of the dossier, which had been put at her disposal. My German colleague at once brought to M. Sazonof's notice that Austria-Hungary would not accept interference in her difference with Serbia, and that Germany also on her side could not accept a suggestion which would be contrary to the dignity of her ally as a Great Power.

In the further course of the conversation, the Minister explained that that which Russia could not accept with indifference was the eventual intention of Austria-Hungary "*de dévorer la Serbie.*" Count Pourtalès answered that he did not accept any such intention on the part of Austria-Hungary, as this would be contrary to the most special interest of the Monarchy. The only object of Austria-Hungary was "*d'infliger à la Serbie le châtiement justement mérité.*" M. Sazonof on this expressed his doubts whether Austria-Hungary would allow herself to be contented with this, even if explanations on this point had been made.

The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof that Germany should work with Russia at the maintenance of peace. The German Ambassador assured the Russian Minister that Germany certainly had no wish to bring about a war, but that she naturally fully represented the interests of her ally.

## No. 17.

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

IN answer to Your Excellency's telegram of yesterday :

I beg you to explain at once to Sir Edward Grey that our *démarche* of yesterday at Belgrade is not to be considered as a formal ultimatum, but that it is merely a *démarche* with a time-limit, which, as Your Excellency will be good enough to explain to Sir Edward Grey in strict confidence will—if the time-limit expires without result—for the time be followed only by the breaking off of diplomatic relations, and by the beginning of the necessary military preparations, as we are absolutely resolved to carry through our just demands.

Your Excellency is empowered to add that if Serbia, after the expiration of the time-limit, were only to give way under the pressure of our military preparations, we should indeed have to demand that she should make good the expenses which we had incurred ; as is well known, we have already had twice (1908 and 1912) to mobilise because of Serbia.

## No. 18.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.**Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

I RECEIVED the Russian Chargé d'Affaires on the morning of the 24th, and assured him that I attached special importance to bringing to his knowledge as soon as possible the steps we were taking in Belgrade, and explaining to him our point of view as regards them.

Prince Koudacheff, while thanking me for this courtesy, did not hide his anxiety as to our categorical procedure against Serbia, and he observed that there had always been apprehension at St. Petersburg that our *démarche* might take the form of a humiliation of Serbia, which must have an echo in Russia.

I took the opportunity of re-assuring the Russian Chargé d'Affaires as to this. Our aim was to clear up the untenable position of Serbia as regards the Monarchy, and with this object to cause the Government of that State on the one hand publicly to disavow the tendencies directed against the present position of the Monarchy, and to suppress them by administrative measures, and on the other hand to make it possible for us to satisfy ourselves that these measures were honestly carried out. I explained at greater length the danger, not only to the integrity of the Monarchy, but also to the balance of power and the peace of Europe, which would be involved in giving further scope to the Great-Servian propaganda, and how all the dynasties and, not least, the Russian, would apparently be threatened, if the idea took root that a movement which made use of murder as a national weapon could be continued with impunity.

In conclusion, I pointed out that we did not aim at any increase of territory, but only at the maintenance of what we possess, a point of view which could not fail to be understood by the Russian Government.

Prince Koudacheff remarked on this that he did not know the view of his own Government, and also did not know what position Serbia would take towards individual demands.

At the conclusion of our interview the Chargé d'Affaires expressly said that he would not fail to bring to the notice of his Government the explanation which I had given him of the step we had taken, especially to the effect that no humiliation of Serbia was intended by us.

### No. 19.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg and Constantinople.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

YOUR EXCELLENCY will find herewith the dossier mentioned in the circular note to the Powers with reference to the Great-Servian propaganda, and its connection with the Serajevo murder.

Your Excellency is instructed to bring this dossier to the notice of the Government to which you are accredited.

### *Enclosure.*

The Servian agitation, which has as its object the separation from the Austrian Monarchy of the Southern Slav districts in order to unite them with the Servian State, dates from far back.

This propaganda on Servian soil, always the same in its ultimate object, although varying in its means and intensity, reached one of its culminating points at the time of the annexation crisis. Throwing off the protecting cloak of secrecy, it then revealed its purpose openly and undisguisedly, and attempted, under the patronage of the Servian Government, to attain its ends by every means in its power.

While the whole of the Servian press was calling for war against the Monarchy by malicious invectives in which facts were perverted, apart from other means of propaganda, associations were being formed to prepare for this war.

The Narodna Odbrana stood out as the most important of these associations. Having its origin in an already existing revolutionary committee, it was constituted as a private society, although in fact it took the form of an organisation of Servian military and civil officials wholly dependent on the Foreign Office at Belgrade. Amongst its founders one may mention: General Božo Janković, ex-ministers Ljuba Jovanović, Ljuba Davidović, and Velislav Vulović, Živojin Dačić (Director of the Government printing establishment), and Majors (then Captains) Voja Tankosić and Milan Pribičević. This association aimed

at the creation and equipment of free companies for use in the impending war against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. (See Appendix 2.)

A convincing description of the activity at that time of the Narodna Odbrana will be found amongst others in the deposition of Trifko Krstanović, a Bosnia-Herzegovinian subject, in the course of his evidence before the district court at Serajevo ; he was then at Belgrade, and had been accepted by the Narodna Odbrana, with other subjects of the Monarchy as a komitadji. At the beginning of 1909, Krstanović had arrived with about 140 fellow-members at a school established for the formation of new bands at Čuprija (in the district of Jagodina), managed by Captains Voja Tankosić and Dušan Putnik. The only instructors at this school were Servian officers. General Božo Janković and Captain Milan Pribičević inspected the three-monthly courses of these bands at regular intervals.

The new komitadjis received their training in musketry, bomb throwing, mine laying, blowing up of railways, tunnels and bridges, and the destruction of telegraph wires. According to the instructions of their leaders, it was their duty to put into practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina the knowledge they had recently acquired.

By this action, carried on in the most open manner and encouraged by the Servian Government, the Narodna Odbrana was thus prepared for guerilla warfare against Austria-Hungary. In this way subjects of the Monarchy were led into treason against their country, and induced, as Servian emissaries, systematically to practice underhand attacks against the means of defence of their country.

This period of aggressive aspirations ended with the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 31st March, 1909, in which the Government of Belgrade announced that they were prepared to accept the new situation created in municipal and international law by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and solemnly promised to maintain in future friendly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

With this declaration, the agitation, which constituted a source of constant trouble to Austria-Hungary, seemed to have come to an end, and the road to an amicable *rapprochement* between Servia and the Monarchy to have been entered on. Deprived of the encouragement of the Servian Government, and combated by that Government in accordance with their engagements, the propaganda hostile to the Monarchy could only have continued a shadowy existence and would have been condemned to early destruction. On the other hand, the ties of language, race and culture existing between the Southern Slav districts of the Monarchy and Servia ought to have resulted in the realisation of a task of common development inspired by mutual friendship and parallel interests.

These hopes, however, have not been realised.

Aspirations hostile to the Monarchy have continued, and under the eyes of the Servian Government, who have done nothing to suppress this movement, the anti-Austro-Hungarian propaganda has only increased in extent and volume. Hatred against the Monarchy has been fanned and kindled into an irreconcilable feeling. The Servian people alike by adapting their former course of action to the new

situation and by supplementing it by fresh methods were summoned to the "inevitable death struggle" against Austria-Hungary. Secret ramifications have been systematically spread towards the Slav districts in the south of the Monarchy whose subjects have been incited to treason against their country.

Above all, the Servian press has since then worked incessantly in this spirit.

Up to the present time no fewer than eighty-one newspapers appearing in Servia have had to forfeit their right to delivery through the post on account of their contents falling within the scope of the penal law.

There is hardly a clause in the penal code protecting the sacred person of the Monarch and the members of the Imperial Family, or the integrity of the State, that has not been violated by Servian papers.

A few examples of these press views, selected from the great mass of material published by the press at various dates, are contained in Appendix I.

Without entering into a detailed account of these expressions of Servian public opinion, it is necessary to note that in spite of the formal recognition accorded by Servia, it has never ceased to consider the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both before and after the event, as a robbery committed against Servia for which reparation is due. This idea not only constantly recurs with every modulation of its coarse language in the papers professing most advanced views, but also finds expression in hardly veiled terms in the "Samouprava," which is in such close touch with the Foreign Office of Belgrade. (See Appendix I (b).)

Nor can one omit to draw attention to the manner in which the attempt made on the 15th June, 1910, at Serajevo, by Bogdan Zerajić against the Feldzeugmeister von Varešanin, Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was turned to account by the press.

As is known, Zerajić had killed himself immediately after his deed, and before committing it had burnt all his papers. Under these circumstances, it was impossible to throw full light upon the motives of his crime. It could, however, be inferred from a document found on his person that he was a follower of the views of Krapotkin. Evidence collected leads likewise to the conclusion that the crime was of an anarchist type.

This, however, did not prevent the Servian press from celebrating the criminal as a national Servian hero and from glorifying his deed. Indeed, the "Politika" protested strongly against the idea that Zerajić was an anarchist, and declared him to be "a Servian hero whose name all Servians will repeat with respect and grief."

The "Politika" considers the 18th August\* of the same year as a suitable opportunity on which to return to the crime of Zerajić, "whose name will be sacred to the people," and to celebrate the outrage in verse. (See Appendix I (a).)

In this way this crime, which had nothing to do with the territorial aspirations against the Monarchy, was exploited for the furtherance

\* Birthday of His Imperial and Apostolic Majesty.

of these ideas and by the glorifying of Zerajić, murder was hailed in the most explicit way as a glorious means towards the realisation of this aim and one worthy to be imitated in the struggle. This approbation of murder as a weapon fully admissible in the struggle against the Monarchy re-appears later in the press in discussing the attempt made by Jukić against the Royal Commissioner von Cuvaj. (See Appendix I (c).)

These newspapers, which were circulated not only in Serbia but also, as we shall show later, illicitly smuggled into the Monarchy by well-organised secret methods, have awakened and kept alive this mood in the masses, a mood which has provided a fruitful field for the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy.

The Narodna Odbrana became the centre of the agitation carried on by the associations. The same persons who were at its head at the time of the annexation still control it. Now as then, they still control it in the capacity of the most active and energetic organisers, the most violent opponents of the Monarchy; General Božo Janković, Živojin Dačić (Director of the Government printing establishment), and Majors Milan Pribičević and Voja Tankosić. Organised on a broad and far-reaching scale and constituted on a strict hierarchical basis (see Appendix 2, "Organisation"), the Narodna Odbrana counted soon some 400 committees which developed a very active agitation.

Moreover, the Narodna Odbrana became closely allied with the "shooting federation" (*Schützenbund*), (762 societies), the great Sokol\* Association "Dusan" (2,500 members), the Olympian Club, the association of horsemen (*Reiterverein*), "Prince Michael," the society of sportsmen (*Jägerbund*), and the league of development (*Kulturliga*), as well as numerous other associations all of which, subordinate to it, were under the guidance and protection of the Narodna Odbrana, and worked on the same lines. Becoming more and more closely intermingled, these associations arrived at a complete amalgamation in such a way that to-day they are nothing but members of the single body of the Narodna Odbrana.

Thus the Narodna Odbrana has set up all over Serbia a close network of agitation, and has attracted to its principles all those who were receptive of its ideas.

The official publications of the Narodna Odbrana demonstrate sufficiently clearly the spirit which animates it.

While in its statutes, it represents itself as an "educational society" (*Kulturreverein*) concerning itself only with the spiritual and physical improvement of the Servian population and its material progress, the Narodna Odbrana discloses in its official publication (see Appendix 2) the true and single motive of its existence in that which it calls its "re-organised programme": to preach to the Servian people the sacred truth by "fanatical and indefatigable work" under the pretence that the Monarchy wishes to "take away Servian liberty and language and even to destroy her"; that it is an essential necessity

[\* Sokol = falcon. The name given to gymnastic associations throughout Slav countries which have adopted the falcon as their emblem.]



to wage against Austria-Hungary, her "first and greatest enemy," "a war of extermination with rifle and cannon, and "by every means" to prepare the people for this war, which is "to liberate the conquered territories," in which "seven million brothers are suffering in bondage."

All the efforts "at an educational programme" (*Kulturbestrebungen*) of the Narodna Odbrana are exclusively concerned with this idea simply as a means for the organisation and education of the people for the longed-for death struggle against the Monarchy.

All the associations affiliated to the Narodna Odbrana work in the same spirit; the Sokol Association at Kragujevac will serve as an example (see Appendix 3).

As in the case of the Narodna Odbrana, officers, professors and civil servants are at its head.

The speech in which its President, Major Kovačević, opened the annual meeting of 1914, made absolutely no mention of physical training, which is supposed to be the real object of a Sokol association, and confined itself solely to "the preparations for war" against the "dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the north" who "robs millions of Servian brothers of their liberty and rights, and holds them in bondage and chains."

In the administrative reports of this association the technical work is placed entirely in the background, and only serves as headlines for the avowal of the real "objects of the activities of the administration," namely, the preparation of national development and the strengthening of the "oppressed nation" with the object of enabling it to carry out its "incomplete programme and its unfinished task," and to accomplish that "great action" "which is to be carried out in the near future," "the liberation of those brothers who live across the Drina, who are suffering the martyrdom of the crucified."

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial reports to send forth the appeal that "falcons must be reared" capable "of bringing freedom to the brothers still in bondage."

As in the case of the "educational programme" of the Narodna Odbrana, the gymnastic activity of the Sokols is not the real object but merely a means at the service of the same propaganda carried on in the same spirit, and even with the very same words.

When the Narodna Odbrana appeals to the "people" for a death struggle against the Monarchy, it does not address itself only to the Servian people, but to all Southern Slav nationalities. In the eyes of the Narodna Odbrana, the Slav regions in the south of the Monarchy are regarded as "our subjected Servian territories." (See Appendix 4.) The Southern Slav subjects of the Monarchy are further also expected to take part in this "national work." This "healthy and necessary work" is, therefore, to be carried on beyond the Servian frontier. The Narodna Odbrana recruits its "heroes for this holy war" even on the soil of the Monarchy, and among them Obilic, the murderer of Murad, is to light them on their way as an example of sacrifice for one's country worthy of imitation.

But in order to incite "brothers outside Servia" to share in "the work of private effort," the Narodna Odbrana keeps in close touch

with the "brothers beyond the frontier." It is not said in the publications of the society, how this intimate association is carried out, no doubt because it appertains to that part of the "common work" which "for many reasons cannot, or ought not to be divulged."

How comprehensive this branch of its activity is, can be seen by the fact that not only the central committee of the Narodna Odbrana, but also certain of its local committees contain special sections for "foreign affairs."

This "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated branches is extremely varied.

What is relatively less dangerous inasmuch as it can be officially controlled, consists of lecture tours undertaken by distinguished members of the Narodna Odbrana in the south-eastern parts of the Monarchy where they speak before various societies on national or educational subjects. These tours give the speakers the desired opportunity, which is indeed the chief object of these journeys, of explaining the true aims of the associations in language more or less veiled, which is intelligible to those who are already initiated.

Amongst these emissaries, one of the best known is Živojin Đačić (Director of the Government printing establishment), already several times alluded to; it was he who, on the 8th August, 1909, issued an "appeal" to the Servian people in which he called Austria-Hungary the enemy of Servia, and exhorted them to prepare for the war against the Monarchy. On numerous occasions, Đačić undertook tours of this nature in the south-eastern districts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. During one of these lectures at Karlovci in 1912, he flung his accustomed prudence to the winds and spoke openly of the "union of all Serbs against the common foe," by which he designated Austria-Hungary in unmistakable language.

More dangerous are the relations with associations in the Monarchy formed by Servian associations imbued with the spirit of the Narodna Odbrana under the cloak of community of interests and of culture; for the mutual visits of these associations, whether by delegates or in bodies, which escape all official control, are utilised by the Servians for all sorts of plots against the Monarchy.

Thus, for instance, at the well-known feast of the Prosvjeta Association at Serajevo, in September, 1912, an envoy of the Narodna Odbrana had the effrontery secretly to recruit Bosnian adherents to his society. (See Appendix 6.) The message which the representative of the Sokol Association at Kragujevac brought to the "brothers in Bosnia" at this feast was: "We have not forgotten you; the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still powerful"—a thought which in confidential intercourse would no doubt have found quite a different expression and one better corresponding to the tendencies of this society which we have already explained. (See Appendix 3.) As to the events that take place at meetings of the same kind in Servia, the Imperial and Royal authorities cannot have any information founded on unimpeachable authority, as they only possess on this matter confidential information which it is difficult to check. In this connection, one may mention the visit of Agram students to Servia in April, 1912, who received from the Servians an official military

reception accompanied even by a review of troops in their honour, and that in a manner so suggestive that the administrative report of the Sokol Association at Kragujevac could say: "This event marks the beginning and germ of a great deed which will be accomplished in the near future, it is a germ which will ripen when the soul of the people bursts its bonds and until there is no barrier that has not been destroyed."

It is only recently that it has come to the knowledge of the Austro-Hungarian authorities that the Servian Sokol associations have succeeded in inducing similar societies into the Monarchy to establish a connection with them which is up to the present secret, and the character of which is not yet quite clear, for the inquiries on this point are still in progress. Up to the present, however, the information obtained permits the conclusion that traces have been discovered of one of the ways by which the subversive aims of the Servian Sokols and their friends have poisoned the minds of certain groups of mistaken and misled persons in the Monarchy.

This propaganda which is aimed at wider circles, and is rather of a preparatory nature, assumes minor importance compared with that of the "foreign work" which is conducted by the Narodna Odbrana and its friends in the form of personal agitation among individuals. It is in this field that the most melancholy results are shown.

By means of confidential and secret emissaries, it carries the poison of rebellion to the circles of men of mature age as well as those of irresponsible youth.

It is thus, for example, that the late officers of the Honved V.B., D.K., V.M., and the lieutenant of Croatian-Slavonian Gendarmerie V.K., led astray by Milan Priviĉević, left the service of the army of the Monarchy under most suspicious circumstances and turned to Serbia; they have seen in the meanwhile most of their dreams unrealised and some of them, at any rate, are thinking of returning to the Fatherland they have betrayed.

The agitation introduced from Serbia into the middle schools of Croatia and Bosnia is unhappily too well known to need illustration; what is less known is that people who have been expelled from Croatian and Bosnian schools owing to grave breaches of discipline, are received in Serbia with open arms, and often even protected by the State and educated as enemies of the Monarchy. The Servian schools with their anti-Austrian staffs, and their large number of professors and teachers who are members of the Narodna Odbrana, are clearly establishments thoroughly adapted for training experts of this kind. A very notable case of this sort may be quoted here. In March, 1914, several pupils of the Training College of Pakrac (Croatia) were dismissed on account of a strike. They went to Serbia, where some of them immediately obtained situations as schoolmasters, while others were admitted to a college for teachers. One of those who had been thus dismissed, and who was connected with anti-Austrian circles, declared publicly that he and his people would give a proof, during the sojourn of the hereditary Archduke in Bosnia, that this province was Servian territory. It is, as we may add, highly significant that during the stay of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia, the Royal

Servian Prefect of the district of Krajna gave to the three training college students, who were thus gravely implicated, Servian passports in which he falsely described them as Servian subjects, although he must have known that they were Croatians. With these passports, the three agitators were able to enter the Monarchy without being noticed, where, however, they were eventually recognised and arrested.

All this is not, by a long way, enough to give a complete representation of the "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana.

The Imperial and Royal Government had been informed for a long time past by confidential reports that the Narodna Odbrana had made military preparations for the war which it desired to make against the Monarchy, inasmuch as it kept emissaries in Austria-Hungary, who, as soon as hostilities broke out, would attempt in the usual guerilla manner to destroy means of transport and equipment and stir up revolt or panic. (See Appendix 7.)

The criminal proceedings taken in 1913 by the District Court at Serajevo against Jovo Jagličić and his associates for espionage (Appendix 6), confirm this confidential information. As at the time of its foundation, the preparation for guerilla warfare still figures in the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, to which must now be further added a complete system of espionage.

It is for this reason that the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, described as "re-organised," is in reality an extended programme which includes the preparation for a "war of extermination" against the Monarchy, and even its realisation, and finally the unfurling of the "ancient red flag of the Narodna Odbrana."

Acts of terrorism must finally result from this atmosphere of hatred against the Monarchy, which is publicly and secretly provoked, and from an agitation which considers itself free from all responsibility; in order to bring them about, all means are regarded as permissible in the struggle against Austria-Hungary, including even without any sense of shame common acts of murder.

On the 8th June, 1912, a man named Lukas Jukić shot Von Cuvaj, the Royal Commissioner at Agram, with the result that the Councillor (*Banalarat*) Von Hervoić, who was seated in the same carriage was mortally wounded. Jukić, in his flight, shot a policeman who was pursuing him, and wounded two others.

From the subsequent public investigation it appeared that Jukić was saturated with the ideas and plans propagated by the Narodna Odbrana, and that although Jukić had for some time past been devoting himself to criminal schemes, these schemes were only matured after he had made an excursion to Belgrade, together with the Agram students on the 18th of April, 1912. At the noisy celebrations in honour of the visitors, Jukić had entered into relations with several people belonging to the circle of the Narodna Odbrana, with whom he had had political discussions. A few days afterwards he returned to Belgrade, and there received from a Servian major a bomb, and from a comrade the Browning pistol with which he carried out his crime.

In the opinion of experts, the bomb found at Agram was made in an arsenal for military purposes.

Jukić's attempt had not been forgotten, when on the 18th of August, 1913, Stephen Dojčić, who had returned from America, made an attempt on the life of the Royal Commissioner, Baron Skerlec, at Agram—an attempt which was the outcome of action organised by the Servians among the Southern Slavs living in America, and which was also the work of the "foreign" propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and its confederates.

A pamphlet by the Servian, T. Dimitrijević, printed in Chicago, and entitled "Natrag u staro ognjiste vaše," with its unbridled attacks against His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, and its appeal to the Servians of the Monarchy with reference to their impending "deliverance," and urging them to migrate home to Serbia, demonstrates the fact that the propaganda carried out unchecked in America from Serbia, and that carried on from Serbia in the territory of the Monarchy, worked on parallel lines.

And again, scarcely a year later, Agram was the scene of a new outrage, this time unsuccessful.

On the 20th of May, 1914, Jakob Schäfer made an attempt at the Agram Theatre on the life of the Ban, Freiherr von Skerlec, an attempt which was frustrated at the last moment by a police official. The subsequent investigation revealed the existence of a plot inspired by Rudolf Hercigonja. From the depositions of Hercigonja and his five accomplices, it is manifest that this crime also originated in Serbia.

Having taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate Jukić, Hercigonja fled to Serbia (October, 1912), where, together with his accomplice Marojan Jakšić, he consorted with the komitadjis and members of the Narodna Odbrana. As frequently happens when immature minds are excited by occupying themselves too early with political questions, the result of this corrupting company was here also disastrous. Hercigonja returned home impressed by the dogma learnt in Belgrade that the Southern Slav territories of Austria-Hungary must be separated from it and re-united to the Servian kingdom. He had further been persuaded by the teachings of the friends with whom he associated there, that this object should be pursued by means of attempts on the lives of persons holding high office and leading politicians of the Monarchy as the only means of obtaining this end.

This is the spirit in which Hercigonja influenced his friends at Agram and converted some of them to his ideas. Foremost among his plans was the carrying out of an attempt on the life of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

A few months before proceedings had been taken against Luka Aljinović for treasonable agitation. In the course of these proceedings three witnesses declared that Aljinović had told him that in the year 1913 he had received at Belgrade 100 dinar from the Narodna Odbrana, and a similar sum from a secret association of students, for purposes of agitation, but especially to carry out an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

It is clear how far the criminal agitation of the Narodna Odbrana and those who shared in its views, has of late been primarily directed against the person of the hereditary Archduke. From these facts,

the conclusion may be drawn that the Narodna Odbrana, as well as the associations hostile to the Monarchy in Servia, which were grouped round it, recently decided that the hour had struck to translate theory into practice.

It is noteworthy, however, that the Narodna limits itself in this way to inciting, and where the incitement has fallen on fertile soil to providing means of material assistance for the realisation of its plans, but that it has confided the only dangerous part of this propaganda of action to the youth of the Monarchy, which it has excited and corrupted, and which alone has to bear the burden of this miserable "heroism."

All the characteristics of this procedure are found in the history and origin of the profoundly regrettable outrage of the 28th of June (see Appendix 8).

Princip and Grabež are characteristic examples of young men who have been poisoned from their school days by the doctrines of the Narodna Odbrana.

At Belgrade, where he frequented the society of students imbued with these ideas, Princip busied himself with criminal plans against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, against whom the hatred of the Servian element hostile to the Monarchy was particularly acute on the occasion of his tour in the annexed territories.

He was joined by Čabrinović, who moved in the same circles, and whose shifting and radically revolutionary views, as he himself admits, as well as the influence of his surroundings in Belgrade and the reading of the Servian papers, inspired him with the same sense of hostility to the Monarchy, and brought him into the propaganda of action.

Thanks to the state of mind in which he already was, Grabež succumbed very quickly to this milieu, which he now entered.

But however far this plot may have prospered, and however determined the conspirators may have been to carry out the attempt, it would never have been effected, if people had not been found, as in the case of Jukić, to provide the accomplices with means of committing their crime. For, as Princip and Čabrinović have expressly admitted, they lacked the necessary arms, as well as the money to purchase them.

It is interesting to see where the accomplices tried to procure their arms. Milan Pribičević and Živojin Đačić, the two principal men in the Narodna Odbrana, were the first accomplices thought of as a sure source of help in their need, doubtless because it had already become a tradition amongst those ready to commit crimes, that they could obtain instruments for murder from these representatives of the Narodna Odbrana. The accidental circumstance that these two men were not at Belgrade at the critical moment doubtless balked this plan. However, Princip and Čabrinović were not at a loss in finding other help, that of Milan Čiganović, an ex-komitadji, and now a railway official at Belgrade, and at the same time an active member of the Narodna Odbrana, who, in 1909, first appeared as a pupil at the school (*Bandenschule*) at Cuprija (see Appendix 5). Princip and Čabrinović were not deceived in their expectations, as they at once received the necessary help from Čiganović.

The latter, and at his instigation, his friend Major Voja Tankosić, of the Royal Servian Army, also one of the leaders of the Narodna Odbrana, who has already been mentioned several times, and who, in 1908, was at the head of the school of armed bands at Čuprija (see Appendix 5), now appear as moving spirits and active furtherers in the plot; the repulsive manner in which they approved as a matter of course, is significant of the moral qualities of the whole anti-Austrian movement. They had at first only one doubt, and that but a fleeting one, as to whether the three conspirators were really resolved to commit this act. This doubt, however, soon disappeared, thanks to their insidious counsels. Thenceforth they were prepared to give every assistance. Tankosić produced four Browning pistols, ammunition and money for the journey; six hand-grenades from the Servian army supplies completed the equipment, of which the composition and origin recalls the case of Jukić. Anxious about the success of the attempt, Tankosić had the conspirators instructed in shooting, a task which Čiganović carried out with a success which has since been fully proved. Tankosić and Čiganović were further anxious to ensure secrecy for the plot by special means which had not been bargained for by the assassins. They therefore supplied cyanide of potassium, telling the two culprits to commit suicide after the crime, a precaution which was to be specially advantageous to themselves, as secrecy would thus relieve them of the slight danger which they were incurring in the enterprise. Sure death for the victims of their corruption, perfect security for themselves, this is the motto of the Narodna Odbrana, as was already known.

In order to render the execution of the crime possible, it was necessary that the bombs and arms should be secretly smuggled into Bosnia. There again Čiganović gave all the assistance in his power; he wrote out for the conspirators the exact route to be followed, and assured them of the collusion of the Servian Customs officials for getting them into Bosnia. The way in which this journey, described by Princip as "mysterious," was organised and carried out can leave no doubt but that this route was a secret one, prepared in advance, and already often used for the mysterious designs of the Narodna Odbrana. With an assurance and a certainty which could only result from long habit, the frontier guards at Šabac and Loznica lent their administrative organisation for the purpose. The secret transport with its complicated system of ever-changing guides, who were summoned as if by magic, and who were always on the spot when wanted, was effected without a hitch. Without inquiring into the object of this strange journey of some immature students, the Servian authorities set this smooth machinery into motion at a word from the ex-komitadji and minor railway official, Čiganović. However, they had no need to ask any questions, as from the instructions they had received, it was perfectly clear that a new "mission" of the Narodna Odbrana was being carried out. The sight of the arsenal of bombs and revolvers caused the exciseman Grbić merely to smile good-naturedly and approvingly—sufficient proof of how accustomed they were on this "route" to find contraband of this nature.

The Royal Servian Government have taken a grave responsibility on their shoulders, in allowing all this to take place.

Though bound to cultivate neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, they have allowed their press to disseminate hatred against the Monarchy; they have allowed associations established on their own territory under the leadership of high officers, of public officials, of professors and of judges, to carry on openly a campaign against the Monarchy, with the ultimate object of inciting its citizens to revolution; they have not prevented men devoid of all moral scruples, who share in the direction of its military and civil administration from poisoning the public conscience, so that in this struggle low murder appears as the best weapon.

## APPENDIX 1.

### OPINIONS OF THE SERVIAN PRESS.

(a) The "Politika," on the 18th August, 1910, on the occasion of the eightieth birthday of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, published a large portrait of Bogdan Zerajić, who, two months earlier, had made a murderous attack on the Governor of Bosnia, Freiherr Von Varešanin. In the article dealing with this, the following observations were made:—"Two months ago, on the 2nd of June (old style), on the opening day of the Diet of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a young Servian, the student Bogdan Zerajić, made an attempt in Serajevo to kill the Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, General Marian Varešanin. Zerajić fired five shots at this renegade, who had assured his career by pouring out the blood of his brothers in the famous insurrection in Rakovica, but, owing to a remarkable accident, did not succeed in killing him. Whereon the brave and composed Zerajić fired the sixth and last bullet through his own head, and immediately fell dead. In Vienna, they knew very well that it was not the reading of Russian and revolutionary writings which had induced Zerajić to make his attempt, but that he acted thus as the noble scion of a race which wished to protest against foreign rule in this bloody way. Therefore, they sought to hush up the whole matter as quickly as possible, and—contrary to their custom—to avoid an affair which would have still more compromised the Austrian Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Vienna, it was desired that every memory of Zerajić should be extinguished, and that no importance should be attached to his attempt; but just this fear of the dead Zerajić, and the prohibition against mentioning his name throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, brought it about that his name is spoken among the people as something sacred to-day, on the 18th of August, perhaps more than ever.

"To-day, we too light a candle at his grave and cry 'Honour to "Zerajić!"'"



To this is added a poem, the translation of which is as follows :—

“ Bosnia lives and is not dead yet,  
 In vain have you buried her corpse ;  
 Still the chained victim spits fire,  
 Nor is it yet time to sing the dirge.  
 With devil’s hand you have scratched a grave for her  
 But the living dead will not descend into the vault ;  
 Emperor, dost thou hear ?  
 In the flash of the revolver the leaden bullets hiss about  
     thy throne !  
 These are not slaves ; this is glorious freedom  
 Which flashes from the bold hand of the oppressed !  
 Why does this horrible Golgotha shudder ?  
 Peter drew the sword in Christ’s defence,  
 His hand fell, but out of the blood  
 A thousand brave hands will rise ;  
 That shot was only the first herald  
 Of the glorious Easter after Golgotha’s torments.”

(b) On the 8th October, 1910, on the occasion of the anniversary of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the “Politika” and the “Mali Journal,” the last of which appeared with a black border, published articles in which they indulged in violent attacks against Austria-Hungary. Europe must convince herself that the Servian people still think always of the “*revanche*.” The day of the “*revanche*” must come ; for this the feverish exertions of Serbia to organise her military power as well as the feeling of the Servian people and their hatred of the neighbouring kingdom were a guarantee.

On the same occasion the “Samouprava” wrote on the 9th October, 1910, “Abuse and excesses are no fit means to express true patriotism ; quiet, steady and honest work alone leads to the goal.”

(c) On the 18th April, 1911, the “Politika” said : “Except for a few cynics, no one in Serbia would be glad to see King Peter proceeding to Vienna or Budapest. By the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the possibility of friendship between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was once for all destroyed. Every Servian feels that.”

(d) The “Beogradske Novine” wrote on the 18th April, 1911 :—“Even in Government circles the projected journey of King Peter to the Emperor Francis Joseph is disapproved. The storm of indignation which has seized the whole of the Servian race on account of the King’s proposed journey is entirely comprehensible.”

(e) The “Mali Journal” of the 19th April, 1911, says : “A visit of King Peter to the ruler of Austria-Hungary would be an insult to all Serbs. By this visit, Serbia would forfeit the right to play the part of Piedmont. The interests of Serbia can never coincide with the interests of Austria.”

(f) On the 23rd April, 1911, the “Politika,” the “Mali Journal,” the “Tribuna,” the “Beogradske Novine,” and the “Večernje Novosti,” commented on the projected visit of King Peter to the Court of Vienna : “Between Serbia and Austria, friendship can never exist. The projected visit of King Peter would, therefore, be for Serbia

a 'shameful capitulation,' 'a humiliation of Serbia,' 'a solemn sanctioning of all the crimes and misdeeds that Austria-Hungary has committed against Serbia and the Servian people.'"

(g) On the 18th April, 1912, the "Trgovinski Glasnik" wrote in an article headed, "The decay of Austria"—

"In Austria-Hungary decay prevails on all sides. What is now happening beyond the Danube and the Save is no longer a German, Magyar, Bohemian or Croatian crisis, it is a universal Austrian crisis, a crisis of the dynasty itself. We Servians can observe such a development of affairs in Austria with satisfaction."

(h) The "Balkan," in an article entitled "The Borders of Albania," in attacking Austria-Hungary, expressed itself to this effect: "If Europe is too weak to call a halt to Austria-Hungary, Montenegro and Servia will do it, saying to Austria, 'Halt! no further!' A war between Austria-Hungary and Servia is inevitable. We have dismembered the Turkish Empire, we will dismember Austria too. We have finished one war, we are now facing a second."

(i) The "Večernje Novosti," of the 22nd April, 1913, appeals to the Servian travelling public and to Servian traders to boycott the *Donau Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft* (The Danube Steam Navigation Company). "No one should travel or consign goods by ships of this Austrian Company. All who do this should be punished with fines by a committee. The monies would flow to the funds of the Komitadjis which are to be applied for the purpose of the coming war with Austria."

(k) The "Tribuna" of the 26th May, 1913, on the occasion of the seizure of Ada Kaleh by Austria, writes: "The criminal black and yellow Austria has again carried out a piratical trick. It is a thief who, when he cannot steal a whole sack of gold, contents himself with one dinar."

(l) On the 10th June, 1913, on the occasion of the recurrence of the anniversary of the murderous attack on the Royal Commissary in Agram by the student Luka Jukić, the Servian newspapers published memorial articles. An article in the "Pragda" stated that: "It must grieve us to the bottom of our hearts that everyone has not acted like our Jukić. We have no longer a Jukić, but we have the hatred, we have the anger, we have to-day ten million Jukićs. We are convinced that soon Jukić, through his prison window, will hear the last cannon shot of freedom."

(m) The "Mali Journal" of the 7th October, 1913, gives a leading place to an article in which Austria-Hungary is denied the right of existence, and the Slavonic peoples are invited to support the offensive campaign contemplated by Servia.

(n) The "Piémont" writes on the commemoration day of the annexation: "Five years ago to-day an imperial-decree extended the sovereignty of the Hapsburg sceptre over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Servian people will feel for decades yet the grief which was that day inflicted on them. Shamed and shattered, the Servian people groaned in despair. The people-vow to take vengeance in attaining freedom by an heroic step. This day has aroused the energy which had already sunk to sleep, and soon the refreshed hero will strive for freedom. To-day when Servian graves adorn the ancient Servian territories, when the

Servian cavalry has trod the battlefields of Macedonia and old Servia, the Servian people having ended their task in the South turn to the other side, whence the groans and tears of the Servian brother are heard, and where the gallows has its home. The Servian soldiers who to-day in Dušan's kingdom fight those Albanians who were provoked against us by the state which took Bosnia and Herzegovina from us, vowed to march against the "second Turkey" even as with God's help they had marched against the Balkan Turkey. They make this vow and hope that the day of revenge is drawing near. One Turkey vanished. The good Servian God will grant that the "second Turkey" will vanish too."

(o) The "Mali Journal" of the 4th November, 1913, writes: "Every effort towards a *rapprochement* with Austria-Hungary is equivalent to a betrayal of the Servian people. Servia must understand the facts and always hold before her eyes that she has in Austria-Hungary her most dangerous enemy, and that it must be the sacred obligation of every Servian Government to fight this enemy.

(p) On the 14th January, 1914, the "Pragda" said: "Our new year's wishes are first of all for our still unfreed brothers sighing under a foreign yoke. Let the Servians endure; after Kossovo came Kumanovo, and our victorious career is not yet ended.

(q) The "Novosti" of the 18th January, 1914, published a picture of "The Blessing of the Water in Bosnia" with the following text: "Even in places which lie under the foreign yoke, the Servians preserve their customs against the day when in glorious joy the day of freedom dawns."

(r) The "Zastava" confesses in January, 1914: "Servia incites the Austro-Hungarian Servians to revolution."

(s) The "Mali Journal" of the 9th March, 1914, writes: "Servia can never forget Franz Ferdinand's sabre-rattling in the Skutari affair."

(t) On the 4th April, 1914, the "Zastava" writes: "The Austrian statesmen who only conduct a policy of hatred, a bureaucratic policy, not a policy inspired by broad vision, are themselves preparing the ruin of their State."

(u) The "Pravda" of the 8th April, 1914, says: "Austria has now lost her right to exist."

(v) In their Easter numbers (April, 1914) all the Servian newspapers expressed the hope that soon their unfreed, oppressed brothers under the yoke would celebrate a joyous resurrection.

(w) In the "Tribune" of the 23rd April, 1914, it is stated that: "The pacifists have invented a new catchword, that of the 'patriotism of Europe.' This programme can only be realised, however, when Austria is partitioned."

(x) The "Mali Journal" of the 12th May, 1914, writes: "What are called crimes in private life are called, in Austria, politics. History knows a monster, and that monster is called Austria."

## APPENDIX 2.

EXTRACT FROM THE "NARODNA ODBRANA," AN ORGAN PUBLISHED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE NARODNA ODBRANA SOCIETY. (NARODNA ODBRANA IZDANJE STREDISNOG ODBORA NARODNE ODBRANE. BEOGRAD, 1911. "NOVA STAMPARIJA" DAVIDOVIĆ, DEČANSKA ULICA BR. 14, LJUB. DAVIDOVIĆA).

In a short introduction it is first of all remarked that this pamphlet "does not completely or exhaustively reproduce the whole work of the Narodna Odbrana because, for many reasons, it is neither permissible nor possible to do this."

The document is divided into three parts of which the first consists of fourteen chapters and is in the nature of a programme, while the second contains a report of the activities of the Society, and in the third examples are given for the organisation of similar societies abroad.

In the first chapter, "Origin and activity of the first Narodna Odbrana," it is remarked that the Society was founded as a consequence of the popular movement arising in Serbia on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that it had the following objects:—

(1) Raising, inspiring and strengthening the sentiment of nationality.

(2) Registration and enlistment of volunteers.

(3) Formation of volunteer units and their preparation for armed action.

(4) Collection of voluntary contributions, including money and other things necessary for the realisation of its task.

(5) Organisation, equipment and training of a special revolutionary band (Komitee), destined for special and independent military action.

(6) Development of activity for the defence of the Servian people in all other directions. In this connection, it is remarked that owing to the recognition of the annexation by the Great Powers an end had been made to all this work of the Society on which, while retaining its existing constitution, the Society had taken measures to reorganise its programme and to undertake new work, so that, on the recurrence of a similar occasion, "the old red War Flag of the Narodna Odbrana would again be unfurled."

At the beginning of the second chapter, "The new Narodna Odbrana of to-day," it is stated that "at the time of the annexation, experience had shown that Serbia was not ready for the struggle which circumstances imposed upon her, and that this struggle, which Serbia must take up, is much more serious and more difficult than it was thought to be; the annexation was only one of the blows which the enemies of Serbia have aimed at this land, many blows have preceded it, and many will follow it. Work and preparation are necessary so that a new attack may not find Serbia equally unpre-

pared." The object assigned to the work to be done by people of every class is stated to be "the preparation of the people for war in all forms of national work, corresponding to the requirements of the present day," and the means suggested to effect this object are "strengthening of the national consciousness, bodily exercises, increase of material and bodily well-being, cultural improvement, &c. . . . so far as individuals and societies can and should assist the State in these spheres."

The third chapter, "The three principal tasks," begins with a hint that the annexation has taught that national consciousness in Serbia is not so strong as it should be in a country which, as a small fraction of three millions, forms a hope of support for seven millions of the oppressed Servian people. The first task of the Society, therefore, consists in strengthening the national consciousness. The second task is the cultivation of bodily exercises, the third the proper utilisation of these activities learned in the field of sport.

In the fourth chapter (Musketry) prominence is given to the value of good training in musketry, especially having regard to the circumstances of Serbia, where the military training only lasts six months. These observations conclude with the sentence :

"A new blow, like that of the annexation, must be met by a new Serbia, in which every Servian, from child to greybeard, is a rifle-man."

The fifth chapter, which treats of "The relations of the Narodna Odbrana to the Sokol societies," begins with a social and political excursus as to the conditions on which the powers of States depend. In this connection the fall of Turkey is referred to, and it is said :

"The old Turks of the South gradually disappear and only a part of our people suffer under their rule. But new Turks come from the North, more fearful and dangerous than the old; stronger in civilisation and more advanced economically, our northern enemies come against us. They want to take our freedom and our language from us and to crush us. We can already feel the presages of the struggle which approaches in that quarter. The Servian people are faced by the question 'to be or not to be?'"

"What is the object of the Lectures" is the title of the seventh chapter, the principal contents of which are covered by the following sentences :

"The Narodna Odbrana instituted lectures which were largely propaganda lectures. The programme of our new work was developed. Every lecture referred to the annexation, the work of the old Narodna Odbrana and the task of the new. The lectures will never cease to be propaganda lectures, but they will develop special branches more and more and concern themselves with all questions of our social and national life."

In the eighth chapter, "Women's Activities in the Narodna Odbrana," the ninth "Detail and Lesser Work," and the tenth, "Renaissance of the Society," the preparation and deepening of the Society's work and the necessity of a regeneration of the individual, the nation and the State are treated in reference to the tasks of the Narodna Odbrana.

The Introduction to the eleventh chapter ("New Obiliće and Singjeliće"\*) runs as follows :—

"It is an error to assert that Kossovo is past and gone. We find ourselves in the midst of Kossovo. Our Kossovo of to-day is the gloom and ignorance in which our people live. The other causes of the new Kossovo live on the frontiers to the North and West : the Germans, Austrians and "Schwabas," with their onward pressure against our Servian and Slavonic South." In conjunction with the reference to the heroic deeds of Obiliće and Singjeliće, the necessity of sacrifice in the service of the nation is alluded to, and it is declared that "national work is interwoven with sacrifice, particularly in Turkey and in Austria, where such workers are persecuted by the authorities and dragged to prison and the gallows. For this struggle, also, against gloom and ignorance there is need of such heroes. The Narodna Odbrana does not doubt that in the fight with gun and cannon against the "Schwabas" and the other enemies with whom we stand face to face, our people will provide a succession of heroes. However, the Narodna Odbrana is not content with this, for it regards the so-called peaceful present day conditions as war, and demands heroes too for this struggle of to-day which we are carrying on in Servia and beyond the frontier."

The twelfth chapter treats of "Union with our brothers and friends," and its principal contents are concentrated in the following sentences :—

"The maintenance of union with our brothers near and far across the frontier, and our other friends in the world, is one of the chief tasks of the Narodna Odbrana. In using the word 'people' the Narodna Odbrana means our whole people, not only those in Servia. It hopes that the work done by it in Servia will spur the brothers outside Servia to take a more energetic share in the work of private initiative, so that the new present day movement for the creation of a powerful Servian Narodna Odbrana will go forward in unison in all Servian territories."

The thirteenth chapter, which is headed "Two Important Tasks," proceeds as follows :—

"As we take up the standpoint that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has completely brought into the light of day the pressure against our countries from the North, the Narodna Odbrana proclaims to the people that Austria is our first and greatest enemy." This work (that is to say, to depict Austria to the Servian people as their greatest enemy) is regarded by the Society, according to the following expressions of opinion, as a healthy and necessary task, in fact, as its principal obligation. For the pamphlet goes on as follows :—

"Just as once the Turks attacked us from the south, so Austria attacks us to-day from the north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of fighting Austria, she preaches a sacred truth of our national position."

\* Miloš Obiliće (or Kobilić) crept—according to Servian tradition—into the Turkish Camp, after the battle on the Amselveld, and there murdered the Sultan Murad (Von Kállay "Geschichte Der Serben," Vol. I). Stephan Singjelić, Prince of Resara, played a part during the Servian Revolution, 1807-1810. In 1809, Singjelić defended the redoubt of Tschagar against the Turks, and is said to have blown himself into the air, with some of his followers and many Turks, when outnumbered. (Von Kállay "Die Geschichte des serbischen Aufstandes.")

The hatred against Austria brought about by this propaganda is, of course, not the aim but the natural consequence of this work, the object of which is independence and freedom. If on this account hatred of Austria germinates, it is Austria who sows it by her advance, which conduct "makes obligatory a war of extermination against Austria."

After some praise of the modern conception of nationalism the remark is made that in speaking of "freedom and unity," too much is mere talk. The people must be told that :—

"For the sake of bread and room, for the sake of the fundamental essentials of culture and trade, the freeing of the conquered Servian territories and their union with Servia is necessary to gentlemen, tradesmen, and peasants alike." Perceiving this the people will tackle the national work with greater self-sacrifice. Our people must be told that the freedom of Bosnia is necessary for her, not only out of pity for the brothers suffering there, but also for the sake of trade and the connection with the sea.

The "two tasks" of the Narodna Odbrana are then again brought together in the following concluding sentence :—

In addition to the task of explaining to the people the danger threatening it from Austria, the Narodna Odbrana has the important duty, while preserving intact the sacred national memories, of giving to the people this new, wholesome and, in its consequences, mighty conception of nationalism and of work in the cause of freedom and union."

The fourteenth and final chapter begins with an appeal to the Government and people of Servia to prepare themselves in all ways for the struggle "which the annexation has foreshadowed."

Hereon the activities of the Narodna Odbrana are again recapitulated in the following sentences :—

"While the Narodna Odbrana works in conformity with the times according to the altered conditions, it also maintains all the connections made at the time of the annexation; to-day therefore it is the same as it was at the time of the annexation. To-day, too, it is Odbrana (defence); to-day, too, Narodna (of the people); to-day, too, it gathers under its standard the citizens of Servia as it gathered them at the time of the annexation. Then the cry was for war, now the cry is for work. Then meetings, demonstrations, voluntary clubs (*Komitees*), weapons and bombs were asked for; to-day steady, fanatical, tireless work and again work is required to fulfil the tasks and duties to which we have drawn attention by way of present preparation for the fight with gun and cannon which will come."

---

The pamphlet and the annual report contain the following information as to the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana :—

A Central Committee at Belgrade directs all proceedings of the Narodna Odbrana. All other committees of the Narodna Odbrana are subject to this. The Central Committee is divided into four sections :—for cultural work, for bodily training, for financial policy, and for foreign affairs.

District Committees, with their centre at the seat of the offices of the District Government, conduct the affairs of the Society in the corresponding districts. Every District Committee divides itself into sections for culture (the President being the Chairman of the local branch of the "Culture League"), for bodily training (the President being a local member of the Riflemen's, Sokol, Sportsmen's and Horsemen's clubs) and for financial affairs; some District Committees have also a section for Foreign Affairs.

Divisional Committees located at the seat of the local authorities conduct the affairs of the Society in the various divisions.

Local Committees conduct the Society's affairs in the various towns and villages.

Confidential men are located in those places in the interior of the country where the constitution of a Committee is not necessary.

Societies "which work in close connection with the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana" and are supported by the latter in every respect are the following:—

The Riflemen's Association with 762 societies, the Sokol Association "Dusan the Strong" with 2,500 members, the Olympic Club, the Horsemen's Society "Prince Michael," the Sportsmen's Association and the Culture League.

All these societies are organised on similar lines to those of the Narodna Odbrana and use their premises, including club houses, libraries, &c. Distinguished members of these societies are chairmen of sections in the Committees of the Narodna Odbrana.

---

### APPENDIX 3.

EXTRACT FROM THE "REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOKOL SOCIETY DUSAN THE STRONG IN KRAGUJEVAC IN THE YEARS 1912-13." (KRAGUJEVAC PRINTING OFFICE "BUDUĆNOST" Tih. LEKIĆ 1914.)

At the head of this report is printed the speech with which the President, Major Kovačević of the Servian Army, greeted the annual meeting in January, 1914.

"It is known to you," the President began, "that Sokolism, which arose in the struggle against Germanism, is a purely Slavonic institution, which has for its aim to unite and to inspire all the Slavonic brothers, and to give physical and intellectual training for the struggle against the enemy of Slavism.

"We Servians, as a part of the great Slavonic community, have taken up the Sokol idea and have agreed to the common work for our own and our brothers' welfare and happiness.

"We Servians, too, will live and work in the spirit of the Sokols, for we wish to revive the weary and the feeble, to strengthen the weak and the troubled, to free the imprisoned and the enchained. We have done this now and in earlier wars. We have rescued part of



our brothers from the insolence of the enemy in the South. We have struck off their fetters, we have rid them of their sufferings and given them freedom, so that they enjoy happiness, equality and brotherhood."

After giving a few words of praise to this "noble work" which "realised a part of the great Sokol idea," Major Kovačević proceeded :

"Oh, my brothers and sisters, our enemy in the North is more dangerous and pitiless, because he is stronger in respect of his civilisation and his economic position.

"This enemy is insatiable in his lusts ; he holds millions of our brothers in slavery and chains. He took law and freedom from them and subjected them all to his service. The brothers murmur, call and beg for still quicker help.

"We must not leave them to the mercy of this fearful and greedy enemy. We must hurry to their help the sooner because it is our duty to do so. Could we in any event be happy when so many brothers live in slavery, suffer and murmur ?

"Brothers and sisters !

"The enemy is dangerous, greedy and troublesome. Let us ever be on our guard.

"Let us go to work with still greater willingness and self-sacrifice. Let us be scrupulous according to the sacred Sokol obligation, true and enduring.

"Let us prepare ourselves for the struggle and for the just Sokol idea.

"Let us unite and ally ourselves with innumerable Sokol hosts, and let us always remember that truth which the Servian Sokols wrote upon their flag : That only a healthy, powerful, well-organised people, conscious of its nationality, is fit to defend itself, to struggle, and to conquer."

The report of the Committee of Management follows the speech of the President. After a description of the successes in the last wars, which interfered with the activities of the Society for two years, it is stated that "the day arrived when we returned to our work, because our programme was not yet fulfilled, because our task was not yet ended. A great part of our people still endure the pains of the crucified Christ ; we have still to visit our brothers beyond the Drina ; we have still to seek out the town of Serajevo and the inheritance of St. Sava\* ; we must behold the home of Marina Novak, of Deli Radivoj and of the old Vujadin ; we must cross the mountains of Romanija and see why Travnik is veiled in mist. That song must end at last : ' Ah ! Bosnia, thou orphan child before God, hast thou nowhere people of thy race . . . ' "

After a discussion of various undertakings of the Society, emphasis is laid on the fact that the Society maintains relations with the brother societies beyond the Save and the Drina, and special emphasis is laid on the dispatch of delegates to the Jubilee of the Prosvjeta held in Serajevo. On this the report remarks : "By sending representatives

\* St. Sava (ob. 1236) is the patron saint of the Servians. Herzegovina is the name of *Ducatus Santi Save*. The "inheritance of St. Sava" is, therefore, equivalent in meaning to Herzegovina."

to the brothers in Bosnia the Committee intended to say to them—we have not forgotten you, the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still mighty.” After a detailed description of a visit of the Agram students to Serbia\* and of the dedication of the flag of “the Young People’s Temperance Association,” the report of the executive concludes with the following sentences:—

“These manifestations—the coming of the brother Croats to Sumadija and the meeting of the ‘temperate youth’ from all Servian regions are correctly appreciated by our leaders, and one would not exaggerate if one said that these events indicate the beginning and the germ of a great deed to be done in the near future.

“They are the expression of a great and, till now, silent awakening of the national consciousness and of the strength of an oppressed nation which is not allowed to arise and unite. In a little time this germ will ripen, and when the soul of the people arises still more, there will be no barrier which it cannot break, and no obstacle which it cannot tear down upon its way. The work of strengthening this power, the assistance and acceleration of the progress of this national development, the preparation and the support of this idea, was always the aim of the actions of our leaders.”

The treasurer’s report enumerates first of all those who have supported the society. In addition to a number of members of the Kragujevac District Committee, the following are mentioned and thanked:—

The District Committee of the “Narodna Odbrana” at Kragujevac, particularly its “Ritter” section, which often assisted the Sokol Society with substantial support; the Headmaster of the Gymnasium at Kragujevac, who “always showed his fatherly care” to the Sokols; the Divisional Commandant of Sumadija, who had substantially supported the society; the President of the District Court at Kragujevac; the District Chairman and the Parish Chairman at Kragujevac.

After referring to the members of the society who have fallen in war, the treasurer closes his report with the following words:—

“After so brilliant a victory over a portion of our enemies, those who control our society hope that you all, from now onwards, will devote yourselves still more, more unitedly and more entirely, to the activities of Sokolism so that you may rear falcons in our falcon’s eyrie who, at the given moment, will one day be ready to fly aloft, and in their mighty flight bring freedom, love and brotherhood to all our brothers who are not yet free.”

The annual report is signed by Major M. J. Kovačević, President, by the secretary of the Law Courts, D. V. Brzaković, as secretary, and by ten members of the executive, among whom are included two professors (Emil Lukić and Milan Janković), as well as a further officer (Major of Infantry, Michael Vasić).

\* This visit of the Agram students (April, 1912) to Belgrade, Nish, Semendria, &c., was used in Serbia as the pretext for a great demonstration of hostility to the Monarchy. The excursionists were accorded military honours, and lunches and balls took place in the Military Academy and the Officers’ Club. In Nish, indeed, a military parade was held in honour of the visitors.

It is clear from this annual report, and from a schedule also signed by Major M. J. Kovačević and Brzaković, Secretary of the Law Courts, and sent to the Kragujevac Sokol Society by the "Srpski Soko" in Tuzla for completion, that the Sokol Societies in Serbia stand in close relation with various similar societies in the Monarchy to an extent not hitherto known.

---

#### APPENDIX 4.

##### THE SERVIAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE IN THE SERVICE OF THE NARODNA ODBRANA.

An appeal by the Narodna Odbrana appears as a supplement to the Servian Official Gazette, "Srpski Novine," of 28th June, 1914 (new style), and was supplied to all subscribers to the paper.

The following passages occur in this appeal:—

"Brothers and sisters! Kossovo was only partly avenged, the day of St. Vitus (Vidovdan) was only partly expiated. Just as far as the territories reach where our people's speech is heard—the Servian, Croatian, and Slovenian—from Kikinda to Monastir, from Trieste to Carevo-Solo, just as far and wide does the meaning of St. Vitus' Day and of Kossovo extend. So many souls of our race weep on this territory; so many fetters of our brothers clank; so much work is yet to be done; so much have we still to sacrifice. St. Vitus' Day could formerly mean a day of mourning for us, but to-day, when we have already gone so far in the new history of the people; when behind us stand great and glorious national events, and before us still greater and more glorious events await us; to-day when we stand in the midst of the creation of a great national State; to-day St. Vitus' Day must be for us a day of great joy and pride, because of that which has happened, and sprung from it, and still more because of that which will come. Men and women of Serbia! Millions of our brothers, Slovenes, Croats, and Servians beyond our frontiers, look to-day to us, the Children of the Kingdom, and joy and hope fill their breast as they now behold to-day's majestic manifestations for the national cause. God helps the brave! Forward all! That part of our sacred task which is as yet unrealised calls us. Belgrade, St. Vitus' Day, 1914."

---

#### APPENDIX 5.

##### DEPOSITION OF TRIFKO KRSTANOVIĆ, CONCERNING THE NARODNA ODBRANA.

The baker's assistant, Trifko Krstanović, of Zavadonici, was arrested by a gendarmerie patrol on the night of the 6th-7th July, 1914, because he had been heard to remark shortly after the murderous attack on the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, that this attack was to be expected and because this remark brought him under suspicion of having had knowledge of the plot.

He was, on this account, brought up before the District Court at Serajevo. The examination of the prisoner revealed that his remark did not justify the suspicion which had arisen against him, since it, founded entirely on his earlier knowledge of the activities of the Narodna, was merely the expression of his conviction that, on account of the agitation developing in Serbia against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and especially against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, a deed of that kind was to be expected. In the absence of any material facts in support of the charge, the proceedings against Krstanović were accordingly withdrawn, and, having regard to his knowledge of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which had an important bearing on the inquiry, he was subpoenaed as a witness.

An extract from his depositions taken on the 19th July, 1914, which is relevant to the matters here in question, is as follows :—

“In the autumn of the year 1908, I crossed the frontier to Serbia on the Mokra Gora, near Visegrad, to seek work. I first came to Bagina Bašta in the district of Užice, and as I found no work there, I went to Belgrade, where I arrived just at the time when the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced. As I saw that the annexation had caused great popular commotion and excitement, and that I should not be able to find any work, I went to the Imperial and Royal Consulate and tried to get myself sent home. There I was told to come back in the afternoon, and that I should then be sent home. However, as I came out of the Consulate, a gendarme seized me on the street, and asked me where I came from ; under the impression that I was a spy, he conducted me to a tower (*Karaula*). Here I was questioned, and when I said to them that I wanted to go home, a non-commissioned officer began to abuse me : Why should I now want to go out of Serbia which now needed more people because a war with Austria would come ? When I said to him that I had nothing to live on, he answered me that I would find full maintenance if I would register myself in the Komitee. In my need I agreed, and a gendarme took me to the inn ‘Zelenom Vijencu’ (‘The Green Wreath’), and introduced me there to Voja Tankosić, the leader of the Komitee and a captain in the regular army. Here, at the ‘Green Wreath’ I was provided with food and lodging, and, as I saw, other members of the Komitee lived here. Voja Tankosić told me that the business of the Komitee was to learn bomb-throwing, the destruction of bridges, tunnels, telegraphs and railways, because a war between Serbia and Austria could easily arise. On this a man took me to a small building belonging to the Royal Demesne next to the Treasury, where the offices of the Komitee were situated, and in the office I met Milan Pribičević, who enrolled me in the Komitee. At this enrolment, Milan Pribičević asked me whether Voja Tankosić had told me the obligations which I had as a member of the Komitee. To this I answered ‘Yes.’ He said that those enrolled must be efficient, strong, and self-sacrificing. “There were then about 70 of us enrolled. In Belgrade we did nothing. After about six weeks our leader Tankosić informed us that the Great Powers had prohibited our Komitee, and that we must leave Belgrade and hide ourselves somewhere in an out-of-the-way place not visited

by foreigners. In this way they sent us to the town of Čuprija. Here we were drilled by the officers Voja Tankosić, Dušan Putnik, Zivko Gvosdić and Mitar Djinović, who was involved in the Montenegrin bomb outrage, and was shot in Montenegro. In order that no one should become aware of our objects, or know anything of our numbers, we were forbidden to have intercourse with outsiders. We practised the throwing of bombs, the construction of mines, and the destruction of telegraphs, railways, tunnels and bridges. Every fortnight we were visited by Milan Pribičević, General Božo Janković, the pharmacist Škarić, the deputy Zivko Rafajlović, and a certain Glišić Milutin, a Treasury official, who watched our drill and paid for our board on each occasion. Our instructors told us that, when war was declared, we Komitees would go in advance, then the volunteers, and then the regular army. There were about 140 men at Čuprija. Besides board, we had lodging and clothes and 25 para a day for tobacco. The school lasted about three months, that is until March, 1909. Then the members of the committee told us that we were dismissed, that we could all go wherever we wished, for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognised by the Great Powers, and that our Komitee had become useless. On the dissolution of the Komitee, General Božo Janković told me to enter the service of Božo Milanović at Šabac, where I should receive wages of 50 dinar a month. He did not tell me what the nature of the service would be. I accepted, because, as a member of the Komitee, I regarded myself as bound to obey General Janković, and also because I had nothing to live on, and had to earn my livelihood. In this way I came to Šabac in March, 1909, and reported myself to Božo Milanović, a tradesman of Šabac. General Janković had told me that Božo Milanović was chairman of the Narodna Odbrana in Šabac, and that I should assist him in connection with this Narodna Odbrana. When I had given Božo Milanović the General's letter and he had read it, he told me that I must serve him faithfully and carry out his orders. My chief duty would be to carry his letters wheresoever they were addressed. It would cost me my life if I failed to carry a letter to its destination, and if any one else got hold of it. On the next day, Božo Milanović gave me a closed letter which I was to take to Čedo Lukić, Superintendent of Excise at Serbischn-Rača. On the road to Rača, at the village of Bogatić, the District Captain stopped me, took the letter from me, opened it and read it. In the letter it said that Lukić should immediately buy three boats so that they should be ready if they were required. 100 dinar were enclosed in the letter. On this occasion the Captain told me that the Ministry had given strict orders that the Komitadji were to do nothing without orders, so that international diplomatic intervention should not be provoked. I returned to Šabac and told Božo Milanović what had happened to me. Božo Milanović applied to the District Prefect, who gave orders that the revolver, which the Captain at Bogatić had taken from me, should be returned. He also gave orders that the Captain should send the letter to Čedo Lukić to whom it was addressed. I carried letters of this sort from March, 1909, until October, 1910, and in that time I took

43 letters to Serbisch-Rača, 55 to Ložnica, 5 to Zvornik, 2 to Ljubivija, and I don't know how many to Koviljača. I noticed how often I was in each place because these places are a very long way from Šabac. I took the letters to the chiefs of the Customs houses in the various places, and from them I received letters in reply and took them to Božo Milanović. I recollect that on a few occasions I took letters to Šepačka Ada. My assistant in letter carrying was one Vaso Erić, a native of Srebrenica. Every week I took letters from Božo Milanović to Belgrade, and delivered them to Milan Pribičević and Božo Janković. I knew nothing of the contents of these letters, and no one told me anything about them. So far as I could see, the letters despatched by Božo Milanović were not in cipher, but the letters sent by the chiefs of the Customs houses were written in special characters, a fact which I observed when Božo Milanović opened them. Once I brought one of these cipher letters to Božo Milanović, I think it was from Zvornik, and he sent me with the letter to Mika Atanasijević, Professor at Šabac, to decipher. He did this, as he usually did; but perhaps he forgot to close the letter, so that I could read it. The letter stated, that it was reported from a reliable source, that money was to be stamped with the likeness of the heir to the throne, and this was an indication that the Emperor Francis Joseph was about to abdicate. After about eight months of my service with Božo Milanović, Božo gave me his visiting-card with a death's head drawn upon it; on it was written that I was designated an initiate (*povjerenik*) of the Narodna Odbrana. On this occasion he told me, that the business was spying . . .

"On one occasion, I learnt from the officer Dušan Opterkić, member of the Narodna Odbrana, that the Narodna Odbrana had 23 branches in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Beyond this, I do not know what organisation, if any, the Narodna Odbrana has in Bosnia. From time to time, Milan Pribičević gave me a revolver, or money for the purchase of a revolver, for me to give to the Customs officers on the frontier who served as Komitadjis who had no revolver nor any money to buy a revolver themselves. It appeared to me that Milan Pribičević gave them these things as an honour, just because they were Komitadjis. I had nothing else to do with arms.

"On one occasion, during my service with Božo Milanović, I was ordered to accompany a man to a peasant in Lijasnica on the Drina, who would give us all necessary information and show us everything, so that we two could kill Ljubo Stanaričić, a Servian officer of Reserve, who had fled to Bijeljina. For the Committee of the Narodna Odbrana had learnt that Ljubo Stanaričić was dangerous to the Servian State, and had resolved that he should be put to death.

"That man and I received instructions from Božo Milanović to go to a certain place across the Drina, and to kill Ljubo Stanaričić, who lives just on the bank of the Drina on the Bosnian side in the district of Bijeljin. I and that man had descended into the Drina, but because the water was deep, and we saw that Ljubo was walking round his house with a gun on his shoulder, we returned to that peasant's house. As I saw that we could not kill him with the knife,

I sent that man to Šabac to tell Božo Milanović that it was not possible to kill Stanaričić in the manner he desired, namely, with the knife. On this, I received orders from Božo Milanović that we should kill him in any case. We then determined to shoot him with a gun. According to Božo's instructions, the man who was with me was to shoot and kill him, and I was to confirm whether these instructions were carried out. In the meantime, however, a mounted gendarme brought us instructions from the District Prefect of Sabać that we were to return, and to abandon the original project. And so we returned to Šabac.

"In October, 1910, I demanded an increase of pay from Božo Milanović, and, on his refusal, I left his service. From Šabac I went to Belgrade, where I met General Janković, and he had me arrested for refusing obedience. They took me through various prisons for about two months, and all because I had refused to obey them, and they feared I would betray their secrets. Finally, the authorities decided to send me to Bosnia. In Šabac a prisoner told me that my life was at stake. The gendarmes accompanied me to Zvornik, where they handed me over to the Bosnian gendarmes. In this way I came to Bosnia in December, 1910.

"I know nothing of any 'Black Hand,' with the exception of what I have read of it in Servian newspapers. I can't remember now what was written in the newspapers about the 'Black Hand.' Nor do I know anything of the 'Black List.' After the annexation there prevailed in Servia universal anger and hatred against the person of the Heir to the Austrian Throne, who was regarded as the sworn enemy of the Servians."

Beyond this, Krstanović referred to his earlier statements, of which only the following are of interest as supplementing the foregoing testimony.

The Komitee into which Milan Pribičević introduced Krstanović was set up by the Narodna Odbrana. In the school at Čuprija there were 20 to 22 Austrian subjects. Milan Čiganović was also one of the pupils.

In the school at Čuprija it was inculcated that the Komitee must be ready to proceed to Bosnia, on the command of the Narodna Odbrana, and there act according to the orders of their commanders.

---

## APPENDIX 6.

EXTRACT FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF  
SERAJEVO IN THE PROSECUTION OF JOVO JAGLIČIĆ AND OTHERS  
FOR ESPIONAGE.

In the year 1913, it was discovered that Jovo Jagličić and several accomplices were carrying on espionage in Bosnia in the interests of Servia. The criminal proceedings instituted in the matter afforded *inter alia* opportunities for obtaining an insight into the methods of the Great-Servian propaganda, and more especially of the Narodna Odbrana.

Jovo Jagličić made a statement that in the month of August or September, 1912, he for the first time met Petar Klarić, known as Pešut, formerly a cattle inspector in Foča, who had fled to Montenegro in 1912 and then became a Komitadji.

At their first meeting Klarić asked Jagličić whether he knew Rade Milošević of Kalinovik, and, on his answering, said that Milošević was lying very ill in hospital: "It would be a pity if he were to die, we have spoken of great matters, has he never said anything to you about them?" On receiving a negative answer Klarić went on: "I had something important to tell you, we are Servians, and must do something important for Serbia. Come to my office." There the following conversation ensued between them:—

"Jovan, I will tell you something; I don't know you yet and whether you will betray me. I tell you, nevertheless, and if you have the heart, betray me!"

On Jagličić asking him what it was all about, Klarić answered, "Brother, in Serbia there is a society called the 'Narodna Odbrana.' Many people must join this society; many have been enrolled already in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the whole Monarchy; among them are people of intelligence and means, long-headed people, and if they can do it why should we not do it too, so that we too may help a bit."

To the question, what was the object of this society, Klarić answered:—

"The Society has this object: for instance, you are in Kalinovik; you let me know what the news is there, how many soldiers, how many guns, how much ammunition, different arms, who comes, who leaves, and so on. We have a secret writing, 'cipher,' and use it for correspondence. If you are loyal, you will get it too."

Jagličić was frightened that Klarić was merely sounding him for the purpose of denouncing him, and therefore asked him to tell him the names of some of the members, on which Klarić reflected for some time and then told him a name, which gave him confidence.

Hereon Klarić said to him: "Shall I give you the 'cipher'?" Jagličić agreed. Klarić, who knew the cipher by heart, wrote it out on a slip and gave it to Jagličić.

On another occasion Klarić gave an account of his stay at Banja-Koviljača (near Ložnica) where he was instructed by the Servian captain Todorović\* in bomb-throwing, and when asked by the accused why he learnt this he answered: "If anything such as I have spoken of to you comes to pass, it is necessary that I should know how to handle bombs, and that I should teach you and you should teach others, so that powder magazines and other important objects should be blown up, for in that case we should receive bombs from Serbia."

Klarić then described the appearance of the bombs, and said that he had already enrolled people who, in case of war, would cut telegraph and telephone wires.

\* Captain Kosta Todorović was then in fact Boundary Commissioner and Director of the Servian Intelligence Service for the frontier line from Rača to Ljuboija.



At these meetings Jagličić learnt from Klarić that it also appertained to the duties of members of the Narodna Odbrana to induce Austro-Hungarian soldiers to desert, to enlist volunteers (Komitadjis), to organise bands, to blow up objects and depots, and so on. Klarić also informed him that even cipher correspondence between Bosnian and Servian members would not be entrusted to the post, but despatched across the frontier by reliable messengers.

Klarić further told Jagličić that on the occasion of the Prosvjēta celebration (in September, 1912) a Servian major had stayed in the Hotel "Europe" with the Servian deputation which was sent to it,\* that Klarić had taken members of the Narodna Odbrana to him, and that he had sworn them in.

From a spy Jagličić learnt that bombs would arrive in Serajevo, or had already arrived, that these had the appearance of pieces of soap,† and that two or three would either be sent to this spy or that he would fetch them.

## APPENDIX 7.

### FROM CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS ON THE NARODNA ODBRANA.

The control of the Narodna Odbrana is in the hands of representatives of all parties, so as to win over both the progressives and those who are hostile to the conspirators. Its actual guiding spirit is Pribičević, now Major. The position of secretary is always filled by an officer on leave.

The object of the Narodna Odbrana is to develop effective propaganda in military and civilian circles in the Southern-Slav portions of Austria-Hungary, with the object of preparing for a revolution, interference with any mobilisation that may take place, and the initiation of panics, revolts, &c.

The organisation has many trusted representatives and emissaries in the Monarchy, who carry on an unostentatious personal propaganda. Some are sent specially—to enlist a few men—preferably railway officials—in the neighbourhood of important bridges, junctions, &c., whose duty it is at the appropriate moment to carry out the directions they have received, or to get them carried out.

Intercourse between the members of the Narodna Odbrana is, so far as possible, effected by keeping in personal touch with each other.

Young people, workmen and railwaymen chiefly are enrolled as members.

\* The Servian major, Mika Janković, appeared as a delegate at the Prosvjeta celebration.

† The bombs used in the Serajevo attack on the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, as well as those found in the Save, near Brčko, in the year 1913, which came from the Royal Servian Arsenal at Kragujevac, can in fact be compared with pieces of soap.

## APPENDIX 8.

EXTRACT FROM THE RECORDS OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOSNIA AND HERZGOVINA AT SERAJEVO, TOUCHING THE PROCEEDINGS THERE INSTITUTED AGAINST GAVRILO PRINCIP AND CONFEDERATES ON ACCOUNT OF THE CRIME OF ASSASSINATION PERPETRATED ON THE 28TH JUNE, 1914, ON HIS IMPERIAL AND ROYAL HIGHNESS THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND OF AUSTRIA-ESTE AND HER HIGHNESS THE DUCHESS SOPHIE OF HOHENBERG.

*I. The deed and the perpetrators.*

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, Trifko Grabež, Vaso Čubriović and Četres Popović confess that in common with the fugitive Mehemed Mehmedbašić they contrived a plot for the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and, armed with bombs and in the case of some of them with Browning pistols, laid wait for him on the 28th June, 1914, on his progress through Serajevo for the purpose of carrying out the planned attack.

Nedeljko Čabrinović confesses that he was the first of the conspirators to hurl a bomb against the Archduke's carriage, which missed its mark and which on exploding injured only the occupants of the carriage following the Archducal motor car.

Gavrilo Princip confesses that he fired two shots from a Browning pistol against the Archducal motor car, by which the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg received fatal wounds.

Both perpetrators confess that the act was done with intent to murder.

These confessions have been fully verified by means of the investigations which have taken place, and it is established that the deceased Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the deceased Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg died as a result of the revolver shots fired at them by Gavrilo Princip.

*II. Origin of the plot.*

The accused have made the following declarations, which are essentially consistent, before the examining magistrate:—

In April, 1914, Princip, during his stay at Belgrade, where he associated with a number of Servian students in the cafés of the town, conceived the plan for the execution of an attempt on the life of the late Archduke Franz Ferdinand. He communicated this intention to his acquaintance Čabrinović, who also was in Belgrade at the time. The latter had already conceived a similar idea and was ready at once to participate in the attempt. The execution of an attempt on the Archduke's life was a frequent topic of conversation in the circle in which Princip and Čabrinović moved, because the Archduke was considered to be a dangerous enemy of the Servian people.

Princip and Čabrinović desired at first to procure the bombs and weapons necessary for the execution of the deed from the Servian Major Milan Pribićević or from the Narodna Odbrana, as they themselves did not possess the means for their purchase. As, however, Major Pribićević and the authoritative member of the said association, Živojin Dačić, were absent from Belgrade at that time, they decided to try to obtain the weapons from their acquaintance Milan Ciganović, who had formerly been a Komitadji and was at that time in the employment of the State railways.

Princip, through the instrumentality of an intimate friend of Ciganović, now got into communication with the latter. Thereupon Ciganović called on Princip and discussed the planned attempt with him. He entirely approved it, and thereupon declared that he would like to consider further whether he should provide the weapons for the attempt. Čabrinović also talked with Ciganović on the subject of the weapons.

At Easter Princip took Trifko Grabež, who also was in Belgrade, into his confidence. The latter is also shown by his own confession to have declared himself ready to take part in the attempt.

In the following weeks Princip had repeated conversations with Ciganović about the execution of the attempt.

Meanwhile Ciganović had reached an understanding on the subject of the planned attack with the Servian Major Voja Tankosić, who was a close friend of his and who then placed at his disposal for this object the Browning pistols.

Grabež confesses in conformity with the depositions of Princip and Čabrinović that on the 24th May he, accompanied by Ciganović, visited Major Tankosić at the latter's request at his rooms. He says that after he had been introduced Tankosić said to him: "Are you the man? Are you determined?" Whereupon Grabež answered: "I am." Tankosić next asked: "Do you know how to shoot with a revolver?" and when Grabež answered in the negative Tankosić said to Ciganović: "I will give you a revolver, go and teach them how to shoot."

Hereupon Ciganović conducted Princip and Grabež to the military rifle range at Topčider and instructed them in a wood adjoining the range in shooting with a Browning pistol at a target. Princip proved himself the better shot of the two. Ciganović also familiarized Princip, Grabež and Čabrinović with the use of the bombs which were later given to them.

On the 27th May, 1914, Ciganović handed over to Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež, as their confessions agree in stating, six bombs, four Browning revolvers and a sufficient quantity of ammunition as well as a glass tube of cyanide of potassium with which to poison themselves after the accomplishment of the deed in order that the secret might be kept. Moreover Ciganović gave them some money.

Princip had previously informed Danilo Ilić, at Easter, of his plan of assassination. He now begged the latter on his return to Serajevo to enlist certain additional persons, in order to ensure the success of the attempt. Hereupon Ilić according to his confession enlisted Jaso Čubrilović, Četko Popović and Mehemed Mehmedbašić in the plot.

### *III. Origin of the bombs.*

Only one of the bombs was made use of in the execution of the attempt. The remaining five bombs came later into the possession of the police at Serajevo.

In the opinion of the judicial experts these bombs are Servian hand-grenades which were factory-made and intended for military purposes. They are identical with the 21 bombs which were found in the Save at Brčko in the year 1913 and which were partly in their original packing, which proved without a doubt that they came from the Servian arsenal of Kragujevac.

It is thus proved that the grenades which were used in the attempt against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand also came from the stores of the Army Depot at Kragujevac.

Grabež quite spontaneously calls the grenades which were handed over to him and his accomplices "Kragujevac bombs."

### *IV. Transport of the three assailants, and of the weapons from Servia to Bosnia.*

With regard to this Princip makes the following statement :—

Čiganović told Čabrinović, Grabež and Princip that they were to make their way via Šabac and Ložnica to Tuzla and there to betake themselves to Miško Jovanović who would take over the weapons. Next they were to go to Šabac and report themselves to the frontier captain Major Rade Popović, to whom he gave them a note, of which Princip took charge. On the 28th May the three accomplices left Belgrade with the weapons. At Šabac Princip handed over the note which he had received from Čiganović to Major Popović, who thereupon conducted all three to the orderly room and drew them up a pass in which it was stated that one of them was an exciseman and the other two his colleagues. The pass contained also the name of this alleged exciseman, but he had forgotten the name. At the same time Major Popović handed over a closed letter for the frontier captain at Ložnica, whose name was Pravanović, Prdanović or Predojević.

Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež passed the night at Šabac and went by train the next morning to Ložnica, with a half-price ticket, it may be remarked, on the strength of the pass which Major Popović had drawn up for them. They reached Ložnica at noon and delivered to the frontier captain at that place Major Popović's letter, in which were the words: "See that you receive these people and bring them on their way, you know where." The frontier captain said he would summon his excisemen from the frontier and give the three into the charge of the most reliable man. Thereupon he telephoned, and made an appointment with the three accomplices for 7 o'clock the next morning in his office.

Next morning the three conspirators agreed that Čabrinović should take Grabež's pass and make his way openly to Zvornik, but that Princip and Grabež should cross the frontier secretly. This plan was

discussed with the frontier captain and it was decided that an excise-man from Lješnica called Grbić was to take Princip and Grabež with him to his tower (*karaula*) and bring them over the frontier. Čabrinović accordingly walked to Banja Koviljača in the direction of Zvornik. Princip and Grabež drove with the exciseman Grbić to Lješnica, where they deposited the bombs and the revolver in a room in a hotel. While they were doing so the exciseman Grbić caught sight of these objects. Princip himself described this journey as mysterious.

Grabež's statement conformed in essentials with Princip's and was supplemented by an addition to the effect that Grbić laughed when he saw the bombs and the revolver and merely asked to what part of Bosnia they were going with those bombs. The excisemen certainly thought that Grabež and Princip were travelling on a mission.

Grbić and a second exciseman brought Princip and Grabež in a boat to an island in the Drina. There Grbić instructed them to wait for a peasant who would come to fetch them. They passed the night on the island in a peasant's hut to which Grbić had directed them; next day came a peasant who conducted them during the night first through a bog and then over the mountains to the neighbourhood of Priboj, where he handed them over to the local teacher Čubrilović, who seemed to have been already waiting for them, to see them further on their way.

He took them on to Miško Jovanovitch at Tuzla.

Čabrinović's statement about the events of the journey up to the point at which he parted with Princip and Grabež conformed in essentials with those of the latter, and only added by way of supplement that Major Popović told them that he did not reach Šabac from Belgrade till the day before their arrival.

In Ložnica, Čabrinović, Princip and Grabež decided to separate, as it was too dangerous to go about all three together. The frontier captain at Ložnica, whom they informed of this, applauded their plan and gave Čabrinović a letter for M. Jaklojević, the teacher at Mali-Zvornik. Hereupon Čabrinović handed over the bombs, Browning pistol and ammunition which he had been carrying, to Princip and Grabež, and went to Mali-Zvornik with an exciseman who had been told off to accompany him.

There he found the teacher Jaklojević, to whom he handed the letter from the frontier captain of Ložnica. Hereupon the former notified the Servian frontier guard. When Čabrinović, with the teacher, reached this frontier post, a man was already waiting there for them, who brought them in a boat over the Drina to Gross-Zvornik in Bosnia.

Čabrinović then proceeded to Miško Jovanović at Tuzla.

### *Supplement.*

Just before this memoir was closed, minutes of evidence were published by the District Court at Serajevo from which it appears that a subject of the Monarchy some days before the 28th June last desired to make a report to the Imperial and Royal Consulate at Belgrade to the effect that he suspected that a plan existed for the execution of an attempt on the life of Archduke Franz Ferdinand

during his presence in Bosnia. It seems that the man was prevented from making this report by members of the Belgrade police force, who arrested him on trivial grounds just as he was about to enter the Imperial and Royal Consulate. The conclusion to be drawn from the statements contained in the evidence in question would seem to be that the police officials concerned had knowledge of the planned attempt, and only arrested this man in order to prevent him from laying the information.

As these statements have not yet been verified, no opinion can be expressed at the present stage on their reliability. In view of the investigations into the matter now pending, the more minute details of the evidence cannot be published more exactly at present.

## APPENDIX 9.

### THE SERVIAN PRESS ON THE ASSASSINATION.

(a) The Belgrade newspaper "Balkan" writes on the 29th June, with regard to the two perpetrators:—

"Nedeljko Čabrinović, a compositor by profession, was full of anarchical ideas, and well known as a restless spirit. Until twenty days ago, he lived in Belgrade, whither he came after the war and was employed in the State printing works. Before his departure he announced that he was going to Trieste, where he would get work in a new printing works. Gavrilo Princip also was living at Belgrade until a short time ago. During the war he offered his services as a volunteer, but was not accepted, and therefore he left Belgrade. He returned, however, at Christmas last year to Belgrade, attended the gymnasium for a time, and left Belgrade almost at the same time as Čabrinović, though in a different direction. Princip was a silent, nervous, hard-working student, and associated with some fellow students who came, like himself, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as latterly with Čabrinović. He inclined towards socialistic ideas, although he had originally belonged to the Young Men Progressive Party. Princip, like Čabrinović, was brought up at Serajevo; the two have been bound by ties of the closest friendship since their childhood."

(b) The "Piémont," of the 1st July, points out that Princip's protest was a sequel to the public protest of the assassin Zerajić. The explanation of the former's, as of the latter's activities, is to be found in the system of government in Bosnia. The circumstance that Princip executed the deed of vengeance on the national festival of St. Vitus, the day which had been chosen for the manœuvres, made the desperate act of the young martyr more intelligible and more natural. (The newspaper was confiscated by the police on account of this article; the confiscation was, however, annulled the day after by the Court of First Instance at Belgrade).

(c) The Young Radical "Odjek," of the 3rd July, says:—"The Archduke Franz Ferdinand was sent to Serajevo on the day of national enthusiasm in order to celebrate a brutal manifestation of

violence and domination. This brutal act was bound to evoke brutal feelings of resistance, hatred and revenge."

(d) The organ of the Nationalist Party, "Srpska Zastava," of the 3rd July, says in an article entitled "Suspicious and Threats":—"The assassination comes to be regarded more and more as the outcome of the unsound state of affairs in the Monarchy. On the other hand, the savage persecution of the Servian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina evokes the horror of the whole civilised world."

(e) The Progressive newspaper, "Pravda," of the 3rd July, writes:—"The policy of Vienna is a cynical one. It exploits the death of the unfortunate couple for its abominable aims against the Servian people."

(f) The "Agence des Balkans," of the 3rd July, says:—"The crimes which have been perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Servians have been carried out under the auspices and at the direct instigation of the Austro-Hungarian civil and military authorities."

(g) The "Pravda," of the 4th July, says:—"All the murders and assassinations which have been carried out up to the present time in Austria have arisen from one and the same source. The oppressed peoples of the Monarchy were obliged to have recourse to this method of protest, because no other way was open to them. In the chaos of a reign of terror, it is natural and quite intelligible that the era of assassinations should have firmly established itself."

(h) The "Balkan," of the 5th July, remarks that Austria-Hungary "must be placed under international control, because of its persecution of the innocent"; for Austria-Hungary has less cohesion than Turkey.

(i) The "Mali Journal," of the 7th July, writes:—"A sprig of the Middle Ages has been murdered at Serajevo within the last few days. He has been murdered by a lad whose grief for the enslavement of his immediate Fatherland (*engeres Vaterland*) amounted to a paroxysm, that grief which the robbers of the land of his fathers had brought upon him. What has been the contribution of official Austria-Hungary to this? It has answered with general massacres, plunderings and destruction of Servian life and property. Only the worthless distinguish themselves by such heroism. Cowards are always mighty heroes when they are sure that nothing will happen to them. Only compare Princip and Čabrinović with these heroes, and you will at once see the great difference between them. Civilisation and justice are a huge lie in Austria-Hungary."

(j) The "Tribuna," of the 7th July, says:—"We are of the opinion that the Serajevo murder was arranged to facilitate the extermination of the Servians at one blow."

(k) The "Piémont," of the 8th July, reports from Bajina Baschka that the Austrian officials in Bosnia are preparing a massacre of the Christians.

(l) The "Balkan," of the 8th, publishes a report from Bosnia, under the title "St. Bartholomew's Day at Serajevo," and pleads for a general boycott against all the Austrians living in Servia.

(m) The "Mali Journal," of the 8th, appeals to its readers to boycott the Danube Steamship Company.

(n) Under the title "Nothing from Austria-Hungary!" the "Tribuna," of the 8th, writes that it would be best to order nothing from Austria-Hungary, to abstain from visiting the Austrian and Hungarian Spas, and from calling in doctors from Austria-Hungary. It says that private initiative can accomplish a great deal in the direction suggested. The State and the Government offices must not mix themselves up in this movement. It is enough to appeal to the citizens.

(o) The "Stampa," of the 8th, asserts that the Serajevo police are exposing the arrested assassins to the most inhuman and brutal torture in order to extort from them untrue confessions on which it is intended to base complaints against the Servian people.

(p) The "Agence des Balkans," of the 9th, reports from Belgrade:—"Absolutely trustworthy private reports announce that a general massacre of Servians is on the point of breaking out in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

(q) The "Balkan," of the 9th July, taking as its text Mr. Asquith's statement on the announcement of the news of the death of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, that he was full of anxiety for the fate of humanity,\* publishes a historical survey of the events of the last 40 years, from which it deduces that the Servian people during this period have been exposed to the cruel persecutions of Austria-Hungary's Jesuitical policy. Archduke Franz Ferdinand, like all the sons of Loyola, who only work in human blood, and who do homage to the principle, "The end justifies the means," was bound to be overtaken by fate and to fall a victim to Jesuitism, as the whole of Austria-Hungary will also fall. But by the downfall of Austria-Hungary, peace and tranquility would ensue to mankind. The sum of all these truths emerges in the conclusion that Asquith might with a calm mind have accompanied the news of the murder with the words, "I am no longer anxious for the fate of humanity."

(r) The "Politika," of the 9th July, expresses itself in a leading article under the heading, "Shameless Lies," as follows:—"The manner in which the inquiries into the Serajevo murder are being carried on shows quite clearly what objects Austria is aiming at in those inquiries. When the assassins, regardless of all the tortures to which they were exposed, refused to say what was demanded of them, other individuals were unearthed who expressed themselves ready on certain conditions to confess a certain degree of complicity in the murder, but at the same time to implicate all those persons who were objectionable to Austria. This method has succeeded for the moment because the hired individuals state whatever they are asked to state, and the Austrian police take care that these lies are at once spread to all the points of the compass. Austria has no sense of shame, and thinks that somebody will be found to believe lies of this sort."

(s) The "Stampa," of the 9th, says that not everything which has happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet been revealed and attained publicity. Strict secrecy is being maintained. But the truth

\* ["We are once more confronted with one of those incredible crimes which almost make us despair of the progress of mankind."]

Mr. Asquith's Speech, *Times*, July 1, 1914.]



will sooner or later come to the surface; blood-thirsty Austria will drink, nay, is drinking, Servian blood, till she can drink no more. It is reported that there are to-day about ten thousand wounded and dead in Bosnia."

(*t*) The "Politika," of the 10th July, hurls extravagant abuse against the members of the Imperial House.

(*u*) The Commercial journal, "Trgovinski Glasnik," of the 10th July, talks about the corruption and unscrupulousness of the Austro-Hungarian policy, which it calls Jesuitical, reckless and dishonourable. It is a warning to the Servian people in Austria-Hungary that they are not living in a civilised State which guarantees life and property, but that they must hold themselves armed and ever ready to defend themselves against the robbery of the officials and the Government. After the latest occurrences, the Servian people ought no longer to wait like a lamb, which any day might be led to the slaughter, but like a lion ready for a bloody resistance."

(*v*) In the "Stampa," of the 10th July, we find:—"Nothing lasts for ever, nor will Austria-Hungary remain for ever in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The time is not far off when the Servians who broke the power of the Turks and punished the Bulgarians, will circle round the Ivan Planina on the Trebević."

(*w*) The "Pravda," of the 10th July, under the title "Boycott against Good-for-nothings," appeals for a boycott of Austrian firms in Belgrade, as well as of Austrian wares, and says that it is the duty of the Narodna Odrbana to see that the boycott is strictly carried out.

(*x*) The "Zvono," of the 16th July, declares Princip to be the son of Countess Lonyay, to whom the charge was given that he should avenge the death of Crown Prince Rudolf on his murderer, Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

(*y*) The "Mali Journal," of the 19th July, publishes a report which says:—"Princip was instigated to make the attempt by an Austro-Hungarian agent. It is said in Vienna that it is only in the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade that the real culprit is to be found."

(*z*) The leading Young Radical organ, "Odjek," of the 20th July, writes:—"Austria-Hungary offers a hundred proofs that it will inherit the title of the 'sick man' of Europe. While in Servia not a single Austrian citizen has been molested, villages and towns have been plundered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact is one more proof on how much higher a cultural and moral level Servia stands than Austria-Hungary."

## APPENDIX 10.

### THE LOCAL COMMITTEE OF THE NARODNA ODRBANA AT NISH, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE CRIME AGAINST THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND.

A confidential communication has come to the ears of the Imperial and Royal Foreign Office from a reliable correspondent, whose name will be published at the proper time, according to which the Local

Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, recently held a meeting at which the president of this Committee, Jaša Nenadović, director of the Nish prison, touched on the subject of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, using the following words: "Serbia was absolutely bound this time to have recourse to a measure like the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, because the Archduke, on account of his aggressive and eccentric character, was a prominent and deadly danger for Serbia, and possibly for wider Slavonic circles also. Had he remained alive, he would have soon challenged Serbia to war or attacked it, in which case Serbia, which was now so much weakened materially, and had not yet completed her army re-organisation, would certainly have been lost. But now Serbia had been rescued by the Serajevo murder, and one of the dangers which threatened Serbia in the person of the victim had been swept out of the way. Serbia would now have rest for several years, as the new heir to the throne would consider well before walking in the steps of his predecessor.

Though he was aware, continued the speaker, that the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand would be a heavy blow and a great grief to Austria-Hungary, and that it would be followed by the torture of those of our nation who were living in that country, yet he would not have thought that his suppositions would have been so completely fulfilled, and that the Croats would have behaved as they had. Yet his friends in Bosnia and Herzegovina had assured him that the Austro-Hungarian officials were cowards and would not dare to overstep the mark in the measures they took; unfortunately, however, these friends, and through them, we too had been disappointed. If things went on much longer as they were going at present, revolvers and bombs would at last have to play their real rôle. Whatever the God of Serbia has in store, things cannot go on as at present."

The remarks of the speaker were received with complete approval by his hearers.

## APPENDIX 11.

### SUPPLEMENTS AFTER GOING TO PRESS.

#### 1.—*To Appendix 8.*

The teacher, Čubrilović, who undertook the guidance of Princip and Grabež at Priboj, has made a complete confession, from which the following important facts emerge:—

In the year 1911, Čubrilović, on the occasion of a Sokol expedition to Šabac, was initiated by Božo Fović, a member of the managing committee of the Narodna Odbrana, into the objects of that association, and was then appointed representative of the Narodna Odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnia). At his invitation, Miško Jovanović was later nominated representative of the Narodna Odbrana for Tuzla.

A peasant acted as go-between in the communications with the Narodna Odbrana, in fact, the same peasant who brought Princip and Grabež to Čubrilović; with the information that he was bringing

two Servian students with weapons to him. When he learned this, he knew that it was a "mission" from the Narodna Odbrana. Princip and Grabež told him that they had bombs and revolvers with them, with a view to making an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

2.—*Pictures in the Belgrade War Office of a nature hostile to the Monarchy.*

There are four allegorical pictures on the wall outside the reception hall of the Royal Servian War Office, of which three are representations of Servian victories, while the fourth symbolises the realisation of the anti-Monarchical tendencies of Servia.

Over a landscape, partly mountains (Bosnia), partly plains, (South Hungary), rises the "Zora," the rosy dawn of Servian hopes. In the foreground stands a woman in armour, whose shield bears the names of all the "provinces still awaiting liberation": Bosnia, Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Symria, Dalmatia, &c.

No. 20.

*Count Berchtold to the Under Secretary, Freiherr von Macchio at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Lambach, July 25, 1914.*

RUSSIAN Chargé d'Affaires telegraphs to me that he has received urgent instructions from his Government to press for a prolongation of time-limit fixed for the ultimatum to Servia. I request Your Excellency to reply to him in my name that we cannot consent to a prolongation of time-limit. Your Excellency will add, that Servia, even after breaking off of diplomatic relations, can bring about friendly solution by unconditional acceptance of our demands, although we should be obliged in such an event to demand reimbursement by Servia of all costs and damage incurred by us through our military measures.

No. 21.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Bad Ischl, July 25, 1915.*

FOR Your Excellency's information and guidance :—

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires called this morning on the Under Secretary, in order to express in the name of his Government the wish that the time-limit fixed in our note to Servia might be prolonged.

This request was based on the grounds that the Powers had been taken by surprise by our move, and that the Russian Government would regard it merely as natural consideration for the other

Cabinets, on the part of the Vienna Cabinet, if an opportunity were given to the former to examine the data on which our communication to the Powers was based and to study our prospective dossier.

The Under Secretary replied to the Chargé d'Affaires that he would immediately bring his explanation to my knowledge; but that he could tell him at once that there was no prospect of a prolongation of the time-limit fixed being granted by us. As to the grounds which the Russian Government had advanced in support of the wish they had expressed, they appeared to rest upon a mistaken hypothesis. Our note to the Powers was in no way intended to invite them to make known their own views on the subject, but merely bore the character of a statement for information, the communication of which we regarded as a duty laid on us by international courtesy. For the rest, we regarded our action as a matter concerning us and Servia alone, which action, notwithstanding the patience and long-suffering we had exhibited for years past, we had been forced by the development of circumstances to take, much against our own wish, for the defence of our most vital interests.

---

#### No. 22.

*Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

CABINET Council met yesterday evening and early this morning; form of answer to our note was settled after several drafts, and is to be delivered to me before the time-limit expires. I hear that Royal train is being made up; gold belonging to the National Bank and to the railway, as well as the Foreign Office records, are being taken into the interior of the country. Some of my colleagues are of the opinion that they must follow the Government; packing-up is proceeding at the Russian Legation in particular.

Garrison has left town in field order. Ammunition depots in the fortress were evacuated. Railway station thronged with soldiers. The ambulance trains have left Belgrade, proceeding towards the south. In pursuance of the instructions which have reached me while I write, we intend, in the event of a rupture, to leave Belgrade by the 6.30 train.

---

#### No. 23.

*Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Semlin, July 25, 1914.*

ORDERS for general mobilisation were issued in Servia at 3 p.m.

---

## No. 24.

*Freiherr Von Giesl to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Semlin, July 25, 1914.*

As a result of the Royal Servian Government's unsatisfactory answer to our demands of the 23rd inst., I have announced that diplomatic relations are broken off with Serbia, and have left Belgrade with the staff of the Legation. The reply was delivered to me at two minutes to six p.m.

---

## No. 25.

*Note of the Royal Servian Government of 12/25 July, 1914.**[See pp. 507-514.]*

## No. 26.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.**Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

WE were, of course, aware, when we decided to take serious measures against Serbia, of the possibility that the Servian dispute might develop into a collision with Russia. We could not, however, allow ourselves to be diverted by this eventuality from the position we took up towards Serbia, because fundamental considerations of national policy brought us face to face with the necessity of putting an end to the state of affairs in which a Russian charter made it possible for Serbia to threaten the Monarchy continuously without punishment and without the possibility of punishment.

Should events prove that Russia considered the moment for the great settlement with the central European Powers to have already arrived, and was therefore determined on war from the beginning, the following instructions to your Excellency appear indeed superfluous.

It might, however, be conceivable that Russia, in the event of the refusal of our demands by Serbia, and in face of the resulting necessity for us of military measures, might think better of it, and might even be willing not to allow herself to be swept away by the bellicose elements. It is to meet this situation that the following explanations have been drawn up, which your Excellency will use with M. Sazonof and the President of the Council, at the right moment, in the manner which you think best, and when the opportunity, in your opinion, presents itself.

I assume, generally, that your Excellency in the existing circumstances, has established a close understanding with your German colleague, who will certainly have been enjoined by his Government to leave the Russian Government no room for doubt that Austria-Hungary, in the event of a conflict with Russia, would not stand alone.

I am under no illusion that it will be easy to make M. Sazonof understand the step taken by us at Belgrade, which had become inevitable.

There is, however, one factor which cannot fail to impress the Russian Foreign Minister, and that is the emphasising of the circumstance that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in conformity with the principle to which it has adhered for decades past, is actuated in the present crisis by no selfish motives in appealing to arms in order to reach a settlement of her differences with Serbia.

The Monarchy possesses territory to repletion and has no desire for Servian possessions. If a conflict with Serbia is forced upon us, it will be for us not a conflict for territorial gain, but merely a means of self-defence and self-preservation.

The contents of the circular note, which in itself is sufficiently eloquent, are placed in their proper light by the dossier relating to the Servian propaganda against the Monarchy, and the various points of connection between this propaganda and the crime of June 28th.

Your Excellency will draw the Russian Minister's very particular attention to this dossier and impress upon him that it is an unique event in history that a Great Power should have borne with the seditious intrigues of an adjoining small State for so long a time and with such unparalleled patience as Austria-Hungary has borne with those of Serbia.

We had no wish to pursue a policy adverse to the ambitions of the Christian Balkan States, and we have therefore—notwithstanding that we well knew how little value was to be attached to Servian promises—suffered Serbia to increase her territory after the annexation crisis of 1908 to nearly double its former extent.

Since that time the subversive movement which has been fostered in Serbia against the Monarchy has assumed such excessive proportions that the vital interests of Austria-Hungary, and even of our Dynasty itself, appear to be threatened by the revolutionary activities of Serbia.

We must assume that to conservative loyal Russia energetic measures on our part against this menace to all public order will appear intelligible and indeed necessary.

When Your Excellency reaches this point in your conversation with M. Sazonof, the moment will have arrived to add to your explanation of our motives and intentions the hint that we—as your Excellency will have already been in a position to explain—aim at no territorial gains, and also did not wish to infringe the sovereignty of the Kingdom, but that, on the other hand, we will proceed to extreme measures for the enforcement of our demands.

That we had striven up till now, so far as in us lay, to preserve the peace which we considered to be the most precious possession of nations, was shown by the course of events during the last 40 years, and by the historical fact that our gracious Emperor has won for himself the glorious title of "Protector of the Peace."

We should, therefore, most sincerely deplore the disturbance of the European peace, because we also were of the opinion that the strengthening of the Balkan States in a position of political and

national independence would prove to the advantage of our relations with Russia, and would also remove all possibility of antagonism between us and Russia; also because we have always been ready, in the shaping of our own policy, to take into consideration the dominant political interests of Russia.

Any further toleration of Servian intrigues would undermine our existence as a State and our position as a Great Power, thus also threatening the balance of power in Europe. We are, however, convinced that it is to Russia's own interests, as her peaceful leaders will clearly see, that the existing European balance of power which is of such importance for the peace of the world, should be maintained. Our action against Servia, whatever form it takes, is conservative from first to last, and its object is the necessary preservation of our position in Europe.

## No. 27.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

As point 5 of our demands, namely, the participation of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement in Servia has given rise to special objection on the part of M. Sazonof, your Excellency will explain in strict confidence with regard to this point that this clause was interpolated merely out of practical considerations, and was in no way intended to infringe on the sovereignty of Servia.

By "collaboration" in point 5, we are thinking of the establishment of a private "Bureau de Sûreté" at Belgrade, which would operate in the same way as the analogous Russian establishments in Paris and in co-operation with the Servian police and administration.

## No. 28.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.*

As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilisation of Russian troops, Count Pourtalès has called the Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the fact that nowadays measures of mobilisation would be a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure. For, in that event, the purely military consideration of the question by the general staffs would find expression, and if that button were once touched in Germany, the situation would get out of control.

M. Sazonof assured the German Ambassador on his word of honour that the reports on the subject were incorrect; that up to that time not a single horse and not a single reservist had been called up, and that all the measures that were being taken were merely measures of preparation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, and perhaps Kasan and Moscow.

Immediately afterwards the Imperial German Military Attaché received by courier late in the evening an invitation from Suchomlinof, the Minister for War, who explained that Count Pourtalès had spoken with the Foreign Minister about the Russian military preparations, and as the Ambassador might have misunderstood certain military details, he was taking the opportunity of giving him more detailed information. In the following telegram from Count Pourtalès to Berlin which has been placed at my disposal, the pertinent communications from Major von Eggeling are collected :

“The Military Attaché reports with regard to a conversation with the Russian Minister of War : M. Sazonof had asked him to make the military position clear to me. The Minister for War gave me his word of honour that as yet no orders for mobilisation of any kind had been issued. For the present merely preparatory measures would be taken, not a horse would be taken, not a reservist called up. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan, which face Austria, would be mobilised. In no circumstances will mobilisation take place on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna and St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany is earnestly desired. My question what was the object of the mobilisation against Austria, was met with a shrug of the shoulders and a reference to the diplomatists. I gave the Minister for War to understand that his friendly intentions would be appreciated by us, but that we should also consider mobilisation against Austria to be in itself extremely threatening. The Minister emphasised repeatedly and with great stress Russia's urgent need of and earnest wish for peace.”

---

No. 29.

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

HERR VON TSCHIRSCHKY informed me to-day in pursuance of his instructions that, according to a telegram from Prince Lichnowsky which had been despatched in London on the 25th of July at 3 p.m., Sir E. Grey had transmitted to the latter the sketch of an answer from Servia, and had remarked in the private letter accompanying it, that he hoped that the Berlin Cabinet in view of the conciliatory tenour of this answer would support its acceptance in Vienna.

I consider it desirable that your Excellency should again approach the matter with the Secretary of State, and call his attention to the fact that almost simultaneously with the transmission by him of this letter to Prince Lichnowsky, namely at 3 p.m. yesterday, Servia had already ordered the general mobilisation of her army, which proves that no inclination for a peaceful solution existed in Belgrade. It was not till six o'clock, after mobilisation had been proclaimed, that the answer, which had apparently been previously telegraphed to London and the contents of which were not reconcilable with our demands, was delivered to the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade.

---



## No. 30.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

WE have broken off diplomatic relations with Serbia after she had refused the demands we had addressed to her. I beg your Excellency now to proceed at once to the Foreign Minister or his deputy, and to express yourself to him approximately to the following effect:—

The Royal Servian Government have refused to accept the demands which we were forced to address to them in order to secure permanently our most vital interests which were menaced by them, and have thereby made it clear that they do not intend to abandon their subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in some of our frontier provinces and their final disruption from the Monarchy

Reluctantly, therefore, and very much against our wish, we find ourselves obliged to compel Serbia by the sharpest measures to make a fundamental change in the attitude of enmity she has up to now pursued.

## No. 31.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

JUST had a long conversation with M. Sazonof. Told the Minister I was under the impression that mistaken ideas were prevalent in Russia with regard to the character of our action. We were credited with wishing to push forward into Balkan territory, and to begin a march to Salonica or even to Constantinople. Others, again, went so far as to describe our action merely as the starting point of a preventive war against Russia. I said that all this was erroneous, and that parts of it were absolutely unreasonable. The goal of our action was self-preservation and self-defence against hostile propaganda by word, in writing, and in action, which threatened our integrity. It would occur to no-one in Austria-Hungary to threaten Russian interests, or indeed to pick a quarrel with Russia. And yet we were absolutely determined to reach the goal which we had set before us, and the path which we had chosen seemed to us the most suitable. As, however, the action under discussion was action in self-defence, I could not conceal from him that we could not allow ourselves to be diverted from it by any consequences, of whatever kind they might be.

M. Sazonof agreed with me. Our goal, as I had described it to him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered that the path which we were pursuing with a view to attaining it was not the surest. He said that the note which we had delivered was not happy in its form. He had since been studying it, and if I had time, he would like to look it through once more with me. I remarked that I was at his service, but was not authorised either to discuss the text of the

note with him or to interpret it. Of course, however, his remarks were of interest. The Minister then took all the points of the note in order, and on this occasion found seven of the ten points admissible without very great difficulty; only the two points dealing with the collaboration of the Imperial and Royal officials in Servia and the point dealing with the removal of officers and civil servants to be designated by us, seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present form. With regard to the two first points, I was in a position to give an authentic interpretation in the sense of your Excellency's telegram of the 25th instant; with regard to the third, I expressed the opinion that it was a necessary demand. Moreover, matters had already been set in motion. The Servians had mobilised on the previous day and I did not know what had happened since then.

---

## No. 32.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

I EMPOWER your Excellency to declare to M. Sazonof that, so long as the war between Austria-Hungary and Servia remains localised, the Monarchy does not aim in any way at territorial acquisitions of any sort.

---

## No. 33.

*Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, June 27, 1914.*

M. SAZONOF explained to the German Ambassador that he could "guarantee" to him "that on the Russian side no mobilisation had been begun; though it was true that certain necessary military precautions were being taken."

The German military attaché at St. Petersburg reports that "the Russian Minister of War has given him his word of honour that not a man or a horse has been mobilised; however, naturally, certain military precautions have been taken"; precautions which, as the German military attaché adds, apparently spontaneously, to his report, "are to be sure pretty far-reaching."

---

## No. 34.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, London, Paris and St. Petersburg.*

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

ANNEXED you will find the text, annotated with our remarks, of the note which the Royal Servian Government on the 25th of June transmitted to the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade.

---

*Enclosure.*

*Reply of the Royal Servian Government to the Imperial and Royal Government of the 12/25 July, 1914.*

*Translation.*

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant,\* and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina† and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State — protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th\* March, 1909 — have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their agents, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved.

*Remarks.*

The Royal Servian Government confine themselves to asserting that, since the declarations on the 18th March, 1909, no attempt has been made by the Servian Government and their agents to change the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thereby they deliberately and arbitrarily shift the ground on which our *démarche* was based, as we did not maintain that they and their agents have taken any official action in this direction.

Our charge, on the contrary, is to the effect that the Servian Government, notwithstanding the obligations undertaken in the above-quoted note, have neglected to suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.

Their obligation, that is to say, was that they should change the whole direction of their policy and adopt a friendly and neighbourly attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not merely that they should refrain from officially attacking the incorporation of Bosnia in the Monarchy.

\* Old style.

† The Servian Parliament.

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies — manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of

The proposition of the Royal Servian Government that utterances in the press and the activities of societies are of a private character and are not subject to official control is absolutely antagonistic to the institutions of modern States, even those which have the most liberal law with regard to press and associations; this law has a public character and subjects the press, as well as associations, to State control. Moreover, Servian institutions themselves contemplate some such control. The complaint against the Servian Government is in fact that they have entirely omitted to control their press and their associations, of whose activities in a sense hostile to the Monarchy they were well aware.

This proposition is incorrect; the Servian Government were accurately informed of the suspicions which were entertained against quite definite persons and were not only in a position but also bound by their internal laws to initiate spontaneous enquiries. They have done nothing in this direction.

Our demand ran:—

"The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda

the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration :—

“The Royal Government of Serbia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary—*i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly pledged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909.\*

“The Government, &c. ....”  
(identical with the text as demanded).

The Royal Government further undertake :—

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina† a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government

\* New style.

directed against Austria-Hungary . . .”

The alteration made by the Royal Servian Government in the declaration demanded by us implies that no such propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary exists, or that they are cognisant of no such propaganda. This formula is insincere and disingenuous, as by it the Servian Government reserve for themselves for later use the evasion that they had not by this declaration disavowed the then existing propaganda, and had not admitted that it was hostile to the Monarchy, from which they could further deduce that they had not bound themselves to suppress propaganda similar to that now being carried on.

The wording demanded by us ran :—

“The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries . . . participated. . . .”

By the adoption of this wording with the addition “according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government” the Servian Government are pursuing the object that has already been referred to above, namely, that of preserving a free hand for the future.

We had demanded of them :—

1. “To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.”

We wished therefore to ensure that Serbia should be obliged to see to it that press attacks of that nature should be discontinued in future; we wished therefore

† The Servian Parliament.

engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

to know that a definite result in this connection was assured.

Instead of this Serbia offers us the enactment of certain laws which would be calculated to serve as means towards this result, viz. :—

(a) A law under which, the press publications in question which are hostile to the Monarchy are to be punished on their merits (*subjectiv*) a matter which is of complete indifference to us, all the more as it is well known that the prosecution of press offences on their merits (*subjectiv*) is only very rarely possible, and, if any law of the sort is laxly administered, even in the few cases of this nature a conviction would not be obtained; this, therefore, is a proposal which in no way meets our demand as it does not offer us the slightest guarantee for the result which we wish to obtain.

(b) A law supplementary to Article 22 of the constitution which would permit confiscation—a proposal which is equally unsatisfactory to us, as the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no use to us, but only the obligation of the Government to apply it; this, however, is not promised us.

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory—all the more so as they are evasive in that we are not told within what period of time these laws would be enacted, and that in the event of the rejection of the Bills by the Skupstchtina—apart from the possible resignation of the Government—everything would be as it was before.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal

The whole of the public life of Serbia teems with the propaganda against the Monarchy, of the Narodna Odbrana and of societies affiliated to it; it is therefore quite impossible to admit the reservation made by the Servian

act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia everything that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from the military

Government when they say that they know nothing about them.

Quite apart from this the demand we have made is not entirely complied with, as we further required :—

That the means of propaganda possessed by these associations should be confiscated.

That the re-establishment of the dissolved associations under another name and in another form should be prevented.

The Belgrade Cabinet maintains complete silence in both these directions, so that the half consent which has been given us offers no guarantee that it is contemplated to put a definite end to the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy, especially of the Narodna Odbrana, by their dissolution.

In this case also the Servian Government first ask for proofs that propaganda against the Monarchy is fomented in public educational establishments in Servia, when they must know that the school books which have been introduced into the Servian schools contain matter of an objectionable nature in this respect, and that a large proportion of the Servian teachers are enrolled in the ranks of the Narodna Odbrana and the societies affiliated with it.

Moreover, here, too, the Servian Government have not complied with a portion of our demand as fully as we required, inasmuch as in their text they have omitted the addition which we desired “both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction”—an addition which quite clearly shows in what directions the propaganda against the Monarchy in the Servian schools is to be looked for.

Inasmuch as the Royal Servian Government attach to their con-

service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and functionaries for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th\* June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results

sent to the removal of the officers and functionaries in question from military and civil service the condition that these persons should have been convicted by judicial enquiry, their consent is confined to those cases in which these persons are charged with a crime punishable by law. As we, however, demand the removal of those officers and functionaries who foment propaganda against the Monarchy, a proceeding which is not generally punishable by law in Servia, it appears that our demand under this head also is not complied with.

International Law has just as little to do with this question as has criminal procedure. This is purely a matter of State police, which must be settled by way of a separate agreement. Servia's reservation is therefore unintelligible, and would be calculated, owing to the vague general form in which it is couched, to lead to unsurmountable difficulties when the time comes for concluding the prospective agreement.

Our demand was quite clear and did not admit of misinterpretation. We desired:—

(1) The opening of a judicial enquiry (*enquête judiciaire*) against accessories to the plot.

(2) The collaboration of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the investigations relating thereto ("*recherches*" as opposed to "*enquête judiciaire*").

It never occurred to us that representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government should take part in the Servian judicial proceedings; it was intended that they should collaborate only in the preliminary police investigations,

\* Old style.



of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

directed to the collection and verification of the material for the enquiry.

If the Servian Government misunderstand us on this point they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between "*enquête judiciaire*" and simple "*recherches*" must be familiar to them.

In desiring to be exempted from all control in the proceedings which are to be initiated, which if properly carried through would have results of a very undesirable kind for themselves, and in view of the fact that they have no handle for a plausible refusal of the collaboration of our representatives in the preliminary police investigations (numberless precedents exist for such police intervention) they have adopted a standpoint which is intended to invest their refusal with an appearance of justification and to impress on our demand the stamp of impracticability.

This answer is disingenuous.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankosić. As regards Milan Ziganović, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th\* June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for pre-

The enquiries set on foot by us show that three days after the crime, when it became known that Ciganović was implicated in the plot, he went on leave and travelled to Ribari on a commission from the Prefecture of Police at Belgrade. It is, therefore, in the first place incorrect to say that Ciganović had left the Servian State Service on the 25th/28th June. To this must be added the fact that the Prefect of Police at Belgrade, who had himself contrived the departure of Ciganović and who knew where he was stopping, declared in an interview that no man of the name of Milan Ciganović existed in Belgrade.

\* Old style.

venting the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials whether in Serbia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will themselves take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

The interviews in question must be quite well-known to the Royal Servian Government. By requesting the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them all kinds of details about these interviews, and keeping in reserve the holding of a formal enquiry into them, they show that they are not willing to comply seriously with this demand either.

## No. 35.

*Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

The proposal for mediation made by Great Britain, that Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France should meet at a conference at London, is declined so far as Germany is concerned on the ground that it is impossible for Germany to bring her Ally before a European Court in her settlement with Servia.

---

## No. 36.

*Freiherr Von Müller to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tokio, July 28, 1914.*

To-day's semi-official "Japan Times" contains a leading article which concludes by saying that Japan is on the best possible terms with the three Great Powers concerned—Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia—while it is in no way interested in Servia. In the case of war, the Imperial Government would, as a matter of course, maintain the strictest neutrality.

---

## No. 37.

*Count Berchtold to the Royal Servian Foreign Office at Belgrade.*  
(Translated from the French.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

The Royal Servian Government not having answered in a satisfactory manner the note of 23rd July presented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Servia.

---

## No. 38.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

For Your Excellency's information and for communication to the Secretary of State :—

I have received the following telegram from Count Mensdorff, dated the 27th inst. :—

"I have to-day had the opportunity of explaining at length to Sir Edward Grey, that our action is not one of aggression but of self-defence and of self-preservation, and that we have no intention of

making any territorial acquisition, or of destroying Servian independence. What we desire is to obtain a certain measure of satisfaction for what has passed, and guarantees for the future.

For this purpose I availed myself of some of the points out of Your Excellency's communications to Count Szápáry.

Sir E. Grey said to me that he was very much disappointed that we were treating the Servian answer as if it were a complete refusal.

He had believed that this answer would furnish a basis on which the four other Governments could arrive at a peaceful solution.

This was his idea when he proposed a conference.

The conference would meet on the assumption that Austria-Hungary as well as Russia would refrain from every military operation during the attempt of the other Powers to find a peaceful issue.

(The declaration of Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons to-day amplifies the project of a conference.) When he spoke of our refraining from military operations against Servia, I observed that I feared that it was perhaps already too late. The Secretary of State expressed the view that if we were resolved under any circumstances to go to war with Servia, and if we assumed that Russia would remain quiet, we were taking a great risk. If we could induce Russia to remain quiet, he had nothing more to say on the question. If we could not, the possibilities and the dangers were incalculable.

As a symptom of the feeling of unrest he told me that the British Grand Fleet, which was concentrated in Portsmouth after the manœuvres, and which should have dispersed to-day, would for the present remain there. 'We had not called up any Reserves, but as they are assembled, we cannot at this moment send them home again.'

His idea of a conference had the aim of preventing, if possible, a collision between the Great Powers, and he also aimed at the isolation of the conflict. If, therefore, Russia mobilises and Germany takes action, the conference necessarily breaks down.

I believe that I need not specially point out to Your Excellency that Grey's proposal for a conference, in so far as it relates to our conflict with Servia, appears, in view of the state of war which has arisen, to have been outstripped by events.

---

No. 39.

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

We attach the greatest importance to the point that Sir E. Grey should appreciate in an impartial manner our action against Servia in general, and in particular our refusal to accept the Servian answer, and I therefore ask Your Excellency to take the opportunity of explaining to the Secretary of State in detail the dossier which is being sent to you by post, and that you will emphasize the specially salient passages; in the same sense Your Excellency should discuss with Sir E. Grey the critical observations on the Servian note (the text of the note with our observations has been sent to Your Excellency by post

yesterday), and you should make clear to him that the offer of Serbia to meet points in our note was only an apparent one, intended to deceive Europe without giving any guarantee for the future.

As the Servian Government knew that only an unconditional acceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the Servian tactics can easily be seen through: Serbia accepted a number of our demands, with all sorts of reservations, in order to impress public opinion in Europe, trusting that she would not be required to fulfil her promises. In conversing with Sir E. Grey your Excellency should lay special emphasis on the circumstance that the general mobilisation of the Servian army was ordered for the afternoon of the 25th July at 3 o'clock, while the answer to our note was delivered just before the expiration of the time fixed, that is to say, a few minutes before 6 o'clock. Up to then we had made no military preparations, but by the Servian mobilisation we were compelled to do so.

#### No. 40.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

FOR your Excellency's information and guidance:

The Imperial Russian Ambassador spoke to me to-day in order to inform me of his return from short leave in Russia, and at the same time to execute a telegraphic instruction of M. Sazonof. The latter had informed him that he had had a lengthy and friendly discussion with your Excellency (your Excellency's telegram of the 27th instant), in the course of which he had discussed with great readiness the various points of the Servian answer. M. Sazonof was of the opinion that Serbia had gone far in meeting our wishes, but that some of the demands appeared to him entirely unacceptable, a fact which he had not concealed from your Excellency. It appeared to him under these circumstances that the Servian reply might properly be regarded as furnishing a starting point for an understanding to attain which the Russian Government would gladly lend a hand. M. Sazonof therefore desired to propose to me that the exchange of ideas with your Excellency should be continued, and that your Excellency should receive instructions with this end in view.

In reply, I emphasised my inability to concur in such a proposal. No one in our country could understand, nor could anyone approve negotiations with reference to the wording used in the answer which we had designated as unsatisfactory. This was all the more impossible because, as the Ambassador knew, there was a deep feeling of general excitement which had already mastered public opinion. Moreover, on our side war had to-day been declared against Serbia.

In reply to the explanations of the Ambassador, which culminated in asserting that we should not in any way suppress the admitted hostile opinion in Serbia by a warlike action, but that, on the contrary

we should only increase it, I gave him some insight into our present relations towards Servia which made it necessary, quite against our will, and without any selfish secondary object, for us to show our restless neighbour, with the necessary emphasis, our firm intention not to permit any longer a movement which was allowed to exist by the Government, and which was directed against the existence of the Monarchy. The attitude of Servia after the receipt of our note had further not been calculated to make a peaceful solution possible, because Servia, even before she transmitted to us her unsatisfactory reply, had ordered a general mobilisation, and in so doing had already committed a hostile act against us. In spite of this, however, we had waited for three days. Yesterday hostilities were opened against us on the Hungarian frontier on the part of Servia. By this act we were deprived of the possibility of maintaining any longer the patience which we had shown towards Servia. The establishment of a fundamental but peaceful amelioration of our relations towards Servia had now been made impossible, and we were compelled to meet the Servian provocation in the only form which in the given circumstances was consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy.

---

## No. 41.

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador, who discussed matters with me to-day has, in accordance with his instructions, explained the attitude of Sir E. Grey with regard to our conflict with Servia as follows:—

The British Government have followed the previous course of events during the crisis with lively interest, and they attach importance to giving us an assurance that they entertain sympathy for us in the point of view we have adopted, and that they completely understand the grievances which we have against Servia.

If England has no ground for making our dispute with Servia in itself an object of special consideration, nevertheless this question cannot escape the attention of the Cabinet at London, because this conflict may affect wider circles and thereby imperil the peace of Europe.

To this extent England is affected by the question, and it is only on this ground that Sir E. Grey has been led to send an invitation to the Governments of those countries which are not directly interested in this conflict (Germany, Italy and France), in order to test in common with them by means of a continuous exchange of ideas the possibilities of the situation, and to discuss how the differences may be most quickly settled. Following the precedent of the London conference during the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of the various States mentioned resident at London should, according to the view of the British Secretary of State, keep themselves in continual contact with him for the purpose indicated. Sir E. Grey had already received answers expressed in very friendly terms from the Govern-

ments concerned, in which they concurred in the suggestion put forward. At present it was also the wish of the Secretary of State, if possible, to prevent even at the eleventh hour the outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and if this were not possible at least to prevent the conflict from causing a collision involving bloodshed; if necessary, by the Servians withdrawing without accepting battle. The reply which had reached us from Serbia appeared to offer the possibility that it might provide the basis of an understanding. England would willingly be prepared in this matter to make her influence felt according to our ideas and wishes.

I thanked the Ambassador for the communication of Sir E. Grey, and I answered him that I fully appreciated the view of the Secretary of State. His point of view was, however, naturally different from mine, as England was not directly interested in the dispute between us and Serbia, and the Secretary of State could not be fully informed concerning the serious significance which the questions at issue had for the Monarchy. If Sir E. Grey spoke of the possibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities, this suggestion came too late, since our soldiers were yesterday fired at by soldiers from over the Servian frontier, and to-day war has been declared by us against Serbia. I had to decline to entertain the idea of a discussion based on the Servian answer. What we asked was the integral acceptance of the ultimatum. Serbia had endeavoured to get out of her difficulty by subterfuges. We knew these Servian methods only too well.

Through the local knowledge which he has gained here, Sir Maurice de Bunsen was in a position to appreciate fully our point of view, and he would be in a position to give Sir E. Grey an accurate representation of the facts.

In so far as Sir E. Grey desired to be of service to the cause of European peace, he would certainly not find any opposition from us. He must, however, reflect that the peace of Europe would not be saved by Great Powers placing themselves behind Serbia, and directing their efforts to securing that she should escape punishment.

For, even if we consented to entertain such an attempt at an agreement, Serbia would be all the more encouraged to continue on the path she has formerly followed, and this would, in a very short time, again imperil the cause of peace.

The British Ambassador assured me in conclusion that he fully understood our point of view but, on the other hand, he regretted that, under these circumstances, the desire of the British Government to arrive at an agreement had, for the time being, no prospect of being realised. He hoped to remain in constant communication with me as that appeared to him, on account of the great danger of a European conflagration, to be of special value.

I assured the Ambassador that I was at all times at his disposal, and thereupon our conversation came to an end.

---

## No. 42.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

July 28, 1914.

I REQUEST your Excellency to go at once to the Chancellor or the Secretary of State and communicate to him the following in my name:—

“According to mutually consistent reports, received from St. Petersburg, Kieff, Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, Russia is making extensive military preparations. M. Sazonof has indeed given an assurance on his word of honour, as has also the Russian Minister of War, that mobilisation has not up to now been ordered; the latter has, however, told the German Military Attaché that the military districts which border on Austria-Hungary—Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan—will be mobilised, should our troops cross the Servian frontier.

“Under these circumstances, I would urgently ask the Cabinet at Berlin to take into immediate consideration the question whether the attention of Russia should not be drawn, in a friendly manner, to the fact that the mobilisation of the above districts amounts to a threat against Austria-Hungary, and that, therefore, should these measures be carried out, they would be answered by the most extensive military counter measures, not only by the Monarchy but by our Ally, the German Empire.”

In order to make it more easy for Russia to withdraw, it appears to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first place, be taken by Germany alone; nevertheless we are ready to take this step in conjunction with Germany.

Unambiguous language appears to me at the present moment to be the most effective method of making Russia fully conscious of all that is involved in a threatening attitude.

## No. 43.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

July 28, 1914.

INFORMATION has been received from the Imperial German Ambassador that Sir E. Grey has appealed to the German Government to use their influence with the Imperial and Royal Government, in order to induce them either to regard the reply received from Belgrade as satisfactory, or to accept it as a basis for discussion between the Cabinets.

Herr von Tschirschky was commissioned to bring the British proposal before the Vienna Cabinet for their consideration.



## No. 44.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at St. Petersburg,  
London, Paris and Rome.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

FOR your Excellency's information.

I have to-day handed to the Imperial German Ambassador the following memorandum in answer to a *démarche* made here by him :

*Memorandum.*

The Imperial and Royal Government have received with deep gratitude information of the communication which the Imperial German Ambassador made to them on the 28th inst. with regard to the request of the British Cabinet that the Imperial German Government should use their influence with the Vienna Cabinet that they might regard the answer from Belgrade either as satisfactory, or as a basis for discussion. So far as concerns what was said by the British Secretary of State to Prince Lichnowsky, the Imperial and Royal Government desire in the first place to draw attention to the fact that the Servian answer in no way contains an acceptance of all our demands with one single exception, as Sir E. Grey appears to assume, but rather that on most points reservations are formulated, which materially detract from the value of the concessions which are made. The points which are not accepted are, however, precisely those which contain some guarantee for the real attainment of the end in view.

The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal their astonishment at the assumption that their action against Serbia was directed against Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans, for this implies the supposition that the propaganda directed against the Monarchy has not merely a Servian but a Russian origin. The basis of our consideration has hitherto been rather that official Russia has no connection with these tendencies, which are hostile to the Monarchy, and that our present action is directed exclusively against Serbia, while our feelings for Russia, as we can assure Sir E. Grey, are entirely friendly.

Further, the Imperial and Royal Government must point out that to their great regret they are no longer in a position to adopt an attitude towards the Servian reply in the sense of the British suggestion, since at the time of the *démarche* made by Germany a state of war between the Monarchy and Serbia had already arisen, and the Servian reply has accordingly already been outstripped by events.

The Imperial and Royal Government take this opportunity of observing that the Royal Servian Government, even before they communicated their reply, had taken steps towards the mobilisation of the Servian forces, and thereafter they allowed three days to elapse without showing any inclination to abandon the point of view contained in their reply, whereupon the declaration of war followed on our side.

If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on the Russian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace between the Great Powers, and with a view to the localisation of the war which has been forced upon us by many years of Servian intrigues, the Imperial and Royal Government could only welcome this.

---

## No. 45.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

FRANCE is unmistakably making certain military preparations as is announced by the newspapers, perhaps with a certain exaggeration.

As I learn in strictest confidence, Baron Schoen is commissioned to discuss these preparations with M. Viviani to-day, and to point out that in these circumstances Germany may be compelled to take similar measures which necessarily could not be kept secret, and which could not fail to cause great public excitement when they became known. In this way the two countries, although they are only striving for peace, will be compelled to at least a partial mobilisation, which would be dangerous.

Further, in accordance with these instructions, Baron Schoen will declare that Germany has a lively desire that the conflict between us and Servia should remain localised, and that in this Germany relies on the support of France.

---

## No. 46.

*Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

As early as Sunday the German Government declared at St. Petersburg that Russian mobilisation would have as a consequence German mobilisation.

Thereupon there followed on the part of Russia the reply announced in my telegram of the 27th inst. Following this a telegram has to-day been sent to St. Petersburg, stating that owing to the further progress of the Russian measures of mobilisation Germany might be brought to mobilise.

---

## No. 47.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

As I have learned from the German Ambassador that M. Sazonof is showing himself greatly excited over your Excellency's alleged disinclination to continue the exchange of ideas with Russia, and over

the mobilisation of Austria-Hungary, which is supposed to be much more extensive than is necessary, and, therefore, directed against Russia, I visited the Minister in order to remove certain misunderstandings which seemed to me to exist.

The Minister began by making the point that Austria-Hungary categorically refused to continue an exchange of ideas. I agreed in view of your Excellency's telegram of the 28th July that your Excellency had indeed declined, after all that had occurred, to discuss the wording of the note, and in general the Austro-Hungarian-Servian conflict, but said that I must make it clear that I was in a position to suggest a much broader basis of discussion in declaring that we had no desire to injure any Russian interests, that we had no intention, naturally on the assumption that the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia remained localised, of annexing Servian territory, and that we also had no idea of touching the sovereignty of Servia. I was convinced that your Excellency would always be ready to keep in touch with St. Petersburg with regard to Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.

M. Sazonof gave me to understand that he had been convinced of this so far as territory was concerned, but so far as the sovereignty of the country was in question he must continue to hold the opinion that to force on Servia our conditions would result in Servia becoming a vassal State. This, however, would upset the equilibrium in the Balkans, and this was how Russian interests became involved. He returned to the question of a discussion of the note, the action of Sir E. Grey, &c., and he desired again to point out to me that Russia recognised our legitimate interest, and desired to give it full satisfaction, but that this should be clothed in a form which would be acceptable to Servia. I expressed the view that this was not a Russian but a Servian interest, whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that Russian interests were in this case Servian interests, so that I was obliged to make an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new topic.

I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of anxiety in Russia, because we had mobilised eight corps for action against Servia. M. Sazonof assured me that it was not he (who knew nothing about this) but the Chief of the General Staff who had expressed this anxiety. I endeavoured to convince the Minister that any unprejudiced person could easily be persuaded that our southern corps could not constitute a menace for Russia.

I indicated to the Minister that it would be well if his Imperial Master were informed of the true situation, more especially as it was urgently necessary, if it was desired to maintain peace, that a speedy end should be put to the military competition (*lizzitieren*) which now threatened to ensue on account of false news. M. Sazonof very characteristically expressed the view that *he could communicate this to the Chief of the General Staff, for he saw His Majesty every day.*

The Minister further informed me that a Ukase would be signed to-day, which would give orders for a mobilisation in a somewhat extended form. He was able, however, to assure me in the most official way that these troops were not intended to attack us. They would only stand to arms in case Russian interests in the

Balkans should be in danger. An explanatory note would make this clear, for the question here was one of a measure of precaution which the Emperor Nicholas had found to be justified, since we, who in any case have the advantage of quicker mobilisation, have now also already so great a start. In earnest words I drew M. Sazonof's attention to the impression which such a measure would make in our country. I went on to express doubt whether the explanatory note would be calculated to soften the impression, whereupon the Minister again gave expression to assurances regarding the harmlessness(!) of this measure.

---

## No. 48.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

I HAVE just heard from Herr von Tschirschky, that the Russian Ambassador has told him that he has been notified by his Government that the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan are being mobilised. He said that Russia was outraged in her honour as a Great Power, and was obliged to take corresponding measures. The Russian mobilisation is confirmed by the commanders of our Galician forces, and, according to a communication from the Imperial and Royal Military Attaché, in a conversation which M. Sazonof had to-day with the German Ambassador it was no longer denied.

I request your Excellency to bring the above without delay to the knowledge of the German Government, and at the same time to emphasise that if the Russian measures of mobilisation are not stopped without delay, our general mobilisation would have, on military grounds, to follow at once.

As a last effort to maintain the peace of Europe, I considered it desirable that our representative and the representative of Germany at St. Petersburg, and, if necessary, at Paris, should at once be instructed to declare to the Governments to whom they are accredited in a friendly manner, that the continuance of the Russian mobilisation, would have as a result counter-measures in Germany and Austria-Hungary, which must lead to serious consequences.

Your Excellency will add that, as can be understood, in our military operations against Serbia we will not allow ourselves to be diverted from our path.

The Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at St. Petersburg and Paris are receiving identical instructions to make the above declaration as soon as their German colleague receives similar instructions.

---

## No. 49.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

IN answer to your Excellency's telegram of the 29th July.

I am of course still ready to explain to M. Sazonof, through your Excellency, the various points contained in our note addressed to Serbia

which however has already been outstripped by recent events. I should also attach special importance, in accordance with the suggestion made to me through M. Schebeko, also to discussing on this occasion in a confidential and friendly manner the questions which affect directly our relations towards Russia. From this it might be hoped that it would be possible to remove the ambiguities which have arisen and to secure the development in a friendly manner of our relations towards our neighbours, which is so desirable an object.

---

## No. 50.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

For Your Excellency's information and guidance :—

I have to-day explained to M. Schebeko that I have been informed that M. Sazonof has been hurt by my flat refusal of his proposal as to a discussion with your Excellency, and that he is not less hurt that no exchange of ideas has taken place between myself and M. Schebeko.

With reference to the first point, I had already permitted your Excellency by telegram to give M. Sazonof any explanations he desired with regard to the note—which in any case appears to be outstripped by the outbreak of war. In any case this could only take the form of subsequent explanations, as it was never our intention to depart in any way from the points contained in the note. I had also authorised your Excellency to discuss in a friendly manner with M. Sazonof our special relations towards Russia.

That M. Sazonof should complain that no exchange of ideas had taken place between M. Schebeko and myself must rest on a misunderstanding, as M. Schebeko and myself had discussed the practical questions two days before, a fact which the Ambassador confirmed with the observation that he had fully informed M. Sazonof of this conversation.

M. Schebeko then explained why our action against Serbia was regarded with such anxiety at St. Petersburg. He said that we were a Great Power which was proceeding against the small Servian State, and it was not known at St. Petersburg what our intentions in the matter were; whether we desired to encroach on its sovereignty, whether we desired completely to overthrow it, or even to crush it to the ground. Russia could not be indifferent towards the future fate of Serbia, which was linked to Russia by historical and other bonds. At St. Petersburg they had taken the trouble to use all their influence at Belgrade to induce them to accept all our conditions, though this was indeed at a time when the conditions afterwards imposed by us could not yet be known. But even with reference to these demands they would do everything they could in order to accomplish at any rate all that was possible.

I reminded the Ambassador that we had repeatedly emphasized the fact that we did not desire to follow any policy of conquest in Serbia, also that we would not infringe her sovereignty, but we only

desired to establish a condition of affairs which would offer us a guarantee against being disturbed by Servia. To this I added a somewhat lengthy discussion of our intolerable relations with Servia. I also gave M. Schebeko clearly to understand to how large an extent Russian diplomacy was responsible for these circumstances, even though this result might be contrary to the wishes of the responsible authorities.

In the further course of our discussion I referred to the Russian mobilisation which had then come to my knowledge. Since this was limited to the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kasan it had an appearance of hostility against the Monarchy. I did not know what the grounds for this might be, as there was no dispute between us and Russia. Austria-Hungary had mobilised exclusively against Servia; against Russia not a single man; and this would be observed from the single fact that the first, tenth and eleventh corps had not been mobilised. In view, however, of the fact that Russia was openly mobilising against us, we should have to extend our mobilisation too, and in this case I desired to mention expressly that this measure did not, of course, imply any attitude of hostility towards Russia, and that it was exclusively a necessary counter-measure against the Russian mobilisation.

I asked M. Schebeko to announce this to his Government, and this he promised to do.

#### No. 51.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at London and St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

I am telegraphing as follows to Berlin :—

Herr von Tschirschky has in accordance with his instructions yesterday communicated a discussion between Sir E. Grey and Prince Lichnowsky in which the British Secretary of State made the following announcement to the German Ambassador :—

Sazonof has informed the British Government that after the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia, he is no longer in a position to deal directly with Austria-Hungary, and he therefore requests that Great Britain will again take up her work of mediation. The Russian Government regarded the preliminary stoppage of hostilities as a condition precedent to this.

To this Russian declaration, Sir E. Grey remarked to Prince Lichnowsky that Great Britain thought of a mediation *à quatre*, and that she regarded this as urgently necessary if a general war was to be prevented.

I ask your Excellency to convey our warm thanks to the Secretary of State for the communications made to us through Herr von Tschirschky, and to declare to him that in spite of the change in the situation which has since arisen through the mobilisation of Russia, we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us and Servia.

The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military

action against Serbia should continue to take its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilisation which is directed against us, in which case, of course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian attitude.

---

## No. 52.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

The order for the general mobilisation of the entire Army and Fleet was issued early to-day.

---

## No. 53.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic Representatives.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

For your information and for use in your dealings with the Government to which you are accredited.

As mobilisation has been ordered by the Russian Government on our frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military measures in Galicia.

These measures are purely of a defensive character and arise exclusively under the pressure of the Russian measures, which we regret exceedingly, as we ourselves have no aggressive intentions of any kind against Russia, and desire the continuation of the former neighbourly relations.

*Pourparlers* between the Cabinets at Vienna and St. Petersburg appropriate to the situation are meanwhile being continued, and from these we hope that things will quieten down all round.

---

## No. 54.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

German Ambassador in pursuance of the instructions of his Government has declared here that if the general mobilisation ordered by the Russian Government is not stopped within 12 hours, Germany also will mobilize. At the same time Baron Schoen has asked whether France will remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and Russia. An answer to this is requested within eighteen hours. The time limit expires to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock in the afternoon.

---

## No. 55.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

Your Excellency's telegram of the 30th July has been received.

You will have gathered from my telegram of the 29th July, that without waiting for instructions I again resumed conversations with M. Sazonof more or less on the basis which has now been indicated to me, but that the points of view on the two sides had not materially approximated to each other.

Meanwhile, however, it has appeared from the conversations between the German Ambassador and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia will not accept as satisfactory the formal declaration that Austria-Hungary will neither diminish the territory of the Servian Kingdom nor infringe on Servian sovereignty, nor injure Russian interests in the Balkans or elsewhere; since then moreover a general mobilisation has been ordered on the part of Russia.

---

## No. 56.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.*

I visited M. Sazonof to-day, and told him that I had received instructions, but that I must premise that I was entirely ignorant of the present condition of affairs created in Vienna, by the general Russian mobilisation, and that in interpreting the instructions which I had received previously, I must leave this condition out of account. I said that the two instructions of Your Excellency dealt with the misunderstanding that we had declined further negotiations with Russia. This was a mistake, as I had already, without instructions, assured him. Your Excellency was not only quite prepared to deal with Russia on the broadest basis possible, but was also especially inclined to subject the text of our note to a discussion so far as its interpretation was concerned.

I emphasised how much the instructions of Your Excellency afforded me a further proof of goodwill, although I had to remind him that the situation created since then by the general mobilisation was unknown to me; but I could only hope that the course of events had not already taken us too far; in any case, I regarded it as my duty in the present moment of extreme anxiety to prove once again the goodwill of the Imperial and Royal Government. M. Sazonof replied that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of goodwill, but he desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations at St. Petersburg for obvious reasons appeared to promise less prospect of success than negotiations on the neutral *terrain* of London. I replied that Your Excellency, as I had already observed, started from the point of view that direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburg, so that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to his suggestion as to London, but I would communicate on the subject with your Excellency.

---



## No. 57.

*Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

The Secretary of State has just informed me that no answer has been received from Russia to the German demand.

The Russian troops have crossed the German frontier at Schwidden (south-east of Bialla).

Russia has thus attacked Germany.

Germany, therefore, regards herself as at war with Russia.

The Russian Ambassador has this morning received his passports ; he intends to leave to-day.

## No. 58.

*Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*London, August 4, 1914.*

I have just seen Sir E. Grey. The British Government have sent to Germany an ultimatum on account of Belgium. They expect a reply at 12 o'clock to-night.

Sir E. Grey said to me that at present there was no reason why he should make any communication to the Imperial and Royal Government, and there was no cause why a conflict should arise between us, so long as we were not in a condition of war with France. In any case, he hoped that we would not begin hostilities without the formality of a previous declaration of war. He does not intend to recall Sir M. de Bunsen.

Should we be at war with France, it would indeed be difficult for Great Britain, as the ally of France, to co-operate with her in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean.

## No. 59.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.**(Translated from the French.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 5, 1914.*

I ask Your Excellency to hand over the following note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs :—

“On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform His Excellency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows :—

“In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia ; and of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that conflict, to open hostilities against Germany ; and whereas Germany is consequently at war with Russia ; Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with Russia from the present moment.”

After handing over this note Your Excellency will ask that passports may be prepared, and you will leave without delay with the entire staff of the Embassy with the exception of any members who are to be left behind. At the same time M. Schebeko is being furnished with his passport by us.

---

## No. 60.

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 6, 1914.*

I have received Your Excellency's telegram of the 4th August.

I ask you to assure Sir E. Grey that we will in no case open hostilities against Great Britain without a previous formal declaration of war, but that we also expect that Great Britain will observe towards us a similar attitude, and that she will not undertake any hostile act against us before formally declaring war.

---

## No. 61.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

*(Translated from the French.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 8, 1914.*

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to go and see him in order to communicate to me that, according to positive information which has reached him, the Innsbruck Army Corps has been brought to the French frontier. M. Doumergue wishes to know without delay if this information is correct, and if it is so, what is the intention of the Imperial and Royal Government. As France is at war with Germany the despatch of our troops to the French frontier is, according to the views held by the Minister, not consistent with the existing condition of peace between Austria-Hungary and France. M. Dumaine is commissioned to make a similar communication to Your Excellency.

---

## No. 62.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szécsen at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 9, 1914.*

With reference to Your Excellency's telegram of the 8th instant.

After conferring with the General Staff I authorise Your Excellency to inform the French Government that the information regarding the participation of our troops in the Franco-German war is a complete invention. I have expressed myself in a similar manner to M. Dumaine.

---

## No. 63.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.**(Translated from the French.)**(Telegraphic.)**Paris, August 10, 1914.*

I have received your telegram of the 9th August and communicated at once the contents to M. Doumergue. The Minister, who had received a similar telegraphic report from M. Dumaine concerning his conversation with Your Excellency, admitted that our troops are not on the French frontier, but he maintains that he has positive information that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been brought to Germany, and that this makes it possible for that Empire to withdraw her troops from those districts which are occupied by our soldiers, and that in the opinion of the Minister this amounts to a facilitation of German military operations. I repeatedly drew the attention of the Minister to the wording of the answer of Your Excellency, and he has admitted that it is not possible to speak of an effective participation of our troops in the Franco-German war, but he insisted that it is undeniable that our troops are present on German territory, and that this is equivalent to the provision of military assistance to Germany. In these circumstances he has authorised the French Ambassador at Vienna to ask for his passports without delay, and to leave Vienna to-day with the entire staff of the Embassy. The Minister informed me that in view of this position, my presence here can be of no use; indeed in view of the excitement of the populace it might give occasion to regrettable occurrences which he desired to avoid. He offered to place a train at my disposal from to-night onwards in order that I might leave France. I answered that it was impossible for me to receive instructions from Your Excellency before the evening, but that in view of the recall of M. Dumaine, I asked him to have my passport prepared.

---

## No. 64.

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.**Vienna, August 11, 1914.*

The French Government have commissioned their Ambassador here to ask for his passports on the ground that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been sent to Germany, whereby it has been possible for the German army staff to withdraw their troops from those German districts which are occupied by our contingents. This measure of our general staff indicates in his view the grant of military assistance to Germany.

Your Excellency should bring to the knowledge of the British Government that according to information obtained from a reliable source the assertion made by the French Government is unfounded.

---

## No. 65.

*Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.*

*(Translated from the French.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*London, August 12, 1914.*

I have just received from Sir E. Grey the following communication :—

At the request of the French Government, who are not in a position to communicate direct with your Government, I have to make to you the following communication :—

The Austro-Hungarian Government, after declaring war on Servia, and thus taking the first initiative to the hostilities in Europe, have, without any provocation on the part of the Government of the French Republic, extended the war to France :—

(1) After Germany had in succession declared war on Russia and France, the Austro-Hungarian Government have joined in the conflict by declaring war against Russia, which was already fighting on the side of France.

(2) According to information from numerous trustworthy sources Austria has sent troops to the German frontier under circumstances which amounted to a direct menace to France.

In view of these facts the French Government are obliged to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government that they will take all measures which make it possible for them to answer these actions and these threats.

Sir E. Grey adds :—

As a breach with France has been brought about in this way the British Government feel themselves obliged to announce that Great Britain and Austria-Hungary will be in a state of war as from 12 o'clock to-night.

---

## No. 66.

*The Japanese Ambassador to Count Berchtold.*

*(Translated from the English.)*

*Vienna, August 20, 1914.*

MY LORD,

Your Excellency will doubtless have already received information from his Excellency Baron Müller of the communication which was addressed to the German Government by my Government on the 15th inst. Nevertheless I take the liberty, although I have not received any instructions to do so, to enclose herewith for your Excellency's personal information, a copy of a telegram bearing on the matter which I have received from Tokio.

*Enclosure.*

The Japanese Government, who have taken the present situation into their earnest consideration, have, in accordance with a complete understanding made with the British Government, for the purpose of strengthening and maintaining general peace in the regions of

Eastern Asia, which is one of the aims of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, decided to take common action with Great Britain in giving effect to the necessary measures for this purpose. Nevertheless, before proceeding with measures of this kind, the Japanese Government have thought it proper to address a friendly request to the German Government, which was communicated to them on the 15th August, 1914, in the following words :—

“(1) All German warships must be withdrawn at once from the waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The ships that cannot be withdrawn must be disarmed.

(2) The German Government must unconditionally and without compensation hand over to the Japanese authorities the whole of the leased territory of Kiao-chau before the 16th September, 1914, for the purpose of handing this territory back to China.

The Japanese Government have informed the German Government that, in case an answer intimating unconditional compliance with the above-mentioned demands is not received before Sunday, the 23rd, at mid-day, they will proceed as appears necessary to them.

It is earnestly to be hoped that the above-mentioned demands, for a reply to which so ample time is given, will be agreed to by the German Government; should they, however, not comply with this demand, a course of action which would be deplored, the Japanese Government will be obliged to take the necessary measures to attain their end.”

The grounds on which the Imperial Government base their present attitude is, as already mentioned, none other than to maintain the common interests of Japan and Great Britain, which are set out in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by establishing a basis of a lasting peace in the territory of Eastern Asia. The Japanese Government have in no respect the intention of embarking upon a policy of territorial expansion, nor do they entertain any other selfish designs. For this reason the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect with the greatest care the interests of third Powers in Eastern Asia and to refrain from injuring them in any degree.

## No. 67.

*Count Berchtold to Count Clary at Brussels.*

*(Translated from the French.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 22, 1914.*

I ASK your Excellency to communicate the following to the Royal Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at once :—

“I have the honour to bring the following to the knowledge of your Excellency in accordance with the instructions of our Government :—

Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas as

has just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity, and inadmissible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria-Hungary finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations, and considers herself, from this moment, in a state of war with Belgium.

I am leaving the country with the staff of the Legation, and I am entrusting the protection of my countrymen to the Minister of the United States in Belgium.

Count Errembault de Dudzeele has received his passports from the Imperial and Royal Government.

---

No. 68.

*Prince Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 23, 1914.*

THE Foreign Office has informed the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires that the Imperial German Government do not intend to send an answer to the Japanese ultimatum. The German Government have instructed their Ambassador at Tokio, after the expiration of the time allowed by Japan, at 12 o'clock to-day, to leave Japan, and they will, at the same time, furnish the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires here with his passports.

At mid-day the Chargé d'Affaires was furnished with his passports, and he will leave Berlin early to-morrow morning with the staff of the Embassy.

---

No. 69.

*Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Müller at Tokio.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 24, 1914.*

THE Commander of S.M.S. "Elisabeth" has been instructed to take part in the fighting at Tsingtau. I ask your Excellency, in view of the action taken by Japan against our Ally, the German Empire, to ask for your passports. You should inform the Consulates, and you should travel to America with the colony and the staff of the Embassy and of the Consulates. Your Excellency should entrust the protection of our countrymen and their interests to the American Ambassador. The Japanese Ambassador here is being furnished with his passports.

---

# IX.

## TELEGRAMS AND LETTERS

**PUBLISHED OFFICIALLY IN THE PRESS BY  
THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN,  
RUSSIA AND GERMANY.**

TELEGRAMS AND LETTERS PUBLISHED  
OFFICIALLY IN THE PRESS BY THE  
GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN,  
RUSSIA AND GERMANY.

I.

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE AND  
HIS MAJESTY THE CZAR.

(Published in the British Press on the 5th August, 1914.)

No. 1.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan (St. Petersburg).*

*Foreign Office, 1st August, 1914.*

You should at once apply for an audience with His Majesty the Emperor, and convey to him the following personal message from the King:—

“My Government has received the following statement from the German Government:—

“On July 29 the Russian Emperor requested the German Emperor by telegraph to mediate between Russia and Austria. The Emperor immediately declared his readiness to do so. He informed the Russian Emperor of this by telegraph, and took the required action at Vienna. Without waiting for the result of this action Russia mobilized against Austria. By telegraph the German Emperor pointed out to the Russian Emperor that hereby his attempt at mediation would be rendered illusory. The Emperor further asked the Russian Emperor to suspend the military operations against Austria. This, however, did not happen. In spite of this the German Government continued its mediation at Vienna. In this matter the German Government have gone to the farthest limit of what can be suggested to a Sovereign State which is the ally of Germany. The proposals made by the German Government at Vienna were conceived entirely on the lines suggested by Great Britain, and the German Government recommended them at Vienna for their serious consideration. They were taken into consideration at Vienna this morning. During the deliberations of the (? Austrian) Cabinet, and before they were concluded, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported the mobilization of the entire Russian army and fleet. Owing to this action on the part of Russia the Austrian answer to the German proposals for mediation, which were still under consideration, was not given. This action on the part of Russia is also directed against Germany—that is to say, the Power whose mediation had been invoked by the Russian Emperor. We were bound to reply with serious counter measures to this action, which we were obliged to consider as hostile, unless we were prepared to endanger the safety of our



country. We are unable to remain inactive in face of the Russian mobilization on our frontier. We have therefore informed Russia that, unless she were prepared to suspend within twelve hours the warlike measure against Germany and Austria, we should be obliged to mobilize, and this would mean war. We have asked France if she would remain neutral during a German-Russian war.'

"I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do everything in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted conversations between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to secure the peace of the world."

---

No. 2.

*His Majesty the Czar to His Majesty King George.*

1st August, 1914.

I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not German Ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government declaring war. Ever since presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade, Russia has devoted all her efforts to finding some pacific solution of the question raised by Austria's action. Object of that action was to crush Serbia and make her a vassal of Austria. Effect of this would have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of such vital interest to my Empire. Every proposal, including that of your Government, was rejected by Germany and Austria, and it was only when favourable moment for bringing pressure to bear on Austria had passed that Germany showed any disposition to mediate. Even then she did not put forward any precise proposal. Austria's declaration of war on Serbia forced me to order a partial mobilization, though, in view of threatening situation, my military advisers strongly advised a general mobilization owing to quickness with which Germany can mobilize in comparison with Russia. I was eventually compelled to take this course in consequence of complete Austrian mobilization, of the bombardment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia, and of secret military preparations being made in Germany. That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was quite unexpected by me, as I have given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued.

In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia. God bless and protect you.

## II.

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN LONDON AND BERLIN,  
30TH JULY-2ND AUGUST, 1914.

(Published in the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of the  
20th August, 1914.)

## No. 1.

*His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia to His Majesty King  
George, dated 30th July, 1914.*

I ARRIVED here yesterday and have communicated what you were so good as to say to me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday to William, who was very thankful to receive your message.

William, who is very anxious, is doing his utmost to comply with the request of Nicholas to work for the maintenance of peace. He is in continual telegraphic communication with Nicholas, who has to-day confirmed the news that he has ordered military measures which amount to mobilization, and that these measures were taken five days ago.

We have also received information that France is making military preparations while we have not taken measures of any kind, but may be obliged to do so at any moment if our neighbours continue their preparations. This would then mean a European war.

If you seriously and earnestly desire to prevent this terrible misfortune, may I propose to you to use your influence on France and also on Russia that they should remain neutral. In my view this would be of the greatest use. I consider that this is a certain and, perhaps, the only possible way of maintaining the peace of Europe. I might add that Germany and England should now more than ever give each other mutual support in order to prevent a terrible disaster, which otherwise appears inevitable.

Believe me that William is inspired by the greatest sincerity in his efforts for the maintenance of peace. But the military preparations of his two neighbours may end in compelling him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenceless. I have informed William of my telegram to you, and I hope that you will receive my communication in the same friendly spirit which has inspired it.

(Signed) HENRY.

## No. 2.

*His Majesty King George to His Royal Highness Prince Henry of  
Prussia, dated 30th July, 1914.*

THANKS for your telegram. I am very glad to hear of William's efforts to act with Nicholas for the maintenance of peace. I earnestly desire that such a misfortune as a European war--the evil of which could not be remedied--may be prevented. My Government is doing

the utmost possible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone further military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend their preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure William that I am doing all I can, and will continue to do all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe.

(Signed) GEORGE.

No. 3.

*His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George, dated 31st July, 1914.*

MANY thanks for your friendly communication. Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the communication which I have this evening received from Vienna, and which I have passed on to London. I have just heard from the Chancellor that intelligence has just reached him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the mobilization of his entire army and fleet. He has not even awaited the result of the mediation in which I am engaged, and he has left me completely without information. I am travelling to Berlin to assure the safety of my eastern frontier, where strong Russian forces have already taken up their position.

(Signed) WILLIAM.

No. 4.

*His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, dated 1st August, 1914.*

MANY thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an urgent telegram\* to Nicholas, in which I have assured him of my readiness to do everything in my power to further the resumption of the negotiations between the powers concerned.

(Signed) GEORGE.

\* See page 536.

No. 5.

*German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, dated 1st August, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY has just called me to the telephone and has asked me whether I thought I could declare that in the event of France remaining neutral in a German-Russian war we would not attack the French. I told him that I believed that I could assume responsibility for this.

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

## No. 6.

*His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George, dated  
1st August, 1914.*

I HAVE just received the communication of your Government offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great Britain. To this offer there was added the question whether, under these conditions, Germany would refrain from attacking France. For technical reasons the mobilization which I have already ordered this afternoon on two fronts—east and west—must proceed according to the arrangements made. A counter order cannot now be given, as your telegram unfortunately came too late, but if France offers me her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English army and navy, I will naturally give up the idea of an attack on France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier are at this moment being kept back by telegraph and by telephone from crossing the French frontier.

(Signed) WILLIAM.

---

## No. 7.

*German Imperial Chancellor to the German Ambassador at London,  
dated 1st August, 1914.*

GERMANY is ready to agree to the English proposal in the event of England guaranteeing with all her forces the unconditional neutrality of France in the conflict between Germany and Russia. Owing to the Russian challenge German mobilization occurred to-day before the English proposals were received. In consequence our advance to the French frontier cannot now be altered. We guarantee, however, that the French frontier will not be crossed by our troops until Monday, the 3rd of August, at seven p.m., in case England's assent is received by that time.

(Signed) BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

---

## No. 8.

*His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, dated  
1st August, 1914.*

IN answer to your telegram, which has just been received, I believe that there must be a misunderstanding with regard to a suggestion which was made in a friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey when they were discussing how an actual conflict between the German and the French army might be avoided, so long as there is still a possibility of an agreement being arrived at between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow morning in order to ascertain whether there is any misunderstanding on his side.

(Signed) GEORGE.

---

## No. 9.

*German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor,  
dated 2nd August, 1914.*

THE suggestions of Sir Edward Grey, based on the desire of creating the possibility of lasting neutrality on the part of England, were made without any previous inquiry of France and without knowledge of the mobilization, and have since been given up as quite impracticable.

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

## III.

TELEGRAMS FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR AT LONDON TO THE  
GERMAN IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, 1ST AUGUST, 1914.

(Published in the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of the  
6th September, 1914.)

## No. 1.

*1st August, 1.15 p.m.*

. . . SIR EDWARD GREY'S Private Secretary has just been to see me in order to say that the Minister wishes to make proposals to me for the neutrality of England, even in the case that we had war with Russia and France. I see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon and will communicate at once.

## No. 2.

*1st August, 5.30 p.m.*

SIR EDWARD GREY has just read to me the following declaration which has been unanimously adopted by the Cabinet :—

"The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same positive reply as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country."

On my question whether, on condition that we would maintain the neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite declaration with regard to the neutrality of Great Britain, the Minister answered that that was impossible, but that this question would play a great part in public opinion in this country. If we violated Belgian neutrality in a war with France there would certainly be a change in public opinion which would make it difficult for the Cabinet here to maintain friendly neutrality. For the time there was not the slightest intention to proceed in a hostile manner against us. It would be their desire to avoid this if there was any possibility of doing so. It was, however, difficult to draw a line up to which we could go without

intervention on this side. He turned again and again to Belgian neutrality, and was of opinion that this question would also play a great part.

He had also thought whether it was not possible that we and France should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed opposite to one another without attacking. I asked him if he would be in a position to arrange that France would assent to an agreement of this kind. As we wanted neither to destroy France nor to annex portions of French territory, I could think that we would give our assent to an arrangement of this kind which would secure for us the neutrality of Great Britain. The Minister said he would make inquiries; he also recognised the difficulties of holding back the military on both sides.

### No. 3.

*1st August, 8.30 p.m.*

My communication of this morning is cancelled by my communication of this evening. As there is no positive English proposal before us, any further step in the sense of the message I sent is superfluous.

### IV.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY THE CZAR TO HIS MAJESTY THE  
EMPEROR WILLIAM.

(Published in the Russian Press on the 31st January, 1915.)

*29th July, 1914.*

THANKS for your telegram,\* which is conciliatory and friendly, whereas the official message presented to-day by your Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to The Hague Tribunal. I trust in your wisdom and friendship.

\* German White Book, No. 20, p. 431.

### V.

LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE AND  
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

(Published in the British Press on the 20th February, 1915.)

### No. 1.

*The President of the French Republic to His Majesty King George.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

DEAR AND GREAT FRIEND,

IN the grave events through which Europe is passing, I feel bound to convey to your Majesty the information which the Government of the Republic have received from Germany. The military preparations which are being undertaken by the Imperial Government, especially

in the immediate neighbourhood of the French frontier, are being pushed forward every day with fresh vigour and speed. France, resolved to continue to the very end to do all that lies within her power to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself solely to the most indispensable precautionary measures. But it does not appear that her prudence and moderation serve to check Germany's action; indeed, quite the reverse. We are, perhaps, then, in spite of the moderation of the Government of the Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the most terrible events.

From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be engaged; if, on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the *entente cordiale* would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken.

It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave complete liberty to your Majesty's Government, and that, in the letters exchanged in 1912\* between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon, Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a mutual agreement to consult one another in the event of European tension, and to examine in concert whether common action were advisable.

But the character of close friendship which public feeling has given in both countries to the *entente* between Great Britain and France, the confidence with which our two Governments have never ceased to work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs of sympathy which your Majesty has ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Government of the Republic and of all France.

It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settlement depend.

We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which they have not swerved. In concert with Your Majesty's Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines.

But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. I am profoundly convinced that at the present moment, the more Great Britain, France, and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the preservation of peace.

I beg that your Majesty will excuse a step which is only inspired by the hope of seeing the European balance of power definitely re-affirmed.

Pray accept the expression of my most cordial sentiments.

R. POINCARÉ.

---

\* See pp. 80 and 81.

## No. 2.

*His Majesty King George to the President of the French Republic.*

*Buckingham Palace, August 1, 1914.*

DEAR AND GREAT FRIEND,

I MOST highly appreciate the sentiments which moved you to write to me in so cordial and friendly a spirit, and I am grateful to you for having stated your views so fully and frankly.

You may be assured that the present situation in Europe has been the cause of much anxiety and preoccupation to me, and I am glad to think that our two Governments have worked so amicably together in endeavouring to find a peaceful solution of the questions at issue.

It would be a source of real satisfaction to me if our united efforts were to meet with success, and I am still not without hope that the terrible events which seem so near may be averted.

I admire the restraint which you and your Government are exercising in refraining from taking undue military measures on the frontier and not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be interpreted as a provocative one.

I am personally using my best endeavours with the Emperors of Russia and of Germany towards finding some solution by which actual military operations may at any rate be postponed, and time be thus given for calm discussion between the Powers. I intend to prosecute these efforts without intermission so long as any hope remains of an amicable settlement.

As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future developments; but you may be assured that my Government will continue to discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of interest to our two nations with M. Cambon.

Believe me,

M. le Président,

(Signed) GEORGE R.I.

---



## INDEX.

## INDEX.

**Africa**

Congo. *See that Title.*

German Attacks on British Territory,  
342 (Nos. 75 and 76).

**Alsace-Lorraine**

Inhabitants of Annexed Paris For-  
bidden to Cross Frontier, 215  
(No. 106).

**Austria-Hungary**

Action really directed against Russia,  
22 (No. 17).

Belgium—

War declared with, 342 (No. 77);  
533 (No. 67).

Belgian Reply, 343 (No. 78).

British Ambassador—

Comments on events from 22 July,  
114 (No. 161).

Final Interview with Count Berch-  
told, 119.

British relations with, 529 (No. 58);  
530 (No. 60).

War declared by Great Britain, 532  
(No. 65).

Communications with Representatives  
at—

Belgrade, 448 (Nos. 1, 2), 450  
(No. 6), 452 (No. 7), 500  
(No. 22), 515 (No. 37).

Berlin, 453 (No. 8), 461 (No. 19),  
505 (No. 30), 506 (Nos. 33, 34),  
515 (Nos. 35, 38), 520 (Nos. 42,  
43), 522 (No. 46), 524 (No. 48),  
529 (No. 57), 533 (No. 67), 534  
(No. 68).

Constantinople, 453 (No. 8), 461  
(No. 19).

London, 3 (No. 4), 453 (No. 8), 454  
(No. 9), 455 (No. 10), 460  
(No. 17), 461 (No. 19), 504  
(No. 29), 505 (No. 30), 506  
(No. 34), 516 (No. 39), 518  
(No. 41), 521 (No. 44), 526  
(No. 51), 529 (No. 58), 530  
(No. 60), 531 (No. 64), 532  
(No. 65).

Nish, 450 (No. 5).

Paris, 449 (No. 4), 456 (No. 11), 457  
(Nos. 12, 13), 461 (No. 19), 505  
(No. 30), 506 (No. 34), 521  
(No. 44), 522 (No. 45), 527  
(No. 54), 530 (Nos. 61, 62), 531  
(No. 63).

Rome, 453 (No. 8), 461 (No. 19),  
505 (No. 30), 506 (No. 34), 521  
(No. 44).

**Austria-Hungary—cont.**

Communications with Representatives  
at—*cont.*

St. Petersburg, 267 (No. 3), 453  
(No. 8), 457 (No. 14), 459  
(No. 16), 460 (No. 18), 461  
(No. 19), 499 (No. 21), 501  
(No. 26), 503 (Nos. 27, 28), 505  
(Nos. 30, 31), 506 (Nos. 32, 34),  
517 (No. 40), 521 (No. 44), 522  
(No. 47), 524 (No. 49), 525  
(No. 50), 526 (No. 51), 527  
(No. 52), 528 (Nos. 55, 56), 529  
(No. 59).

Semlin, 500 (No. 23), 501 (No. 24).

Tokio, 515 (No. 33), 534 (No. 69).

Uskub 449 (No. 3).

Vienna, 499 (No. 20), 527 (No. 53),  
532 (No. 66).

General Mobilization of Army and  
Fleet, 95 (No. 127); 222 (No. 115);  
274 (No. 24); 283 (No. 47).

Japan—Relations broken off, 534  
(No. 69).

Mediation proposals, Attitude to-  
wards, 23 (No. 18), 25 (Nos. 24,  
25), 52 (Nos. 61, 62), 62 (No. 81),  
70 (No. 93), 72 (No. 3), 73  
(No. 94), 97 (No. 131), 98 (Nos.  
133, 135), 199 (No. 83), 225  
(No. 120), 226 (No. 121), 293  
(No. 73), 516 (No. 38), 521  
(No. 44), 522 (No. 47), 524  
(No. 49), 526 (No. 51), 528  
(No. 56).

Mobilization on Russian Frontier, 203  
(Nos. 90 and 91); 527 (No. 53).

Notification to British Embassy of  
State of War with Serbia (28 July),  
44.

Notification to the Powers of breaking  
off of relations with Serbia, 505  
(No. 30).

Official Summary of Events, 443.

Russia, relations with—

British Attitude, 65 (No. 87).

Direct Conversations, proposals for,  
&c., 40 (No. 45), 85 (No. 110),  
86 (No. 111), 177 (No. 55), 197  
(No. 80), 198 (No. 81), 199  
(No. 82), 204 (No. 92), 213  
(No. 104).

Refusal by Austria, 58 (No. 74),  
203 (No. 91), 205 (No. 93).

German Advice to Austria, 58  
(No. 75).

**Austria-Hungary—cont.**

Russia, Relations with—*cont.*

Mediation Proposals. *See that Sub-head, above.*

Russian engagement to stop Military preparations if Austria takes certain course, 75 (No. 97), 76 (No. 99).

War Declared by Austria, 298 (No. 79), 529 (No. 59).

Sandjak, Intentions as to, 225 (No. 120), 228 (No. 125).

Servia, Relations with—

Austrian Attitude, 145 (No. 11), 146 (No. 12), 147 (No. 14), 152 (No. 20), 161 (No. 29), 171 (No. 45), 178 (No. 56), 183 (No. 61), 370 (Nos. 1, 2, 3), 371 (No. 4), 372 (Nos. 6, 7, 8), 373 (No. 9), 374 (Nos. 11 and 12), 376 (Nos. 14, 15, 16), 377 (No. 17), 378 (Nos. 18 and 19), 379 (Nos. 20 and 21), 380 (No. 22), 381 (No. 23), 382 (Nos. 24 and 25), 384 (No. 29), 387 (No. 31), 394 (No. 52), 407, 426 (No. 3), 460 (No. 18), 501 (No. 26), 505 (No. 31), 517 (No. 40).

*See also Title, Mediation Proposals.*

Austrian Dossier sent to the Powers, 461 (No. 19).

Austrian Intentions, 63 (No. 82), 290 (No. 66).

Austrian Minister and Staff leave Belgrade, 24 (No. 23), 28 (No. 31), 29 (No. 35), 173 (No. 48), 178 (No. 56), 274 (No. 21), 302 (No. 5), 390 (Nos. 40, 41), 391 (No. 42), 501 (No. 24).

Austrian Official Reports as to Serbian feelings towards Austria, 448-9 (Nos. 1, 2, 3), 450 (No. 5), 451 (No. 6).

Austrian Press, Warlike attitude of, 146 (No. 12), 148 (No. 14).

Austrian Statement that her declaration of readiness to respect Servian Integrity and Sovereign Rights had been received by Russia in silence—Contradiction, 293 (No. 75).

Berlin Press, Attitude of, 268 (No. 7).

British Attitude and Efforts, 65 (No. 87), 151 (No. 19), 152 (No. 19), 154 (No. 22), 163 (No. 32), 164 (No. 33), 165 (No. 34), 166-7 (No. 36), 167 (Nos. 36, 37), 169 (Nos. 40, 41), 175 (No. 50), 184 (No. 61), 187 (No. 66), 188 (No. 68), 209 (No. 98), 273 (No. 20), 517 (No. 40), 518 (No. 41).

*See also Title, Mediation Proposals.*

**Austria-Hungary—cont.**

Servia, Relations with—*cont.*

Events from Date of Serajevo Murders to Presentation of Austrian Note to Servia of 23 July—French Reports, 144-153.

Espionage by Servia—Prosecution for, at Serajevo, 487.

French Views and Efforts, 150 (No. 17), 154 (No. 22), 157 (No. 26), 160 (No. 28), 161-2 (No. 30), 164 (No. 33), 165 (No. 34), 180 (No. 57), 204 (No. 92).

*See also Title, Mediation Proposals.*

German Views and Attitude, 16 (No. 8), 18 (No. 11), 144 (No. 9), 149 (No. 16), 151 (Nos. 18, 19), 153 (Nos. 20, 21), 158 (No. 27), 160 (No. 28), 161-2 (Nos. 29, 30), 167 (No. 37), 169 (No. 41), 170 (No. 43), 173 (No. 47), 175 (No. 50), 179 (Nos. 56, 57), 180 (No. 57), 183 (No. 61), 184-5 (No. 62), 199 (No. 83), 200 (No. 85), 202 (No. 87), 204 (No. 92), 206 (No. 94), 229 (No. 125), 269 (No. 8), 272 (No. 18), 273 (Nos. 19, 20), 276 (No. 28), 380 (No. 22), 382 (No. 24), 383 (No. 26), 393 (No. 51), 394 (No. 52), 398, 405.

*See also Title, Mediation Proposals.*

Italian Views and Efforts, 27 (No. 29), 150 (No. 17), 158 (No. 27), 174 (No. 50), 176 (No. 51, 52), 383 (No. 28).

Localization of the Dispute, German View, 1 (No. 2), 17 (No. 9), 160 (No. 28), 166 (No. 36), 272, 389 (No. 36), 407, 424 (No. 1), 425 (No. 2), 457 (Nos. 12, 13, 14), 459 (No. 16).

Mediation Proposals. *See separate Title.*

Military Action Intended by Austria, 23 (No. 18), 37 (No. 40), 38 (No. 41).

Military Operations Not to be Undertaken Immediately, 25 (No. 25), 26 (No. 26).

Non-interference by other Powers—German opinion. *See sub-heading, Localization of the Dispute, above.*

"Narodna Odbrana," Extract from (1911), 476.

Narodna Odbrana Society—Appeal of, in Servian Official Gazette, 483.

Nish Local Committee—Attitude on Serajevo Murders, 497.

Organization and Work of, 479-80, 489.

Work of—Deposition by Trifko Krstanovic, 483.

**Austria-Hungary—cont.**

Servia, Relations with—*cont.*

Occupation of Belgrade or other Towns as a Basis for Negotiations, 75 (No. 98), 78 (No. 103), 219–220 (No. 112).

Russian Views and Attitude, 14 (No. 6), 15 (No. 7), 21, 22 (No. 17), 28 (No. 28), 29 (No. 33), 39 (No. 44), 49 (No. 55), 59 (No. 118), 145 (No. 10), 151 (No. 18), 153 (No. 20), 154 (No. 22), 163 (Nos. 31, 32), 164 (No. 33), 167–8 (Nos. 38, 39, 40), 170 (Nos. 42, 43), 171 (Nos. 44, 45), 174 (No. 50), 176 (Nos. 52, 53), 177 (Nos. 54, 55), 186 (No. 64), 269 (No. 10), 274 (No. 23), 280 (No. 40), 281 (No. 42), 459 (No. 16), 503 (No. 28), 505 (No. 31), 522 (No. 47), 524 (No. 49), 528 (Nos. 55, 56).

*See also* Mediation Proposals.

Servia's Willingness to entertain reasonable Austrian requirements, 148 (No. 15).

Servian Appeal to the Powers, possibility of, 22 (No. 17).

Servian Attitude and Views, 150 (No. 18), 152 (No. 19), 153 (No. 20), 158 (No. 27), 371 (No. 5), 372 (No. 8), 384 (No. 30).

Servian Note of 1908, 4, 22 (No. 17), 49 (No. 55).

Servian Preparations before delivery of answer to Austrian Note, 500, 504 (No. 29).

Servian Press, opinions of, prior to the Serajevo Murders, 472.

Servian Territory not to be seized, 23 (No. 18), 68 (No. 90), 69 (No. 91), 99–100 (No. 137), 407, 427 (No. 5), 506 (No. 32).

Servian War Office—Pictures of a nature hostile to Dual Monarchy, 499.

Situation before Presentation of Ultimatum of 23 July, 1 (Nos. 1, 2), 2 (No. 3), 4.

Sokol Society Dusan the Strong—Report on the activities of, in Kragujevac (1912–13), 480.

Special Points for Great Britain, 516 (No. 39).

Turkish Views, 186 (No. 65).

Ultimatum of 23 July, 3 (No. 4), 16 (No. 8), 155 (Nos. 23, 25), 159 (No. 28), 164 (No. 48), 266 (No. 1), 388 (Nos. 33, 34), 389 (Nos. 35, 36).

Austrian Official Commentary, 453–4 (No. 8).

Austrian Statement that Note is not an Ultimatum, but a *Démarche* with a Time-limit, 20 (No. 14), 21 (No. 17), 166 (No. 36).

Austro-Hungarian Views, 13 (No. 5), 15 (No. 7).

**Austria-Hungary—cont.**

Servia, Relations with—*cont.*

Ultimatum of 23 July—*cont.*

British Attitude, 13 (No. 5), 17 (No. 10), 18 (No. 11), 19 (No. 12), 22 (No. 17), 24 (No. 22), 455 (No. 10).

French Attitude and Views, 14 (No. 6), 17 (No. 10), 21 (Nos. 15, 16), 456 (No. 11).

German Denial of Prior Knowledge 23 (No. 18), 25 (No. 25), 149 (Nos. 15, 17), 161 (No. 30), 162 (No. 30), 165 (No. 35), 166 (No. 36), 169 (No. 41), 180 (No. 57), 181 (No. 57), 196 (No. 78), 272 (No. 18), 273 (Nos. 19, 20).

German Prior Knowledge of, 74 (No. 95).

German Support of Austrian Action, 272 (No. 18), 273 (Nos. 19, 20).

Italian Views, 53 (No. 64).

Point 5—Austrian Explanation, 503 (No. 27).

Redrafting of certain Articles proposed by Russia, 275 (No. 25).

German Attitude, 280 (No. 38).

Russian Attitude and Views, 14 (No. 6), 15 (No. 7), 21, 22 (No. 17), 39 (No. 44), 49 (No. 55), 89 (No. 118), 275 (No. 25), 457 (No. 14), 459 (No. 15).

*See also* Title, Mediation Proposals.

Servian Attitude, 16 (No. 8).

Servian Reply, 24 (No. 21), 27 (No. 30), 31 (No. 39), 172 (Nos. 46, 47), 173 (No. 48), 389 (No. 38), 417.

Austrian Official Commentaries 417, 507.

Austrian Views, 193 (No. 72 (2)), 197 (No. 80), 276 (No. 27).

British Views, 40 (No. 46), 42–43 (No. 48), 281 (No. 42).

German Views, 29 (Nos. 32, 34), 278 (No. 33).

Non-publication of, in German Press, 282 (No. 46).

Refusal of Austria-Hungary

Accept, 41 (No. 48), 273 (No. 21), 279 (No. 37).

Russian Views, 278 (No. 33).

Special Points to be brought before Great Britain, 454 (No. 9), 460 (No. 17).

Time Chosen for Presentation, significance of, 15 (No. 6), 165 (No. 35).

Time limit—

Dangers of, 2 (No. 3).

Proposals for Extension, 167 (No. 38), 168–9 (Nos. 39, 40, 41), 170 (Nos. 42, 43), 171 (Nos. 44, 45), 173 (No. 48), 175 (No. 50), 270 (Nos. 11, 12, 14), 271 (Nos. 15, 16).

**Austria Hungary—cont.**

Servia, Relations with—*cont.*

Ultimatum of 23 July—*cont.*

Time limit—*cont.*

Proposals for Extension—*cont.*

Austrian Refusal, 499 (Nos. 20, 21).

British Attitude, 18 (No. 11).

German Views, 22 (No. 18).

Italian Attitude, 37 (No. 40).

Russian Views, 19 (No. 13), 26 (No. 26), 37 (No. 40).

Unconditional Acceptance Demanded, 23 (Nos. 19, 20).

War Declared by Austria-Hungary, 44-45 (No. 50), 54 (No. 66), 57 (No. 73), 303 (No. 7), 392 (Nos. 45, 46, 47), 393 (No. 48), 515 (No. 37).

Telegrams between French and Russian Representatives Purposely Delayed by, 279 (No. 36).

Troops on French Frontier, 530 (Nos. 61, 62), 531 (Nos. 63, 64), 532 (No. 65).

**Belgium**

Agreement for Joint Action to Resist Germany, 324 (No. 48), 325 (Nos. 49, 52).

Appeal to Great Britain, France and Russia, 242 (No. 152), 321 (No. 40), 322 (No. 42), 323 (No. 43).

Austria declares War, 342 (No. 77), 533 (No. 67).

Belgian Reply, 343 (No. 78).

Communications with Representatives at—

Belgrade, 302 (No. 4).

Berlin, 300 (No. 2), 303 (Nos. 6, 8), 304 (Nos. 9, 11), 305 (No. 12), 306 (No. 12), 307 (Nos. 14, 15), 308 (Nos. 16, 19), 312 (No. 23), 313 (No. 24), 317 (Nos. 34, 35), 324 (No. 45).

Hague, 301 (No. 3), 303 (No. 8), 308 (No. 17), 312 (No. 23), 315 (No. 29), 325 (No. 50), 332 (Nos. 54, 55, 56), 334 (No. 60), 335 (No. 62), 336 (No. 63), 337 (No. 64), 340 (Nos. 70, 71), 341 (No. 73), 342 (No. 77), 343 (No. 78).

London, 300 (No. 2), 303 (No. 8), 304 (Nos. 9, 11), 305 (No. 12), 307 (Nos. 13, 15), 308 (Nos. 16, 19), 312 (No. 23), 313 (No. 24), 314 (No. 26), 316 (No. 30), 318 (No. 36), 319 (Nos. 37, 38), 321 (No. 39), 322 (Nos. 41, 42, 43), 325 (Nos. 49, 52), 333 (Nos. 57, 58), 337 (No. 66), 341 (No. 75), 345 (No. 79).

Luxemburg, 301 (No. 3), 303 (No. 8), 308 (No. 17).

Madrid, 317 (No. 33), 324 (No. 46), 325 (No. 51).

Paris, 300 (No. 2), 303 (No. 8), 304 (Nos. 9, 11), 305 (No. 12), 307 (No. 15), 308 (Nos. 16, 19), 312 (No. 23), 313 (No. 24), 316

**Belgium—cont.**

Communications with Representatives at—*cont.*

(No. 30), 319 (No. 38), 322 (Nos. 42, 43), 324 (No. 47), 325 (No. 52), 333 (Nos. 57, 58), 334 (No. 59), 335 (No. 61), 337 (No. 66), 341 (No. 74).

Rome, 301 (No. 3), 303 (No. 8), 308 (No. 17).

St. Petersburg, 300 (No. 2), 303 (No. 8), 308 (Nos. 16, 19), 312 (No. 23), 313 (No. 24), 319 (No. 38), 322 (Nos. 42, 43), 325 (No. 52), 337 (No. 66).

Vienna, 300 (Nos. 1, 2), 303 (Nos. 7, 8), 308 (Nos. 16, 19), 312 (No. 23), 313 (No. 24).

Congo. *See that Title.*

Despatch to Representatives Abroad for Presentation to the respective Governments, 323 (No. 44).

Formal Assurance by Germany that in no case would Territory be Annexed, 109 (No. 157).

French Offer of Support against Germany and Belgian Reply, 106 (No. 151), 238 (No. 142), 313 (No. 24).

German Allegations, founded on Documents said to have been discovered in Brussels, of Secret Military Arrangements between Great Britain and Belgium—Disproof of, 350-367.

German Allegation of Hostile Acts, 93 (No. 122).

Belgian Reply, 344-7 (No. 79 and encl.).

German Minister, Departure of, 316 (Nos. 31, 32), 317 (No. 34).

German Minister's Notification to Belgian Foreign Secretary of Breaches of International Law by France, 311 (No. 21).

German Proposal to, after Fall of Liège, 334 (No. 60), 335 (No. 62 and encl.), 337 (No. 64), 340 (No. 70).

Belgian Reply, 336 (No. 63), 337 (No. 65), 340 (No. 71), 341 (No. 73).

British Approval of Reply, 339 (No. 68).

French Approval, 339 (No. 69).

Russian Approval, 340 (No. 72).

German Request for Free Passage of Troops through, Belgian Refusal, and British Protest, 107 (No. 153).

German Ultimatum and Reply, 237 (No. 141), 309 (No. 20), 311 (No. 22).

Germany declares War, 243 (No. 154).

Great Britain, Relations with previously to the Outbreak of War, 350-367.

Integrity of—German Attitude, 64 (No. 85), 109 (No. 157).

**Belgium—cont.**

- Interests in Germany entrusted to Spanish Ambassador, 317 (No. 33), 324 (No. 46), 325 (No. 51).
- King Albert's Appeal to King George, 107 (No. 153), 313 (No. 25).
- Military Preparations, 202 (No. 87), 243 (No. 152), 301 (No. 2), 303 (No. 8).
- Minister at Luxemburg—Circumstances of Departure, 337-8 (No. 66).
- Minister Leaves Berlin, 324 (No. 45).
- Mobilization Ordered, 304 (No. 10), 305 (No. 11).
- Neutrality of—
  - Belgian Request for Assurance from Germany, 308 (No. 19).
  - British Action in case of Violation, 105 (No. 148), 108 (No. 155), 235 (No. 137), 239 (No. 144), 314 (Nos. 26, 28), 319 (No. 37), 321 (No. 39), 322 (No. 43), 541 (No. 2).
  - British Inquiry to Belgium, 87 (No. 115), 304 (No. 11).
  - Belgian Reply, 95 (No. 128).
  - British Inquiry to France and Germany, 87 (Nos. 114, 115), 109 (No. 159), 217 (No. 110).
  - French Reply, 94 (Nos. 124, 125), 224, 227 (No. 122), 292 (No. 72), 307 (Nos. 13, 15).
  - German Refusal to Reply, 92 (No. 122), 93 (No. 123), 109 (No. 159), 227 (No. 123), 230 (No. 126), 292 (No. 72), 307 (No. 14).
  - French Assurance to Belgium, 304 (No. 9).
  - German Assurance in 1911, 306 (No. 12).
  - German Assurances in 1913, 306 (enclosure).
  - Violation by Germany, 109 (Nos. 158, 159), 237 (Nos. 140, 141), 242 (Nos. 151, 152), 316 (No. 30), 321 (No. 40).
  - German Chancellor's Admission and Excuse—"Necessity knows no law," 317 (No. 35), 318 (No. 36).
  - German Excuse, 109 (No. 157).
  - German Note to Belgian Government, 314 (No. 27), 316 (No. 30), 321 (No. 40).
- Note sent to Representatives Abroad, to be delivered to the various Powers if occasion should arise, 300 (No. 2), 301 (No. 3).
- Presentation of, 308 (Nos. 16, 17).
- Scheldt, Navigation of—Correspondence with Netherlands, 332 (Nos. 54, 55, 56).
- Summary of events by Foreign Minister, 319 (No. 38), 322 (No. 43).
- Telegram to Representatives abroad notifying German Ultimatum and the Reply, 312 (No. 23).

**Belgrade**

- Bombardment of, 220 (No. 113).

**Berlin**

- Attack on British Embassy, 112.
- Warlike demonstrations by Public, 172 (No. 47), 175 (No. 50), 277 (No. 30).

**Bulgaria**

- Declaration of Neutrality, 284 (No. 52).

**Congo**

- Belgian Attitude as to, 333 (Nos. 57, 58).
- British Attitude as to, 333 (Nos. 57, 58), 341-2 (No. 75).
- French Attitude as to, 333 (Nos. 57, 58), 341 (No. 74).

**France**

- Ambassador to Germany—Circumstances of Departure from Berlin, and Treatment on Journey, 243 (No. 155).
- Army Officers on Leave Recalled, 59 (No. 76).
- Attitude in case of an Attack on Great Britain, 80, 81, 260.
- Attitude in case of War between Germany and Russia—German Inquiry, 223 (No. 117), 527 (No. 54).
- Austro-Hungarian Troops on French Frontier, 530 (Nos. 61, 62), 531 (No. 63, 64), 532 (No. 65).
- Austro-Servian Relations—
  - Events from Date of Serajevo Murders to Presentation of Austrian Note to Servia of 23 July—Reports, 144-153. (*See also Title*, Mediation Proposals.)
  - Ultimatum of 23 July—
    - Advice to Servia regarding Reply, 21 (No. 15).
    - Attitude and Views, 14 (No. 6), 17 (No. 10), 21 (No. 16), 456 (No. 11).
    - Views on, and Efforts, 150 (No. 17), 154 (No. 22), 157 (No. 26), 160 (No. 28), 161-2 (No. 30), 164 (No. 33), 165 (No. 34), 180 (No. 57), 204 (No. 92).
    - See also Title*, Mediation Proposals.
  - Belgian Reply to German Proposal after Fall of Liège, Approval of, 339-40 (No. 69).
- Belgium—
  - Appeal from, 242 (No. 152).
  - Assurance to, of respect for Neutrality, 304 (No. 9).
  - Neutrality of—
    - Agreement for Joint Action in Defence, 325 (No. 52).
    - Reply to British Inquiry, 94 (Nos. 124, 125), 224, 227 (No. 122), 292 (No. 72), 307 (Nos. 13, 15).
    - Offer of Support to, in Defence of Neutrality, 106 (No. 151), 238 (No. 142), 313 (No. 24).

**France—cont.**

Colonies—German refusal to give undertaking as to, 64 (No. 85).

Communications with Representatives at—

Athens, 242 (No. 151).

Basle, 182 (No. 60).

Bavaria, 135 (No. 4).

Belgrade, 155 (No. 25), 157 (No. 26), 158 (No. 27), 159 (No. 28), 165 (No. 34), 172 (No. 46), 200 (No. 85), 206 (No. 94), 206 (No. 95), 209 (No. 99), 242 (No. 151).

Berlin, 122 (No. 1), 130 (No. 2), 133 (No. 3), 142 (No. 6), 144 (No. 9), 148 (No. 15), 152 (No. 20), 155 (No. 25), 157 (No. 26), 158 (No. 27), 159 (No. 28), 161 (Nos. 29, 30), 165 (Nos. 34, 35), 166 (No. 36), 169 (No. 41), 170 (No. 42), 170 (No. 43), 172 (No. 47), 174 (No. 50), 178 (No. 56), 183 (No. 61), 184 (No. 64), 187 (No. 67), 190 (No. 73), 191 (No. 74), 192 (No. 75), 195 (No. 78), 198 (No. 81), 200 (No. 85), 204 (No. 92), 206 (Nos. 94, 95), 213 (No. 105), 215 (No. 107), 216 (No. 109), 219 (No. 112), 221 (No. 114), 222 (No. 116), 225 (No. 120), 226 (No. 121), 227 (Nos. 122, 123), 228 (No. 125), 232 (No. 130), 234 (No. 136), 236 (No. 139), 241 (No. 149).

Berne, 242 (No. 151).

Brussels, 202 (No. 87), 224 (No. 119), 227 (No. 122), 237 (No. 141), 238 (No. 142), 242 (No. 152), 243 (No. 154).

Bucharest, 242 (No. 151).

Budapest, 145 (No. 11).

Christiania, 182 (No. 58), 242 (No. 151).

Constantinople, 186 (No. 65), 200 (No. 85), 206 (Nos. 94, 95), 221 (No. 114), 228 (No. 125), 234 (No. 136), 242 (No. 151).

Copenhagen, 242 (No. 151), 243 (No. 155).

Frankfort, 202 (No. 87).

Hague, 237 (No. 140), 242 (No. 151).

London, 149 (No. 16), 149 (No. 17), 151 (No. 19), 152 (No. 20), 155 (No. 25), 157 (No. 26), 158 (No. 27), 159 (No. 28), 163 (No. 32), 164 (No. 33), 166 (No. 36), 167 (No. 37), 168 (No. 40), 174 (No. 50), 176 (No. 52), 178 (No. 56), 183 (No. 61), 184 (No. 62), 185 (No. 63), 187 (No. 66), 188 (Nos. 68, 69), 189 (Nos. 70, 71), 192 (No. 75), 195 (No. 78), 196 (No. 80), 200 (No. 85), 206 (Nos. 94, 95), 208 (No. 97), 209 (No. 98), 210 (No. 101), 214 (No. 106), 216 (No. 108), 217 (No. 110), 219 (No. 112), 221 (No. 114), 225 (No. 120), 227 (No. 122), 228 (No. 125), 229

**France—cont.**

Communications with Representatives at—*cont.*

(Nos. 126, 127), 234 (No. 136), 235 (No. 137), 236 (No. 138), 238 (No. 143), 239 (Nos. 144, 145), 240 (No. 146), 242 (No. 151), 243 (No. 153).

Luxemburg, 182 (No. 59), 218 (No. 111), 232 (Nos. 128, 129), 233 (Nos. 131, 132), 249 (No. 156).

Madrid, 228 (No. 125), 234 (No. 136), 242 (No. 151).

Munich, 153 (No. 21), 202 (No. 89), 242 (No. 150).

Rome, 149 (Nos. 16, 17), 152 (No. 20), 155 (No. 25), 157 (No. 26), 158 (No. 27), 159 (No. 28), 165 (No. 34), 171 (No. 44), 174 (No. 50), 176 (Nos. 51, 52), 178 (No. 56), 183 (No. 61), 190 (No. 72), 195 (No. 78), 200 (Nos. 84, 85), 206 (Nos. 94, 95), 207 (No. 96), 219 (No. 112), 221 (No. 114), 225 (No. 120), 228 (Nos. 124, 125), 234 (No. 136), 242 (No. 151).

St. Petersburg, 145 (No. 10), 149 (Nos. 16, 17), 152 (No. 20), 155 (No. 25), 157 (No. 26), 158 (No. 27), 159 (No. 28), 163 (No. 31), 165 (No. 34), 166 (No. 36), 167 (No. 38), 174 (No. 50), 177 (No. 54), 178 (No. 56), 183 (No. 61), 184 (No. 62), 186 (No. 64), 192 (No. 75), 195 (No. 78), 199 (No. 82), 200 (No. 85), 201 (No. 86), 203 (No. 91), 206 (Nos. 94, 95), 210 (Nos. 100, 101), 211 (No. 102), 212 (No. 103), 219 (No. 112), 220 (No. 113), 221 (No. 114), 222 (No. 117), 223 (No. 118), 225 (No. 120), 228 (No. 125), 234 (Nos. 134, 136), 242 (No. 151).

Stockholm, 157 (No. 26), 158 (No. 27), 159 (No. 28), 165 (No. 34), 166 (No. 36), 242 (No. 151).

Vienna, 144 (Nos. 7, 8), 146 (No. 12), 147 (No. 13), 150 (No. 18), 155 (No. 25), 157 (No. 26), 158 (No. 28), 165 (No. 34), 166 (No. 36), 168 (No. 39), 171 (No. 45), 173 (No. 48), 174 (No. 50), 177 (No. 55), 178 (No. 56), 183 (No. 61), 184 (No. 62), 192 (No. 75), 195 (No. 78), 196 (No. 79), 199 (No. 83), 200 (No. 85), 203 (No. 90), 205 (No. 93), 206 (Nos. 94, 95), 103 (No. 104), 219 (No. 112), 221 (No. 114), 222 (No. 115), 225 (No. 120), 228 (No. 125), 234 (No. 136), 242 (No. 151).

Congo. *See that Title.*

Declaration of Determination to support Russia, 286 (No. 55), 287 (No. 58).

**France—cont.**

- Germany, Relations with—
  - German Allegations of Violation of German Territory by French, and French Denial, 240 (Nos. 146, 147), 241 (Nos. 148, 149), 244.
  - German Ambassador preparing to leave Paris, 94 (No. 124), 95 (No. 126).
  - German Attitude if France remains Neutral in case of German-Russian War, 539 (No. 5).
  - War declared by Germany, 240 (No. 147), 241 (No. 149), 324 (No. 47).
- Government Notification to Representatives of the Powers at Paris, 252 (No. 157).
- London Embassy—Note communicated by (27 July), 47.
- Mediation proposals, Attitude and Efforts, 17-18 (No. 10), 51 (No. 59), 38 (No. 42), 45 (No. 51), 47 (No. 52), 189 (No. 70), 194 (No. 76), 196 (No. 79), 198 (No. 81), 204 (No. 92), 208 (No. 97), 280 (No. 39), 284 (No. 53), 286 (No. 55).
- Military Attaché at Berlin, Letter to Minister of War (15 March, 1913), 123 (No. 1).
- Military Preparations, 211 (No. 101), 522 (No. 45).
- Mobilization Ordered, 99 (No. 136), 293 (No. 74).
- Mobilization for Protection only, 231 (No. 127).
- Naval Attaché at Berlin—Letter to Minister of Marine (15 March, 1913), 126 (No. 2).
- Peace, Conclusion of, Declaration as to, 264.
- President's Autograph Letter to King George, 218 (No. 110), 542 (V.).  
The King's Reply, 544.
- President's Message to French Parliament (4 August, 1914), 253.
- President of the Council's Speech in the Chamber of Deputies (4 August, 1914), 255.
- Press—Misleading Note to, suggested by German Ambassador, 180 (No. 57), 184 (No. 62).
- Report to Minister for Foreign Affairs (on Public Opinion in Germany, according to the Reports of the Diplomatic and Consular Agents) (30 July, 1913), 136 (No. 5).
- Summary of Events, by Foreign Minister, 284 (No. 53).
- Telegram to French Representatives Abroad on Declaration of War, 241 (No. 149), 242 (No. 150).
- Territory Violated by Germany, 234 (No. 136), 236 (No. 139), 244.
- Troops kept 10 kilom. from German Frontier, although Germans actually on French Frontier, 98 (No. 134), 99 (No. 136), 102 (No. 140), 214 (No. 106).

**France—cont.**

Warnings from Reports of Ambassadors, etc., in 1913 as to German Aims and Ambitions, 122-143.

**Germany**

- Africa—Attacks on British Territory, 342 (Nos. 75, 76).
- Aims and Ambitions—Increases in Army and Navy. Official French Reports in 1913, 122-143.
- Ambassador preparing to leave Paris, 94 (No. 124), 95 (No. 126).
- Army Officers on Leave Recalled, 59 (No. 76), 182 (No. 60).
- Attitude if Russia mobilized on Austrian Frontier only, 187 (No. 67), 217 (No. 109).
- Attitude towards France if she remains Neutral in case of German-Russian War, 539 (No. 5).
- Austro-Russian Relations—Advice to Austria, 58 (No. 75). (*See also* Mediation Proposals).
- Austro-Servian Relations—
  - Localization of the Dispute—Statement, 1 (No. 2), 17 (No. 9), 160 (No. 28), 166 (No. 36), 272.
  - Mediation proposals. (*See that Title*).
  - Ultimatum of 23 July—
    - Denial of Prior Knowledge, 23 (No. 18), 25 (No. 25), 149 (Nos. 15, 17), 161 (No. 30), 162 (No. 30), 165 (No. 35), 166 (No. 36), 169 (No. 41), 180 (No. 57), 181 (No. 57), 196 (No. 78), 272 (No. 18), 273 (Nos. 19, 20).
    - Prior Knowledge of, 74 (No. 95).
    - Redrafting of certain articles proposed by Russia, 275 (No. 25), 280 (No. 138).
  - Servian Reply—
    - Non-publication of, in Press, 282 (No. 46).
    - Views on, 29 (Nos. 32, 34).
  - Support of Austrian Action, 48 (No. 54), 272 (No. 18), 273 (Nos. 19, 20).
  - Time Limit—Extension proposals, views on, 22 (No. 18).
- Views on, and Attitude, 16 (No. 8), 18 (No. 11), 144 (No. 9), 149 (No. 16), 151 (Nos. 18, 19), 153 (Nos. 20, 21), 158 (No. 27), 160 (No. 28), 161-2 (Nos. 29, 30), 167 (No. 37), 169 (No. 41), 170 (No. 43), 173 (No. 47), 175 (No. 50), 179 (Nos. 56, 57), 180 (No. 57), 183 (No. 61), 184-5 (No. 62), 199 (No. 83), 200 (No. 85), 202 (No. 87), 204 (No. 92), 206 (No. 94), 229 (No. 125), 269 (No. 8), 272 (No. 18), 273 (Nos. 19, 20), 276 (No. 28), 380 (No. 22), 382 (No. 24), 383 (No. 26), 393 (No. 51), 334 (No. 52), 398, 405.  
*See also* Mediation Proposals.



**Germany—cont.**

Belgian Minister leaves Berlin, 324 (No. 45).

**Belgium—**

Allegations against, of committing Hostile Acts, 93 (No. 122).

Belgian Reply, 344-7 (No. 79 and encl.).

Alleged Secret Military Arrangements made with Great Britain—Disproof of, 350-367.

**Neutrality of—**

Assurance given by Chancellor in 1911, 306 (No. 12).

Assurances given in 1913, 306 (encl.).

Belgian Request for Formal Declaration, 308 (No. 19).

Refusal to Reply to British Inquiry, 92 (No. 122), 93 (No. 123), 109 (No. 159), 227 (No. 123), 230 (No. 126), 292 (No. 72), 307 (No. 14).

Violation of, 109 (Nos. 158, 159), 237 (Nos. 140, 141), 242 (Nos. 151, 152), 316 (No. 30), 321 (No. 40).

Chancellor's Admission and Excuse—"Necessity knows no law," 317 (No. 35), 318 (No. 36).

Excuse for, 109 (No. 157).

Notification to Belgian Government, 314 (No. 27), 316 (No. 30), 321 (No. 40).

Proposal to, after Fall of Liège, 334 (No. 60), 335 (No. 62 and encl.), 337 (No. 64), 340 (No. 70).

Belgian Reply, 336 (No. 63), 337 (Nos. 64 and 65), 340 (No. 71), 341 (No. 73).

British Approval, 339 (No. 68).

French Approval, 339 (No. 69).

Russian Approval, 340 (No. 72).

Request to, for Free Passage of Troops—Belgian Refusal and British Protest, 107 (No. 153).

Ultimatum to, and Reply, 237 (No. 141), 309 (No. 20), 311 (No. 22).

War Declared by Germany, 243 (No. 154).

British Ambassador's Final Interviews and departure from Berlin, 110 (No. 160).

**Communications with Representatives at—**

Berne, 428 (No. 9).

Kovno, 427 (No. 8).

London, 108 (No. 157), 424 (No. 1), 428 (No. 10), 429 (Nos. 12, 13, 15).

Paris, 424 (No. 1), 428 (No. 10a), 430 (No. 17), 433 (No. 25), 434 (No. 27).

Rome, 430 (No. 19).

St. Petersburg, 424 (No. 1), 427 (Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7), 428 (Nos. 10b, 11), 429 (No. 14), 430 (No. 18), 433 (Nos. 24, 26).

Vienna, 426 (No. 3), 430 (No. 16).

(M 3649)

**Germany—cont.**

Congo. (*See that Title*).

Efforts to throw Responsibility on Russia, 185 (No. 62), 200 (No. 85), 230 (No. 127), 394 (No. 51).

**Emperor—**

British Military and Naval Titles, Renunciation of, 113.

Conversation with King of the Belgians in the presence of General von Moltke in 1913—Change in his attitude towards Peace, 142 (No. 6).

Czar's Telegrams from and to, 84 (No. 108), 89 (No. 118), 101 (No. 139), 411-413, 542 (No. IV.).

King George, Telegrams to and from, 539 (Nos. 3, 4), 540 (Nos. 6, 8).

Returns to Berlin (26 July), 29 (No. 33).

**France, relations with—**

French Territory Violated, 234 (No. 136), 236 (No. 139), 244.

German Allegations of Violation of German Territory by French, and French Denial, 240 (No. 146, 147), 241 (Nos. 148, 149), 244.

Inquiry to, as to Attitude in event of War between Germany and Russia, 527 (No. 54).

War Declared by Germany, 240 (No. 147), 241 (No. 149), 324 (No. 4).

French Ambassador and Staff, Treatment of, after Declaration of War, 243 (No. 155).

French Colonies—Refusal to give Undertaking as to, 64 (No. 85).

French Military Attaché's Letter to French Minister of War (15 March, 1913), 123 (No. 1).

French Naval Attaché's Letter to French Minister of Marine (15 March, 1913), 126 (No. 2).

**Great Britain—**

Military and Naval Preparations, Inquiry as to, and British Reply, 290 (No. 65).

**Neutrality—**

Efforts to obtain Assurance of, 64 (No. 85), 229 (No. 126), 230 (No. 127), 239 (No. 144).

British Reply, 77 (No. 101), 85 (No. 109).

Views on, 205 (No. 92).

Ships, Detention of, by Germany, 96 (No. 130), 103 (No. 143), 104 (No. 145), 106 (Nos. 149, 150), 108 (No. 156).

Ultimatum from, 243 (No. 153), 318 (No. 36), 321 (No. 39), 529 (No. 58).

War declared by Great Britain, 322 (No. 41).

Imperial Chancellor's Speech before Reichstag, on 4 August, 436.

2 D

**Germany—cont.**

Interests in Belgium entrusted to United States Minister, 316 (No. 32), 339 (No. 67).

Japanese Ultimatum, 532 (No. 68).

German decision not to Reply, 534 (No. 68).

“Kriegsgefahrzustand” (State of Danger of War) declared, 86 (No. 112), 99 (No. 136), 222 (Nos. 116, 117).

Luxemburg—Neutrality Violated, 96 (No. 129), 104 (Nos. 146, 147), 105 (No. 148), 218, 233 (Nos. 131, 132), 234 (No. 133), 237 (No. 140), 308 (No. 18).

Chancellor's Admission and Excuse—“Necessity knows no law,” 317 (No. 35).

Mediation proposals, Attitude towards, 1 (No. 1), 23 (No. 18), 38 (No. 43), 40 (No. 46), 49 (No. 55), 52 (No. 60), 56 (No. 71), 62 (No. 80), 63, (No. 84), 69 (No. 92), 73 (No. 94), 83 (No. 106), 84 (Nos. 107, 108), 184 (No. 61), 187 (No. 67), 190 (No. 73), 191 (No. 74), 195 (No. 77), 196 (No. 78), 197 (No. 81), 204 (No. 92), 216 (Nos. 107, 108, 109), 221 (No. 114), 276 (No. 28), 278 (Nos. 34, 35), 283 (No. 51), 284 (No. 53), 285 (No. 54), 286 (No. 55), 288 (No. 61), 289 (No. 63), 303 (No. 6), 408, 409, 429-30 (Nos. 12-16), 410, 515, 538-9, 540 (Nos. 6, 7, 8).

Military and Naval Preparations against Russia, 75 (No. 97).

Military Preparations, Commencement of, 82, 83, 86 (No. 112), 87 (No. 113), 202-203 (Nos. 88, 89).

Minister leaves Servia, 393 (No. 50).

**Mobilization—**

Action to be taken in event of Russia Mobilizing, 39 (No. 43).

General Mobilization of Navy and Army, 103 (No. 142), 232 (No. 130), 289 (Nos. 61, 62).

Official Denial, 213 (No. 105).

Ordered, 100 (No. 138).

Preliminary Steps, 86 (No. 112), 99 (No. 136), 214 (No. 105), 215 (No. 106), 222 (Nos. 116, 117), 291 (No. 68).

Secret Preparations, 223 (No. 118), 231, 293 (No. 73).

Naval Preparations, 182 (No. 58), 211 (No. 102).

Notification to Belgium of Breaches of International Law by France, 311 (No. 21).

Object of, in seeking to gain time, 212 (No. 103).

Prince Henry—Telegrams from and to King George, 538 (Nos. 1, 2).

Reservists ordered to hold themselves in readiness, 182 (No. 59).

**Germany—cont.**

Responsibility for the War, 297 (No. 78).

Russia, relations with, 161 (No. 32).

Ultimatum to Russia requiring Demobilization, 88 (No. 117), 92 (No. 121), 94 (No. 124), 95 (No. 126), 100 (No. 138), 102 (No. 141), 210 (Nos. 100, 101), 212 (No. 103), 222 (No. 115), 223 (No. 117), 225 (No. 120), 226 (No. 121), 287 (No. 58), 292 (No. 70), 522 (No. 46), 527 (No. 54).

War Declared by Germany, 234 (Nos. 134, 135), 294 (No. 76), 529.

Secret Report concerning the Strengthening of the German Army, Aims and Obligations of the National Policy, and of their Special Organisations for Army Purposes, 130.

Summary of Events issued by German Foreign office, 405.

Support of Attitude taken by Austria-Hungary, 48 (No. 54), 272 (No. 18), 273 (Nos. 19, 20).

Troops on French Frontier, although French Troops kept 10 Kilom. from German, 98 (No. 134), 214 (No. 106).

War desired from the First, 103 (No. 141), 226 (No. 120), 227 (No. 121).

War not Desired by, 22 (No. 17), 23 (No. 18).

**Great Britain—**

Ambassador to Austria-Hungary—Summary of Events from 22nd July, 114 (No. 161).

Ambassador to Germany—Final Interviews and Departure from Berlin, 110 (No. 160).

Assurance to France that Fleet will Protect French Coasts and Shipping against German Fleet 105 (No. 148).

Attitude if France and Russia Reject Reasonable Proposal, 86 (No. 111).

Attitude in case of Violation of Belgium, 541 (No. 2).

Attitude in case of War between Germany, Russia and France, 541 (Nos. 1, 2), 542 (No. 3).

Attitude in the Event of an Attack on France, or a General War, 65 (No. 87), 67 (No. 89), 77 (No. 101), 78 (No. 102), 79 (No. 105), 88 (No. 116), 90 (No. 119), 93 (No. 123), 105 (No. 148), 185 (No. 63), 216 (No. 108), 217-218 (No. 110), 229 (No. 126), 231 (No. 127), 260, 273 (No. 20), 282 (No. 42), 516 (No. 38).

Correspondence between Sir. E. Grey and M. Paul Cambon (Nov., 1912), 80, 81.

Russian Expectations, 272.

**Great Britain—cont.**

- Austria-Hungary, relations with, 529 (No. 53), 530 (No. 60).
- War Declared by Great Britain, 119, 532 (No. 65).
- Austro-Russian Relations—
  - Attitude, 65 (No. 87). (*See also* Mediation Proposals.)
- Austro-Servian Relations—
  - Attitude and Efforts, 65 (No. 87), 151 (No. 19), 152 (No. 19), 154 (No. 2), 163 (No. 32), 164 (No. 33), 165 (No. 34), 166-7 (No. 36), 167 (Nos. 36, 37), 169 (Nos. 40-41), 175 (No. 50), 184 (No. 61), 187 (No. 66), 188 (No. 68), 209 (No. 98), 273 (No. 20), 517 (No. 46), 518 (No. 41). *See also* Mediation Proposals.
- Ultimatum of 23 July—
  - Attitude, 13 (No. 5), 17 (No. 10), 18 (No. 11), 19 (No. 12), 22 (No. 17), 24 (No. 22), 455 (No. 10).
- Servian Reply, Views on, 19 (No. 12), 24 (No. 22), 40 (No. 46), 42-43 (No. 48), 281 (No. 42).
- Time-limit—
  - Extension, Proposals for and Attitude, 18 (No. 11).
- Belgian King's Appeal to King George, 107 (No. 153), 313 (No. 25).
- Belgian Reply to German Proposal after Fall of Liège, Approval of, 339 (No. 68).
- Belgium—
  - Appeal from, 242 (No. 152).
  - Neutrality of—
    - Action in case of Violation, 105 (No. 148), 108 (No. 155), 235 (No. 137), 239 (No. 144), 314 (Nos. 26, 28), 319 (No. 37), 321 (No. 39), 322 (No. 43), 541 (No. 2).
  - Agreement for Joint Action in Defence of Belgium, 324 (No. 48), 325 (No. 49).
  - Inquiry to Belgium, 87 (No. 115), 304 (No. 11).
  - Belgian Reply, 95 (No. 128).
  - Inquiry to France and Germany, 87 (Nos. 114, 115), 109 (No. 159), 217 (No. 110).
  - French Reply, 224, 227 (No. 122).
  - German Refusal to Reply, 227 (No. 123), 230 (No. 126).
  - Protest against German Demand to Belgium to allow Free Passage of Troops, 107 (No. 153).
  - Relations previously to the outbreak of War, 350-367.
- Communications with Representatives at—
  - Belgrade, 16 (No. 8), 19 (No. 12), 24 (Nos. 21, 22, 23), 27 (No. 40), 54 (Nos. 65, 66), 82 (No. 83).

**Great Britain—cont.**

- Communications with Representatives at—*cont.*
  - Berlin, 1 (Nos. 1, 2), 18 (No. 11), 22 (No. 18), 25 (No. 25), 27 (No. 27), 29 (Nos. 33, 34), 30 (No. 36), 38 (No. 43), 40 (No. 46), 52 (No. 60), 54 (No. 67), 55 (No. 68), 56 (No. 71), 58 (No. 75), 59 (No. 76), 60 (No. 77), 82 (No. 84), 64 (No. 85), 66 (No. 88), 67 (No. 89), 68 (No. 90), 75 (No. 98), 77 (No. 101), 78 (No. 102), 84 (Nos. 107, 108), 85 (No. 109), 86 (Nos. 111, 112), 87 (No. 114), 92 (Nos. 121, 122), 93 (No. 123), 96 (No. 130), 97 (Nos. 131, 132, and 133), 100 (No. 138), 103 (Nos. 142-143-144), 104 (No. 145), 106 (Nos. 149, 150), 107 (No. 153), 108 (No. 156), 109 (No. 159).
  - Brussels, 87 (No. 115), 95 (No. 128), 104 (No. 146), 106 (No. 151), 108 (Nos. 154-155), 109 (No. 158).
  - Constantinople, 63 (No. 82).
  - Luxemburg, 96 (No. 129), 104 (No. 147).
  - Paris, 17 (No. 10), 20 (No. 14), 21 (No. 15), 21 (No. 16), 27 (No. 27), 30 (Nos. 36, 37), 38 (No. 42), 45 (No. 51), 51 (Nos. 58, 59), 65 (No. 87), 76 (No. 99), 79 (Nos. 104, 105), 82 (No. 105), 87 (No. 114), 88 (Nos. 116, 117), 90 (No. 119), 94 (Nos. 124, 125, 126), 98 (No. 134), 99 (No. 136), 102 (No. 140), 105 (No. 148), 106 (No. 152).
  - Rome, 23 (No. 19), 27 (No. 29), 29 (No. 35), 30 (Nos. 36, 38), 43 (No. 49), 50 (No. 57), 53 (Nos. 63, 64), 62 (Nos. 80, 81), 65 (No. 86), 69 (No. 92), 77 (No. 100), 83 (No. 106).
  - St. Petersburg, 14 (No. 6), 20 (No. 14), 21 (No. 17), 25 (No. 24), 27 (No. 27), 39 (No. 44), 40 (No. 45), 41 (No. 47), 49 (No. 55), 55 (No. 69), 57 (No. 72), 60 (No. 78), 75 (No. 97), 78 (No. 103), 85 (No. 110), 87 (No. 113), 91 (No. 120), 98 (No. 135), 101 (No. 139).
  - Vienna, 2 (No. 3), 13 (No. 5), 15 (No. 7), 23 (No. 20), 26 (No. 26), 28 (Nos. 31, 32), 37 (No. 40), 38 (No. 41), 41 (No. 48), 43 (No. 50), 50 (No. 56), 52 (No. 62), 57 (No. 73), 58 (No. 74), 61 (No. 79), 69 (No. 91), 73 (No. 94), 74 (Nos. 95, 96), 89 (No. 118), 95 (No. 127), 99 (No. 137), 102 (No. 141), 114 (No. 161).

Congo. *See that Title.*

**Great Britain—cont.**

Declaration of intention to support France, as a preventive of War, proposed, 76-77 (No. 99).

**Fleet—**

Non-dispersal of, after Review, 41 (No. 47), 43 (No. 48), 187 (No. 66).

Protection to French Coast and Shipping, 230 (No. 126), 235 (No. 137), 236 (No. 138), 238 (No. 143), 262.

German allegations, founded on Documents said to have been found in Brussels, of Secret Military Arrangements between Great Britain and Belgium, Disproof of, 350-367.

**Germany—**

Ultimatum to, 109 (No. 159), 243 (No. 153), 318 (No. 36), 321 (No. 39), 529 (No. 58).

Delivery of, and Replies of German Foreign Secretary and Chancellor, 110 (No. 160).

War declared, 112, 322 (No. 41).

**King George—**

Letters from French President, 218 (No. 110), 542 (V.).

The King's Reply, 544.

Personal Message to the Czar, 536.

The Czar's Reply, 537.

Telegrams from and to German Emperor, 539 (Nos. 3, 4), 540 (Nos. 6, 8).

Telegrams to and from Prince Henry of Prussia, 538 (Nos. 1, 2).

Luxemburg, Neutrality of—British Attitude, 235.

Mediation Proposals, Attitude and Efforts, 17-18 (No. 10), 18 (No. 11), 30 (Nos. 36, 37), 39-40 (No. 44), 52 (No. 62), 54 (No. 67), 55 (Nos. 68, 69), 60 (No. 77), 65 (No. 87), 66 (No. 88), 68 (No. 90), 86 (No. 111), 184 (No. 61), 188 (No. 68), 209 (No. 98), 274 (No. 22), 277 (No. 31), 292 (No. 71), 516 (No. 38), 520 (No. 43), 536, 538-9, 540 (Nos. 6, 8).

Military and Naval Preparations—German Inquiry and British Reply 290 (No. 65).

Navy—*See Sub-heading Fleet, above.*

Neutrality of, 14-15 (No. 6), 22 (No. 17), 25 (No. 24), 41 (No. 47).

German Efforts to obtain Assurance of, 64 (No. 85), 229 (No. 126), 230 (No. 127), 239 (No. 144).

British Reply, 77 (No. 101), 85 (No. 109).

German Views, 205 (No. 92).

Parliament—Support of Government Policy, 240 (No. 145).

Peace, Conclusion of, Declaration as to, 264.

Servian Appeal to, 188 (No. 69), 389 (No. 35).

**Great Britain—cont.**

Servian Prime Minister's thanks for Speech in House of Commons on 27 July, 63 (No. 83).

Ships, Detention of, by Germany, 96 (No. 136), 103 (No. 143), 104 (No. 145), 106 (Nos. 149, 150), 108 (No. 156).

**Holland.** *See Netherlands.*

**Italy**

Austro-Servian Relations—

Mediation Proposals, Views on. *See Title Mediation Proposals.*

Ultimatum of 23 July

Time limit—

Extension, proposals for, and attitude, 37 (No. 40).

Views on and Efforts, 27 (No. 29), 53 (No. 64), 150 (No. 17), 158 (No. 27), 174 (No. 50), 176 (Nos. 51, 52), 383 (No. 28).

*See also Mediation Proposals.*

Declaration of Neutrality, 106 (No. 152), 228 (No. 124).

Foreign Minister's Speech in Chamber on 5 December, 1914, 401 (No. 2).

Mediation proposals, Views on, 29 (No. 35), 43 (No. 49), 50 (No. 57), 83 (No. 106), 189 (No. 71), 190 (No. 72), 200 (No. 84).

Position of, with regard to the Austrian Note to Servia, 165 (No. 35), 174 (No. 50), 176 (Nos. 51, 52), 179 (No. 56), 190 (No. 72).

**Japan**

Austria-Hungary—Relations broken off, 534 (No. 69).

Declaration of Neutrality as regards Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia, while having no interest in Servia, 515 (No. 36).

Ultimatum to Germany, 532 (No. 66). German decision not to reply, 534 (No. 68).

**Luxemburg**

Belgian Minister—Circumstances of Departure, 337-8 (No. 66).

French Minister—Circumstances of Enforced Departure, 249-252.

Minister of State—Telegrams to Sir E. Grey (2 August), 96, 104.

**Neutrality of—**

British Attitude, 235 (No. 137).

Inquiry to France and Germany, 218 (No. 111), 232 (No. 128).

French Reply, 232 (No. 129).

German Reply, 231.

Violation by Germany, 96 (No. 129), 104 (Nos. 146, 147), 105 (No. 148), 218 (No. 111), 233 (Nos. 131, 132), 234 (No. 133), 237 (No. 140), 308 (No. 18).

German Chancellor's Admission and Excuse—"Necessity knows no law," 317 (No. 35).

**Mediation Proposals**, 23 (No. 18), 25 (Nos. 24, 25).

Austria-Hungary, Attitude of, 52 (Nos. 61, 62), 62 (No. 81), 70 (No. 93), 72 (No. 3), 73 (No. 94), 97 (No. 131), 98 (Nos. 133, 135), 199 (No. 83), 225 (No. 120), 226 (No. 121), 293 (No. 73), 516 (No. 38), 521 (No. 44), 522 (No. 47), 524 (No. 49), 526 (No. 51), 528 (No. 56).

France, Attitude and Efforts of, 17-18 (No. 10), 51 (No. 59), 38 (No. 42), 45 (No. 51), 47 (No. 52), 189 (No. 70), 194 (No. 76), 196 (No. 79), 198 (No. 81), 204 (No. 92), 208 (No. 97), 280 (No. 39), 284 (No. 53), 286 (No. 55).

German Attitude, 1 (No. 1), 23 (No. 18), 38 (No. 43), 40 (No. 46), 49 (No. 55), 52 (No. 60), 56 (No. 71), 62 (No. 80), 63 (No. 84), 69 (No. 92), 73 (No. 94), 83 (No. 106), 84 (Nos. 107, 108), 184 (No. 61), 187 (No. 67), 190 (No. 73), 191 (No. 74), 195 (No. 77), 196 (No. 78), 197 (No. 81), 204 (No. 92), 216 (Nos. 107, 108, 109), 221 (No. 114), 276 (No. 28), 278 (Nos. 34, 35), 283 (No. 51), 284 (No. 53), 285 (No. 54), 286 (No. 55), 288 (No. 60), 289 (No. 63), 303 (No. 6), 408, 409, 410, 429-30 (Nos. 12-16), 515, 538-9, 540 (Nos. 6, 7, 8).

Great Britain, Attitude and Efforts of, 17-18 (No. 10), 18 (No. 11), 30 (Nos. 36, 37), 39-40 (No. 44), 52 (No. 62), 54 (No. 67), 55 (Nos. 68, 69), 60 (No. 77), 65 (No. 87), 66 (No. 88), 68 (No. 90), 86 (No. 111), 184 (No. 61), 188 (No. 68), 209 (No. 98), 274 (No. 22), 277 (No. 31), 292 (No. 71), 516 (No. 38), 520 (No. 43), 536, 538-9, 540 (Nos. 6, 8).

Italian Views, 29 (No. 35), 43 (No. 49), 50 (No. 57), 83 (No. 106), 189 (No. 71), 190 (No. 72), 200 (No. 84).

Occupation of Belgrade or other point a condition of accepting Mediation, 75 (No. 98), 78 (No. 103), 219-220 (No. 112).

Russian Attitude and Efforts, 47 (No. 53), 49 (No. 55), 50 (No. 56), 56 (No. 70), 58 (No. 74), 60 (No. 77), 71 (2), 91 (No. 120), 97 (Nos. 131, 132), 98 (No. 133), 201 (No. 86), 211 (No. 102), 212 (No. 103), 213 (No. 104), 219-220 (Nos. 112, 113), 230 (No. 127), 283 (No. 48), 288 (No. 60), 290 (No. 67), 517 (No. 40), 522 (No. 47), 537, 542 (IV.).

Servian Attitude, 150 (No. 18), 152 (No. 19), 153 (No. 20), 158 (No. 27).

Urgency of Action, 283 (No. 48).

**Netherlands**

British Offer of Support if pressed by Germany, 319 (No. 37), 321 (No. 39).

Declaration of Neutrality, 326.

Integrity of—German Attitude, 64 (No. 85), 109 (No. 157).

War Buoying in the Scheldt, 315 (No. 29), 325 (No. 50), 332 (Nos. 54, 55, 56).

**Norway**

British Offer of Support if pressed by Germany, 319 (No. 37), 321 (No. 39).

**Peace, Efforts for.** *See* Mediation Proposals.

**Russia**

Austria-Hungary, Relations with—

Direct Conversations, proposals for, 40 (No. 45), 85 (No. 110), 86 (No. 111), 177 (No. 55), 197 (No. 80), 198 (No. 81), 199 (No. 82), 204 (No. 92), 213 (No. 104).

Refusal by Austria-Hungary, 58 (No. 74), 203 (No. 91), 205 (No. 93).

Engagement to stop Military preparations in Austria takes certain course, 75 (No. 97), 76 (No. 99).

German Advice to Austria, 58 (No. 75).

Mediation Proposals. *See that Title.*  
War Declared by Austria, 293 (No. 79), 529 (No. 59).

**Austro-Servian Relations—**

Austrian Statement that her Declaration of Readiness to respect Servian Integrity and Sovereign Rights had been received by Russia in Silence—Contradiction, 293 (No. 75).

**Ultimatum of 23 July—**

Redrafting of certain Articles proposed by Russia, 275 (No. 25).

German Attitude, 280 (No. 38).  
Servian Reply, Views on, 278 (No. 33).

Time Limit—Extension, proposals for, Views on, 19 (No. 13), 26 (No. 26), 37 (No. 40).

Views on and Attitude, 14 (No. 6), 15 (No. 7), 21-22 (No. 17), 28 (No. 28), 29 (No. 33), 39 (No. 44), 49 (No. 55), 59 (No. 118), 145 (No. 10), 151 (No. 18), 153 (No. 20), 154 (No. 22), 163 (Nos. 31, 32), 164 (No. 33), 167-8 (Nos. 38, 39, 40), 170 (Nos. 42, 43), 171 (Nos. 44, 45), 174 (No. 50), 176 (No. 52, 53), 177 (Nos. 54, 55), 186 (No. 64), 269 (No. 10), 274 (No. 23), 280 (No. 40), 281 (No. 42), 459 (No. 16), 503 (No. 28), 505 (No. 31), 522 (No. 47), 524 (No. 49), 523 (Nos. 55, 56).

*See also* Mediation Proposals.

**Russia—cont.****Belgium—**

Appeal from, 242 (No. 152).

**Neutrality of—**

Agreement for Joint Action, 325 (No. 52).

Reply to German Proposal after Fall of Liège, Approval of, 340 (No. 72).

**Communications with Representatives at—**

Belgrade, 266 (Nos. 102), 267 (No. 4), 269 (No. 9), 270 (No. 13), 273 (No. 21).

Berlin, 55 (No. 70), 267 (No. 5), 268 (No. 7), 270 (No. 14), 275 (No. 26), 277 (No. 30), 278 (No. 33), 279 (No. 38), 280 (No. 39), 282 (No. 46), 283 (Nos. 49, 51), 288 (No. 60), 289 (Nos. 61, 62, 63), 290 (No. 67), 291 (No. 68).

Fiume, 282 (No. 44).

London, 47 (No. 53), 48 (No. 54), 56 (No. 70), 71 (No. 93), 72 (No. 93), 267 (Nos. 4, 5), 271 (No. 16), 272 (No. 17), 273 (No. 20), 274 (No. 22), 277 (Nos. 31, 32), 278 (No. 33), 281 (No. 42), 282 (No. 43), 283 (Nos. 48, 50), 285 (No. 54), 288 (No. 60), 289 (No. 64), 290 (Nos. 65, 67), 291 (No. 69), 292 (Nos. 71, 72).

Nish, 287 (Nos. 57, 59).

Paris, 267 (Nos. 4, 5), 269 (No. 8), 271 (No. 15), 273 (No. 19), 276 (Nos. 27, 28), 277 (Nos. 29, 32), 278 (Nos. 33, 34, 35), 279 (Nos. 36, 37), 283 (No. 50), 284 (No. 53), 286 (No. 55), 287 (No. 58), 288 (No. 60), 290 (No. 67), 293 (Nos. 73, 74, 75).

Prague, 274 (No. 24).

Rome, 267 (Nos. 4, 5), 274 (No. 23), 278 (No. 33), 288 (No. 60), 290 (No. 67).

Vienna, 70 (No. 93), 267 (No. 4), 270 (Nos. 11, 12), 275 (No. 25), 278 (No. 33), 281 (No. 41), 282 (No. 45), 283 (No. 47), 288 (No. 60), 290 (Nos. 66, 67).

**Czar—**

Personal Message from King George, 536.

\*The Czar's Reply, 537.

Prince Alexander of Servia's Appeal to, 267 (No. 6).

The Czar's Reply, 209 (No. 99), 280 (No. 40), 286 (No. 56), 287 (No. 57).

Telegrams to and from German Emperor, 84 (No. 108), 89 (No. 118), 101 (No. 139), 411-413, 542 (V.).

French Declaration of Determination to Support, 286 (No. 55), 287 (No. 58).

**Russia—cont.**

German Efforts to put Responsibility for War on, 185 (No. 62), 200 (No. 85), 230 (No. 127), 394 (No. 51).

Germany, Relations with, 161 (No. 32).

German Ultimatum requiring Demobilization, 88 (No. 117), 92 (No. 121), 94 (No. 124), 95 (No. 126), 100 (No. 138), 102 (No. 141), 287 (No. 58), 292 (No. 70), 522 (No. 46), 527 (No. 54).

Germany Declares War, 234 (Nos. 134, 135), 294 (No. 76), 529 (No. 57).

Germany's Reasons for War with Russia—Issued by German Foreign Office, 405.

Great Britain, Attitude of—Expectations as to, 272.

Mediation proposals, Attitude and Efforts, 47 (No. 53), 49 (No. 55), 50 (No. 56), 56 (No. 70), 53 (No. 74), 60 (No. 77), 71 (2), 91 (No. 120), 97 (Nos. 131, 132), 98 (No. 133), 201 (No. 86), 211 (No. 102), 212 (No. 103), 213 (No. 104), 219-220 (Nos. 112, 113), 230 (No. 127), 233 (No. 48), 288 (No. 60), 290 (No. 67), 517 (No. 40), 522 (No. 47), 537-542 (IV.).

Mobilization, 55 (No. 70), 56 (No. 71), 59 (No. 76), 60 (No. 78), 84 (No. 108), 86 (No. 112), 87 (No. 113), 206 (No. 95), 207 (No. 96), 210 (Nos. 100, 101), 213 (No. 104), 223 (No. 118), 284 (No. 51), 291 (No. 68), 520 (No. 42), 524 (No. 48), 527 (No. 52).

Denials of, 503 (No. 28).

Offer to Stop Military Preparations if Austria takes certain course, 212 (No. 103).

Suspension of, 211 (No. 102).

Vienna Press refraining from Publishing Russian Explanation, 212 (No. 104).

Mobilization against Austria to be ordered immediately Austrian Troops Cross Servian Frontier, 57 (No. 72).

Mobilization not directed against Germany, 284 (No. 51).

Peace, Conclusion of, Declaration as to, 264.

Summary of Events by Foreign Minister, 295 (No. 77).

Troops Cross German Frontier—German Allegation, 103 (No. 144).

Unreadiness for War, 57 (No. 71).

**Salonica**

Austrian Designs as to, 63 (No. 82).

**Sandjak**

Austrian Intentions, 63 (No. 82), 225 (No. 120), 228 (No. 125).

**Scheldt**

War Buoying Measures, 315 (No. 29), 325 (No. 50), 332 (Nos. 54, 55, 56).

**"Scrap of Paper,"**

Speech by German Chancellor, 111.

**Serajevo Murders**

144 (Nos. 7, 8), 370 (Nos. 1, 2, 3).

Austrian Dossier sent to the Powers, 461 (No. 19).

Austrian Efforts to put Blame on Serbia, and Excite Public Opinion, 370 (Nos. 1, 2, 3), 371 (No. 4), 372 (Nos. 7, 8), 373 (No. 9), 374 (Nos. 11, 12), 376 (Nos. 14, 15, 16), 378 (No. 18, 19), 379 (Nos. 20, 21), 380 (No. 22), 382 (No. 24), 383 (No. 27), 394 (No. 29, 30), 394 (No. 52), 443-500, 502.

Austrian Official Reports of State of Serbian Feeling, 448-9 (Nos. 1, 2, 3), 450 (No. 5), 451-2 (No. 6).

Conclusions Established by the Criminal Inquiry, 5, 12.

Extracts from Records of the Court at Serajevo touching the Proceedings against Gavriló Princip and Confederate, 490-498.

False Reports from Austria, 370 (No. 3), 371 (No. 4), 372 (No. 7), 373 (No. 8).

Nish Local Committee of Narodna Odbrana, Attitude of, 497.

Servian Press Comments, 494.

**Servia**

Amsfeld Anniversary, Celebration of, 448 (No. 1), 449 (No. 3).

Appeal to Great Britain, 188 (No. 69), 389 (No. 35).

Appeal to the Powers, 269 (No. 9).

Austria-Hungary, Relations with—

Austrian Intentions, 63 (No. 82), 290 (No. 66).

Austrian Minister leaves Belgrade, 24 (No. 23), 28 (No. 31), 29 (No. 35), 173 (No. 48), 178 (No. 56), 274 (No. 21).

Austrian Official Reports as to Servian feelings towards Austria, 448-9 (Nos. 1, 2, 3), 450 (No. 5), 451 (No. 6).

Austrian Press, Warlike Attitude of 146 (No. 12), 148 (No. 14).

Austrian Statement that her Declaration of Readiness to Respect Servian Integrity and Sovereign Rights had been Received by Russia in Silence—Contradiction, 293 (No. 75).

Austrian Views and Attitude, 145 (No. 11), 146 (No. 12), 147 (No. 14), 152 (No. 20), 161 (No. 29), 171 (No. 45), 178 (No. 56), 183 (No. 61).

*See also Title, Mediation Proposals.*

Berlin Press, Attitude of, 268 (No. 7).

British Attitude and Efforts, 65 (No. 87), 151 (No. 19), 152 (No. 19), 154 (No. 22), 163 (No. 32), 164 (No. 33), 165 (No. 34), 166-7 (No. 36), 167 (Nos. 36, 37), 169 (Nos. 40-41), 175 (No. 50), 184 (No. 61), 187

**Servia—cont.**

Austria-Hungary, Relations with—*cont.*

British Attitude and Efforts—*cont.*

(No. 66), 188 (No. 68), 209 (No. 98), 273 (No. 20), 517 (No. 40), 518 (No. 41).

*See also Title, Mediation Proposals.*

Events from Date of Serajevo Murders to Presentation of Austrian Note to Servia of 23 July—French Reports, 144-153.

French Views and Efforts, 150 (No. 17), 154 (No. 22), 157 (No. 26), 160 (No. 28), 161-2 (No. 30), 164 (No. 33), 165 (No. 34), 180 (No. 57), 204 (No. 92).

*See also Title, Mediation Proposals.*

German Views and Attitude, 144 (No. 9), 149 (No. 16), 151 (Nos. 18, 19), 153 (Nos. 20, 21), 158 (No. 27), 160 (No. 28), 161-2 (Nos. 29, 30), 167 (No. 37), 169 (No. 41), 170 (No. 43), 173 (No. 47), 175 (No. 50), 179 (Nos. 56, 57), 180 (No. 57), 183 (No. 61), 184-5 (No. 62), 199 (No. 83), 200 (No. 85), 202 (No. 87), 204 (No. 92), 206 (No. 94), 229 (No. 125), 269 (No. 8), 272 (No. 18), 273 (Nos. 19, 20), 276 (No. 28), 380 (No. 22), 382 (No. 24), 383 (No. 26), 393 (No. 51), 394 (No. 52), 398 (No. 405).

*See also Title, Mediation Proposals.*

Italian Views and Efforts, 150 (No. 17), 158 (No. 27), 174 (No. 50), 176 (No. 51, 52), 383 (No. 28).

Localization of the Dispute—German Statement, 1 (No. 2), 17 (No. 9), 160 (No. 28), 166 (No. 36), 272.

Mediation Proposals. *See that Title.*

Military Action Intended by Austria, 23 (No. 18), 37 (No. 40), 38 (No. 41).

Military Operations not to be Undertaken Immediately, 25 (No. 25), 26 (No. 26).

Non-interference by other Powers—(*See Sub-head, Localization of the Dispute, above.*)

"Narodna Odbrana," Extract from (1911), 473.

Narodna Odbrana Society—

Appeal of, in Servian Official Gazette, 483.

Nish Local Committee—Attitude on Serajevo Murders, 497.

Organization and Work of, 479-80, 489.

Work of—Deposition by Trifko Krstanovic, 483.

Occupation of Belgrade or other Towns as a Basis for Negotiations, 75 (No. 93), 78 (No. 103), 219-220 (No. 112).

*Servia—cont.*Austria-Hungary, Relations with—*cont.*

Russian Views and Attitude, 28  
(No. 28), 23 (No. 33), 145  
(No. 10), 151 (No. 18), 153  
(No. 20), 154 (No. 22), 163  
(Nos. 31, 32), 164 (No. 33),  
167-8 (Nos. 38, 39, 40), 170  
(Nos. 42, 43), 171 (Nos. 44, 45),  
174 (No. 50), 176 (Nos. 52, 53),  
177 (Nos. 54, 55), 186 (No. 64),  
269 (No. 10), 274 (No. 23),  
280 (No. 40), 281 (No. 42), 459  
(No. 16), 503 (No. 28), 505  
(No. 31), 522 (No. 47), 524  
(No. 49), 528 (Nos. 55, 56).

See also *Tiile*, Mediation Pro-  
posals.

Servia's Willingness to entertain  
reasonable Austrian require-  
ments, 148 (No. 15).

Servian Appeal to the Powers, possi-  
bility of, 22 (No. 17).

Servian Attitude and Views, 150  
(No. 18), 152 (No. 19), 153  
(No. 20), 158 (No. 27), 371  
(No. 5), 372 (No. 8), 384 (No.  
30).

Servian Note of 1908, 4, 22 (No. 17),  
49 (No. 55).

Servian preparations before delivery  
of answer to Austrian Note,  
500, 504 (No. 29).

Servian Press, opinions of, prior to  
the Serajevo Murders, 472.

Servian Territory not to be seized,  
23 (No. 18), 68 (No. 90), 69  
(No. 91), 99-100 (No. 137), 407,  
427 (No. 5), 506 (No. 32).

Servian War Office—Pictures of a  
nature hostile to Dual  
Monarchy, 499.

Situation before Presentation of  
Ultimatum of 23 July, 1 (Nos.  
1, 2), 2 (No. 3), 4.

Sokol Society Dusan the Strong—  
Report on the activities of, in  
Kragujevac (1912-13), 480.

Special Points for Great Britain, 516  
(No. 39).

Turkish Views, 186 (No. 65).

Ultimatum of 23 July, 3 (No. 4),  
16 (No. 8), 155 (Nos. 23, 25),  
159 (No. 28), 164 (No. 48),  
266 (No. 1), 338 (Nos. 33, 34),  
389 (Nos. 35, 36).

Austrian Official Commentary,  
453-4 (No. 8).

Austrian Statement that Note is  
not an Ultimatum, but a  
Démarche with a Time-limit,  
20 (No. 14), 21 (No. 17), 166  
(No. 36).

Austro-Hungarian Views, 13 (No.  
5), 15 (No. 7).

British Views regarding Reply, 19  
(No. 12), 24 (No. 22).

*Servia—cont.*Austria-Hungary, Relations with—*cont.*

Ultimatum of 23 July—*cont.*

British Attitude, 13 (No. 5), 17  
(No. 10), 18 (No. 11), 19  
(No. 12), 22 (No. 17), 24  
(No. 22), 455 (No. 10).

French advice to Servia regarding  
Reply, 21 (No. 15).

French Attitude and Views, 14  
(No. 6), 17 (No. 10), 21 (Nos.  
15, 16), 456 (No. 11).

German Attitude, 16 (No. 8), 18  
(No. 11).

German Denial of Prior Know-  
ledge, 23 (No. 18), 25 (No.  
25), 149 (Nos. 15, 17), 161  
(No. 30), 162 (No. 30), 165  
(No. 35), 166 (No. 36), 169  
(No. 41), 180 (No. 57), 181  
(No. 57), 196 (No. 78), 272  
(No. 18), 273 (Nos. 19, 20).

German Prior Knowledge of, 74  
(No. 95).

German Support of Austrian  
Action, 272 (No. 18), 273  
(Nos. 19, 20).

Italian Views, 53 (No. 64).

Point 5—Austrian Explanation,  
503 (No. 27).

Redrafting of certain Articles  
proposed by Russia, 275 (No.  
25).

German Attitude, 280 (No. 38).  
Russian Attitude and Views, 14  
(No. 6), 15 (No. 7), 21, 22  
(No. 17), 29 (No. 41), 49  
(No. 55), 89 (No. 118), 275  
(No. 25), 457 (No. 14), 459  
(No. 15).

Servian Attitude, 16 (No. 8).

Servian Reply, 24 (No. 21), 27  
(No. 30), 31 (No. 39), 172  
(Nos. 46, 47), 173 (No. 48),  
389 (No. 38), 417.

Austrian Official Commentaries,  
417, 467.

Austrian Views, 193 (No. 72  
(2)), 197 (No. 80), 276 (No.  
27).

British Views, 40 (No. 46), 42-  
43 (No. 48), 281 (No. 42).

German Views, 29 (No. 32, 34),  
278 (No. 33).

Non-publication of, in German  
Press, 282 (No. 46).

Refusal of Austria to accept,  
41 (No. 48), 273 (No. 21),  
279 (No. 37).

Russian Views, 278 (No. 33).

Special Points to be brought before  
Great Britain, 454 (No. 9),  
460 (No. 17).

Time chosen for Presentation,  
significance of, 15 (No. 6),  
165 (No. 35).

Time Limit—  
Dangers of, 2 (No. 3).



**Servia—cont.**Austria-Hungary, Relations with—*cont.*Ultimatum of 23 July—*cont.*Time Limit—*cont.*

Proposals for Extension, 167

(No. 38), 168–9 (Nos. 39, 40

41), 170 (Nos. 42, 43), 171

(Nos. 44, 45), 173 (No. 48),

175 (No. 50), 270 (Nos. 11,

12, 14), 271 (Nos. 15, 16).

Austrian Refusal, 499 (Nos.  
20, 21).

British Attitude, 18 (No. 11).

German Views, 22 (No. 18).

Italian Attitude, 37 (No. 40).

Russian Views, 19 (No. 13),

26 (No. 26), 37 (No. 40).

Unconditional acceptance de-  
manded, 23 (Nos. 19, 20).

War Declared by Austria-Hungary,

44–45 (No. 50), 54 (No. 66),

57 (No. 73), 303 (No. 7), 392

(Nos. 45, 46, 47), 393 (No. 48),

515 (No. 37).

British Chargé d'Affaires Leaves  
Belgrade, 24 (No. 23).Government Leaves Belgrade, 24 (No.  
23), 274 (No. 21), 391 (No. 41).Integrity to be respected, but no  
assurance regarding Independence,  
51 (No. 59).**Servia—cont.**

Kragujevac—Work of Sokol Society

Dusan the Strong (1912–13), 480.

Mediation Proposals, Attitude towards,

151 (No. 18), 152 (No. 19), 153

(No. 20), 158 (No. 27).

Minister Leaves Berlin, 393 (No. 49).

Minister Leaves Vienna, 392 (No. 42).

Mobilization Ordered, 391 (No. 41), 500  
(No. 23).

Names, Mode of pronunciation, 442.

Prince Regent—

Appeal to the Czar, 209 (No. 99),

267 (No. 6).

The Czar's Reply, 280 (No. 40),

286 (No. 56), 287 (No. 57).

Speech from the Throne to the

Skupchina after Declaration of

War, 287 (No. 59).

Summary of Events by Minister at  
Vienna, 394 (No. 52).**Triple Entente.** *See also Names of the  
Powers.*Declaration signed by, as to Con-  
cluding Peace, 264.**Turkey**Austro-Servian Relations, Views on,  
186 (No. 65).**Vienna**

Demonstrations against Servia, 373

(No. 9), 374 (No. 11).

**War between Great Powers**

German Attitude 57 (No. 71).

LONDON:

PRINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE  
BY HARRISON AND SONS, 45-47, ST. MARTIN'S LANE, W.C.,  
PRINTERS IN ORDINARY TO HIS MAJESTY.

(M 3649) Wt. 43163—490 25M 4/15

